If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you. — neomac


No problem, I am happy to teach you. — boethius

BTW how many rubles do I owe you, prof?

First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.

So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine — boethius

.

Your reasoning looks rather out of historical circumstances.
First, Ukrainians didn’t refuse negotiation BY DEFAULT. There have been several attempts for negotiations for a ceasefire, all of them ultimately failed. Add to that a long history of failed agreements and reviving historical tensions between Ukraine and Russia. So the refusal of negotiation can very likely be a consequence of past failed negotiation attempts and failed agreements.
Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. Indeed, the idea that the US and European allies would compensate for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses is geopolitically questionable if that implies burdening the US as the hegemon (which has been explicitly and repeatedly antagonised by Russia) and its allies (which can’t easily make concessions to Russia without irritating the hegemon) for the Ukrainian losses (which, notice, would be also Western losses if Ukraine was meant to be more integrated into the Western sphere of influence!), the costs of compensating such losses, and the additional strategic risks (by emboldening Russia, China and Iran witnessing Western weakness) while, at the same time, condoning everything to an anti-Western Russia. And historically questionable: appeasing Hitler just emboldened his hegemonic ambitions (and also encouraged a nasty alliance with the Soviet Union before their great patriotic war, right prof?).
Third, whatever the Russian initial demands were circumstances for peace negotiation worsened within a month: the failure of the Russian special operation in Kiev (if the objective was Ukrainian capitulation) and the genocidal massacres (like in Bucha) became public (as much Russian state media support of Russian genocidal intents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Russia_Should_Do_with_Ukraine). Later, the deal-breaker demands included also the new annexed oblasts. So I’m not surprised that Ukrainians would be compelled to refuse negotiation. Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US.

As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.

The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war. — boethius

I was talking about RUSSIAN official deal-breaker demands (given the quotations I made) not Ukrainian deal-breaker demands. Indeed, Ukrainians were opened to make concessions. But they either didn’t satisfy Russia or didn’t satisfy the Western allies (not surprisingly so if they have to play the role of security guarantors).

None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate


Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101. — boethius

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. Indeed, if the US was in the same shoes of Ukraine, namely invaded by a foreign great power historically bent to destroy, dispossess and oppress the US, would it be irrational for Americans to hyperbolically “fight to the last person” as long as powerful foreign allies helped with the weapons the US needed and the economic support? I would expect the answer would be “absolutely-fucking-lutely!” from a real American and Republican patriot like Sen. Lindsey Graham, right prof? Especially if Sen. Linsey Graham considers Russia a state sponsoring terrorism (https://twitter.com/aaronjmate/status/1554486803431886848), right prof?
Besides, claims of “using fanatical fighters” are not particularly compelling: Russia uses “fanatical fighters” in Donbas against the Ukrainian regime AS MUCH AS “non-fanatical fighters” to spread pro-Russian propaganda with the same arguments you yourself and your sidekicks are pushing here (even with greater zealousness than pro-war Russians themselves!). And this too is a “post-WWII great-power conflict 101”.
As far as I’m concerned, between the US and Ukraine there is a convergence of interests. Until the US wants to play the hegemon and Ukraine needs the US to escape from Russian sphere of influence, there is a convergence of interests. This is the relevant point I’d make.

For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.

The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical. — boethius

I have no reason to specifically assume that Zelensky or Western leaders are as gullible as you wish to depict them. What I have reason to generally assume is that politicians (which are always assisted by appointed military, intelligence, economic, political and communication advisors) are not expected to easily fall for propaganda as you seem to assume. Besides it’s most certainly unreasonable to expect that political leaders’ conscious decision process would be infallible and fully transparent to the general public while history is still in the making. As far as I’m concerned, Zelensky and Western political leaders may have had no need for the sort of encouragement you are suggesting, which would be best suited more for the general Western audience. On the other side, it may be in Zelensky’s interest to press partners to keep their words in terms of commitment and remind them of related reputational costs.
Concerning the Europeans, it’s up to them to decide to what extent it’s in their best interest to remain within the American sphere of influence and play along. At this point in history, the risk they may overlook to me is that the weaker, more isolationist or more distracted the US is, the greater is the risk the hegemonic game among the US, Russia, China and Islamist regimes will move more aggressively inside an unprepared Europe. So better for the European leaders to take the time the Ukrainians bought them to prepare for the worst.

Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business". — Echarmion


Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.

Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.

... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO. — boethius

Unless there is essentially zero hope for Ukrainians to obtain the wished compensation as much as there is zero hope for joining NATO.
My expectation still remains the same: to the extent the US and its European allies strategically aim at preserving the Western world order against anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ challenges, they can’t possibly dismiss Ukraine ’s security concerns and simply reconcile with Russia after what Russia has done. Russia’s imperialist ambitions need to be frustrated as much as possible, and its military/economic projection capacity and prospects of growth should impactfully drop for decades to come wrt the trends set prior to the beginning of the war. However my understanding is also that at this point in history the US has no interest to commit more than it did. Whatever the reasons are, the American hegemony and deterrence power is dangerously eroding, and failing in Ukraine will have major reputational costs for the US leadership.

To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.

Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.

The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.

Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014. — boethius

Sure, also the US intervened in support of Kiev to prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian regime given the military disadvantage of Ukraine in a war with Russia.
So what? Even if Russia’s invasion is some sort of sensible rational act on the part of a provoked Russia (which COMPLETELY RATIONALLY kills people Putin claims are one people with the Russians and repeatedly threatens to start a nuclear war over it despite nobody has aggressed Russia proper, right prof?) still there are very strong reasons to oppose it: Russia defies the Western world order and violates Ukrainian right to independence and territorial sovereignty AFTER having acknowledged it officially and repeatedly. What's so hard to understand, prof?
In any case, that’s my argument to question your views and it doesn’t rely to what you attribute to pro-Ukrainian Western propaganda to spin your own pro-Russian counter-propaganda . So you are not going to score points with me by deconstructing your own myth of Western propaganda.

The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression — "boethius

.

Here you are making a big deal of a fallacious equivocation. “Provocations” as Putin and Mearsheimer’s intend it PRESUPPOSE a concept of sphere of influence (as Putin says “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia”) and hegemonic conflict. In this case, such “provocations” and whining over it are part of the business of competing for hegemony (China whines over the American provocations in the Pacific). There are no accepted supreme ruling authorities to appeal to for rights violation, just security dilemmas and ways to deal with them (ALSO offensively or preventively). Which thing makes me question also certain political or moral implications you may wish to draw from it (like putting all/most/primarily the blame on the US for the current war).
Another thing however is to claim that the Russian aggression of Ukraine was “unprovoked” because Ukraine didn’t aggress Russia proper, like Hamas did instead aggress Israel proper very recently. This point is relevant for the Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West. Besides even when Ukraine fought ethnic Russians, the latter still were Ukrainian citizens in Ukrainian territory, some of which turned into anti-Ukrainian “fanatical fighters“ through the interference of a foreign imperialist power, namely Russia. Indeed, “fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101”, right prof? And Ukraine had sovereign power to fight them back as much as Russia had sovereign power to fight back the Chechens independence movement, right prof? On the other side, if Russia had hard power ways to end Ukrainian abuses toward ethnic Russian minorities, the West had soft power ways to obtain the same results through Westernisation (e.g. EU and NATO membership). This, again, is a rather important point if you want to talk Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West.
BTW if Ukrainians are also “one people” with the Russians as Putin would claim , the killing ethnic Russian argument sounds rather pointless. Unless Putin explains how Ukrainians can be at the same time “one people” with the Russians but two distinct ethnic groups, to me Putin’s killing Ukrainians (including innocent civilians) amounts to killing ethnic Russians according to HIS OWN ASSUMPTIONS, right prof?
Besides Russia could have simply solicited the ethnic Russians that felt horribly “persecuted” by the Nazi Ukrainian regime to flee in Russia, like Jews did flee in Israel and the US. Russia has a big land you know and since it didn’t have problem to even forcefully and massively deport people in other parts of its own vast territory (as it did with the Ukrainians during this war and the Crimean Tatars in the past), why should it have problems to help relocate all ethnic Russians that feel persecuted by the Ukrainian regime into the motherland? Donbas’ “fanatic fighters” can’t possibly be more safe from genocidal Nazi-Vampire-Cannibal Zelensky, with all his Swastikas tattoos, worshipping Hitler and extermination of all Russians on earth in concentration camps, in some part of Siberia than in Donbas, right prof? Also because in Russia there are more nazis which will protect them than exterminating them, right prof?

If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.

The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.

You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.

Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. — "boethius

Again, I don’t give half a kopeck about your myth of Western propaganda. I would still find arguably rational for the US and Ukraine to oppose Russia EVEN IF Russia is rational (wrt its strategic goals), provoked (in Putin’s or Mearsheimer’s sense), competent and not easy to beat. I don’t need AT ALL to deny such assumptions to make my point which you are more than welcome to criticise, prof.
Criticising pro-West propaganda can be as easy as criticising pro-Russian propaganda. But it may not be as fruitful as you wish. Indeed, the risk of spinning your counter-propaganda at large is simply to increase political polarisation that hostile powers can/will exploit, which in turn will push more authoritarian/extremist political trends in the West.
Besides, you and your sidekick and likeminded people won’t stop to promote anti-Western and anti-US propaganda EVEN IF the US/West/NATO did what you suggest for a cease-fire in Ukraine, because their historical faults for this war and beyond are endless, right prof?
Don’t ever waste your time to talk about Western propaganda with me, if you want to score points with me. Ever.

The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.

If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces. — "boethius

Your notion of “rationality” is grounded on your own sense of the value of life, and a convenient example were the odds are taken to be clear by default and in abstraction from the historical and geopolitical context.
Once again, yours are non-shared assumptions. As far as I’m concerned, anybody can put value to their own or other people’s life the way they feel, then one can more or less share/sympathise with. So people can value their independence and social identity, more than their own lives and more than other people can share. Indeed, your reasoning is biased by the value you attribute to life, which is typically Western. Morale at war implies readiness to sacrifice ones’ life, and for military leaders to sacrifice soldiers and civilians, also at the risk of doing it disproportionately, and even against more capable adversaries. Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds fight for their independence and national identity, for generations, no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. BTW how many Russians, soldiers and civilians, were killed during the great patriotic war, prof?
I find COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL to assess human behaviour based on social standards not grounded on realistic assumptions about human behaviour. Humans value social identity and freedom to the point of fighting for them to death, take revenge for it, mistrust enemies for it, and sacrifice their own individual and collective well-being/safety for it, over decades, over generations. Afghans, Kurds, Palestinians, Israeli, Ukrainians, and Russians keep reminding us that however tragic in itself and disturbing to armchair self-entitled nobodies on the internet, this is a very common hardcore driving factor of human behaviour. To what extent that holds for Ukrainians is up to the Ukrainians to tell.
My understanding is that all countries pursuing national interest are rationally compelled to assess proximity in values, capabilities, history, ambitions and margins for cooperation wrt other countries. Ukraine is more open to join the West while Russia wants to antagonise the West. Besides, in geopolitics, as much as in the Ukrainian war, the odds especially in the long term remain uncertain. The best countries can do, is to try to gain as much relative advantage as possible over competitors, and the historical and geopolitical context offer relevant guidance in understanding the stakes of the ongoing competition.

However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.

The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.

If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses. — boethius

Since the very beginning, the idea was basically that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine until it gets its demands satisfied. And such demands do not require Russia to occupy all Ukraine or murder every Ukrainian. So military loss and victory for Russia must be assessed wrt Russian demands and declared goals, as well as their evolution. And even if Zelensky’s idea of winning back all occupied territories is currently unattainable, that doesn’t imply that Ukraine is willing to surrender to all Russian demands. Indeed, until the West is backing and intends to back the Ukrainians because strategically convenient, the Ukrainians do not need to surrender to all Russian demands, even more so if they have personal reasons not to do so.

I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on.

Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections.

In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability?

Recently brought to my attention was a report written by former UN Assistant Secretary-General Michael von der Schulenberg, German professor Hajo Funke and retired formerly highest-ranking German general Harald Kujat. — Tzeentch

Where is the link to the report?

Contrary to Western interpretations, Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was the reason for the war. — Tzeentch

Contrary to Western interpretations?! Nobody doubts that this is Putin’s declared reason for his aggression. The questions is: Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was a LEGITIMATE reason for Putin’s aggression of Ukraine or that the US bears all/most of/primarily the blame for this war?

4) There is little doubt that these peace negotiations failed due to resistance from NATO and in particular from the USA and the UK. — Tzeentch

At this link where they talk about the report you are referring to (https://braveneweurope.com/michael-von-der-schulenburg-hajo-funke-harald-kujat-peace-for-ukraine), I see that the first cited sources are essentially Naftali Bennett, Schröder, Turkish Foreign Minister. I limit myself to say that the last two may have their interest in putting the West in a bad light. Concerning Naftali Bennett, his views are significantly more nuanced than it looks by cherry-peaking what he said in his interview (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK9tLDeWBzs): indeed, he goes as far as to say at minute 2:45:41 “this is pre-Bucha, Bucha massacre, once that happened I said it’s over” (it would interesting to see if Bennett has changed his mind about the Bucha massacre after the recent Hamas massacre in Israel), at minute 2:59:34 “in a broad sense, I think there was a legitimate decision by the West to keep striking Putin” (referring to the more aggressive approach against Putin) or at minute 3:02:09 “there was a good chance to reach a cease fire, but I’m not sure. But I’m not claiming it was the right thing. In real time I thought the right thing was a ceasefire, now I can’t say. Maybe it would have conveyed the wrong message to other countries”.

Concerning the Istanbul Communiqué, two points remain predictably uneasy to settle: the territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea, the security guarantees. Concerning the security guarantees, either they exclude Russia so they become a version of NATO which Russia couldn’t possibly like if that’s Putin’s issue, or they include Russia (the aggressor) which can at the very least sabotage any effort of Ukrainian Westernisation (as much as it happens with resolutions that go against Russian interest in the UN) while being spared economic and diplomatic sanctions.

Translation:

(1) You cannot, and have not, provided one quote supporting your claim that the Russian stance on Ukraine and NATO has changed. — Mikie

I have provided four such quotes, including two from the Kremlin presidential site itself. here is the fifth one:

I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners. — Press Statement and Answers to Questions at a Joint News Conference with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma

(2) You completely ignore the historical record.

Lol, no, I supplement the historical record. The difference between us is that I acknowledge that Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. It is you who ignores the historical record that does not suit your narrative, so you claim that the stance was 'always clear'. No, it was not clear at all, as the quotes I have provided show. Also, as I have mentioned, you completely ignore the overall context of the NATO and Russia relations, such as NATO-Russia Council, from which some of the quotes come.

And let us not forget that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.

I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on. — frank

But that would have damaged trump, possibly beyond repair. Which would probably have not been in Russia's interest. Or Putin might have considered the west especially weak in the wake the COVID pandemic. Also possible is that Putin intended his invasion in 2020, coinciding with political turmoil in the US, but COVID stopped that plan. In the early days of COVID, some estimates had the mortality way higher than it actually was.

Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. — frank

Putin seems to have overestimated the strength of his military, but I doubt he overestimated it by that much.

Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections. — frank

Something along these lines. Deal US prestige a crushing blow, demonstrating it's weakness as an ally, while restoring Russia's great power status and cementing his reputation in Russia.

What's not to like? But it was not to be.

In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability? — frank

Arguably, he had some reason to overestimate his chances for success. In Georgia the russian forces did poorly, but were overall successful and western reactions were muted. In Ukraine in 2014, russian forces were spectacularly successful and Ukraine was even briefly staggered by a ragtag bunch of mercenary "separatists". The western reaction was less muted, but still far from unified and effective.

Taken together Putin might well have assumed that his military would pull off a blitzkrieg campaign so shocking that the Ukrainian military would be unable to respond, while the west would look on helplessly and just pile on some more toothless sanctions.

The russian military isn't some incompetent bunch of conscripted farmers, as pro Ukrainian propaganda sometimes suggested. They had much improved from their nadir in the first Chechen war. But apparently they, like some many others before them, did not sufficiently account for the effect of determined resistance aimed at their logistics and c&c.

I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on.

Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections.

In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability? — frank

Well, a full-scale war is not something you can do overnight. The plans must have started a few years back. Besides with the smoldering conflict in Donbas (which effectively negated any chance for Ukraine joining NATO and made EU accession much more difficult) he might have counted on regaining political influences in Ukraine. Also Zelensky was seen as an 'Eastern' candidate, in fact in the Ukrainian West he was suspected by some of being a Russian puppet or agent, given that he came from nowhere, was born in the East, barely spoke Ukrainian, etc. For Russia 'Belarusinization' was a better scenario than a simple land grab, that option was chosen when it was clear that Ukraine will decisively steer toward the West.

But I also think that the escalation might have been dictated by the internal politics. The belliigerence present in the propaganda was hard to contain (just to illustrate, they were seriously debating on the state TV plans to 'open up' the Suwalki corridor, i.e. invading Poland or Lithuania...). The 2014 sanctions, however modest, were hurting Russia more than they admitted. After 2019 the economy began to stagnate and the prospects were not rosy, so the triumph, even at the cost of some hardships, could be just what Putin needed (and the prospect of increased energy resource prices would not hurt either). Some analysts also point out that Putin could not wait much longer - the reaction of the Western Europe to 2014 annexation was timid, to put it mildly, mostly because of its dependence on Russian resources. But they have realized that and began to limit that dependence, so Putin had to make a move before they had alternatives (but was too late anyway, it turned out).

But that would have damaged trump, possibly beyond repair. — Echarmion

I don't think Trump can be damaged. If ten snakes popped out of his head and announced that they were from Betelgeuse and they were here to destroy the human race and started beaming lasers out of their eyes to blow up everything in sight, his followers would be like: hell yea!!

Taken together Putin might well have assumed that his military would pull off a blitzkrieg campaign so shocking that the Ukrainian military would be unable to respond, while the west would look on helplessly and just pile on some more toothless sanctions. — Echarmion

Something like that. I think he thought Ukraine would fall quickly.

so the triumph, even at the cost of some hardships, could be just what Putin needed — Jabberwock

Needed for what? To remain in power?

here is the fifth one: — Jabberwock

And here is, once again, the context:

Question: Is Russia going to join NATO? What major changes do you foresee in the relations between Ukraine and NATO? And how do you see the pattern of Ukraine-Russia-NATO relations in the future?

Vladimir Putin: Russia does not intend to join NATO. Russia, as you know, is engaged in a very constructive dialogue with NATO to create a new Russia-NATO structure “at twenty”, in which all twenty countries will be represented as nations, each having one vote, and all the issues will be solved without prior consultations, without any prior decisions on a number of issues being taken first within the bloc. You know about these issues and practical consultations have already been completed. These issues are terrorism, humanitarian operations, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners.

It wasn’t a question of Ukraine joining NATO.

The difference between us is that I acknowledge that Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. — Jabberwock

Yeah, in the same way Trump has provided evidence of a stolen election.

So far, 3 “quotes” shown to be complete garbage.

So I’ll repeat: the Russian position on US turning Ukraine into a western puppet never changed, including Ukraine joining NATO. Hence why you can’t provide a single quotation that says otherwise.

No, it was not clear at all, as the quotes I have provided show. Also, as I have mentioned, you completely ignore the overall context of the NATO and Russia relations, such as NATO-Russia Council, from which some of the quotes come. — Jabberwock

The quotes show nothing of the sort, as I have now shown three times. Like I said— perhaps just making something up will be the best path for you, given you can’t find any in the real world.

And yes, the NATO-Russia council context works exactly against your thesis. That you somehow think it doesn’t is hilarious.

And again:

Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. It was known in 1995 and explained by Stanley Resor, Paul Nitze, etc., in an open letter to Clinton. It was known very well right up to 2008, when William Burns wrote the following:

Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.

[NATO] would be seen … as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze...It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”

It was known in June of 2021, when a massive Seabreeze exercise was conducted:

The largest ever NATO operation in the Black Sea takes place under explosive conditions, beginning just six days after Russian armed forced fired warning shots and then dropped four bombs in the path of HMS Defender, a British warship that entered Russia’s territorial waters off Crimea. The US ignored a request made June 22 from Russia's embassy in Washington—just hours before the UK warship incident—for Sea Breeze to be cancelled this year, with Moscow warning of the danger of military confrontation.

This week’s Sea Breeze manoeuvres, which have taken place annually since 1997, are the largest ever. Co-hosted by the US and Ukrainian navies, Sea Breeze 2021 will involve 32 countries, 5,000 troops, 32 ships, 40 aircraft and 18 special operations. It is being led by the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), an immediate reaction force which consists of four to six destroyers and frigates. A squadron of US Marines are taking part, with the main naval force involved the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet headquartered in Naples, Italy.

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/06/29/sebr-j29.html

It was known in September 2021, when the White House announced that

We intend to continue our robust training and exercise program in keeping with Ukraine’s status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/

It was admitted by the NATO chief himself:

During the disastrous Vietnam War, it was said that the US government treated the public like a mushroom farm: keeping it in the dark and feeding it with manure. The heroic Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers documenting the unrelenting U.S. government lying about the war in order to protect politicians who would be embarrassed by the truth. A half-century later, during the Ukraine War, the manure is piled even higher.

According to the U.S. government and the ever-obsequious New York Times, the Ukraine war was “unprovoked,” the Times’ favorite adjective to describe the war. Putin, allegedly mistaking himself for Peter the Great, invaded Ukraine to recreate the Russian Empire. Yet last week, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg committed a Washington gaffe, meaning that he accidently blurted out the truth.

In testimony to the European Union Parliament, Stoltenberg made clear that it was America’s relentless push to enlarge NATO to Ukraine that was the real cause of the war and why it continues today. Here are Stoltenberg’s revealing words:

“The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition to not invade Ukraine. Of course, we didn't sign that.

The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second-class membership. We rejected that.

So, he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. He has got the exact opposite.”

https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/nato-chief-admits-expansion-behind-russian-invasion

And so on.

Needed for what? To remain in power? — frank

Not so much yet, rather to stave off dissent. Note that whoever lately dared to criticize Putin directly (like the late Prigozhin or now imprisoned Girkin) did so from even more nationalistic point of view, even the supposed champion of democracy, Navalny, made some statements in this vein. Once the jinn is out, it is hard to push it back into the bottle. And nothing cements the authoritarian rule like a common external enemy.

Lol. Yeah maybe Putin invaded because _____.

Just do armchair speculation. Good enough. :up:

Hey maybe Putin thought he could conquer an entire country with 190K troops. Sounds reasonable.

Yeah, in the same way Trump has provided evidence of a stolen election.

So far, 3 “quotes” shown to be complete garbage.

So I’ll repeat: the Russian position on US turning Ukraine into a western puppet never changed, including Ukraine joining NATO. Hence why you can’t provide a single quotation that says otherwise. — Mikie

I have provided five quotations of Putin that basically say that Ukraine is free to do as it pleases, all in context of NATO expansion or cooperation, including some spoken at the same summit that started Ukraine's accession to NATO and including one that literally states that concerning the NATO expansion, quoted directly from the presidential site. You may pretend all you want that Putin did not say that, the record is quite clear.

And yes, the NATO-Russia council context works exactly against your thesis. That you somehow think it doesn’t is hilarious. — Mikie

Sure, Russia is so angry with NATO expanding by Ukraine, that it organizes joint exercises with NATO. That surely works against my thesis.

Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. — Mikie

Sure, that is why on the Kremlin site there is the already known statement:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged.

So either Putin (and his press service) knowingly contradicts himself from sentence to sentence, or maybe Russia's unchanged position on the expansion at that time is not that clear as you believe it is. Take your pick.

But do that remembering that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.

And nothing cements the authoritarian rule like a common external enemy. — Jabberwock

He rose to power originally by starting a war. More war would pull the country behind him?

I have provided five quotations of Putin that basically say that Ukraine is free to do as it pleases, all in context of NATO expansion or cooperation, including some spoken at the same summit that started Ukraine's accession to NATO and including one that literally states that concerning the NATO expansion, quoted directly from the presidential site. You may pretend all you want that Putin did not say that, the record is quite clear. — Jabberwock

No. You’ve provided one quote — which isn’t even a direct quote — that’s relevant, which is then followed by a contradictory statement. That’s all you’ve given.

To remind:

“On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged.”

If that’s all you have — and apparently it is, given you can’t find another one — then that’s pretty weak indeed. But yeah, that definitely contradicts everything I provided above. :ok:

So either Putin (and his press service) knowingly contradicts himself from sentence to sentence, or maybe Russia's unchanged position on the expansion at that time is not that clear as you believe it is. Take your pick. — Jabberwock

So a long, well documented historical record— or one vague/contradictory, indirect quote. And that’s really all you have, isn’t it?

Guess our own ambassadors needed to completely rethink their views because of that one (reported) statement. Makes sense.

“Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”

Internet guy: “all wrong, because I found one second-hand, contradictory statement.”

Just do armchair speculation. Good enough. :up: — Mikie

Are you doing your speculation from a footstool? If so, you should upgrade!

He rose to power originally by starting a war. More war would pull the country behind him? — frank

That's not quite true, Putin was elevated to power by the Jelzin family. But his success in the second Chechen war did much to secure his rule.

If that’s all you have — and apparently it is, given you can’t find another one — then that’s pretty weak indeed. But yeah, that definitely contradicts everything I provided above. — Mikie

No, I have four other that say exactly the same thing. 'Russia has no concerns about the expansion of NATO from the standpoint of ensuring security, but Russia will organize its military policies accordingly in connection with NATO nearing its borders'. What do you believe 'NO CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXPANSION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENSUIRNG SECURITY” means, in your own words? Because I find it difficult to interpret it as 'Russia is gravely threatened by NATO expansion'. You believe that 'Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, and it will choose its own path to peace and security' is unrelated to NATO when it was spoken at the very summit dealing with Ukraine's NATO accession. So what do you think it referred to? You believe that 'processes of expanding interaction with NATO' spoken A MONTH after Ukraine has joined NATO Action Plan have nothing to do with NATO expansion... So which 'processes' did Putin have in mind? I am afraid it is a mystery only to you.

EDIT: Correction, in March Kuchma has declared his intent to join the Action Plan, it was joined in November.

That's not quite true, Putin was elevated to power by the Jelzin family. But his success in the second Chechen war did much to secure his rule. — Echarmion

Supposedly he was chosen because he demonstrated that he was corrupt, so Yeltsin, who was also corrupt, believed Putin wouldn't prosecute him for his crimes. War increased his power?

Supposedly he was chosen because he demonstrated that he was corrupt, so Yeltsin, who was also corrupt, believed Putin wouldn't prosecute him for his crimes. War increased his power? — frank

Well I'm sure the word Putin would use is not "corrupt" but "loyal". But yes that is what I read as well, and also that he was a bit of a blank slate politically. Noone knew what he really stood for. At the time, he might have simply been considered an interim solution. Someone not offensive, who would make sure the Yeltsin family got off free, and then make way for someone with more of a political profile. But Putin quickly made his mark by taking a hardline stance on Chechnya and is to this day suspected of having orchestrated terror attacks to have a pretext for a second Chechen war. That brought him into his own as a political figure in his own right.

Another allegation is that Putin was essentially always a KGB trojan horse, who played the role of the loyal vassal long enough to get into power, and then started to enact the kind of policies his KGB clique had wanted to employ since the days of the USSR.

Do note that all this is based on somewhat hazy rememberings on books I read / listened to. So it's quite possible I muddled something, Perhaps @Jabberwock can correct any glaring mistakes, since they seem knowledgeable.

Yeah, the one reference you’ve provided — a second hand account which doesn’t even quote Putin, and which contradicts your point a second later — must disprove what, for example, Paul Nitze and William Burns knew, what Germany and France knew, and what was explicitly stated over and over again by Putin (in his actual words), of which I gave a sample and which has been well documented and admitted to even by the NATO chief himself.

Makes perfect sense. That one quote also disproves the analyses of Stephen Cohen, Seymour Hersh, Jeffrey Sacks, Mearsheimer, etc. All easily dismissed because an internet guy found a quote he’s interpreted (wrongly) as “if Ukraine wants to join NATO, that’s fine with us.” Perfectly proportional.

Right. That's what I meant by saying he rose to power by starting a war. I realized Yeltsin had already picked him as a successor.

Right, fair enough. We could also say his legitimacy was forged in a war. War, or perhaps we should be more neutral and call it direct military action, has worked for Putin.

War, or perhaps we should be more neutral and call it direct military action, has worked for Putin. — Echarmion

Yep.

No, I have provided five references. Not to mention the bigger context that has just flown over your head. So let me sum this up for you, in a way that even you understand:

1. Russians are fond of saying that expansion of NATO with Ukraine is the Worst Thing that Could Be Done To Russia.
2. In 1997 Yeltsin signs the NATO Founding Act, that literally stipulates that each country is sovereign and may seek its security however it wants. In simpler words, he agrees in writing that any country, including Ukraine, can do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
3. In 2002 Kuchma declares he specifically plans to start the procedure to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
4. A month later Putin meets with Kuchma and declares that they are the best buddies ever and that Ukraine can do whatever it wants with the Guys Who Plan to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (previous quote).
5. In November 2002 Kuchma and the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia meet in Brussels to plan exactly how they want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. Putin attends the meeting with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and says that he is actually the best buddies with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia who literally have just finished planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. He also adds that he wants to do many great things with the Guys Who Have Just Finished Planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021111a.htm). Moreover, he literally and specifically says that the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia will not in any way affect his relations with his newly found buddies (previous quotes).
6. In 2003 he meets again with Kuchma, the guy who just started to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia with the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and again says they are the best buddies ever (http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21987). He does not even mention in passing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
7. In 2004 he gives his full support in the coming elections to Kuchma, the Guy Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
8. Afterwards he indeed does many great things with the Other Guys Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (even after 2008, e.g. Russia was in joint exercises with NATO forces in 2011).

Got it?

No, I have provided five references. — Jabberwock

No, you’ve provided one. The others were shown to be complete garbage. Easy for anyone to go back and check.

So I’m glad you see you’re sticking with “one second hand reference” versus the entire documentary record and analyses by the US’s own experts. Predictable.

Too bad Burns, for example, wasn’t around so you could educate him with your cute narrative.

It’s amazing how quickly you devolve into nonsense when confronted on your fictions. Pity.

Well I'm sure the word Putin would use is not "corrupt" but "loyal". But yes that is what I read as well, and also that he was a bit of a blank slate politically. Noone knew what he really stood for. At the time, he might have simply been considered an interim solution. Someone not offensive, who would make sure the Yeltsin family got off free, and then make way for someone with more of a political profile. But Putin quickly made his mark by taking a hardline stance on Chechnya and is to this day suspected of having orchestrated terror attacks to have a pretext for a second Chechen war. That brought him into his own as a political figure in his own right.

Another allegation is that Putin was essentially always a KGB trojan horse, who played the role of the loyal vassal long enough to get into power, and then started to enact the kind of policies his KGB clique had wanted to employ since the days of the USSR.

Do note that all this is based on somewhat hazy rememberings on books I read / listened to. So it's quite possible I muddled something, Perhaps Jabberwock can correct any glaring mistakes, since they seem knowledgeable. — Echarmion

Yes, that is about it, the only thing that might not be clear from the first paragraph is the sequence: Putin became the prime minister, he has risen up due to hardline stance in the war and then was annointed as the stand-in president in the place of resigning Yeltsin (which practically guaranteed him winning the elections). While I do not think he was exactly a KGB pawn, he certainly would not gain the power nor hold it initially without the support of the circles of the secret services and the oligarchs (which in Russia is often the same), like Berezovsky. Then he got more and more powerful by skillfully maneuvering between different hostile cliques.

No, you’ve provided one. The others were shown to be complete garbage. Easy for anyone to go back and check.

Do I’m glad you see you’re sticking with “one second hand reference” versus the entire documentary record and analyses by the US’s own experts. Predictable.

Too bad Burns, for example, wasn’t around so you could educate him with your cute narrative.

It’s amazing how quickly you devolve into nonsense when confronted on your fictions. Pity. — Mikie

Yes, it is easy for anyone to check what was actually said and in what context. That it flies over your head is not exactly my problem, I have tried. And if you mention Burns, you might have missed this part of his report:

Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in the region. It is also politically popular to paint the U.S. and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from Russian nationalists.

So your beloved Burns says that NATO enlargement is used as a political tool to gain support from Russian nationalists (doesn't he know they were made up by the West?!). Could this might be the reason why Putin was saying different things to different people? Just wondering...

So your beloved Burns says that NATO enlargement is used as a political tool to gain support from Russian nationalists — Jabberwock

It can be used that way, of course. And I’m sure it’s a very emotional topic. I would assume the same would be true for the US if China were running military drills in Mexico. Wouldn’t make the US right to invade Mexico, but I think the least we’d say is that it would be a major factor.

Which we apparently can’t say about Russia— because Putin is a madman bent on conquering Ukraine with 190 thousand troops.

Which we apparently can’t say about Russia— because Putin is a madman bent on conquering Ukraine with 190 thousand troops. — Mikie

Do you know how many Soviet troops have initially attacked Afghanistan? Or how many American troops have invaded Panama?

By the way, you have not answered my question... If it is too difficult, maybe we can break it down: can you describe in your own words what the phrase 'Russia has no concerns' might mean?

I would assume the same would be true for the US if China were running military drills in Mexico. Wouldn’t make the US right to invade Mexico, but I think the least we’d say is that it would be a major factor. — Mikie

These sorts of thought experiments have come up before, e.g. Oct 11, 2023. Let's have your take on it. (y)

I guess that's what things look like on the ground at the moment ...

Finnish volunteers target Russian soldiers during fierce gun battle in Ukraine (Daily Mail · 1m:9s · Nov 19, 2023)


... in some places anyway.

Someone should set up a venture: "Treat yourself to a thrilling action adventure in Ukraine. Safety not guaranteed. The new trend in vacation." :)

Do you know how many Soviet troops have initially attacked Afghanistan? — Jabberwock

In ‘79? I have no idea. 70/80 thousand? What’s the point? Afghanistan was a population of maybe 14 million people and the situation was much different. Ukraine has 40 million people or so.

So you’re really going to argue that Russia wanted to conquer Ukraine, eh? Maybe Putin really is that stupid— but in any case there’s no evidence for it. There were other reasons for invasion. Conquest wasn’t one of them.