To my mind "the hard problem of consciousness" is only "hard" for (Cartesian) philosophers because their aporia is actually still only an underdetermined scientific problem. — 180 Proof
So it makes good sense for physics to decree optical redness and maryredness to be incommensurable by fiat. — sime
This quote from Chalmer's essay on the "hard problem of consciousness" touches on a key issue of our philosophical debates. He asks whether Information is both phenomenal and noumenal. And my general answer is Yes. But, the phenomenal aspects are "easy", because our physical senses can detect them. So, it's the noumenal aspects that we argue about. My position is that Information is both Physical and Mental. But discussing mental stuff is like nailing jello to the wall, it's inherently squishy and hard to pin down."An obvious question is whether all information has a phenomenal aspect. One possibility is that we need a further constraint on the fundamental theory, indicating just what sort of information has a phenomenal aspect. The other possibility is that there is no such constraint. If not, then
experience is much more widespread than we might have believed, as information is everywhere." ___Chalmers quote — Apustimelogist
I don't know that anyone believes an atom has awareness of it's environment, and I don't think Chalmers is implying it.Perhaps the most contentious feature of Consciousness is its experiential quality. He implies that "experience" --- as a form of generic information --- "is everywhere". And that sounds like Panpsychism, with the implication that even an atom has awareness of its environment. — Gnomon
In the Enformationism thesis, Consciousness is viewed as an emergent form of basic mathematical Information. If you don't understand, or agree with, that essential relationship, the Hard Problem will remain an apples & oranges conundrum.I'm still on this information-consciousness relation.
Our brain specific information has complete access to our consciousness and vice versa.
So if you don't understand this of course understanding consciousness is going to be hard.
How can you propose information is everywhere when it's just a projection of your mind. Of course it's going to be a hard problem because you have set up the problem wrong. — Mark Nyquist
Chalmers seems to think that "everything is conscious" in some sense of "thing" and "consciousness". But I doubt that he believes that atoms are little beings chatting amongst themselves about their feelings. It's that "some sense" that needs to be explained. In my own thesis, I use abstract "Information" instead of personal "Psyche", partly in order to avoid the absurdity of atomic awareness. :smile:I don't know that anyone believes an atom has awareness of it's environment, and I don't think Chalmers is implying it. — Patterner
Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.
For present purposes, the relevant sorts of mental states are conscious experiences. I will understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities are conscious: that is, that there is something it is like to be a quark or a photon or a member of some other fundamental physical type. This thesis is sometimes called panexperientialism, to distinguish it from other varieties of panpsychism (varieties on which the relevant entities are required to think or reason, for example), but I will simply call it panpsychism here. — Chalmers
... is not my statement. — 180 Proof
's that "some sense" that needs to be explained. In my own thesis, I use abstract "Information" instead of personal "Psyche", partly in order to avoid the absurdity of atomic awareness. :smile: — Gnomon
But what if the object of translation was not optical redness but brain states? It seems then that the context problem doesn't apply because Mary's perceptions are always present alongside her brainstates and correlate so much that many suspect that they are identical. — Apustimelogist
My only problem with Chalmer's philosophy of Panpsychism is in his word choice. He uses "consciousness" to label his fundamental element. But I prefer to give that prime role to a "primitive precursor to consciousness". I reserve "Consciousness" for the rare feature of the universe that only emerged from zillions of physical interactions (computations) after billions of Earth-year cycles. The big "C" is a recent innovation of evolution.In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:
Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness. — Patterner
Yes. There seems to be a hierarchy of consciousness among living beings, from single-cell organisms to cetaceans. But personally, I would prefer to restrict the term "Consciousness" to living organisms, for which the notion of awareness seems appropriate. The general direction of the universe appears to begin with non-being stuff that evolves toward that which we now call Beings instead of Things. :smile:I believe i have seen Chalmers reference (perhaps in that 2022 Yale talk?) IIT as a framework for how you could have different 'levels' of consciousness essentially mirroring the functionality of the 'being'. Vague, but a hint at a direction. — AmadeusD
Sorry, that was tongue-in-cheek. I didn't mean for it to be taken literally.I'm not sure that I = EMM is an equation. — Mark Nyquist
We seem to be in a similar situation: no understanding of physical processes, however complete, explains consciousness. — Art48
Nice. I rarily see people connecting consciousness with experience. (In the sense of human feeling, as you say.)Perhaps the most contentious feature of Consciousness is its experiential quality. — Gnomon
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