Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all. — javi2541997

Great points. Thanks for your effort. :up: :cool:

I guess you would like the following quote from Austin: — javi2541997

Yes, I think when Austin goes on explaining about the usage of word "Real", even he was aware that our perception was not 100% immune from infallibility. There could be cases of illusion, hallucination, delusion, and confronting with the bogus objects which look like certain objects, but found out to be bogus, lookalikes, mistaken identities etc. Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word.

I don’t think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. I — NOS4A2

I didn't say that. I said that the perceiver (in general) is the medium between the perception and the perceived.

I suspect that, given the indirectness theory, that you would say we perceive our nervous systems, and not the sound waves in air. Is this so? — NOS4A2

No, I would not say that. The nervous system, as medium is neither the perception nor the perceived.

I don't see how one can separate three things, perceiver, perceived and perception. They are clearly interdependent, by definition. — Ludwig V

I think a thorough analysis would show that the three are not properly "interdependent". A "perceiver" is necessarily prior to, as logically required for, both "perceived" and "perception", but it is not necessary that a perceiver is actively engaged in that act which involves a perception and a perceived. This puts "perceiver" into a different category, and independent from both those two. "Perceiver" does not necessarily imply the existence of a "perception" or a "perceived", as the perceiver is not necessarily engaged in that activity referred to by the name. This point is very important to Aristotle's biology, as it is the reason why all the capacities, or powers, of living beings are described as potentials, potencies, rather than as actualities. The reality of this fact implies that we must turn to terms other than "perceived" and "perception" to understand "perceiver".

It is neither the perceived, nor the perception, or even a combination of both, which can provide the defining features of the perceiver because the perceiver exists independently of these. As "perceived" and "perception" become incidental to the perceiver in this way, and not necessary to "perceiver", we must turn in another direction, toward what "perceiver" is dependent upon in order to understand the perceiver.

That's why i said threads like this which focus on the question of a direct or indirect relation between perceived and perception are fundamentally misguided. The relation cannot be understood without first developing an adequate understanding of the perceiver, and this requires turning away from the act of perceiving, towards whatever it is which provides the power or capacity for that act.

So, if we start with a proposition which states the nature of the perceiver, then the relation between perceived and perception will follow from this necessarily, as implied by that proposition, without question. And, as explained above, if we want to understand the nature of the perceiver we must turn to principles other than the relation between perceived and perception. Therefore discussions about the relation between perceived and perception are completely unnecessary, leading nowhere, and they will go on endlessly when this is the subject of discussion rather than the nature of the perceiver.

Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all. — javi2541997

You certainly did, and a very welcome one, too. Thank you.

But could I add that his little disquisition about ordinary language philosophy deserves some attention too. However, I would like to put this issue into the context of Aristotle's method. Since he had a strong background in Ancient Greek (and, no doubt, Latin), Austin must have been familiar with Aristotle. Aristotle was a great respecter (especially in the context of ethics) of his tradition, often under the label of "what people say". He uses that as a reference point, not a referee, so he is happy to amend and adjust that as appropriate in what he is discovering by his attention to how the world actually is - a sort of empiricism, in marked contrast to Plato.

Since I'm lazy, here a quotation from pp. 62 - 64:-

" 'Real' is an absolutely normal word, with nothing new-fangled or technical or highly specialized about it. It is, that is to say, already firmly established in, and very frequently used in, the ordinary language we all use every day. Thus in this sense it is a word which has a fixed meaning, and so can't, any more than can any other word which is firmly established, be fooled around with ad lib. Philosophers often seem to think that they can just 'assign' any meaning whatever to any word; and so no doubt, in an absolutely trivial sense, they can (like Humpty-Dumpty).

Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them; we may wish to tidy the situation up a bit, revise the map here and there, draw the boundaries and distinctions rather differently. But still, it is advisable always to bear in mind

(a) that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary;
(b) that in any case, before indulging in any tampering on our own account, we need to find out what it is that we have to deal with; and
(c) that tampering with words in what we take to be one little corner of the field is always liable to have unforeseen repercussions in the adjoining territory. Tampering, in fact, is not so easy as is often supposed, is not justified or needed so often as is often supposed, and is often thought to be necessary just because what we've got already has been misrepresented."

The reference to Humpty-Dumpty is presumably a swipe at Ayer & co.

I wouldn't be surprised if he (or they) got the idea from Aristotle. At least, far from being a revolution, it seems that it has a reasonably respectable ancestry. But, of course, a revolution is so much more dramatic than a tradition..

Keeping on the track, Austin says that 'real' 'nor does it have a large number of different meanings-it is not ambiguous. ' I just don't understand why he says this. — javi2541997

You could say that it has a different meaning for each substantive it gets attached to. But what Austin is emphasizing is that it does the same job, i.e. has the same use, when attached to the substantives it gets attached to. One could quarrel with that, but there's no clear principle of individuation attached to either meanings or uses, so we can allow different applications of those terms.

Austin claims that 'real' is more understandable among the people than 'proper' 'genuine', 'true' 'authentic', etc. — javi2541997

If that's what he means to say, it is indeed hard to understand. I think he is not saying that but saying that "real" is an umbrella or basket for all those other terms. Perhaps more like the head of the family.

I don't think we are very far apart, though I need to enter a caveat that "perceive" covers a range of activities. After this discussion, we have to be a little cautious using that term.

I was using "interdependent" as a flexible term to cover the different relationships between those elements. So, yes, a perceiver is not just a perceiver but has an independent existence as, say, a creature with the capacity to perceive, not just a particular perception, but a whole range of different perceptions. But surely, the perceiver is only a perceiver as capable of exercising that capacity, just as parents are only parents in relation to their children, even though they are many other things that do not require any such relationship. If they don't have children, they are not parents.

And, yes, to understand that capacity we have to understand that creature, not only when perceiving this perception, but many different perceptions but also as capable of, and performing, many other actions as well. But surely, understanding the capacity requires also understanding the exercise of it?

You certainly did, and a very welcome one, too. Thank you. — Ludwig V

Thank you for your kind words. I appreciate it.

But could I add that his little disquisition about ordinary language philosophy deserves some attention too. — Ludwig V

I agree.

(a) that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary; — Ludwig V

I fully agree with you in this sense, and it reminds me of Steven Pinker and his book: 'Words and Rules. The ingredients of Language'. For example, when children learn basic 'stuff' or knowledge, they do not mimic sentences or words like parrots. First, they try to make sense of what they perceive, and this is thanks to language. It is not arbitrary, as you said.

But what Austin is emphasizing is that it does the same job, i.e. has the same use, when attached to the substantives it gets attached to. One could quarrel with that, but there's no clear principle of individuation attached to either meanings or uses, so we can allow different applications of those terms. — Ludwig V

Ah, OK. Now I can see more clear what Austin holds in his theory.

If that's what he means to say, it is indeed hard to understand. I think he is not saying that but saying that "real" is an umbrella or basket for all those other terms. Perhaps more like the head of the family. — Ludwig V

I think he actually meant that 'real' is a concept which fits better in the understanding of people rather than others, which shares the same 'substantive-hungry' claim. I don't think it is an umbrella or basket for the rest of the words with the same 'root', but the one we tend to pick before the others. That's why he named it as 'dimension-word' because 'real' - as a term - can fill up our demands better than 'proper' or 'true'. Nevertheless, although this point of Austin is very interesting, he decided not to go deeply into it...

Great points. Thanks for your effort. — Corvus

Thanks, mate. :up:

Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word. — Corvus

Exactly. But it is interesting to point out that, according to Austin, this matter doesn't usually come up in our ordinary daily life, but only when things may not be what they seem to be. Thus, I think he refers to that most of us already give for granted many truths (or real facts, like the example of the 'pig'), and only when we debate - like we are doing right now - those questions flourish.

There could be cases of illusion, hallucination, delusion, and confronting with the bogus objects which look like certain objects, but found out to be bogus, lookalikes, mistaken identities etc. Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. — Corvus

I suggest that Austin does not allow himself to be seduced by the cartesian sceptical argument into pursuing some perfectly assured certainty, which in the end destroys so much, but to notice that when things go wrong, there are ways of coping. Somewhat as, when you drive down a road, you have no assurance that the unexpected will not happen. But you are confident that you can deal with such incidents as and when they occur. That's particularly clear in his fourth point, that real is an adjuster word.

I didn't say that. I said that the perceiver (in general) is the medium between the perception and the perceived.

You also said that the nervous system was the medium. So if both perceiver and nervous systems (in general) is the medium, then I’m left to assume nervous systems are perceivers in your view. They perceive and are also mediums. But I just don’t know how that can be possible, because much more than a nervous system is required for the act of perceiving.

Humans and other animals perceive, and are therefor perceivers. This is what I mean when I use the term “perceiver”: a thing that perceives. It can be said these things perceive. The same cannot be said of nervous systems.

As for your positioning of perceiver, perceptions, and mediums, it’s too odd for me to think about because it implies the perception (whatever that is) is somewhere outside or behind the perceiver.

A stab at how Austin and Ayers are talking past one another:

For Ayers, the hallmark of indirect realism is divergence between the world as experienced by a human, and the world as it is. If there's a difference, it's indirect realism. Ayers says that since one's experience is a representation from a certain point of view, requiring interpretation for usefulness, there is divergence.

For Austin, if human experience lines up correctly with what one would expect from a certain POV, and therefore requiring interpretation, then directness and indirectness are valueless descriptions.

I think Ayers' view works, although he doesn't really prove anything. He starts out assuming indirect realism and concludes indirect realism. Austin's view might be valuable for someone who thinks all indirect realism requires a homunculus.

Humans and other animals perceive, and are therefor perceivers. This is what I mean when I use the term “perceiver”: a thing that perceives. It can be said these things perceive. The same cannot be said of nervous systems. — NOS4A2

What do you mean here that it can be said for animals but not nervous systems?

What do you mean here that it can be said for animals but not nervous systems?

It cannot be said that a nervous system can perceive because perception involves more than nervous systems. For instance, in humans, lungs, a heart, bones, muscles, skin etc. are involved in the act.

I see. I think I understand what you mean. It seems rather arbitrary though: where does the extension end? At the actual physical objects we perceive?

I think these details are important because no one mentions these components of perception, as far as I know. Which extension do you mean?

Comprehensive. Well done.

This is an argument I have made use of many times. I have several times used this quote from Austin's Other minds:

The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking 'Is it a real table?' (a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney) and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that one feels at a loss as to 'how to prove' it is a real table. It is the use of the word 'real' in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that 'real' has a single meaning ('the real world' 'material objects'), and that, a highly profound and puzzling one. Instead, we should insist always on specifying with what 'real' is being contrasted - not what I shall have to show it is, in order to show it is 'real': and then usually we shall find some specific, less fatal, word, appropriate to the particular case, to substitute for 'real' — Austin

An example of it's use, in a conversation with @T Clark

Let's look at "Does quantum physics say nothing is real?". Austin's strategy is to ask about the use of the word "real" here, looking for an alternative phrasing that sets out what is being said - as explained previously.

To understand what "real" is doing here we ask what it is to be contrasted with, and what other term might replace "not real". Use pattern is "it's not a real X, its a Y"...
— Banno

So we parse "Quantum physics say nothing is real" as something like "According to quantum physics, it's not a real thing, it's a..."; and ask what we are to put here - fake, forgery, illusion...

We know what to put in the cases cited previously, but it is far from clear what we might put here. What this might show is that the words "real" and "unreal" have here become unmoored. They are here outside of a usable context.

What is offered by Austin is not a definition, but a method to test proposed uses. What we have is an antidote to the philosopher's tendency to push words beyond their applicability.

Perhaps seeing this requires a particular conception of philosophical problems as knots in our understanding, to be untied, explained, or showing how to leave the flytrap. but the fly has to want to leave....

There may perhaps be a sense not covered by this, a sense that is "absolute" in some way; but Austins method sets the challenge of setting out clearly what such a sense would be. — Banno

And here again, from three years ago:

It's a bit of a classic misuse by philosophers, a textbook case for Austin.

Is it a real painting, or a reproduction? Is it a real coin, or a counterfeit? Is it a real lake, or a mirage? Is it real magic, or prestidigitation?

What is real is set by the item being discussed.

But philosophers will wander up the garden path by asking if it is real per se. — Banno

The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty. — Antony Nickles

So in outline, Ayer was looking for certainty, and in the process misused and muddled the terms and concepts he was working with. Austin's approach, along with others involved in the "linguistic turn", is to look for clarity over certainty.

The arguments in Lecture VII contrast these difference in approaches.

VII
In addition to what has said, I'd like to emphasises the method that Austin explicates on p. 63.

Words already have uses. Elsewhere Austin says

First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method.) — (Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1957: 181–182

There's an evolutionary point here, that the natural language we use is the result of adaptation over a very long period of time, with the result that it is particularly well suited to doing the sorts of things we do with words.

Notice also that Austin is explicitly not saying that we ought only use words as they are used in everyday contexts (a common criticism from those who have not read Austin). By all means, adapt and invent for new contexts, but do this with care, and with an eye to the existing distinctions and nuance.

Austin also makes the point that changes in the way words are used in one area may have unexpected repercussions in another. Hence it is best to consider widely the context in which they are embedded.

Oh, and for subsequent use, it is worth noting the last point in the lecture, that it is worth making a distinction only if there is a way of telling the difference between what has been distinguished.

I was alluding to something along the lines of the extended mind idea.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_mind_thesis

This is an argument I have made use of many times. I have several times used this quote from Austin's Other minds... — Banno

An example of it's use, in a conversation with T Clark — Banno

Interesting. A worth reading, and I didn't know about that work of Austin's, which looks more 'metaphysical' than 'sense and sensibilia.'

There's an evolutionary point here, that the natural language we use is the result of adaptation over a very long period of time, with the result that it is particularly well suited to doing the sorts of things we do with words. — Banno

Yes. When I read chapter VII I came to this conclusion as well, and this is why - I guess - he states that some words such as 'real' or 'good' are adjusted-words because they respond to innumerable needs from people on ordinary days. I mean, I agree with him that we tend to use 'real' with more confidence (the glass on the table is real! Instead of using 'proper' or 'reliable') and 'good' (the conversation in this thread is good. I think nobody would use 'sublime' here, for instance)

Oh, and for subsequent use, it is worth noting the last point in the lecture, that it is worth making a distinction only if there is a way of telling the difference between what has been distinguished. — Banno

And he also states that 'a distinction which we are not in fact able to draw... is not worth making.' It seems to me that he didn't want to dive in the pure distinction between real and not real.

I would oppose any such view, personally.

Thanks very much for these posts. They were very helpful to me.

Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. — (Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1957: 181–182

A good text, or a good writer, always has more than you think. It's curious how at one level, we understand what the metaphor is getting at (roughly). But on a second look, doubts creep in - and then doubts about the doubts. Perhaps we have to understand what he means by seeing what his practice is. Is this faute de mieux or what really counts?

What is offered by Austin is not a definition, but a method to test proposed uses. What we have is an antidote to the philosopher's tendency to push words beyond their applicability. — Banno

Yes, I think Hume identifies the same problem in relation to the argument from design. Only he calls it "augmentation". I think it's a very important point. I must try to find the reference.

So in outline, Ayer was looking for certainty, and in the process misused and muddled the terms and concepts he was working with. Austin's approach, along with others involved in the "linguistic turn", is to look for clarity over certainty. — Banno

Yes. That is clear enough in this context. I agree also that the detail of the pursuit of clarity becomes more complicated when we push beyond the outline. Ayer surely has views about clarity and certainty.

(I don't want to be obstructive here. I think Austin achieves his goal. I just want to be wary of "augmentation".)

I was alluding to something along the lines of the extended mind idea. — Apustimelogist

I didn't know about this. I'll have to look at it carefully. It addresses some important considerations. However, I'm a bit suspicious of any attempt to locate "the mind" at all. It would be absurd not to acknowledge that I am located in space and time. But It is not obvious that the mind, as such, can be located in the same way, any more than numbers can.

For Ayers, the hallmark of indirect realism is divergence between the world as experienced by a human, and the world as it is. — frank

For Austin, if human experience lines up correctly with what one would expect from a certain POV, — frank

This would be one way of understanding the debate between them. But you are giving too much to Ayer and so missing the point of Austin's argument.

To put it this way, the phenomena here are more complicated that the straightforward distinction between experience and reality can deal with.

Let me try to come at it this way.

1. When Macbeth sees a dagger (i.e. there is a actual, real dagger that he sees), Austin would say that he sees the dagger directly.

2. But that only makes sense if we think of indirect ways in which he might see that dagger, such as via a mirror. In those cases, it makes sense to explain that what he sees (directly) is an image of the dagger and so, in a sense, is inferring that the dagger is there or is interpreting the image as an image of a dagger. Note that the relationship between an image of a dagger is quite hard to describe, but is not at all like the relationship between one dagger and another or the relationship between a dagger and its scabbard.

3. But in the play, there is no dagger, and no image of a dagger. We need to say that he does not see a dagger at all. And yet, he is behaving as if he sees a dagger, and he clearly believes he is seeing a dagger. What are we to say? Well, there is a word that covers this situation - "hallucination". But a hallucination of a dagger is not a real dagger and not a (real) image of a dagger. What, exactly, is a hallucination?

Ayer wants to say that Macbeth sees a dagger-like sense-datum and then wants to argue that what Macbeth actually sees (directly sees) in all three cases is a dagger-like sense-datum. He wants to sweep away the differences between these three cases into the same formula. I think he could justify saying the sense-datum is always what we see "directly". But then, he is extending "direct" and "indirect" and using them in a new context, so he has changed their meanings.

So you could say that they are talking past each other.

Ayer suggests is that to talk of sense-data is just an alternative way of representing the facts. Austin wants to argue is that this amounts to "anything goes" and compares Ayer to Humpty-Dumpty. He also suggests that Ayer doesn't really believe that the choice between the two ways of talking is indifferent.

I would say that the problem is that Ayer's way of talking buries the real differences between the cases.

For the record, to say that someone is hallucinating a dagger is to say that they are behaving as if there is a dagger and believes that there is a dagger when there is no dagger. No more than that. You can call that seeing a dagger or an image of a dagger, if you like, but I think that's just confusing. When people draw the conclusion that we never really see or know reality or that reality is nothing like what we think it is, it becomes absurd.

But surely, the perceiver is only a perceiver as capable of exercising that capacity, just as parents are only parents in relation to their children, even though they are many other things that do not require any such relationship. If they don't have children, they are not parents. — Ludwig V

The two or not quite analogous. Perception is a capacity, as you say, the perceiver is "capable of exercising that capacity". So it is a special type of activity which may be produced. The ability to perform that special activity is what defines "the perceiver". This does not logically require that the perceiver has actually carried out that specific activity yet, as is required with "parent".

The difference, may not seem important at this point, and you will find some philosophers pushing in the other direction, like Wittgenstein, who would define having the ability to 'follow a rule' as someone who has been observed to have followed a specified rule, rather than as someone who has the capacity to follow that rule. But you will see that this sort of mistake (misdirection, or misguided way of looking at such activities) leads to a very serious problem. He then has the problem of trying to figure out at what point the ability to follow the rule comes into existence. Is it after demonstrating the correct action once, twice, or whatever? Furthermore, since the capacity which is understood by 'following a rule' must, from this perspective, come into existence at some point in time, Wittgenstein is faced with the question of what type of capacity exists prior to this. Then each such capacity would be defined by having demonstrated a fulfillment of the required actions, and there would always be a further capacity prior to each action, leading to an infinite regress of capacities prior to the first action, which could not be described as the capacity to perform that observed action.

So Aristotle neatly avoided this problem of infinite regress of potential by defining the potential, or capacity for a specific type of activity as being prior to the activity, in a more absolute sense. From this perspective, the capacity to perceive, what we are calling "the perceiver", must necessarily preexist the act which is implied here by the name, as the act of perception. We must therefore forfeit our empirically based principles to make the understanding of capacities possible. Empiricism infiltrates our thoughts in an attempt to simplify, but it really corrupts our capacity to understand. This corruption of the capacity inclines us to assume that the existence of a "perceiver" requires that an act of perception has already occurred, and such an epistemology leads us to an infinite regress of capacities, rendering these capacities as unintelligible to us. Instead, we must accept the obvious, much more highly, and truly intuitive principle, that the capacity to perceive, which defines "the perceiver" must be prior in time to any act of perception. From here we have a much more realistic way of understanding the relation between the perceived and the perception.

But surely, understanding the capacity requires also understanding the exercise of it? — Ludwig V

So, as outlined above, I would answer "no" to this question. The capacity preexists the exercising of it, therefore analysis of the exercising of it will not provide an adequate understanding. The implied infinite regress will produce infinite discussion, like in this thread. But, as Aristotle showed, any capacity relies on a prior actuality. So understanding the capacity requires understanding the prior actuality which the capacity is based in. This is due to the nature of existence and the passing of time. "Capacity" implies a number of possibilities, while exercising the capacity produces one actuality. The act, which produces one from many, which is exercising the capacity, is not a necessary act, as understood by the concept of free will. It is an act of selecting from possibilities. So the specific act, a specified capacity, must be understood as part of a more general capacity, not by understanding the specific act itself.

You also said that the nervous system was the medium. So if both perceiver and nervous systems (in general) is the medium, then I’m left to assume nervous systems are perceivers in your view. They perceive and are also mediums. But I just don’t know how that can be possible, because much more than a nervous system is required for the act of perceiving. — NOS4A2

Correct, that's why I was careful to begin my discussion of the medium with the qualification "in general". We could start with the eye, or the nose, as the medium for those specific senses. Then we would say that nervous system is the medium for all the senses, "in general". But then you start talking about "the perceiver", and we move to an even more general sense of "the medium" because we see the need to include all the aspects of the living being which support the nervous system, as also required, and therefore part of "the medium".

As for your positioning of perceiver, perceptions, and mediums, it’s too odd for me to think about because it implies the perception (whatever that is) is somewhere outside or behind the perceiver. — NOS4A2

If my way of speaking is foreign to you, making it too difficult to understand, we can drop the discussion, that's fine. But why do you need to imagine a spatial relation between perceiver and perception? It is better to imagine a temporal perspective, as outlined above in my reply to Ludwig. The perceiver is prior to the perception, as necessary to cause it. Therefore the "behind" you refer to is temporal, as after.

Yes, I agree with your point there.

I suggest that Austin does not allow himself to be seduced by the cartesian sceptical argument into pursuing some perfectly assured certainty, which in the end destroys so much, but to notice that when things go wrong, there are ways of coping. Somewhat as, when you drive down a road, you have no assurance that the unexpected will not happen. But you are confident that you can deal with such incidents as and when they occur. That's particularly clear in his fourth point, that real is an adjuster word. — Ludwig V

When Austin keeps analysing the Delusion and Illusion case, he appears to be acknowledging the fact that perception has cases where it gives wrong perception rather than the real perception, which lacks certainty. Of course he is not talking about Cartesian certainty here.

I am not sure if Austin's extensive arguments on Delusion and Illusion were meaningful in his voracious attempt opposing Ayer's Sense-Datum concept. He could just have said that perceptions can lack certainty in certain cases.

I feel that perception doesn't end there, but it activates the other mental activities in the mind such as reasoning, judgement and imagination for the assured certainty on the perceived content, as well as being stored in the memory for later retrieval in the mind for the other mental activities such as analytic, synthetic and creative uses, or the motivation for actions.

And when the perceivers doesn't believe the perceived content has certainty, they will keep on trying to verify on the validity of the perception until reasonable certainty is available to them.

If not, they will be concluded as mistaken identity or illusion, or else conclude or be opened minded the perceived object as unknown or mysterious perception. In case of Delusion, perhaps the perceiver will never find out or acknowledge, if what the perceiver was seeing was delusion.

Thanks for making it more clear. I was just trying to picture it, the haphazard result of dividing what I believe is one entity into two. A “perception” to me is just the perceiver considered abstractly, and not worthy enough to be given position, spacial or temporal. But in a way it does come after, insofar as it is a post hoc state, an afterthought, as in “between this time and that time I was perceiving such and such”. So for me it speaks little of the directness or indirectness of perception and doing so leads me into wild territory.

A “perception” to me is just the perceiver considered abstractly, and not worthy enough to be given position, spacial or temporal. — NOS4A2

Likewise the action is just the actor considered abstractly? Except one actor can do a wide range of actions, so you can't narrow it down to just one action. One actor is a set of actions? So one perceiver is a set of perceptions?

Yes. One can abstract out a specific action from another by considering it on its own as a state, by placing limits on its duration, naming it, and presenting it as a singular movement, and so on. The actor is the action, or rather, the actor acts.

Yes. One can abstract out a specific action from another by considering it on its own as a state, by placing limits on its duration, naming it, and presenting it as a singular movement, and so on. The actor is the action, or rather, the actor acts. — NOS4A2

Do you see how there's a numerical problem here? One actor, Jim, performs three different actions:

1. Picking up the garden hose
2. Whacking the baseball
3. Talking to his neighbor

So if there's equivalency between actor and action, then:

A. There are three different Jims, one for each action, or
B. Jim is equivalent to a set of actions (1,2,3).

See?