But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate. — boethius

I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making.

Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.

Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces.

Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering.

Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life. — boethius

There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground.

Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war?

Neither I nor Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic. — boethius

I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. That is simply wrong and inconsistent with the known facts. It became very clear when you tried to argue for that theory, as you have quickly shown that you lack knowledge of the basic facts and timelines. I understand that you try to save face now, but trying to gloss over your gross inaccuracies is not the way to do it - it just shows that you are eager to discuss things you know little about and backtrack when faced with facts instead of admitting your errors.

I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making. — Echarmion

I agree that Putin et. al. may have believed in a quick and easy victory, either confident in their cunning or then underestimating both the Ukrainians and the CIA. However, the plan the implement clearly prepares for things taking longer and being more difficult and more expensive: otherwise you don't amass hundreds of billions of USD worth of reserves and bullion and you don't put so much effort into being sure to take the land bridge (such as a sophisticated signals and intelligence operation resulting in uncontested advances; Kherson being the most notable in not only taking the city uncontested but bridges across the Dnieper).

Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.

Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces. — Echarmion

Despite these advantages, Ukraine still has hundreds of thousands of troops and hundreds thousands more that can be mobilized and a huge area to operate on.

If Russia takes advantage of the massive border to make essentially uncontested advances (what happens) that creates deep salients that are vulnerable to harassment or even being cut off once Ukraine organizes to arrest the advances; to prevent harassment would require widening the salient significantly which in turn requires significantly more troops to take urban centres in difficult Urban combat and then effectively occupy and pacify these regions. To accomplish this in Northern Ukraine would require hundreds of thousands of additional troops; likely more troops than Russia has in its standing army (as the region is intensely hostile; it's far easier to accomplish in Russian speaking regions in the South, which may explain Russias decision to occupy there, in addition to the land bridge to Crimea and securing fresh water to Crimea being of critical strategic importance, in addition to the mineral resources and industrial capacity).

Russia simply does not have the numbers to occupy all of Ukraine or even a relatively small hostile part of it. A basic rule of thumb to be sure to pacify a population is requiring between 10 and 20 soldiers per 100 inhabitants; 10 being probably certain to achieve pacification and 20 being probably insufficient if the population is hostile (these numbers are often cited to explain why the US fails to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan).

Based on such received wisdom, Russia would need millions of troops to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine. Russia could do it, but it would be incredibly costly in terms of direct costs and consequence for the Russian economy as well as not be worth much. The land bridge to Crimea, the entirety of the Azov sea, securing fresh water to Crimea and an additional defensive buffer zone, all the resources there (from an imperial perspective) are "worth" a cost to pay. As it stands, the Russian plan has secured plenty of valuable assets, whereas occupying all of Ukraine would be an immense liability and be completely unworkable long term.

@Tzeentch has explained this several times but above is further elaboration of why Russia likely has no interest in occupying Kiev much less all of Ukraine.

Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering. — Echarmion

My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis.

There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground. — Echarmion

Well the situation on the ground is that Ukraine has not taken back any significant territory for essentially a year in which to affect the negotiation table, and if Ukraine is losing the war of attrition and reaching its limits in terms of man power then their position is even worse as they cannot credibly threaten to prolong the war and credibly threaten significant damage to the Russians (the major leverage a smaller power has in fighting a larger power: that continued may damage themselves but will be costly to the larger power also).

Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war? — Echarmion

It depends what the peace deal is.

What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal.

The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve.

Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and a global schism in economic and political cooperation.

My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis. — boethius

This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles.

What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal. — boethius

There were several rounds of negotiations which presumably included an exchange of proposals, so I don't know why you'd assume that it's only Ukraine that doesn't want to negotiate.

The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve. — boethius

As I recall there were constant diplomatic efforts during the troop buildup. Is Ukraine also solely responsible for all of these failing?

Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and creates a global schism in economic cooperation. — boethius

So you don't credit the argument that a war of aggression, or a threat with such a war, cannot become an instrument in international politics?

This goes back to the core of the moral question: if we're only concerned about limiting damage, doesn't that leave us fatally exposed to an agreessor?

I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. — Jabberwock

The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation.

As important to my argument as negotiations obviously not succeeding and pretty bad signs such as negotiators being shot:

Clashing reports emerged Saturday surrounding the death of a Ukrainian identified by media as a member of the country’s negotiating team with Russia.

First, widespread reports in local media and social media throughout the day claimed Denis Kireev, who had been photographed taking part in negotiations in Belarus in recent days, had been killed by Ukrainian security forces during an attempt to arrest him.

Kireev, the reports asserted, had been suspected of treason. — Reports claim Ukraine negotiator shot for treason - Times of Israel

Is that Mariupol was effectively occupied by the end of March:

On 28 March, Mayor Vadym Boychenko said "we are in the hands of the occupiers today" in a televised interview,[182] and a spokesman for the Mariupol mayor's office announced that "nearly 5,000 people" had been killed in the city since the start of the siege.[183][184][185] The Ukrainian government estimated that "from 20,000 to 30,000" Mariupol residents had been forcibly sent[186] to camps in Russia[163] under Russian military control.[186] During the day, Russian forces seized the administrative building in the northern Kalmiuskyi District[13] and the military headquarters of the Azov Regiment.[187] The next day, Russian forces were reported to have likely divided Ukrainian troops in the city into two and possibly even three pockets.[188] — Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia

And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument.

What Russian military commanders would have feared is an operation to relieve the forces in Mariupol either by reaching Mariupol or then allowing for the Ukrainian forces to break out and reach some Ukrainian Salient coming towards them (heroic deeds for the Ukrainians and an embarrassment for the Russians, and also losing the value of capturing a bunch of Azov guys).

So, once critical milestone is reached such as effectively securing the largest Ukrainian Urban centre in the south, then it makes sense to withdraw from the North (which is in anywise undermanned in a fixing operation and cannot last indefinitely) to solidify gains in the South: exactly what the Russians do.

If Russia intended to take and occupy Kiev then they would have committed far more troops and engaged in the kind of urban combat they do in Mariupol.

It's pretty common sense along with the fact that entire 200 000 troops Russia devotes to invading Ukraine could all be insufficient to occupy and pacify a hostile population the size of Kiev; so your theory involves the Russians trying to accomplish something that is commonly accepted wisdom in military schools to be impossible to do with the numbers the Russians have (and that's assuming they have zero losses, their entire force may still be insufficient to occupy and pacify Kiev ... and there would still be Ukrainian "resistance" throughout the rest of the country "doing stuff").

The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation. — boethius

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). It says the battle lasted that long, which is of course correct, but saying that the city was 'sieged' in that period just shows again that you have absolutely no clue what you are talking about. For starters, you can read the whole article, not just the first paragraph, maybe that will clear things up for you a bit. Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading.

And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument. — boethius

If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov:

Speaking about de-escalation in the Kiev and Chernigov areas, Peskov said it was a goodwill gesture, intended to create favorable conditions for continuing negotiations. — TASS

So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter.

ssu is confident Ukraine can last many years. — boethius

I think the total destruction of Ukraine is out of the question now. That Ukraine would defend itself like this wasn't before anticipated, after all the US offered Zelensky a way out (meaning they estimated Kyiv would fall in days). Now that has changed. I think the Western aid will be to at least enough for Ukraine to defend, it won't be enough to push Russia totally out. What basically Putin can do is sit behind the Suvorov-line and the make limited counterattacks.

Yet basically after the Ukraine war either halts or goes truly to the frozen conflict mode, then in few years Russia will have built back it's capability.

I take media propaganda with a grain of salt, and if I binged on it as much as the average TFP poster then I would be very worried about my salt intake indeed. — Tzeentch

Uhh... wouldn't be it according to your logic, that we lack our salt?

Sodium is an essential nutrient necessary for maintenance of plasma volume, acid-base balance, transmission of nerve impulses and normal cell function.

This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles. — Echarmion

No, it's called a prediction. Being confident in a prediction, such as the sun will rise tomorrow as it did today, does not take away from its predictive essence.

If the war ends with a deal better than what the Russians were offering both before and immediately following the invasion, then indeed Ukraine has at least achieved better terms of land or other things for all the blood sacrificed.

If the war ends with Russia retaining, even expanding upon, the territory it already occupies then I don't see how anyone could argue Ukraine fought to a superior negotiating position.

Or do you disagree with this diagnostic procedure?

Where you are wrong:

Let's start with the shelling industrial targets which was widely reported but you seem to want to deny:

Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading. — Jabberwock

The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks.

Here is a Ukrainian publication citing directly the original source of the municipal government:

Russian artillery has struck the Antonov factory in Kyiv, the municipal government said in a message on the Telegram messaging service on March 14.

Antonov is a state-owned aerospace and defense concern, famous for producing the AN-225 Mriya aircraft, the largest in the world prior to its destruction by Russian shelling. — Russia shells Antonov factory in Kyiv

Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones.

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Directly from the Wikipedia article:

Estonian Defence Forces intelligence chief Margo Grosberg estimated that the advancing Russian convoy would arrive to Kyiv's outer suburbs in at least two days, after which they would try to lay siege to the city. — Battle of Kyiv

You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.

Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city.

Since you are happy to use Wikipedia as an authority, under the heading "Post-World War II":

The siege of Khe Sanh displays typical features of modern sieges, as the defender has greater capacity to withstand the siege, the attacker's main aim is to bottle operational forces or create a strategic distraction, rather than take the siege to a conclusion. — Siege - Wikipedia

It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:

A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — Siege

Which, ironically, you are making exactly he point that the intention of the Russians is to conquer Kiev by "well prepared assault".

Point is, an army gets to a city, starts to surround the city, people living in the subway: fits the definition of a siege.

If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov: — Jabberwock

I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit.

They achieve key objectives in the meanwhile in the South, so cut their losses and evacuate the North.

As I mention, one con of this strategy is that if there is no quick peace deal and the Norther operation can't be sustained, then retreating will simply encourage the Ukrainians to fight more. So in terms of achieving a quick peace it is a gamble, but if it allows taking the South nearly uncontested (what happens) then if the peace gamble fails then at least there is something to show for the war effort as a whole.

I am not arguing the push to Kiev is some brilliant move that has only positive consequences. There are clearly pros and cons.

However, there are pros and cons, risks and advantages, to every strategy. If Russia only focused on the South, maybe Ukraine would have put up much fiercer resistance, broken the siege at Mariupol at least long enough to heroically evacuate Azov battalion, and the Russian military position would be much worse and that would simply encourage Ukraine to keep fighting.

The logic behind the multi-front war knowing ahead of time there is only resources to sustain the Southern front I would speculate has two foundations:

First, chaos and focus in the North will indeed allow conquering the south to be far easier and so if there's no peace then at least the critical strategic objective is achieved of the land bridge to Crimea and the Kremlin has "something to show for it" even if retreating in the North will be embarrassing on the moment.

Second, historically peace agreements are arrived at very quickly after fighting starts or then wars drag on for quite some time. So, based on historical precedent, if peace is not achieved in the first days and weeks of fighting, probably it won't happen in the short term, so the Russian actions apply maximum pressure at the start and if it does work then they'll fight the long war in the South.

So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter. — Jabberwock

They may have received intelligence or otherwise concluded that Ukraine will not be accepting peace a deal. As I say above, Ukraine may have simply been effective at arresting Russias advance and harassing the Russian supply lines and they are unable to sustain their positions.

Additionally, once Russia has what they want in the South, it maybe perfectly acceptable to the Kremlin that the war continue and they keep their gains. Anyone with an imperialist mindset in the Kremlin will rather the war continue than Ukraine accept the peace deal on offer and be given back all the territory.

If critical positions are achieved in the South, the it would be reasonable to argue that pulling back in the North is militarily the right move, and if Ukraine does not want peace then they shall have war.

Things can be quite complicated, but overall, clearly the Russian military achieves critical objectives with their plan and execution, so they are neither irrational nor incompetent.

I think the total destruction of Ukraine is out of the question now. — ssu

I agree that Russia does not intend to conquer all of Ukraine in any case, and "losing the war" for Ukraine means losing significant territory.

hat Ukraine would defend itself like this wasn't before anticipated, after all the US offered Zelensky a way out (meaning they estimated Kyiv would fall in days). Now that has changed. — ssu

Not anticipated by anyone who doesn't follow the analysis of this kind of thing, but there was plenty of analysis made before the war that the maximalist war aims of Russia would be taking the land bridge all the way to the Dnieper and Russia did not have the forces available to conquer all of Ukraine and also noting Ukraine has a sizeable army, battle hardened by 8 years of war in the Donbas, has advantage in defending, and is not a trivial army to defeat.

Since most people have zero clue about anything, the Western media quickly took advantage of people's perception of Ukraine as some small and backward Eastern European state that should be easy for "the Red army" (the term even being used from time to time, but I mean here to refer to people's perceptions) to topple over. Creating the myth of Russian incompetence was absolutely essential to establish the logic of refusing all negotiation. If analysts and officials admitted that Russia clearly had a sensible plan and conquered a lot of territory in the South that would be extremely difficult for Ukraine to re-conquer if the Russians had a minimum of sense and experience in warfare (which it turns out they do), then this would have severely undermined the momentum for fighting without any clear end state or viable path to victory.

Now that has changed. I think the Western aid will be to at least enough for Ukraine to defend, it won't be enough to push Russia totally out. What basically Putin can do is sit behind the Suvorov-line and the make limited counterattacks. — ssu

I would agree Ukraine could have certainly been able to defend had they been on the defensive and pulling back whenever positions got compromised.

However, since Ukraine defends political symbols and then even more foolishly attacks Russian fortifications, it's possible Ukraine has expended also its capacity for defence and may experience total military collapse.

In my view Russia does not want to conquer all of Ukraine, but total collapse of the front lines would mean Russia taking whatever it does want.

So I agree Ukraine won't be destroyed, but the main reason for this in my view is that Russia does not intend to completely conquer Ukraine (would be simply a long term liability, rather than Russian speaking regions with valuable resources which are long term assets).

Yet basically after the Ukraine war either halts or goes truly to the frozen conflict mode, then in few years Russia will have built back it's capability. — ssu

Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war.

Since this war and now the war in Gaza and general instability has made the world a far dangerous place, as soon as the war ends my prediction is not only will the Russian military be at essentially a climax of war fighting capability but it will find a hungry market to absorb the massive arms manufacturing pace the war has created.

Not everyone is a friend of the US, as surprising as that may seem to some, and everyone else will be buying battle tested arms from Russia at the high levels of production Russia has built up: this will fuel more wars around the globe.

As our environment degrades and the world starts to feel the pain, the cure for our woes will be the traditional one. Modernity, I would wager, was but a brief delirium between our fits of trembling and fever.

Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war. — boethius

My god you have completely lost it.

Not only do you believe in Putin the 4D playing master strategist and that all western information is propaganda.

You seriously believe that after taking massive casualties, loosing hundreds of armored vehicles and artillery and bring reduced to buying artillery ammunition from north Korea Russia is at peak fighting capability.

This is no longer just motivated reasoning it's complete fantasy. Not even russian propaganda would make such an absurd claim.

My god you have completely lost it. — Echarmion

Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. This kind of war makes an army (especially the one that wins) far more dangerous than at the start.

In parallel, Russia has greatly increased arms production.

Of course, a lot of capacity is continuously destroyed in Ukraine, but as soon as the war ends there will be a significant arms built up as well as availability for export.

Since most people have zero clue about anything — boethius

Of course, @boethius knows, but people for example in the White House had "zero clue". :roll:

Much weaponry and equipment [of Ukraine] remains outdated, however, with large numbers of old vehicles or old technology. The air force is a small fleet of Soviet helicopters and aging fighter jets whose effectiveness is questionable -- and would likely be wiped out quickly in the event of a major new Russian incursion, experts say.

"The Russians have learned a lot. The Russians have learned a lot from their operations in Syria, they've continued to reform their military," said Alexander Vindman, a former U.S. Army officer who served as European and Russian affairs director on the White House National Security Council.

"The Ukrainians have learned an enormous amount, but the advantage is still heavily in Russia's favor," he told RFE/RL. "So you're talking about a scenario where there could be heavier casualties, but the outcome doesn't really change."

and onwards...

(Carnegie endowment for international peace) Publicly available assessments suggest that the Ukrainian military would find it very difficult to defend against any large-scale Russian military operation. Some are downright pessimistic about its capabilities. Ukrainian holdings of systems like U.S. Javelin anti-tank missiles would not necessarily be enough to make the Kremlin more hesitant in calculating the cost of military action. Some analysts have suggested that the Kremlin could stage a rapid military onslaught to break the back of the Ukrainian military and force it to retreat behind the Dnieper River. This would position the Kremlin to control what is commonly referred to as “left-bank Ukraine,” including the historic part of Kyiv, which in Putin’s estimation makes up an inalienable part of the great Russian state. Presumably, the Kremlin might even try to install a puppet government in Kyiv and declare it “mission accomplished.”

Hence you are simply wrong in saying that "people who have no clue" making these pessimistic predictions. People simply thought that the Russian army was way more better than it was in 2022. Actions in Syria looked competent and remember that the perfect military operation was the annexation of Crimea. It was a smashing military victory. Exactly why Putin could be so confident in launching a bigger operation last year.

Of course, boethius knows, but people for example in the White House had "zero clue". :roll: — ssu

He is saying the same thing as I just said, that Ukraine can put up fierce resistance but

The Ukrainians have learned an enormous amount, but the advantage is still heavily in Russia's favor,

So you're talking about a scenario where there could be heavier casualties, but the outcome doesn't really change. — what SSU literally just cited

Their helicopter and jet fleet could be essentially "wiped out quickly" (which is essentially what happens and the West needs to scrounge up MIGs from elsewhere).

The author is not explaining how Ukraine will collapse in a matter of days but that Ukraine has "learned a lot" and does have fighting potential, just that Russia has a heave advantage and fighting the Russians will result in heavy casualties that does not ultimately change the outcome.

This is pretty much what all the analysts were saying before the war: that Ukraine can put up a fight, they do have hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a lot of equipment, and an immense territory.

Now, where analysts said Ukraine would lose relatively soon was in the context of zero support from the West, which I think we all agree here that if the West did not intervene Ukraine could not have lasted this long (at least in terms of conventional military fighting).

Hence you are simply wrong in saying that "people who have no clue" making these pessimistic predictions. People simply thought that the Russian army was way more better than it was in 2022. — ssu

The average public indeed have zero clue, the Russian invasion was ultimately arrested by massive support from the West.

This is the mythology, that somehow the small country of Ukraine that has basically no army and should be easy for Russia to simply knock over in a few days, somehow beat the odds and it therefore must be due to Russian incompetence and weakness, rather than massive support and intervention from the West (weapons systems, intelligence capabilities, finance of the entire Ukrainian military and government).

Of course, the West did not intervene enough to actually threaten a Russian defeat, and therefore, like the author you cite notes, the outcome does not ultimately change.

What is interesting here is that despite the Russian military clearly not being incompetent, achieving and then securing against Ukraine's much advertised offensive, critical strategic ground, effectively destroying not only Ukraines Soviet equipment but a large part of the entire regions, and now destroying Western armour in large quantities, there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda.

Propaganda that was critical to justify Ukraine repudiating any negotiation and promising the World victory over the Russians.

Which now we're told was never "really a thing" just something people say to motivate the troops to fight to a better negotiation position that no one can explain how Ukraine's current negotiation position is remotely improved in anyway compared to the start of the war.

Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. — boethius

Yeah, sure, and no doubt we'll soon see them rolling up the front in their Armata tanks, while a fleet of SU 57 jets clears the way.

there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda. — boethius

Oh, the irony!

We've discussed this already at length, what experts were saying before the war:

Likewise, article also gets right:
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

"The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case."

— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS — boethius

This is from conversation here nearly two years ago.

Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan @Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. It also supports the argument by @ssu that analysts expected the Ukrainian military to be destroyed as a cohesive fighting force in short order.

If you wanted to prove that you can't be assumed to argue in good faith, then you have succeeded.

What was RAND corporation saying before the war:

Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre- empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace.

Some analysts maintain that Russia lacks the resources to escalate the conflict. Ivan Medynskyi of the Kyiv-based Institute for World Policy argued, “War is expensive. Falling oil prices, economic decline, sanctions, and a campaign in Syria (all of which are likely to continue in 2016) leave little room for another large-scale military maneuver by Russia.”22 According to this view, Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a proxy war in Ukraine, although, given Russia’s size and the importance it places on Ukraine, this might be an overly optimistic assumption.

There is also some risk of weapons supplied to the Ukrainians winding up in the wrong hands. A RAND study conducted for the President of Ukraine found reasons for concern about the potential misuse of Western military aid. While Ukraine has been tarred by Russian propaganda claims that it mishandled Western military aid, the RAND team also found that “Ukraine’s paper systems for tracking equipment are outdated and vulnerable to corruption.”23 Moreover, the RAND team also expressed concern that, absent reforms to Ukraine’s defense industry, Western military equipment might be reverse- engineered and enter the international market in competition with U.S. suppliers. — Extending Russia - RAND Corporation

RAND essentially argues against what the US policy ultimately does:

The conclusion of the brief of their report on extending Russia is:

Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation. — Overextending and Unbalancing Russia, Brief - RAND corporation

The whole idea that Russia was expected to easily win is total mythical fabrication that was created after Russias initial success that saw some of the fastest armour advances in all of history so did seem (to lay people who have no clue) that Ukraine was collapsing and Russia was easily going to take the whole country.

However, anyone who has experience of soldiery or done honest study of war could easily point out that sustaining such advances at the same rate is logistically impossible, that Ukraine is huge and cannot possibly be overrun entirely in a matter of days or weeks, that one part of the Ukraine built up defences in the South collapsed but other parts didn't move at all, and that US intelligence capabilities is a massive advantage in coordinating a defence, Ukraine has hundreds of thousands of troops and many hundreds of thousands more that can be mobilized etc.

Therefore, when Ukraine arrests the initial invasion / Russia reaches logistical limits, it seems like a great and unforeseen victory and we can all enter magical thinking land where it will be easy to defeat the Russians and no need to ever negotiate!! Hurrah!!

Of course, arresting the initial invasion does not mean being poised to win the war, even if completely uncontested Russia could not occupy all of Ukraine with 200 000 troops.

What ultimately occurs was not unexpected. Ukrainians will likely fight back; that's what they've been preparing for and training for and what soldiers are conditioned to do. Ukraine can resist ... for a time. Russia has certainly the capacity to achieve some objectives (such as the land bridge to Crimea), but not all. The war could last but Russia has a heavy advantage.

Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. — Echarmion

What are you talking about? Are you unable to read??

The report literally starts by stating that conquering all of Ukraine is basically impossible if you take a closer look but Putin may conquer South East Ukraine ... which is what happens.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is amassing a large force near the Ukrainian border and reportedly has a military plan to invade and conquer most of unoccupied Ukraine. Western leaders are rightly taking the threat of such an invasion very seriously, and we cannot dismiss the possibility that Putin will order his military to execute it. However, the close look at what such an invasion would entail presented in this report and the risks and costs Putin would have to accept in ordering it leads us to forecast that he is very unlikely to launch an invasion of unoccupied Ukraine this winter. Putin is much more likely to send Russian forces into Belarus and possibly overtly into Russian-occupied Donbas. He might launch a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion. — Literally the first paragraph of the report in question

Now, the report uses the term "invasion" to mean intent to fully conquer Ukraine, and "limited incursion" for doing something like take a land bridge to Crimea.

I would not use this terminology as clearly invading anywhere in a country is still an invasion, but the paper is meant for other experts and the "invasion / incursion" distinction is made clear.

It analyses what an invasion would entail and that it's basically impossible with the forces Russia has so concludes it's exceedingly unlikely ... but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".

Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does.

So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East?

The end result is rational and achievable (limited incursion to establish a land bridge to Crimea) and accomplishes critical strategic objectives such as securing a long term defence of Crimea and something as trivial (in your analysis) as fresh water ... but somehow the start is irrational and the plan is to fully conquer Ukraine with 200 000 troops and only 10% of that force committed to the capital?

Why would irrational actors have rational results in a process as chaotic and complicated as a war?

The key paragraph to understand the report is on page 14:

Unless the United States and some NATO states actively participate in the fighting, the major variables are the time it takes the Russian military to achieve these aims and the cost it will have to pay in blood and equipment. The outcome of the initial fighting itself is not in doubt.

Reports of the plan and most discussions of the invasion stop at this point. — Report in question

The report explains the narrative in the media of what Putin is allegedly planning to do, and notes that the analysis then just stops at "Russia wins".

However, the author then explain how the alleged plan makes absolutely no sense if it were to be executed. Russia does not have enough troops to occupy all of Ukraine, nor the troops for massive urban combat in multiple cities, and even if cities would surrender as desired (which the author finds exceedingly unlikely), Ukrainians would very likely then conduct an insurgency and trying to do this thing of full scale conquest, even if initially successful, would not achieve any political objectives; it would be just attempting to conquer Ukraine for the sake of it and then have massive problems to deal with.

So either Putin is irrational or then whether intentional or not, Western media plays into what the actual plan is: a fixing operation in the North while the South-East (a feasible objective that serves a strategic purpose and conquers Russian speakers that are easier to pacify) is achieved, which is what happens. Also of note, many parts of the alleged plan do not ever happen, such as an amphibious assault on Odessa.

If the report is read carefully, the only military objective that is feasible with the forces under consideration is taking the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson ... which is what ultimately happens.

For example:

However, the deployment of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) at scale would pose a considerable challenge to Russia’s ability to flow supplies and reinforcements in by air until they established a wide perimeter around the airfield and along the landing approaches to it. — the report

To explain (one of many reasons) why taking Odessa in an amphibious assault would be exceedingly difficult.

Furthermore, the noted effect of MANPADS is what happens in the actual war, forcing Russian air power to stand-off positions, and so would have basically stranded any landing party trying to take Odessa in a full scale invasion as explained ... which maybe explains why that didn't happen, but ultimately only feasible military objectives were taken and occupied long term.

Russia conducts no urban combat in the North (essential for long term occupation) again: because there is no intention to occupy the North long term is the reasonable explanation.

The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks. — boethius

I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'.

Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones. — boethius

Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. Again, one example of shelling does not constitute 'positive outcome' in any sensible way. Beside that factory there were rather vague reports of a few shellings of the residential outskirts, but with no victim or damage reports. As I wrote the artillery shelling was negligible and you have provided zero evidence that would counter that.

You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.

Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city. — boethius

Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. It does not mean that it was the scenario that Russians necessarily planned. Not that it matters that much, given that the convoy got stalled, the main force never reached Kiyv, because it has overextended its supply lines. Thus the supposed 'siege' never happened, as I have already explained. Most of the forces in vicinity of Kiyv were quick, 'expeditionary' forces lacking heavy equipment and firepower, which run out of steam around the middle of March.

It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:

A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — boethius

Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. Given that Russian advance units (not even the main force) were stalled thirty kilometers from the city and rather far from 'nearly entirely encircling a city' (have you even looked at the map in the article?), the city was not blocked in any way, all units and civilians were free to move into and out of the city, because Russians did not have even the main roads in range. No blockade - no siege, according to the quote you have provided.

I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit. — boethius

I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. But you were not, you have made specific statements which were false and inconsistent with the known facts. There was no two-month or even one-month 'siege' by any sensible definition, the effects of shelling were negligible (because Russians have never got in range, contrary to your beliefs) and Russians left in the middle of the negotiations because their assault failed and they had no other choice. Finally, the composition of the force and the progress of the campaign clearly show that Russians were ill prepared for any 'siege' of reasonable duration.

but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".

Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does. — boethius

That's not what happened. I can't tell whether you're brazenly lying to my face or just for some weird reason unable to acknowledge anything that doesn't agree with your beliefs. In any event I see no reason to further engage with you.

What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'. — Jabberwock

Well, considering the shelling I was referring to is explicitly described as artillery shelling by the primary source for the information (the municipality of Kiev) in Ukrainian based publications, your issue with the article is totally irrelevant to our debate.

Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. — Jabberwock

As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation.

Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. — Jabberwock

You are correct, as far as the original source goes, the citation is:

If the Russian troops move forward at the same pace, it will be two days before they reach the suburbs of Kiev, followed by an operation to isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure. — Col. Margo Grosberg

Which Wikipedia correctly paraphrases as "siege".

All of which is a response to your claim that:

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word "siege" as it is at their discretion to describe the situation as a siege, which it obviously is.

Another appearance of the word "siege" in the Wikipedia page is a source, The Washington Post, who publishes an article literally called:

European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues — European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues - The Washington Post

But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege".

Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. — Jabberwock

The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev.

Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case.

It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege.

I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. — Jabberwock

The issues of contention in this particular part of the debate is:

1. Incompetence, as expressed by Jabberwock explicitly stating:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

2. Whether the intention of the Russians was to take and occupy Kiev, as expressed by you stating:

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

I, and also @Tzeentch, explain why the Russian actions are neither incompetent nor incoherent, that they make sense and achieve plenty of military objectives while also applying pressure on Kiev to accept peace terms (which clearly does not happen), to which you reply to these points with the straw man that:

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. — Jabberwock

No where do I say the Northern operation is some "kind of cunning Russian plan".

What are the obvious facts:

1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention.

2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city.

From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success.

Insofar as it is designed to pressure Kiev into accepting a quick peace, it is a failure.

Nowhere do I say the Northern operation is entirely successful. When I explain one purpose of the Northern operation is to pressure Kiev into accepting peace terms, I am very well aware that did not happen and the war continues.

Likewise, no where do I state that the Russian actions represent the best possible strategy. Perhaps things would have gone better for the Russians without the Northern operation, or then perhaps they would have been bogged down in trench warfare trying to break through the Donbas and their columns would have never left Crimea as Ukraine would have done the obvious thing of blowing up the bridges and digging in to prevent that from happening if they were free to focus on what is happening in the South.

The position I am defending is that the Russian plan makes sense and achieves some critical military objectives.

I state clearly that I do not know what probability the Kremlin assigned to Kiev completely capitulating or then accepting peace terms early on, but what is clear is that preparations are made for that not happening and the major military focus is placed on securing critical gains to have "something to show for it" if there is no peace agreement.

That's not what happened. — Echarmion

That's exactly what happens.

The "limited excursion" into South-Eastern Ukraine refers to establishing a land bridge to Crimea.

Literally called by the author "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea".

Which is the third "Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1" in an order of likelihood, following the most likely in the authors opinion:

1. Sub-COA 1a: Deploy Forces to Belarus

and 2. Sub-COA 1b: Overt Deployment in Donbas

Both of which also happen.

The situation on the ground at the moment is that Russia implemented exactly this reports top 3 likely things.

The options to view actions in the North that were abandoned are:

A. Putin and his generals also believed he could waltz in and take Kiev with 20 000 troops.

B. The northern operation was primarily representing a little thing in military parlance called "deception", to divert focus and resources in the North, while more feasible military objectives are achieved in the South.

The evidence for B is that Russia does not commit the troops remotely necessary to take a city of 3 million people, bypasses all urban centres (which are critical to capture for the purposes of long term occupation, but better to avoid if the operation is ephemeral) and does not engage in any Urban combat at all, whereas in the South fierce Urban combat takes place, particular in Mariupol, as the author predicts is necessary:

Securing a land route from Rostov to Crimea would require taking the heavily defended city of Mariupol — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine - Institute for the Study of War

So, what is more probable? That Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy Northern Ukraine with 20 000 troops ... or that the plan to do what Institute of the Study of War finds feasible with Russia's available forces involves a tiny bit of subterfuge and making the Ukrainians believe, at least at the very onset of the war, there is a full scale invasion with the purpose of taking the capital. Subterfuge perhaps aided by the West repeating at face value a "leaked plan" where Russia would take Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and all of Ukraine in one blow.

For people interested in actual reality, the second most basic of all military strategies immediately following the use of force, is deceiving the enemy.

If your objective is A you want your enemy to believe your objective is B.

If you want to break through at a point at A, let's call is A1, then you want to trick your enemy into reinforcing other points other than A1, ideally not even in the vicinity of A but to move forces to B and C and so on.

This is called "Defeat in Detail" or more popularly "Divide and Conquer" described by Wikipedia as:

Defeat in detail, or divide and conquer, is a military tactic of bringing a large portion of one's own force to bear on small enemy units in sequence, rather than engaging the bulk of the enemy force all at once. — Defeat in detail - wikipedia

The end result of all these deliberations is that Russia divides Ukrainian forces between defending the North and the South, allowing Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders in the South and conquer critically strategic terriroty.

The opposition here wants us to believe that this happened accidentally or then as a "consolation prize" to Russia's actual plan of defeating and occupying the North and installing a puppet regime, dedicating about 10% of their overall force in Ukraine to this primary objective.

This latter narrative has so little support that proponents are reduced to simply refusing to accept the common use of words like "siege".

What is more interesting than debating what "siege" means, is why the myth is developed that Russia has completely failed, incompetent, irrational, in disarray, in comparison to a standard of performance expected from the Russians (easily defeat all of Ukrainian forces in a few days, as little as 3, and occupy Kiev) that no expert expected before the war, is that it supports refusing negotiations, which is what the West, in particular the US, wants Ukraine to do.

As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation. — boethius

And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice.

Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word " — boethius

Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case. — boethius

It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range.

The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev. — boethius

No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you:



Russians did not blockade the city, as most of the roads were unobstructed and out of artillery range.

So either it was a failure as a quick forward attack to capture the city or it was a failure as a siege. You may insist it was the latter, but, as I wrote, there are facts that contradict that interpretation.

But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege". — boethius

Except they Russians did not encircle 'most of a city'. It is like saying 'I have nearly imprisoned him, because I closed one of the three doors available to him'. Well, it not 'imprisonment' nor 'near imprisonment'. 'One-third of a siege' is not a siege.

It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege. — boethius

It WOULD be a siege, if Russians managed to blockade the city, which they did not. Saying that there was a siege is simply false. And yes, I do have an obsession with attempts to dilute the initial arguments in such a way. The fact remains that your initial claims were false. No amount of bickering over the definitions will change that. 'Oh, two months were actually three weeks, two-month shelling of military targets was actually shelling of a single factory, the near encirclement of the city was actually getting 30 km from it from and one-third encircling it, and Russians did not stay until the negotiations broke down and run away in the middle, but generally, everything checks out'. No, it does not - these were false claims stated by you and they still remain false. You can either own up to it or continue bickering, but the end result will always be that I will remind you of your false initial claims and show again they were false. If you accept that you were completely wrong when you wrote that, we can discuss other things.

1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention. — boethius

Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes.

2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city. — boethius

Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops.

From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success. — boethius

The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. You do not move your advance troops (as you wrote yourself bypassing other centers of resistance, making them vulnerable to counterattacks) and then cut them off from resources. You do not form a 60 km column and leave it standing for days as sitting ducks. You do not leave your tanks after retreat, because they run out of fuel after a few days. There is no amount of incompetence that would allow any such diversionary plans to be executed.

For a fixing operation all you need to do is to gather your troops ready for an attack, maybe with some small incursions. Ukrainians would have to commit their defensive units anyway. You do not commit large forces into diversionary attacks by definiton. You do not drive your diversions deep into enemy lines overstretching your GLOCs, so then you have to commit even more troops to secure their withdrawal. You do not commit your best airborne troops in a diversion. Saying that the attack on Hostomel was a diversion is simply denying the facts.

It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. — boethius

Dude, read here:
Russia's demands in the early phases of the invasion included legal recognition for Russia's annexation of Crimea, independence of Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as demilitarization and "de-Nazification" of Ukraine

After Russia declared unilateral annexation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that recognition of these additional claims were necessary conditions for any peace plan.

In April 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that he wanted any peace negotiations to focus on creating a "new world order" to counter global hegemony of the United States.

Russia's demands were Ukraine's recognition of Russian-occupied Crimea, independence for separatist-controlled Luhansk and Donetsk, and "de-militarisation" and "de-Nazification". Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that while his country was ready for talks to resume, Russia's demands had not changed.

Dmitry Peskov restated Moscow's demands, that Ukraine should agree to change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, accept that the Crimea was Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you.

So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East? — boethius

By the way, it should be constantly repeated that this figure has been made up by Tzeentch and is a result of his complete misunderstanding the Russian command structure (and his bad arithmetics): https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/813992

While I understand it was just a mistake on his part, his further repeating it is simply dishonest. By treating it now as gospel, other debaters simply embarass themselves.

Since there has been some debate about what Mearsheimer actually believes about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I'll share this quote from a recent lecture given on the 23rd of October, 2023:

[Putin] has not come close to trying to conquer all of Ukraine. When he invaded Ukraine in 2022, they sent 190,000 troops in at the most. There is absolutely no way that a 190,000 troops could conquer Ukraine.

[...]

And if Putin were interested in all conquering of Ukraine, he would need at least 2,000,000, I would argue he would need at least 3,000,000 troops.* He did not have those kind of force levels. He did not try to conquer Kiev. The reason he invaded Ukraine is he wanted to force Zelensky to the bargaining table, so they could get some sort of agreement on Ukrainian neutrality, Ukraine not being in NATO. — John J. Mearsheimer

*Mearsheimer bases this on the German invasion of western Poland, and the size of Poland in relation to Ukraine. The lecture contains more detail.


Note that this is almost exactly my argument as I have defended it here for several months.