I don’t see a problem. Jim remains the same throughout while what he performs does not.

I don’t see a problem. Jim remains the same throughout while what he performs does not. — NOS4A2

Right, so Jim is a set of actions. Not one action.

Jim is Jim. Jim acts. He’s not a set of anything. We tend to abstract Jim into states of Jim. We name the states we have abstracted, make of them a set, and so on. It is at this point we have stopped considering Jim and now consider our own abstractions, ourselves.

Jim is Jim. Jim acts. He’s not a set of anything. We tend to abstract Jim into states of Jim. We name the states we have abstracted, make of them a set, and so on. It is at this point we have stopped considering Jim and now consider our own abstractions, ourselves. — NOS4A2

I agree. The outcome is: the actor is not the action.

The ability to perform that special activity is what defines "the perceiver" — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein, who would define having the ability to 'follow a rule' as someone who has been observed to have followed a specified rule, rather than as someone who has the capacity to follow that rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Forgive me, but if I understand you rightly, you are using "following a rule" as an example, but intend what you say to apply to all actions. I don't want to get involved in what W might have meant or not meant in his argument about this. So, if I may, I shall talk in terms of another example.

I choose "walking across the room" as my example. I think that you intend what you say to apply to that as well. I asked myself whether you intend what you say to non-actions, to what are called dispositions. These are somewhat different in that the disposition of a stone to resist impact from other bodies is not acquired by the stone but is built in, so to speak, when the rock is formed. So there can be no disposition before the disposition, so your argument doesn't apply. So I'll assume that a capacity is a disposition that is acquired, as tempering changes the properties of iron (and so we call it steel).

Wittgenstein is faced with the question of what type of capacity exists prior to this. — Metaphysician Undercover

From this perspective, the capacity to perceive, what we are calling "the perceiver", must necessarily preexist the act which is implied here by the name, as the act of perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a fake puzzle, based on the fact that we tend to use "capacity" in an ambiguous way. We say of an infant that cannot yet walk, or of someone that has not yet learnt to drive that they cannot walk or drive, but that they have to capacity to learn to walk, or drive and in that sense, can walk or drive. The capacity to learn or otherwise acquire, as skill is distinct from the exercise of that skill. Your infinite regress, I'm afraid, is little more than a pun.

Except that we acquire many skills by practice. The infant learns to walk by trying and failing and gradually getting better at it. We learn to drive by sitting in the driving seat and trying to drive and gradually getting better at it. This learning process is built on what we already can do, but which we have not learnt to do. Infants can do various things from birth and even before birth. These are the result of the physical development of the body, and can be compared to the tendency of the stone to resist pressure - that is, they are dispositions, not capacities.

Instead, we must accept the obvious, much more highly, and truly intuitive principle, that the capacity to perceive, which defines "the perceiver" must be prior in time to any act of perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I explained above, the capacity to learn to see is indeed "prior to" the capacity to see, but is not the same capacity as the capacity to see.

He could just have said that perceptions can lack certainty in certain cases. — Corvus

But that is exactly what he does say. He makes a big fuss about it because Ayer argues for a conception of perception that eliminates the possibility of uncertainty at the cost of depriving us of the ability to see anything except what is in our own heads. That's the issue.

I feel that perception doesn't end there, but it activates the other mental activities — Corvus

That's perfectly true. But those activities are not perception, so I'm not quite sure what your point is.

That's perfectly true. But those activities are not perception, so I'm not quite sure what your point is. — Ludwig V

The point is whether seeing an object in your mind, not in the external world should be included in perception. When you are not seeing the cup in the external world anymore, (having returned to your study room from the kitchen where the cup was), you could remember, think, imagine bringing the cup to your study room etc. You visualise the cup in your mind, and are seeing the mental images of the cup.

You visualise the cup in your mind, and are seeing mental images of the cup. — Corvus

I'm afraid I have a mild form of aphantasia. You can speak for yourself, but not for me.

See Wikipedia - aphantasia

I'm quite capable of thinking, remembering, imagining without seeing images. I'm glad of that. It enables me to drive to the shops, which involves remembering them, without seeing images that might interfere with driving safely. How do you manage?

The outline of how I think about this is here

Let me try to come at it this way. — Ludwig V

. There, I do consider the case of an actual image. My discussion of hallucinations deals with one form of mental images. I didn't consider this case. I'm reluctant to deny that people see something when they see mental images, because it seems that some people find them useful in, for example, problem-solving. However, in line with the empirical evidence, I do deny that people always see an actual image when they think about, remember, or imagine a cup.

I don't have a good understanding of the phenomenon. On the other hand, I have no problem saying that what one might call verbal thinking is just suppressed speech, as is reading silently to oneself.

I'm quite capable of thinking, remembering, imagining without seeing images. — Ludwig V

I’m very curious: you say you don’t experience visual remembrances. I take it that, then, for example, you cannot recall what a childhood pet dog (in case you had one) looks like—but can instead only recognize the pet’s visual appearance if you were to see a photograph of the former pet? Also, I take it that you are not able to manipulate a geometric object, such as a square, within your mind? (“Imagination” can be a very ambiguous term at times--due to its etymology not being representative of all the terms often seeks to convey.)

Does the aphantasia you experience by any chance extend to any other sense of perception: sound, touch, taste, smell, and so forth? For instance, can you experience any such thing as an “internal voice” while thinking?

The issue is besides the thread’s topic, but I’d welcome your response.

How do you manage? — Ludwig V

Taking your question at face value: speaking for myself, I view it as an ability that can be used or not used. As one additional tool in the toolbox of cognition. It in no way interferes with any day-to-day cognitive process.

---------

Since I’m posting on this thread, my own position is that all perception of the external world is directly real when addressed from any first-person point-of-view. When addressed from a third-person perspective, however, perceptions of the external world are known to differ; sometimes mildly, such as with the various types of color blindness among humans, sometimes starkly, as can be found in the sometimes starkly different perceptual senses of different species of life (e.g., we don’t perceive the magnetic fields the way homing pigeons, for example, do and always have—cf. magnetoreception); thereby implying indirect realism in terms of individuals’ perceptions of what the external world factually consists of. Because of this, to me, both direct and indirect realism are valid, but occur in different layers of reality as a whole. (Said this to contribute, but I’m not much inclined to read along with the literature of Austin and Ayers, though I’ve been reading parts of this thread.)

VIII
Austin returns to Ayer's text armed with the contents of the previous lecture. Ayer has attempted to explain perception, making a distinction between those that are "qualitatively delusional" and "existentially delusional". Austin's objection is that this gives the impression of their being only two cases to consider. He gives examples that break this proposed dichotomy. Ayer missed those cases where something is taken to be something that it isn't, entirely missing what is perhaps the most common delusion.

Austin goes on to criticise the notion that there are preferred conditions for observations in which we can see the "real" qualities of some object. Again, by way of a series of examples he shows that it is not possible to make this approach coherent.

The key problem according to Austin is trying to give one account where there are multiple, quite different cases. The result is a gross oversimplification that cannot capture or explain what is going on without gross misrepresentation.

Amusingly, on reading the posts in this very thread concerning actors and actions, one can see the very same problem being repeated.

I should like to emphasize, however, how fatal it always is to embark on explaining the use of a word without seriously considering more than a tiny fraction of the contexts in which it is actually used. — p.83

The philosopher's pride here allows him to supose that he can first make the box and then squeeze the examples in. It's surprising how often it is those who advocate some form of empiricism who, for whatever reason, drop their love of observation so readily when they turn to their use of words, instead joining with Humpty Dumpty. It's a worthy quip.

The point is whether seeing an object in your mind, not in the external world should be included in perception. — Corvus

Why should it?

There is a very clear distinction to be made between imagining a cup and pouring tea into it. And a long historical agreement that perception concerns the sense, and the objects in the world around us, and so is best contrasted, rather than confused, with imagination.

But even if you are inclined to hesitate at that distinction, it would be best to keep clear as to the difference between what is imagined and what isn't, lest one spill the tea.

I'm afraid I have a mild form of aphantasia. You can speak for yourself, but not for me. — Ludwig V

I tend to see mental images all the time, when I am remembering or imagining, even when I think of something, I can see images of the object I am thinking of.  

Even when I do gardening, before even starting the work, I would first imagine how it should look after the work, and commence the work as the images seen in my mind, and try to match the reality to the image, and it works better.

Maybe some people cannot see mental images as you said. Do your reasoning, thinking and linguistics  overrides the mental images that you try to see? I am not sure. I cannot imagine it. I am not sure what should be a normativity in this regard.

But I was wondering, Austin and Ayer, talk about perceptions in terms of delusions, illusions, hallucinations, and just ordinary visual perceptions, and they all occur in the realm of so called perception.  But why don't they include mental images we see during our remembering, imagining, thinking, and intuiting? That was my question.  

Why should it?

There is a very clear distinction to be made between imagining a cup and pouring tea into it. And a long historical agreement that perception concerns the sense, and the objects in the world around us, and so is best contrasted, rather than confused, with imagination.

But even if you are inclined to hesitate at that distinction, it would be best to keep clear as to the difference between what is imagined and what isn't, lest one spill the tea. — Banno

You seem to have misunderstood me. I was not saying that seeing and imagining is the same thing.

I was saying that if delusions, illusions are regarded as a type of perception, then why shouldn't seeing mental images in memories, imaginations, thinking and intuitions be thought of as a type of perception too. It was a suggestion, not a claim.

So we parse "Quantum physics say nothing is real" as something like "According to quantum physics, it's not a real thing, it's a..."; and ask what we are to put here - fake, forgery, illusion... — Banno

I interpret the QM claim that nothing is real as meaning something like 'nothing is really as it seems'. Not saying I agree with this as such. but it might be said that in the context, and from the point of view of what QM tells us about the microphysical constitution of ordinary objects, what they are is not what they appear to be.

Taking your question at face value: speaking for myself, I view it as an ability that can be used or not used. As one additional tool in the toolbox of cognition. It in no way interferes with any day-to-day cognitive process. — javra

So you don't see the route to the shops when you remember it? That's good. It could be confusing to see the route as you remember it and as it actually is at the same time. It is simpler and clearer to say that when driving the route, remembering it does not require any images, only correct actions as you go along. (It could also show as correctly telling someone else what to do.)

I'm less sure of what to say given the research about aphantasia. If I take it at face value, some people see something they call an image under circumstances I don't - or so they say. Other people don't - or so they say. Rather than rushing in, it seems best to pause for thought.

Austin goes on to criticise the notion that there are preferred conditions for observations in which we can see the "real" qualities of some object. Again, by way of a series of examples he shows that it is not possible to make this approach coherent. — Banno

His demolition of that classic idea is an excellent piece of philosophical work.

But why don't they include mental images we see during our remembering, imagining, thinking, and intuiting? That was my question. — Corvus

Well, you may see them. But I don't think you can assume that everybody sees them.

I was saying that if delusions, illusions are regarded as a type of perception, then why shouldn't seeing mental images in memories, imaginations, thinking and intuitions be thought of as a type of perception too. It was a suggestion, not a claim. — Corvus

My best answer is that imagining something is not like my cases 1 (the real dagger) or 2 (the reflected dagger), both of which clearly count as perceiving something. It most resembles 3, (the hallucination, except that, of course, you are not fooled, deluded) in that there is no dagger nor image of a dagger involved. Isn't that good enough reason to say they are not perceptions?

How can one be sure one is not fooled? or deluded?
There are even discussions in the Scientific theory symposiums where the scientists discuss how can you tell the Scientific knowledge is what the world really is, not the one imagines the world might be when all the Scientific researches, studies and experiments are based on the fallible human sense observations of the world.

Anyhow, what about the case of illusion where a folk sees an Oasis in the desert when there isn't one? The case of illusion when a folk sees a ghost, when there isn't one? Is there always clear distinction between delusion and illusion? How could you tell which perception is delusion, which one is illusion and which one was the real perception from the first order perspective?

I should like to emphasize, however, how fatal it always is to embark on explaining the use of a word without seriously considering more than a tiny fraction of the contexts in which it is actually used.

I suppose we should wonder how fatal it is. Certainly he doesn’t mean one will die if the philosopher never lists the correct amount of contexts, or uses less accounts than Austin or Banno finds appropriate. Sure, Ayer’s limited account does not help us at all with real pearls, real ducks, real cream, real watches, real novels, but what about the topic at hand? It seems the worst thing to come of it is that some word-concerned philosopher, who never raises his head from the text, might have to quibble about it.

I interpret the QM claim that nothing is real as meaning something like 'nothing is really as it seems'. Not saying I agree with this as such. but it might be said that in the context, and from the point of view of what QM tells us about the microphysical constitution of ordinary objects, what they are is not what they appear to be. — Janus

Ok, so what do you think Austin might have to say here?

Well, for a start, the word "real" in "nothing is really as it seems" should bring on some hesitancy. What's it doing there? We might take it out, and see what happens. Consider "nothing is as it seems". Well, that doesn't seem right. It seems I am writing this, and you are now reading it, to the extent that one could not make sense of "It seems I am not writing this, and you are not reading it".

Also, there isn't anything special about QM in this regard. Pop physics has long told us that the ground beneath your feet is mostly space - "Not really solid, as it seems". But of course the ground is both solid and mostly space, and a good deal of decent physics and chemistry has gone in to showing how these can both be true.

It seems to me (Banno, not Austin) that "QM claims nothing is really as it seems" is a rhetorical attempt to give preeminence to one sort of view over others. But while QM is fine for physics class and designing computers, it's not much use in arranging flowers or deciding what to have for dinner.

So it seems to be an example of the sort of thing Austin was addressing, where the intricacies of the world are overly simplified.

If you like. It was your interlocutor rather than you whom I had in mind. Sure, dismiss this as a mere bookish quibble.

It doesn't matter. — Ciceronianus

I thought that was a little jab at me. It was a good one, by the way. But I think my question still stands. How many contexts would be necessary to appease someone like Austin?

How can one be sure (one) is not fooled? or deluded? — Corvus

Why is that the question?

Why not "What grounds do you have for doubt?"

Why is that the question? — Banno

Have you not read Ludwig's post? I was asking against his points.

It most resembles 3, (the hallucination, except that, of course, you are not fooled, deluded) in that there is no dagger nor image of a dagger involved. Isn't that good enough reason to say they are not perceptions? — Ludwig V

Why not "What grounds do you have for doubt?" — Banno

Would it not be just the same question in different wording?

How many contexts would be necessary to appease someone like Austin? — NOS4A2

Well, pretty much all of them. It's not too hard, with the aid of a tool such as the OED, to pick out the main instances. Even easier now, with online tools. Austin occasionally envisioned a team of scholars doing such research for each philosophically dubious term. But the main methodological point is the order of proceedings: look at how the word is used before deciding what it means.

It's in line with Wittgenstein, of course:

To repeat: don’t think, but look! — PI, §66

Would it not be just the same question in different wording? — Corvus

No.

No. — Banno

Could you explain the difference in the meanings between the two sentences in detail? Bearing in mind he never mentioned your 'ground for doubt'.

One says "Why should we believe?"; the other "Why should we doubt?". Both are useful. Dropping either one altogether leads to irrationality.

My favourite graffiti:

Ok. That is what I believe in too. But I am not sure on the conclusion, if "Dropping either one altogether leads to irrationality." follows from the premies, or if it is a true conclusion. Therefore your argument might not be a valid one. What do you mean by "irrationality"?

An observation, not an argument.

Even if it were an observation, should it not be backed with the evidence and verification, when requested or doubted on the ground of veridicality?

Anyhow if it were a mere observation, it loses validity, objectivity and factuality until it had been fully analysed, reasoned and verified.

I like the way you put that. I’m sold.