It is a question of semantics. It is useful to talk about existence in some circumstances and not in others.

I do not see any importance in speculating how we can point at something we cannot point at. — I like sushi

Useful for whom? The fact that you do not see any importance in what you think of as speculating about how we can point at something we cannot point at and that you frame the question that way says more about you than anything else. I don't see the question as being concerned with pointing at anything at all.

If you agree that we cannot know what we cannot know then that is pretty much all there is to what I have been trying to articulate.

If you disagree then I simply do not use language in the same manner you do.

I agree that it is tautologously true that we cannot know what we cannot know. My only point was that this says nothing about the existence of whatever it is we cannot know.

My only point was that this says nothing about the existence of whatever it is we cannot know. — Janus

That would be impossible.

You seem to be talking about the possible existence of something due to sensible evidence.

If I come to you with a piece of paper with evidence saying that what is written on the paper outlines some ‘object’ beyond of sensory appreciation, and this paper has nothing written only it, would you accept this as evidence of some object wholly beyond our ken. You would not I expect.

The proposition of ‘a-thing-in-itself’ needs greater context. Without context there is nothing to talk about. We may as well argue for the existence of God - therein lies the very same issue. The ‘definition/labelling of’ some object does not render it real.

If we are talking about ‘existence’ as something separate to ‘real’ then we need to demarcate.

I am more in favour of absconding from the whole mess tbh and much prefer the phenomenological approach (Bracketing Out).

If I come to you with a piece of paper with evidence saying that what is written on the paper outlines some ‘object’ beyond of sensory appreciation, and this paper has nothing written only it, would you accept this as evidence of some object wholly beyond our ken. — I like sushi

The piece of paper you are shown is evidence that the piece of paper exists.

As the piece of paper hasn't existed since the beginning of time, we know that something created it, even though we may not know what created it. The piece of paper is evidence that something existed at a prior time even though what that something was may be unknown to us.

IE, the piece of paper is evidence of something that existed at a prior time that may well be wholly beyond our ken.

The proposition of ‘a-thing-in-itself’ needs greater context. — I like sushi

It just is the context; it justifies the representational nature of human intelligence, under which every other context is subsumed.

The propositions are always a priori constructs; the proofs for them, on the other hand, are always empirical. — Mww

Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. 5+7 itself is not a proposition until you add "="
and come up with 12. 5+7=12 is a proposition.

Einflusse, den Kant auf die deutsche Philosophie ausgeübt hat, den Blick abzulenken und namentlich über den Werth, den er sich selbst zugestand, klüglich hinwegzuschlüpfen. Kant war vor Allem und zuerst stolz auf seine Kategorientafel, er sagte mit dieser Tafel in den Händen: "das ist das Schwerste, was jemals zum Behufe der Metaphysik unternommen werden konnte". - — Vaskane

Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant?

Intuitions (Kantian). — I like sushi

As you have suggested, intuition implies connection to knowledge, and indeed it is faculty for knowledge. Not imagination. Imagination is a faculty of its own. The nature of imagination is its freedom from the other mental faculties.

Note: I suppose we may have some other faculty yet to be unearthed. — I like sushi

What does Kant say about it?

5+7=12 is a proposition. — Corvus

Yep, a mathematical proposition, to distinguish the principles of its origin.

Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. — Corvus

Which is why the distinction in principles. Mathematical propositions cannot be bivalent, because they cannot be false, because they are grounded by the principles of necessity and universality.

We’ve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest?

You say reading in English got comfortable for you. I am not really sure how the philosophical scene is in East Asia or in languages like Japanese or Korean. Thinking that your native language is Korean, don't you think you would benefit from reading in it, even with less material published in it? And for that I will quote Nietzsche like Vaskane did: — Lionino

I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.

Likewise, how could the English language, alien, communicate to you in the same way that Korean, transporting concepts to you since a child, does? — Lionino

I have been using English since middle school times in the American High school in Indonesia, and have been reading in English for many years, and worked with English native speaking people, so it became like my main language now. It is not still perfect, but I would say it is par with my Korean.

Otherwise, I, like everyone else, also read philosophy articles written in English, as many important scholars of philosophy today write in English on peer-reviewed journals. But when it comes to classics, I believe that Korean has translated more in philosophy (Kant, Plato, Leibniz) than you could ever consume. — Lionino

Yes, almost every book in English has translated copy in Korean, and Philosophical academic interest in Korea is very high. There are people who are interested in the Western Philosophy, also Eastern Philosophies and Religious studies such as Buddhism. There are many seminars and study groups in the country with ardent passion and enthusiasm. There are internationally well known scholars such as the late JG Kim (USA), and a few working and teaching in Europe (UK and Germany). Here is the Korean Prof. H. Chang (Cambridge University UK ) presenting his paper on Realism.


There are many Youtube channels run by Koreans with Philosophical topics, which I watch sometimes.

This is a youtube channel run by a New Zealander working in Korea. He seems specialising in the continental philosophy. He has many Korean followers.

We’ve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest? — Mww

No no, I was just responding to your points. :)

The idea that we can stop perceiving the world is a troubling one, but remains at the core of anti-realism. — NOS4A2

Not exactly anti-realism, but more to do with Academic Scepticism?

So the question ought to be inverted. What are the grounds for believing that we are perceiving nothing, perceiving the extraterrestrial, or perceiving nothing at all? — NOS4A2

The point is not that we stop perceiving or not perceiving anything at all. But rather, how can we be sure about what we perceive is real or truth?

Or when we are not perceiving the objects we have been perceiving, due to not being present in front of the objects, what are the grounds for us keep believing the unperceived existence?

Because Kant allowed the illusion of God to continue for another 100 years or so. He was essentially just a Christian with his metaphysics. — Vaskane

Understandable. Nietzsche was an atheist.

Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.

Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your “I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper”, doesn’t hold true.

Or I just misunderstood. Dunno.

Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.

Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your “I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper”, doesn’t hold true.

Or I just misunderstood. Dunno. — Mww

No probs. I don't have perfect memories. I am sure no one does :D
This thread is for any topic or issues which one feels related to the concepts "the world", "existence", "belief" or "reasons / grounds / justifications for knowledge" from their own ideas, or any of the historical philosophers' perspectives. It is not a declarative or presumptuous, but exploratory thread, to which, hopefully, some form of conclusion would be heuristically emerging from the discussions.

The point is not that we stop perceiving or not perceiving anything at all. But rather, how can we be sure about what we perceive is real or truth?

Or when we are not perceiving the objects we have been perceiving, due to not being present in front of the objects, what are the grounds for us keep believing the unperceived existence?

I mentioned a few reasons why we’d keep believing in the existence of the world. For one, we never stop perceiving it. But also, there is no reason to do otherwise.

It’s why I ask the question. If you never stop perceiving the world, what are the grounds for doubting the existence of the world?

I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not receiving it? — Corvus

My perception of a world in my mind is the effect of some prior cause, on the assumption that my perception hasn't spontaneously caused itself.

This prior cause was either i) external to my mind or ii) internal to my mind.

As there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is therefore logically impossible to know the cause of an effect just from the effect itself. This means that it is also logically impossible to know whether the cause of my perception of a world in my mind was either external or internal to my mind.

As it is logically impossible to know whether anything exists external to my mind, it also follows that it is logically impossible to know whether or not anything that may exist external to my mind continues to exist when I stop perceiving a world in my mind.

Don't mistake that for not doing "Gods" work. I too am an Atheist, and understand that Nietzsche, in a sense, is much like Nebuchadnezzar, although not a believer still carried out a similar mission to give people a purpose. — Vaskane

Existence of God and proof is another interesting topic which is related to the topic of this thread.
Why do you believe in the existence of God? Or why not? How the existence of God differ from the existence of the world? or unperceived world?

Nietzsche found that "God is dead," to be highly problematic in the rise of nihilism. — Vaskane

Did Nietzsche thought God had been alive and existing before? But died suddenly or gradually?
Or did Nietzsche think that God had never existed at all?
Some say Zarathustra was the new God whom Nietzsche tried to depict as in "Thus spake Zarathustra", but not sure if it was.

I mentioned a few reasons why we’d keep believing in the existence of the world. For one, we never stop perceiving it. But also, there is no reason to do otherwise. — NOS4A2

But do you keep perceiving the world while you are asleep? Are what you perceive always what you think you perceive? Was there any room for doubts, illusions or mistakes in the contents of your perception?

It’s why I ask the question. If you never stop perceiving the world, what are the grounds for doubting the existence of the world? — NOS4A2

For the above reasons.

As there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is therefore logically impossible to know the cause of an effect just from the effect itself. — RussellA

But could you not say that your perception is caused by your sense-data? i.e. the sense perception of the external world?

As you have suggested, intuition implies connection to knowledge, and indeed it is faculty for knowledge. Not imagination. Imagination is a faculty of its own. The nature of imagination is its freedom from the other mental faculties. — Corvus

I was not using Kantian terminology for ‘imagination’.

What does Kant say about it? — Corvus

Nothing I can recall?

No idea what you mean?

But do you keep perceiving the world while you are asleep? Are what you perceive always what you think you perceive? Was there any room for doubts, illusions or mistakes in the contents of your perception?

If we weren’t perceiving in our sleep we wouldn’t wake up when our alarm went off. Our senses have evolved to wake us even in the deepest sleep. At any rate, I see no coherent reason why any of it should be doubted.

Think of the cup in your OP, the one you cannot be sure exists when you are not perceiving it. If you and someone else were sitting around the cup, and you look away, but the other person sees the cup has not moved or vanished or blinked out of existence, are you right to doubt the existence of the cup?

But could you not say that your perception is caused by your sense-data? i.e. the sense perception of the external world? — Corvus

I know that at this moment in time I perceive a world in my mind, and assuming that nothing happens without a reason, there must have been a prior cause for such a perception.

This prior cause was either i) external to my mind or ii) internal to my mind. But because there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is logically impossible to know whether the cause of my perception of a world in my mind was either external or internal to my mind.

If the prior cause of my perception of a world in my mind was external to my mind, then we can say that the information from whatever was external to my mind passed through my sense-data, where sense-data can be thought of as an interface between my mind and whatever is external to my mind.

However, perception, world, internal, external and sense-data should all be thought of as figures of speech rather than literally existing, and as figures of speech only exist in the mind as concepts.

If the prior cause of my perception of a world in my mind was external to my mind, though this is logically impossible to know, then yes, there would be a causal chain going back in time of which sense-data would be one link in the chain.

Ehhhh….that’s ok.

If we weren’t perceiving in our sleep we wouldn’t wake up when our alarm went off. Our senses have evolved to wake us even in the deepest sleep. At any rate, I see no coherent reason why any of it should be doubted. — NOS4A2

If you were perceiving the world while you were asleep, then you wouldn't need the alarm clock to be awakened by it. The fact that you set the alarm clock to be awakened by it proves that you don't perceive the world while asleep.

Think of the cup in your OP, the one you cannot be sure exists when you are not perceiving it. If you and someone else were sitting around the cup, and you look away, but the other person sees the cup has not moved or vanished or blinked out of existence, are you right to doubt the existence of the cup? — NOS4A2

While I look away, I wouldn't know if the cup exist, and I wouldn't know what the person would be doing either. The person could have looked away too, fell asleep, or walked out the room. Anyway, how can I believe in the existence of the cup when I am not seeing it, and base my belief in the existence of the invisible cup relying on the other person's perception, which is totally inaccessible to me?

However, perception, world, internal, external and sense-data should all be thought of as figures of speech rather than literally existing, and as figures of speech only exist in the mind as concepts. — RussellA

Would you not agree that figures of speech can be confusing, and is illogical?

If you could explicate in more detail it would be nice :)

If you do not wish to that is fine.

Note: do not ask which part because none of it said anything to me.