@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

That people have made up their mind, or had made it up before we began), without even understanding what Austin is saying, much less why he is saying it, is proof of the point he is trying to make. Ayer (Plato) makes it look like he is investigating our relation to the world, but before starting had a standard already decided for the answer, thus the need for the wacky picture.

Is anyone going to do a reading of VII? Or are we not done with VI.

Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty. — Antony Nickles

This looks very plausible. It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell?

Is anyone going to do a reading of VII? Or are we not done with VI. — Antony Nickles

As a final flourish, I would like to point out that this have been the point where Austin makes good on his comment that we are told to take it easy "really it's just what we've all believed all along. (There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back.)" (Lecture 1 page 2) This makes it much harder to understand what the doctrine amounts to.

VII looks most interesting. I'm looking forward to what people make of it.

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading... — Antony Nickles

Indeed.

In order to fully understand any position, the student must first grant some of it, at least. "The mark of an educated mind" and all that. Does Austin target Ayer's notion of "perception"? Did Ayer reply?

I think it worth mentioning here that early, basic, and/or rudimentary point of view invariant(universally applicable) perception was taking place long before we ever began noticing.

Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind.

During the time before language, all sorts of different creatures were perceiving all sorts of stuff. None of it was existentially dependent upon language. Not all of it was large enough to be seen with the naked eye. Optical advances grew our knowledge. If using a man-made optical device counts as indirectly perceiving what's on the other side of the glass, then directly perceiving the same things amounts to looking at the same scene after removing the tool.

Not all perception uses tools. If it is the case that all perception is indirect, and it is also the case that not all perception uses tools(Ayer knew this too!) then Ayer's notion of "perception" remains undisturbed by the comparison to optical tools such as telescopes/microscopes. That counts as indirect as well.

He means something different. He's drawing correlations between something other than optical tools.

I find that criticism toothless.

...the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'.

Understanding what one possibly means, what they're talking about, or what they're picking out to the exclusion of all else when they utter "direct perception" or "indirect perception" is just a matter of looking at definitions and/or the way their using the words. With that much I'll readily agree.

But...

Whether "it" is direct or not is to question whether all perception is direct or not.

If it began happening long before we began thinking about it, then we're attempting to take account of something that existed in its entirety prior to our noticing it. If our notion of perception cannot admit this or dovetail with it, then it is wrong.

If all perception includes our thinking about it, then it would follow that only creatures capable of thinking about their own perception are capable of perceptions. We use language to acquire knowledge of that which preceded it. Such metacognitive endeavors emerge via language use replete with naming and descriptive practices. We have ancestors that were once in the cat's stage...

Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether.

Not all notions of perception are on equal footing.

Sorry for the interruption folks. :yikes:

Good points, and interesting paragraphs. It was a pleasure to read but, I admit that I am not capable of understanding everything, but that's a problem of mine, not yours and your arguments.

Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind. — creativesoul

I agree. But the following example is needed to take into account:

Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether. — creativesoul

Well, cats don't know the term 'mice' because this is a human concept of our vocabulary. Cats express themselves using the sound: 'Meow' and maybe when a cat goes with that sound, it is referring to mice as well. And, I do not understand why you claim that no notion of 'perception' is required when the animal kingdom is partially based on this. A cat goes to catch a mouse because it was perceived, they do not act randomly. So, I guess that a cat is aware of what 'mice' means in its animal mind.

Thanks, but the bit you replied to ought not be further expounded or explicated. It's far too tangent.

It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell? — Ludwig V

Oh yeah that’s probably a straight ripoff. I wouldn’t normally bring in these kinds of larger implications/conclusions except I don’t seem to be getting any headway in understanding by keeping my cards covered as Austin does (to the point people only think it matters to words).

I wonder how much the incapacity to deal with an extended and detailed sequence of arguments is a result of learning philosophy from YouTube.

It is a fantasy-world question — Antony Nickles

Yep.

The point concerning direct and indirect has been made by others, myself included. Some ground is infertile. Ideas will not grow there.

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” — Antony Nickles

Yes, there may have been too much presumption on our part that folk had an idea of what Logical Positivism entailed. Ideas of sense data and maybe also of emotivism are perhaps engrained in the thinking of our engineers, without their realising whence they came. But in addition there seems to be a dislike of critique generally. I don't find Austin's style sarcastic so much as droll.

Anyway, nice to see a bit of discussion being kicked up by the thread. It's already much longer than I expected it to be.

It now seems to me that you have not understood what Austin is doing. I suggest a re-read.

It now seems to me that you have not understood what Austin is doing. I suggest a re-read. — Banno

Austin's English and writing style is very clear, so there is little possibility for misunderstanding what he was saying.  And all the points we have been discussing in the threads are also clear.  I have given out my arguments against yours.  You just need to give out yours.

Cavell's idea is very interesting and it would be nice to see how it could be developed into a real part of philosophy - digging deeper into the reasons why scepticism or sense-data seem to be able to recover from refutation and sprout afresh. Rejoining philosophy after being out of touch for so long, it does seem plausible to suppose that some ideas arise from enduring tendencies in human thought, which are not based on the arguments. I didn't find his gestures towards Phenomenology convincing - and it seems that phenomenologists didn't either.

The reason you propose in this case makes sense to me. But I don't think it applies to, for example, Berkeley.

That's very good - bringing in a deeper discussion of the nature of dreaming.

I have not read Malcolm's book, but have heard of it. From what I understand his emphasis was on the observation that our discussions of dreaming are post-hoc; they take place after the fact, while we are awake; and that this led him to supose that dreams are not experiences at all. If that is the case he can hardly be cited as arguing that there is no qualitative difference between dreaming and lucidity. If anything it seems he doubles down on Austin's approach.

we know how to use the words 'I am awake' but not the words 'I am dreaming'. — Richard B

But "I am dreaming" has a use for those who have lucid dreams. The central critique aimed at Malcolm's account is, as I understand it, that he insists that dreams occur (at least in their quintessential form) when one is soundly asleep, a definition not accepted by others, especially dream researchers.

What is most interesting here might be the potential for a distinction between Malcolm, a student of Wittgenstein, and Austin, that might shed light on their relative differences. Good topic.

The central critique aimed at Malcolm's account is, as I understand it, that he insists that dreams occur (at least in their quintessential form) when one is soundly asleep, a definition not accepted by others, especially dream researchers. — Banno

What you say confuses me, because it doesn't seem to fit at all with what I understood Malcolm to be arguing. Malcolm's thesis is regarded as outrageous because he denies that people have experiences while they are asleep. The core of the argument is that to be asleep is to be unconscious, but to experience something is to be conscious, so the common sense of dreaming is self-contradictory.

The only facts of the matter are 1) that young children sometimes wake up convinced of impossibilities and have to be taught that they were dreams and 2) that people often wake up telling stories that seem to them (at the time they are telling the stories) to have happened to them while they were asleep. That impression - that things happened to them while they were asleep - is not evidence that anything did happen to them while they were asleep. On the contrary, the evidence is that nothing happened to them while they were asleep.

I wouldn't want to opine on the opinions of dream researchers. But I am under the impression that much of their data is gathered by observing people while they are asleep (and not talking) and, from time to time, waking them up to see whether they have anything to tell. Which is not evidence that they are experiencing anything while asleep - even though they may think it is.

I think this argument is good. It's weakness is the identification of sleep with unconsciousness. I don't think it is obvious even to common sense that sleep is the same thing as unconsciousness. There is a good deal of common sense observation which suggests that a sleeper can be, to some extent, conscious while asleep - and sleep research has a good deal to say about this. That opens up the possibility of reconciling, to some extent at least, common sense with this argument.

That is, the idea of direct, immediate experience doesn't do what (Ayer) thinks it does. — Ludwig V

Yes, Ayer wants to use it as a basis for certainty on questions empirical, and it simply will not bear that weight.

Thanks for bringing in some more background on Ayer. I've misplaced my copy of Metaphysical Animals, but recall a discussion in there about how Ayer was popular amongst the young men of the mid thirties, who were fond of saying to the dons that they "didn't understand" them - a product of Language, Truth, and Logic. The pendulum, set in motion by Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, had swung too far with the Vienna Circle and its consequences. The forties brought a deep re-thinking of the way philosophy was being done, that superficially looked like an overemphasis on language.

The core of the argument is that to be asleep is to be unconscious, but to experience something is to be conscious, so the common sense of dreaming is self-contradictory. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree that this is his account - forgive my previous poor phrasing.

The only facts of the matter... — Ludwig V

There is, as you point out, also REM and other evidence that show a great deal of activity during sleep. It looks as if something is happening. That seems to be why Malcolm's ideas are discounted.

Consciousness is ubiquitously taken as granted, much too little attention being paid to what we mean in using the term. Malcolm's contribution here is to be applauded.

The question arises, as it invariably does: what mediates perceptions — NOS4A2

All processes are mediated or mediate. Perception can be validly understood as a process.

It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later. — Ludwig V

Different ways of thinking may be selected as valid depending on context.

Philosophy allows us to keep going beyond the limits of our knowledge, and it is one of the main disciplines of humankind. Yet, there will be big debates amongst all the philosophers and their theories to discern who is more right than the other. — javi2541997

The problem I see is that there is no clear wsy of determining which philosphical theory is more right.

But that doesn't mean anything goes, does it? — Ludwig V

Anything that has no intelectual appeal to virtually anyone will not "go" to be sure. I don't see the 'sense data' theory of perception as being in that category. So I see it as being misleading to say, for example, that Austin has definitively refuted the afore-mentioned theory.

But it still treats perceptions as if they were objects and as if those processes produced a final result, thus allowing Dennett to claim that consciousness is an illusion. What if perception is an activity? What if perceptions are no more objects than a magnetic field or a rainbow or an orbit or heat? BTW, none of those things are events, either. — Ludwig V

I agree that perception is not an object, but it can be understood as a process or, phenomenologically, as an immediate presencing.
Magnetic fields, rainbows etc., can be understood as phenomena if not as objects, as processes if not events.

Perception could also be thought of as an activity, but is that not just another word for 'process' with perhaps an implication of agency thrown in?

I've comments to make about VI, but have been doing other things. Apropos of that, what you say here about prejudicial engagement is one of Austin's critiques of Ayer in VI.

Anyway, happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. Small steps, and my notes are mainly for me.

What is the medium? — NOS4A2

Generally speaking, the nervous system.

happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. — Banno

I don’t mind someone else taking the lead either, as I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself.

I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself. — Antony Nickles

That's the natural state of those with our inclinations.

All processes are mediated or mediate. Perception can be validly understood as a process.

I’m not so sure. I cannot see the difference between the body and a bodily process. When I point to either, or both, I am pointing at the same thing. I don’t know how to distinguish between the thing that moves and the movements it makes, as if I was distinguishing between the morning and the evening star.



The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which senses—the perceiver—not that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. Sound waves, for example, where the medium is air, contacts the sensitive biology of the ear directly, not indirectly.

The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which senses—the perceiver—not that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. Sound waves, for example, where the medium is air, contacts the sensitive biology of the ear directly, not indirectly. — NOS4A2

Your question is made irrelevant by the conditions I described. The two described conditions are things perceived, and the perceptions. The perceiver therefore is the medium. There is no need to discuss a beginning and end to the perceiver unless we make the medium, i.e. the perceiver, our subject. But if the medium, perceiver, is made to be the subject of our inquiry, then the thing perceived and the perception are incidental to the inquiry, and the silliness of this thread is avoided.

I don’t think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. I suspect that, given the indirectness theory, that you would say we perceive our nervous systems, and not the sound waves in air. Is this so?

VI

This is a bridging lecture. Up until now Austin has been addressing the argument from illusion. After this lecture Austin moves on to discussing "real" and realism. This is the bit in between, consisting of a bit of summation and a bit of anticipation.

It's I think no more scathing than the previous chapters, in which Ayer's argument is subject to a close vivisection. Austin invokes, again, Ayer's framing of the issue, the presumption that we must either perceive material objects or we perceive sense data, puzzling over Ayer's motivation, and concluding that Ayer began with the view that we only ever see "sense data", the "sensible manifold". On this account the argument from illusion is secondary, a post-hoc justification.

That's all.

I don’t think it can be established that a perceiver is both perceiver and perceived. — NOS4A2

So you don't think that people can perceive themselves - be self-aware?

But if the medium, perceiver, is made to be the subject of our inquiry, then the thing perceived and the perception are incidental to the inquiry, and the silliness of this thread is avoided. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how one can separate three things, perceiver, perceived and perception. They are clearly interdependent, by definition.

The nervous system is not a medium, though, because it is a part of that which senses—the perceiver—not that which the perceiver senses. I guess my next question is: where does the perceiver begin and end? I doubt appealing to biology can furnish an answer in favor of the indirectness of perception. — NOS4A2

Yes, I think this is the way that your analysis has to go. But I don't think that it encourages us to believe that this approach is useful.

The problem I see is that there is no clear way of determining which philosophical theory is more right. — Janus

That doesn't mean that there is no way of determining which theory is more right, or less wrong.

Anything that has no intellectual appeal to virtually anyone will not "go" to be sure. — Janus

You have put your finger on the way to determine which theory is more right or less wrong. Now, how does one establish whether a theory has any intellectual appeal? By argument, perhaps?

There is, as you point out, also REM and other evidence that shows a great deal of activity during sleep. It looks as if something is happening. That seems to be why Malcolm's ideas are discounted. — Banno

In conversations, I found a reluctance to take scientific research on board. The problem here is partly that being a scientist does not make one immune from philosophical mistakes. What makes it even more difficult is that the distinction between ordinary language and science is distinctly permeable. REM is in some ways a technical, theoretical concept, but in others is a common sense observation.

But I don't see that the research can prove that the subject is experiencing something (in the required sense of experience) without also proving that the subject is also conscious. So we need to stop thinking of consciousness as binary. This is not contrary to common sense - half-asleep, half awake.

Research evidence does show a great deal of activity during sleep, and, by the same token, shows that sleepers are not in a normal state of consciousness.

Dreams do not fall foul of the Private Language Argument, since they are reported in ordinary language. But they make no sense unless sleep is not the same as unconsciousness.

There's room for an interesting speculation about why so many philosophers have been so resistant to even considering the philosophical implications of dreaming that they ignore these arguments.

Why not say they are dreaming? — Banno

I have no problem with that and I think that Malcolm (and the very few sympathizers) are wrong to assume/suggest that nothing is going on. But that just emphasizes the question what is going on in dreaming?

Sure. Some might suppose that the conceptual work of the philosopher must give way to the empirical evidence of the scientist but that would be to forget the theoretical background on which such evidence rests.

But still, something is going on in sleeping bodies. Why not say they are dreaming?

I don’t mind someone else taking the lead either, — Antony Nickles

VII

@Corvus Fortunately, Austin comes back to hallucination and this chapter is worth reading and enjoying.

In this chapter, Austin wants to dive into the word 'real' more deeply, and according to him, we can set the word'real' in two categories: A normal or basic word used by ordinary people that is already established in our communicative behaviour - this is why he states: Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them;
And then, an extraordinary word, whose sense is often used by philosophers. It is interesting to highlight that Austin describes the word 'real' as 'substantive-hungry'. Thus, a word that is needed for substantives, to have a definite sense, to get any foothold.

On the other hand, it is important to notice that Austin admits that a question like 'what is real or not' not always comes up. He states that we only question this when the things may be not what they seem. I agree with this. Don't you, folks?

Keeping on the track, Austin says that 'real' 'nor does it have a large number of different meanings-it is not ambiguous. ' I just don't understand why he says this. Now, he is the one who is ambiguous here. These folks... Always with the same complex philosophical arguments...

------------------------------

Austin also states that 'real' is a trouser-word. That is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not real. 'A real duck' differs from the simple 'a duck' only in that it is used to exclude various ways of being not a real duck-but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, etc.

I agree, and I don't have anything against his statement.

'Real' is also a dimension-word (like 'good' Austin affirms). It is an easily comprehensive term in a whole group of words of the same kind. Austin claims that 'real' is more understandable among the people than 'proper' 'genuine', 'true' 'authentic', etc. He also states in a linguistic point of view that: how does the distinction between real cream and synthetic cream differ from the distinction between pure cream and adulterated cream? Is it just that adulterated cream still is, after all, cream?
A lot of questions like these arise, and Austin claims that he shall not go into.

Lastly, 'real' is an adjuster-word. Austin says that it is adjusted to meet 'innumerable' demands of language. He also accepts that vocabulary is finite and we - sometimes - face new things that are unknown to us. An adjust-word helps us to fit the 'new' idea in the vocabulary we have already known. Austin uses a good example: We have the word 'pig', for instance, and a pretty clear idea which animals, among those that we fairly commonly encounter, are and are not to be so called. But one day we come across a new kind of animal, which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do; it is somehow different. But what we could do, and probably would do first of all, is to say, 'It's like a pig. ' ('Like' is the great adjuster-word)

But it is not a 'real' pig... So what is it then? Well, I think Austin claims an eclectic point of view and says: We have, after all, other flexibility-devices. For instance, I might say that animals of this new species are 'piggish'; I might perhaps call them 'quasi-pigs', or describe them (in the style of vendors of peculiar wines) as 'pig-type' creatures.

Again, these 'dilemmas' don't usually come up in our ordinary language. Then, Austin concludes that is not very worthy to make a distinction between 'real X' and 'not real X', and we are not even able to draw it...

Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all.

@Corvus

I guess you would like the following quote from Austin:

When it isn't a real duck but a hallucination, it may still be a real hallucination-as opposed, for instance, to a passing quirk of a vivid imagination. That is, we must have an answer to the question 'A real what?', if the question 'Real or not?' is to have a definite sense, to get any foothold. And perhaps we should also mention here another point that the question 'Real or not?' does not always come· up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us-in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways in which things may be not what they seem. What alternative is there to being a 'real' after-image ? 'Real' is not... — Austin