It would not occur to anyone to conclude that a man is asleep from his saying "I am asleep' any more than to conclude that he is unconscious from his saying 'I am unconscious', or to conclude that he is dead from his saying 'I am dead'." — Richard B

:grin: Good stuff. Very droll! Hope others are enjoying these jokes.

"If a philosopher uses the phrase 'mental phenomenon', say, in such a way that dreams are mental phenomena by definition, then obviously no argument is going to prove to him that they are not. — Richard B

See 's comments regarding representation and mental imagery. There's a lot of variety int he way these ideas are used in philosophical discussion. I'm not at all surprised to find some disparity even amongst those that share basic philosophical methods.

Add that to recent studies showing that folk have very different styles of cognition - not just aphantasia, but a much larger variation, to the extent that it has been suggested that no two minds need quite be the same in how much of their cognition is visual, how much linguistic, and exactly what these both mean.

After all, why should we think that what goes on in everyone's minds is much the same? Why shouldn;t folk give vastly different accounts of their own cogitations?

And hence why should we expect any agreement on "mental Phenomena"?

But what linguistic philosophers, or adept psychologists, might be able to do here is to outline some sort of common ground or some general features, perhaps a "grammar" on which there is more agreement than disagreement.

I'm dubious that any such grammar might include stuff that could clearly be called "qualitative".

This is all very speculative, mere hand waving. The point is to indicate that we might not have good reason to expect much agreement here. Why should we expect there to be one universal account of consciousness, dreaming, cogitation and such?

See The last great mystery of the mind: meet the people who have unusual – or non-existent – inner voices

and Most of us have an inner voice, but if you're part of the minority who doesn't, this could be why

and mostly Cognition: do we all think in the same way?

what are you referring to with "contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works"? There's lots of critique out there. What do you have in mind? — Banno

I was just guessing there would be, but I don't have any in particular. From my own view, I am not sure if Ordinary Language Philosophy can grasp and understand the world in full, because

1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.
2. Language never have access to the world direct.
3. Language is the last activity in the chain of the mental events i.e. you perceive, think, then speak in that order, never the other way around.

That's pretty general. I don't see anything specific enough there to warrant a detailed reply, and in any case, my purpose and interest here is specific, the one book by Austin.

Look, if you need to have a go at Austin, there is already plenty of material out there you can use.
If you want to understand where things went after Austin, read up on Peter Strawson and Paul Grice. Strawson and Austin clashed over the analysis of truth, while Grice inserted a very fine blade between use and meaning, forcing the two apart again. The result was a turn away from natural language in favour of formal languages, especially the work of Kripke and Davidson.

This would be very interesting material for follow up on, perhaps in another thread, or after the material that is at hand here.

I was not having a go at Austin. I was just responding to your question. (rememebr you asked me a question?)

I was wondering if rejecting all other points being raised with Austin's methodology and the points of his book, but keep on insisting to be recalcitrant for staying in the only one book of Austin, in that one book only, and regurgitating what he said repeatedly would be a good approach in understanding Austin. Because at the end of the day, it is a topic of Linguistic Philosophy as well as Perception.

Meh. Keeping to one book or article has proved to be a good way to manage a thread. I've done a few of them. The topic has induced more interest than I thought it would, so maybe it would be worth looking at a few of the Philosophical Papers later.

And if you find the topic repetitive, go do something else. You don't have to be here.

But equally, I'm not obligated to reply to your posts.

I didn't mean the topic is not interesting. I was wondering why anyone should reject the related points being rasied with the topic insisting on staying only in the book. It sounded like some religious ceremonial reading rather than philsophical debate.

I never asked or expect anyone to reply to me. It is totally up to you whether you reply or not. I have been keeping responding to the questions to me, and where I feel related and appropriate, asking back and expressing my own point of view.

The topic has induced more interest than I thought it would... — Banno

Though I haven't had time to read the book, I've very much appreciated the discussion.

Ok.

I've very much appreciated the discussion. — wonderer1

Yeah, it's attracted some fine, intelligent comment, and gone in a few unexpected directions. Most pleasing.

I don’t claim anything in particular about it other than as an example of the standard, which Plato in the Theatetus and Descartes set out better than me. — Antony Nickles

That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm, "the standard" for knowledge. Perhaps Descartes characterizes it like that, but definitely not Plato in his later work, nor Wittgenstein in his later work. Even Russel found problems with math, as evidenced by the paradox he pointed to.

For these philosophers the search for certainty in knowledge leads them to mathematics, but upon analysis math becomes very problematic and disillusionment follows. In the Theaetetus for example, Plato may have presented math as if it was supposed to be the standard, but then exposed problems with that presupposition, and in the Parmenides, he demonstrates problems with math's basic foundational concept, "one", or "unity".

Ok. — Banno

Yeah, feel free. No pressure. Although I had some criticisms on the methodology and the subject itself, I also must admit that I have learnt a lot during the readings of "Sense and Sensibilia".

Why should we expect there to be one universal account of consciousness, dreaming, cogitation and such? — Banno

I'm not all that surprised that there is a variety of first person accounts of various mental phenomena. I'm sure that we all tend to fall victim to the assumption that everyone else is just like me. It's more dangerous when that assumption becomes the idea that everyone else ought to be like me or that there is something wrong when other people turn out to be different from me. (There's an overtone in the very terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" that I think is very dangerous. They are not necessarily pathologies.)

These are first person accounts, not objective reports. The fact that people give such accounts is important, but should not be taken to suggest that they are true, or at least it needs to be taken into account that they are unverifiable (not therefore meaningless). Compare the ways that the medical profession treats "I am in pain". Compare also the trouble that we have (should have) with dreams.

Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception. — Corvus

I'm afraid this triggers one of my hobby-horses. Language is also for expressing emotions, giving orders, consoling people, deceiving people, inspiring the troops, shaming wrong-doers and many other things. Focusing on one, admittedly important, use of language narrows the vision of philosophy and distorts the understanding of people living in the world.
There is, I believe, even an argument that the origins of language, assuming they lie in animal communication systems are severely practical things like expressing peaceful or aggressive intentions, making demands, expressing anger, fear, pleasure and pain and such.
The theoretical uses of language are not the core, but a derivative, and arguably still marginal, use of language.

The infinite regress is only avoided by stopping, which renders the capacity as still not understood, because we do not get to the bottom of it — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this way of looking at an infinite regress has occurred to me. One issue is that once you have taken the first step, you need a reason for not taking the second step.... Or, you need a reason for stopping. The standard view of this, as I'm sure you are aware, is that the infinity of the regress is real, so that, for example, Achilles can never catch the tortoise or we can never acquire a disposition. Wittgenstein takes issue with this, but it is still regarded as a problem.

But we can probably agree that there is a feeling that simply to analyse a disposition (potential, capacity, ability, skill, tendency, liability, habit, custom) as a counter-factual that x would happen if... is not enough. But I notice that you never specify what would count as the bottom of it. But we do look for, and often find, a basis for the disposition. Petrol is flammable because its' molecular structure is such that it easily reacts with the oxygen in the air and so forth. Most ice floats because its molecular structure makes it less dense and therefore lighter, than water. But these are empirical discoveries. So the most that we can say is that a disposition includes the idea that there is a causal basis for the counter-factual, but no more than that. In the end, it's just an application of the principle of sufficient reason.

I know that's not very well argued, but I hope it is enough to suggest at least that there is an alternative view to yours.

My problem with your view is that, so far as I can see, your view of capacity and potential are wide open to the objection that Berkeley rightly levels against the scholastic idea of matter as pure potential and Locke's view that substance is something unknown - that it is empty.

So the math does not provide us with any higher degree of certainty about the world than other language forms, because it is applied according to principles stated in other forms of language anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, mathematics applied to the world is subject to the same caveats and limitations as any other empirical knowledge. The idea of mathematics as something different is about pure mathematics and purely mathematical objects, like numbers.

Plato may have presented math as if it was supposed to be the standard, but then exposed problems with that presupposition, and in the Parmenides, he demonstrates problems with math's basic foundational concept, "one", or "unity". — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for this. But isn't it also true that the Theory of Forms presents an idea that seems to be a generalization of mathematics and provide a basis for his view that the things of this world are but shadows of reality? I would have thought that Plato was quite able to hold a view and recognize difficulties with it at the same time.

While Malcolm gives a little here, there is not much left over to compare whether a conscious experience of a dream is "qualitatively" similar or different to a conscious experience of being awake. — Richard B

Well, I would not say that there is never a give-away within the experience, so to speak. On the contrary, the fact that I seem to be flying might be regarded as a clue. But somehow, such clues seldom, if ever, get picked up. So it is not really the experience that doesn't give away the truth, but the experiencer who doesn't pick up the clues - until they wake up the following morning. But this doesn't amount to a dream-like quality that tells the dreamer what is going on.

I’m not sure where Austin put forward “this idea” of what we do in dreams. — Antony Nickles

The quotation from Austin is:- "I may have the experience (dubbed 'delusive' presumably) of dreaming that I am being presented to the Pope. Could it be seriously suggested that having this dream is 'qualitatively indistinguishable' from actually being presented to the Pope? Quite obviously not. After all, we have the phrase 'a dream-like quality'; some waking experiences are said to have this dream-like quality, and some artists and writers occasionally try to impart it, usually with scant success, to their works." pp. 48, 49.

It's the last sentence I take issue with.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

As an additional note on Lecture VII: Part of philosophy’s problem (exemplified by Ayer) is that the desire for a perfect knowledge, and the subsequent resignation to an imperfect knowledge, both only allow for a fixed outcome (of knowledge, or a “perception”, or “appearance”, or “mental process”, or “meaning”). In this lecture about “reality” Austin is also explaining how our relationship with the world is more than just information, such as would correspond to (equate with) an “objective” world.

As I discussed earlier, one point is that you can’t “fool around” (p.62) with words because of the way they work—the distinctions they make, what they count as doing or being something—is taken from how the world works (their criteria are: what has mattered to our society, what is “really important” (p.77))—I mean, you can fool around, but you look like a madman, or a poet.

Another point, again, is that the situation that we find ourselves in matters, so it is always a discussion of an event (as Ricouer would call it)—a moment in time with a past and you and another with things a certain way, even expectations, etc. To call this just a context though might miss the fact that it also has a future. We do not just see something and either get it (“really” know it) or do not (as an immediate “perception”, just indirect now). We make mistakes, but we correct ourselves; we jump to conclusions, but we can dig deeper and learn more; we apologize, make excuses; but we carry on--despite not having perfect knowledge--without cutting ourselves off from the world.

Another difference with fixed knowledge is that it does not do well with ambiguity, and when we don’t know how to "proceed" (Wittgenstein discusses this as "being able to continue", e.g. a series). As Austin says, there may not be “any right answer” (p.66) and, that, in certain cases, “there is no right answer… no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined.” (P.67) These are the kinds of situations that create the fear of radical skepticism, which philosophy believes can only be resolved by definite knowledge (but then it can’t get it). Austin shows that, despite our not knowing what is “right”, or having a “rule” or a “procedure” or determined “answer”, we still manage to move forward in situations where there is no “tidy, straightforward style” (p.72). His example is that “like” allows us to “adjust” (p.73) our language to adapt to something new, not simple. And being able to account for outliers is not a strong suit for objective criteria; for example, when “pig” has a “meaning” that is a universal amongst particulars. Austin is pointing out that in not demanding a universal “pig”, or a “new world” (i.e. “reality”), but in having "flexibility" (p. 74), we are actually "more precise" (Id.) and can better handle the "unforeseen" (p.75), which is to say, we proceed with the ability to readdress the situation; we can live through it without figuring it all out ahead of time (deontologically, teleologically (what is “right”? A rule, a value?) Thus Austin says, the criteria we employ at a given time can’t be taken as "final, not liable to change.” (p. 76) And that openendedness allows our understandings to adapt as our lives change.

That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it’s not the answer that matters, it’s the desire for an “answer”: something universal, generalized, predetermined, predictable, perfectly logical, etc., e.g., God, the forms, the thing-in-itself, consciousness, reality, sense data, qualia, etc. Austin is saying the whole enterprise is wrong from the get-go.

Part of philosophy’s problem (exemplified by Ayer) is that the desire for a perfect knowledge, and the subsequent resignation to an imperfect knowledge, both only allow for a fixed outcome (of knowledge, or a “perception”, or “appearance”, or “mental process”, or “meaning”). — Antony Nickles

You keep reminding me of Dewey. That's a good thing for me, but perhaps not for others. See his The Quest for Certainty. Analytic and OLP philosophers weren't the only ones seeking to cure philosophy of its various ills.

Thanks for that excellent summary.

A foot-note. There is an additional aspect to this desire for certainty. It is the tendency to universalize. Admittedly not everything is certain (sometimes our sense deceive us), but equally not everything is uncertain (sometimes our senses do not deceive us).

You keep reminding me of Dewey. That's a good thing for me, but perhaps not for others. See his The Quest for Certainty. Analytic and OLP philosophers weren't the only ones seeking to cure philosophy of its various ills. — Ciceronianus

I do think it is important at some point (once we have the complete reading under our belt) to differentiate Austin from Dewey from Wittgenstein, etc. Preliminarily, I think Dewey and Austin don't take into consideration the continuing fear of skepticism (given the powerlessness of our ordinary criteria) in the same way as Wittgenstein, who sympathizes with, and tries to understand, the skeptic's desire (as he fell into that trap with the Tractatus), rather than the, say, condescension that Austin gives off, or Dewey's belief in procedure (or something like that).

phhfttt, fail

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

There is an additional aspect to this desire for certainty. It is the tendency to universalize. Admittedly not everything is certain (sometimes our sense deceive us), but equally not everything is uncertain (sometimes our senses do not deceive us). — Ludwig V

Absolutely. Reacting to the fact that we can't know ahead of time when and how we will make mistakes, be deceived, be judged for not doing the right thing, come to an impasse with others, etc. pushes us towards the vision that we only see "our perception" or only "particular" parts of a chair, i.e., that our relation to the world is always mitigated. The desire for "purity" as Wittgenstein puts it, or "certainty" as Cavell terms it, results in the abstraction from individual cases, turning the state of our situation into an intellectual "problem" which we want to solve universally (beforehand), for any case, so we will never be wrong again, not have to be responsible for our errors and moral duty.

This is why Austin is giving us an overview** of the case-specific actions we can take to reconcile (after the fact) the issues that skepticism takes as simply a failure of knowledge, to show that the individual case is not a weakness, but a strength, as the mechanics work better given the details of the particular, rather than the abstraction to a universal.

**Wittgenstein also investigates examples of the universalization of philosophical issues (rules, others, mental processes, etc.) by showing us a "clear view" of specific "intermediate cases" (see quote below) so we might see how our ordinary criteria are sufficient, precise, etc. despite our disappointment that they can't keep us out of trouble. "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. PI, #122.

I don't think there are much in the way of metaphysical implications from Austin, do you? He's just pointing out the way we speak.

I don't think there are much in the way of metaphysical implications from Austin, do you? He's just pointing out the way we speak. — frank

This is a common misconception. I don't think Austin does himself any favors by saying he is just examining "sense perception" and not directly explaining the implications of what he is doing, and then just jumping into examples. For one, his critique of Ayer is an example of a larger philosophical issue, which includes metaphysics. "The case of 'universal' and 'particular', or 'individual', is similar in some respects though of course not in all." (p.4 fn1) And, also, Austin is denying there is "reality" (directly addressing the metaphysical), which Ayer is arguing we just don't have direct access to (p. 3 and Lec. VII -- I discuss that here).

I address the underestimation of Austin, as just "pointing out the way we speak", here above, but the gist of it is that the things we say (or could say) in situations reflect the criteria we use in judging a thing, and the mechanics of how the world actually works. What we say when talking about "real" are an expression of what matters to us about it, what we count as applicable, how mistakes are corrected, etc.

or Dewey's belief in procedure (or something like that). — Antony Nickles

Method, more specifically, I think (the method of "inquiry").

An excellent series of posts. I can't avoid the suspicion that what you are doing is reading Cavell into Austin; that the arc expressed here is not as explicit as you make it seem. But all the same, that doesn't matter, because it fits what Austin wrote so well. Perhaps one can only read Cavell into Austin because of the Austin in Cavell.

Method, more specifically, I think (the method of "inquiry"). — Ciceronianus

My Dewey is rusty; "method" rings a bell now. I leave it to you to draw those distinctions at some point.

but the gist of it is that the things we say (or could say) in situations reflect the criteria we use in judging a thing, and the mechanics of how the world actually works. What we say when talking about "real" are an expression of what matters to us about it, what we count as applicable, how mistakes are corrected, etc. — Antony Nickles

So if everyone says "God created the world in six days", would that reflect the mechanics of how the world actually works?

There's an overtone in the very terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" that I think is very dangerous. They are not necessarily pathologies — Ludwig V

Quite agree. This seems to be coming to the fore - that there is no single way in which to be conscious.

The theoretical uses of language are not the core... — Ludwig V

For me the key here was Davidson's A nice derangement of epitaphs. Any account can be actively undermined and falsified by another account. Also, formally, an account can be consistent, but only if it is incomplete; or it can be complete, but only if it is inconsistent. Perhaps this is why "not everything is certain, but equally not everything is uncertain".

I don't think any of 's three points are cogent. To a large extent that is what this thread is about.

I can't avoid the suspicion that... the arc expressed here is not as explicit as you make it seem. — Banno

Where Wittgenstein is enigmatic and full of questions, I think Austin takes too much for granted that we will see the implications of what he is doing, and so I do think part of the effort has to be making explicit why he is pointing out what he does (apart from just eviscerating Ayer's position). I find the offhand comments to be the most important almost.

My hope was not to bring Cavell's interests and conclusions into this reading of Austin, but I have let myself be goaded (with all this dismissive talk of "just language" and "quibbling") into expanding on the reasons why philosophy wants something like Ayer's "solution", which is how Cavell sees Wittgenstein going further than what seems like Austin simply refuting Ayer.

I should resolve myself to just doing my reading and responding to those doing the same, but I always hope there is some possibility of getting through to people if I could just say the right thing. But how do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong. It makes me think Austin is even more of a genius because he can make sense of Ayer.

I’m not so sure. I cannot see the difference between the body and a bodily process. When I point to either, or both, I am pointing at the same thing. I don’t know how to distinguish between the thing that moves and the movements it makes, as if I was distinguishing between the morning and the evening star. — NOS4A2

The way I understand it, the movements of the body are not separate from the body, but are just aspects of it; so, I don't know how not to distinguish between the two.

That doesn't mean that there is no way of determining which theory is more right, or less wrong. — Ludwig V

I know how to determine which philosophical theories seem more or less right and wrong to me, but not how they seem to other. I can't but think that we all have our own methods and criteria for determining that, and that those methods and criteria are based on our most fundamental presuppositions..

You have put your finger on the way to determine which theory is more right or less wrong. Now, how does one establish whether a theory has any intellectual appeal? By argument, perhaps? — Ludwig V

I know which theories have intellectual appeal to me, and I have to go on what others tell me about what seems to be most appealing to them. By argument or discussion, I might find out what others are convinced by, and i may or may not agree with them. There is a possibility that I or others may change their mind if a convincing counterargument is presented, but my experience on these forums leads me to think that that is relatively rare.

re-thinking

was there something about the work or my reading that you are confused with or disagree with specifically? — Antony Nickles

I just disagree that there are metaphysical truths we can pull out of the way we speak. It's frequently difficult to even pin point how our speech refers, much less discover great truths in grammar.

So if everyone says "God created the world in six days", would that reflect the mechanics of how the world actually works? — frank

You're thinking of "the world" as not including origin stories, mythology, religious belief, etc. That there is, for example, nothing meaningful to anyone about having the world be created. This is an example of judgment by one standard, e.g. what is "real".