As a pedagogical point, are folk here mostly familiar with speech act theory?

The conversation above with @Corvus has me wondering how much this topic depends on an understanding that language is not purely descriptive. I hadn't considered "How to do things with words" a prerequisite, but perhaps it should have been...?

Ayer adopts a descriptivist theory of language, of course. Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures?

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

As a pedagogical point, are folk here mostly familiar with speech act theory? — Banno

I think this essay addresses the issue in its own way, though perhaps less directly. I think it is important to note that acts that perform something are merely an example of a way that something has the import ("value") to us that we want of truth (judgment, necessity, implications, etc.), without their being judged on the criteria we have for true or false, and so "speech acts" are not replacing that standard (answering the same need), nor are a generalized explanation of meaning.

Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures? — Banno

In this essay, he is also giving examples, but of how we address "real" without turning it into a metaphysical quality everything has (that we don't "perceive"). As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false?

Can you change the tree with words? Ordering it cut down will certainly change it. — Banno

You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words. You can of course influence other language users with words, you can induce them to cut down the tree. So, it is of course true that we are influenced by our own words and the words of others, that is we are influenced by our understandings of the meanings of those words, and not by the words themselves as mere physical phemomena, whether they come in the form of visual symbols or sounds.

The conversation above with Corvus has me wondering how much this topic depends on an understanding that language is not purely descriptive. — Banno

Who doesn't understand that words are not merely descriptive? Someone who has not given the matter any thought would likely not even explicitly think of words as descriptive, let alone as merely descriptive. This seems like a simplistic strawman to me.

I think I'll wait and see what happens in VIII — Ludwig V

Once you've read it, here's a link to my take so far. I haven't written up my notes past page 80.

Just assume that terrible things are going to happen at any time, and then when they do happen you won't be surprised. Does that help? — Antony Nickles

Thanks for your concern.

I'll just make sure that my back-ups are up to date and then get on with it.

As you don't quite say, bad things happen - and not only on the internet. Get Plan B in place and then get on with it.

Get Plan B in place and then get on with it. — Ludwig V

You've been watching too much Amy Schumer.

It's not illogical. If you think it is, could you show how? — frank

I'm not sure what "it" refers to here. I thought my question suggested that I thought that my view that I am a brain in a vat is not illogical. That was intentional.

However, perhaps I haven't understood what you mean by "illogical". ?

Or perhaps you think that I think that the concept of a brain in a vat is illogical. I don't. It is a very odd description, somewhat like describing music on a violin as the sound of catgut vibrating. The overtones are clear - and no doubt deliberate.

You've been watching too much Amy Schumer. — Antony Nickles

I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher?

Or perhaps you think that I think that the concept of a brain in a vat is illogical. I don't. — Ludwig V

Oh good. :up:

As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false? — Antony Nickles

Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue.

Oh good. — frank

Careful, now. I also think that the idea that I'm living in a Matrix situation is an implausible fantasy. In particular, I know that the truth of the matter is far stranger than Matrix proposes
.

Careful, now. I also think that the idea that I'm living in a Matrix situation is an implausible fantasy. In particular, I know that the truth of the matter is far stranger than Matrix proposes — Ludwig V

Yes. It's just that illogical doesn't mean unlikely, or even false. It looked to me that ordinary language was failing us in an ordinary language thread. Good to know that didn't happen. :grin:

Yes, and Austin's approach to truth became part of his fall from grace, via Strawson. So there is plenty to say there, too.

In these lectures the target has a very odd view, that all we have at hand is the perception, and never the thing perceived. I supose such a one could never cut down a tree, but only a perception-of-tree...

Good stuff. "This was Austin's most important idea: All utterances are the performance of speech acts" — Banno

Speech Act Theory seems to have problems. It confuses word utterances from actions just like you have done. Now I know where your confusion is coming from.

If you asked Searle "Who cut the tree?", he would say "You ordered me to cut the tree, so it must be the words in the order sir."

You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words. — Janus

Yeah, you can. I put in the order, Trees-are-us came and implemented it. Who cut down the tree? If they find out it was over twelve metres tall, it is I and not Trees-are-us who get fined. I didn't touch the saw, but I cut the tree down by giving an order.

And all I need demonstrate here is that this is the sort of thing we do say, setting out a way that we do act. That's enough.

There is a difference between an order and a saw. They do different things. But that is not pertinent. I cut the tree down by giving an order.

Whole careers cut down to nought by your succinct brilliance, and after just a cursory read of a tertiary source!

Cheers, Corvus. You win.

There is a difference between an order and a saw. They do different things. But that is not pertinent. I cut the tree down by giving an order. — Banno

Confucius taught this. They call it "social magic." It starts with rituals, but there is also the performance. Confucius taught that you should learn the rituals, and then perfect the performance by breathing life into your interactions with other people. So it's not just the words. They're basically part of the ritual. It's by the performance that you are responsible for the death of the tree.

You don't say "The tree was cut down by my words."    It sounds just not right.
You would say, "The tree was cut down by the tree surgeon."  

I cut the tree down by giving an order. — Banno

That seems nonsensical to me; words do not cut downs trees, people do. You influenced someone by words to cut down the tree, you did not cut down the tree, even though, by convention, you may be held responsible for the other's act of cutting down the tree.

I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher? — Ludwig V

Disregard entirely.

Well, I regret engaging with Corvus, and can understand why you might be confused, coming in part way through.

The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances.

The context was the erroneous description of language given here:

1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.
2. Language never have access to the world direct. (sic)
3. Language is the last activity in the chain of the mental events i.e. you perceive, think, then speak in that order, never the other way around. — Corvus

I'll leave you to agree, or not, with this. I hope to get back to the main text.

(I'd erroneously supposed that Corvus' muddle might segue into Lecture IX, one of the particulars therein being that a word's having a different use need not mean it has a different sense.)

So it's not just the words. — frank

Yep.

Searle goes in to the background conditions and such in detail, while Strawson moves sideways to intent. It's a big area. Even bigger, if we now include Confucius.

The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances. — Banno

In the sense that we may act on other people (and some animals) with our utterances, such as to cause, or at least influence, them to do things, I agree.

Fail #327

It's not illogical. If you think it is, could you show how? — frank

Vats don't have toes that can be smashed.

@Banno perhaps it could be said that the picture of a real world we would describe, merely mitigated by sense-data, limits itself only to a description of the difference of the relations between that data (p.80), and thus is just another version of the descriptive fallacy. Too early to tell as the “difference in relations” is so far unexplained and Austin does seem more concerned that the judgment is based on prediction.

Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue. — Ludwig V

What I was trying to say is that Austin's goal here, as elsewhere, is to show that there are more considerations (criteria) and situations than philosophy takes into account. However, as he hints at earlier, which I mention here, I do think he is (or will be) concerned here also with truth, what Ayer refers to as "veridical", and, though I might grant we can describe things within the picture of sense-datum and on our ordinary terms (these are not a matter of "language"), I think Austin's point will be that there is a right and wrong, perhaps based on what doing those "well" consists of, or that we are not aware of, or do not get, "everything we want". This remains to be seen of course.

Shouldn’t type while biking

Shouldn’t type while biking — Antony Nickles

Sounds dubious.

Just to be sure, the notion of predictive value is from Ayer, pp 267-268. It's Ayer who would privilege certain sense-data because of a mooted "predictive value"...

There's also this gem...

For the only way in which one can test whether a series of perceptions is veridical, in this sense, is to see whether it is substantiated by further sense-experiences , so that once again the ascription of “ reality ” depends upon the predictive value of the sense-data on which the perceptions are based. So long as the general structure of my sense-data conforms to the expectations that I derive from the memory of my past experience, I remain convinced that I am not living in a dream , and the longer the series of successful predictions is extended, the smaller becomes the probability that I am mistaken — p.274

Ayer only knows he's not dreaming because reality is repetitive. Not much of an argument.

The most that we can do is to elaborate a technique for predicting the course of our sensory experience, and to adhere to it so long as it is found to be reliable. And this is all that is essentially involved in our belief in the reality of the physical world. — Ayer, P.274

Almost pragmatic.

But we can probably agree that there is a feeling that simply to analyse a disposition (potential, capacity, ability, skill, tendency, liability, habit, custom) as a counter-factual that x would happen if... is not enough. But I notice that you never specify what would count as the bottom of it. But we do look for, and often find, a basis for the disposition. Petrol is flammable because its' molecular structure is such that it easily reacts with the oxygen in the air and so forth. Most ice floats because its molecular structure makes it less dense and therefore lighter, than water. But these are empirical discoveries. So the most that we can say is that a disposition includes the idea that there is a causal basis for the counter-factual, but no more than that. In the end, it's just an application of the principle of sufficient reason. — Ludwig V

You are not at all paying attention to the difference between capacity, or potential, and a disposition, which I explained. They are opposing terms in the sense that capacity is the freedom to act in a multitude of different way, while a disposition is a restriction to that capacity, resulting in one specific type of action. That is why explaining potential, capacity, skill, liability habit, custom, etc., in terms of dispositions can never be sufficient.

It's very clear to me, that we do not ever get to the bottom of a disposition, because the singularity of the disposition becomes unintelligible when we try to make it consistent with the underlying multitude of possibilities. Molecular structure is not "the bottom" . We must look at the structure of atoms and electron shells to understand the underlying potential which gets tied up in the disposition you call "molecular structure". Then we get faced with the reality of quantum particles being described as possibilities. Ultimately the question of why specific possibilities are selected to be actualized (wave function collapse) cannot be answered. The tendency, in the modern mindset is to ignore the necessity of the act of selection, therefore deny the logical requirement of an agent which selects, and simply assume that the underlying potential restricts or limits itself (self-organization) in an habitual way, resulting in the describable disposition.

My problem with your view is that, so far as I can see, your view of capacity and potential are wide open to the objection that Berkeley rightly levels against the scholastic idea of matter as pure potential and Locke's view that substance is something unknown - that it is empty. — Ludwig V

These arguments both, can only remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance, by replacing it with something actual. This is the actuality of God. The problem though, is that the reality of potential cannot simply be replaced by the actuality of God, because this produces determinism, which is inconsistent with our experience. Therefore to maintain the reality of free will we must maintain the reality of potential. However, since the concept of free will in human beings cannot account for the agent involved in the selection from the possibilities which underly the natural dispositions you refer to, such as molecular structures, we do not avoid the need for the Will of God.

Thanks for this. But isn't it also true that the Theory of Forms presents an idea that seems to be a generalization of mathematics and provide a basis for his view that the things of this world are but shadows of reality? I would have thought that Plato was quite able to hold a view and recognize difficulties with it at the same time. — Ludwig V

The problems with the Theory of Forms, are more complex than you might think. It became evident to Plato that there was a need for "the good", as that which makes the Forms, as intelligible objects, intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Then he started to outline his understanding of the requirement of a medium between the Forms and the things of the sensible world. This medium was Plato's solution to the interaction problem often attributed to dualism.

Showing that Ayer's metaphysics is misconceived is itself a deeply metaphysical activity. — Banno

Has anybody here actually read any Ayers? — frank

I've read enough of A.J. Ayer to know that the way to show his metaphysics as misconceived is through his moral philosophy. He seems to misinterpret the classical (Aristotelian) distinction between the apparent good, and the real good, such that he cannot find any principles which might distinguish these two. I think Copleston provides a good approach.

What is the point trying to create a well with just Austin's linguistic analysis on Ayer?...

<snip>

...Wouldn't the water in the well go stale soon with the prejudice and narrow mindedness rejecting all the relating issues, analysis and criticisms? — Corvus

The well is Austin's criticism of Ayer's position. The conversation is based upon that. In the conversation, relevant replies dip from exactly that well. Germane points and subsequent conversation are not creating the well. They're using it; drawing it up from the depths... examining its contents.

Valid objection/criticism of Austin's critique of Ayer's position is perfectly fine. If the criticism is broad, and it somehow applies locally to this particular thread topic, then that connection ought be set out in as clear and concise language as possible.

There is no logical ground for me to believe the world exists during my sleep, because I no longer perceive the world until waking up to consciousness. Therefore perception is prior to language. — Corvus

The last claim above does not follow from the bit that precedes it.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.

Do we always change the world? With language?
Can you change the tree on the road with your words? — Corvus

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.

The point is that we do sometimes use language to do exactly what you said, but... and this is the important part...

We do other stuff with it too.

I downloaded this PDF:

https://ia804706.us.archive.org/19/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46395/2015.46395.Foundations-Of-Empirical-Knowledge_text.pdf

And things still seem to be working OK.