It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here. — Antony Nickles

I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :)

Thanks for the link, but I have nice hardback copies of both Austin (1962) and Ayer's (1940) books. I was reading both of them today. Must admit Austin's writing style is super clear, and utterly logical.

I am easily persuadable given good arguments, but indirect realism is lacking in that department. So thank you for at least sharing what you believe.

Yes, I do appreciate your points too. After good argument sessions, I always feel I have learnt 10 times more than any lectures or readings.

As you may agree, philosophical arguments are not about brawls, but just your points laid out in several premises and evidences followed by your conclusions. And pointing out why you do or don't agree with your opponents points. :)

He quibbles throughout, but then says that, according to the argument from illusion, sense-data is perceived directly. — NOS4A2

the argument from illusion is intended primarily to persuade us that, in certain exceptional, abnormal situations, what we perceive—directly anyway—is a sense-datum

This is confusing, but if we break it down: they are trying (but fail) to persuade us that we only can "directly" perceive sense datum, because of the problems brought up in certain circumstances which they want to say creates a problem with perception. This is not an admission by Austin that we perceive things directly, but simply stating the argument they are making in creating the indirect/direct distinction.

I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :) — Corvus

I was not intending to suppress discussion. It just helps me to respond to the text and how we are interpreting that, which is what I am trying to focus on discussing--not "my" points, but Austin's--which I see as different than just expressing our views on this issue. But, feel free.

The argument for sense perceptions, or data, and qualia (and appearances, and particulars) have in common that we are problematizing sensing in a particular way—by abstraction from any setting—and creating one answer because we believe there is always a problem (and that we want to buffer ourselves from the possibility of any). — Antony Nickles

That would be one way of seeing it, but actually I was saying the opposite. “Pure sensation” or “qualia” or whatever term you prefer is what we call the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. We then go on to “see X” based on what we’ve learned about how to see. I think Austin considers this issue of “seeing as . . .” later in the book.

But I may not be understanding you. How does any of this problematize sensing? I was hoping to make the problem diminish or even disappear, working in parallel with Austin rather than against him.

“Pure sensation” or “qualia” or whatever term you prefer is what we call the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. We then go on to “see X” based on what we’ve learned about how to see. I think Austin considers this issue of “seeing as . . .” later in the book. — J

The point about abstraction is a note on Austin's method. If we ignore all the uses of a term in all its various contexts (as Austin brings back), then we narrow our understanding of, say, "direct" and "material objects", etc. and our picture becomes unconnected from our lives.

But I may not be understanding you. How does any of this problematize sensing? — J

The fact that we make mistakes, mis-identify, are tricked, and all the other things Austin explores, should point (as Austin does) to the ordinary ways by which we resolve those issues. Philosophy turns these instances into a intellectualized "problem" which underlies all cases, thus unconnected from our procedures and familiarity, because it can then have one solution, here "direct perception", or "qualia".

It doesn't matter. — Ciceronianus

Very true. Of course not.

On re-reading, a few things stand out to me. Foremost is how often Austin explicitly pushes against many of the sorts of things of which he is now accused. Those accusations target a caricature, not the man. Next is the explicit misogyny and racism, which is perhaps more than just an indication of the times. And he's not as cruel as he is in my recollection, although the attack is searing, castigating each and every step in Ayer's book one after the other.

It's interesting to watch and attempting to fit the actual Austin in to the account that is so prevalent here, that indirect realism is about sensory apparatus, the way in which our eyes and brain process vision, and so direct realism must also be about sensory apparatus. Corvus in particular is finding that what Austin actually says does not match the common account of what an indirect realist should say. The hard part for them is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique.

(Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two. — Banno

This applies also to direct/indirect realism. The danger for this thread is that the discussion becomes just another rendition of that tedious "he said/she said".

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. — Ludwig V

The point Austin makes quite early seems to me to cover this:

I. First of all, it is essential to realize that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers- 'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite — p.15

You didn't see it directly, you saw it through a telescope, or a mirror, or only its shadow; how we are to understand "direct" perception depends entirely on what it is contrasted with; so of course it is difficult to imagine what "direct perception" is, per se. It's a nonsense, an invention of the defenders of the sort of argument Ayer is presenting. You can find examples in every thread on perception*.

Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. — Antony Nickles

Yes!

Must admit Austin's writing style is super clear, and utterly logical. — Corvus

Yep, Ciceronianus' Damascan cream pie in the face. A good philosophical account is compelling.

Do we agree that “qualia” refer to actual phenomenological experience... — J

One of the prejudices I share with Austin is a dislike for specifically philosophical innovations. Talk of qualia mostly post dates Austin, but I suspect he would have spent some time pointing out that the term doesn't seem to achieve anything not already found in our ordinary talk of seeing and touching.

Going over my own notes, I found an admission that I did not understand qualia - from 2012. In 2013, I said I do not think that there is worth in giving a name to the subjective experience of a colour or a smell. In 2014, I doubted the usefulness of differentiating a smell from the experience-of-that-smell. Never understood qualia. I still don't see their purpose. — Banno

...that's from three years ago. I've had no reason to reconsider.

* See the ongoing discussion in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14738/a-case-for-transcendental-idealism by way of example. It was in part bemusement at the dreadful standard of the discussion there that inspired my re-reading of Austin.

The fact that we make mistakes, mis-identify, are tricked, and all the other things Austin explores, should point (as Austin does) to the ordinary ways by which we resolve those issues. Philosophy turns these instances into a intellectualized "problem" which underlies all cases, thus unconnected from our procedures and familiarity, because it can then have one solution, here "direct perception", or "qualia". — Antony Nickles

It's an example of what Dewey called The Philosophical Fallacy, now that I think of it--simply put, the disregard of context. Whatever is thought in philosophy to be true (or I would say untrue) under certain conditions may be claimed to be true (or untrue) under all conditions.

It would be so great to have a time machine and go to the future when the mind is more fully understood. :smile:

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus

Having gotten through Lecture IV: this is an example of where Austin takes a deep-dive into the differences between ordinary "uses" of words that philosophy takes as terms for a special purpose, but I think Austin somethings buries the point of all this. ("uses" here are the different "ways in which 'looks like' may be meant and may be taken p.40)

I'm going to take a stab at putting the dots together, but I do think the way he talks about it (below) needs to be accounted for. I take him to be showing how different uses (of like or seems) each have different things that matter to us about them, different ways we judge them, including: whether they are analogous or divergent 36 whether evidence is used 37 that there are different kinds of evidence 39 sometimes only needing a "general impression" 39 what "complications are attributable" 39 what they "well might be mistaken for" 42

I take these various standards and features to show that there are many different means of judging, rather than only whether we see it (directly) or do not see it; which is the point at which philosophy adds something in-between, like "sense-data", because then the standard can be unqualified across instances, locations, and everything sensed. But just because we can make a mistake does not mean we have to interpret sensations as always open to explanation by faulty sensors, as errors can be corrected because there is "nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement" and that I can "retract my statement or at least amend." 43

There is also, again, that judging these cases is different in different contexts, or that there needs to be a correct context, such as: "particular" and "special circumstances" and "suitable contexts" 39 that we need to look at the "full circumstances of particular cases" 39 or that how it is used will "depend on further facts about the occasion of utterance;"

I also want to note that these means of judgment are "our normal interests" 38 in these things, because it opens the question of what philosophy's interests are in its one standard (directness) without regard to instance or context which I take as the desire to "rule out uncertainty altogether, or every possibility of being challenged and perhaps proved wrong."

And to internalize our possibility of failure makes it a problem with me ("my" perception), or with humanity (some faculty or process), but Austin is claiming that our standards and circumstances that frame how these issue play out means that "I am not disclosing a fact about myself" because "the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 (emphasis added). How can it be only your perception when what you see incorrectly can be pointed out by me?

IV
A slightly shorter, but intense, lecture breaking apart various uses of "Look", "Appear" and "Seem". talks about the complexity of the issue, which comes down to Ayer apparently playing on words again - the straight stick looks bent; but what are we to conclude from that? We can agree that it looks bent while maintaining that it is in fact straight; but Ayer would have us deny this, or at the least call it into question. Ayer wants us to take "something looks bent" and conclude that, therefore, something is bent; it's only by our being duped in this way that we will again be convinced of the existence of sense data.

Further, as repeats, "descriptions of looks are neither 'incorrigible' nor 'subjective'... There is certainly nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement that so-and-so looks such-and-such"(p.42). How things look will not carry the weight Ayer would place on it.

"the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 (emphasis added). How can it be only your perception when what you see incorrectly can be pointed out by me? — Antony Nickles

Yes, this one was interesting and you raised a good question.

I will try to develop an answer and make an attempt to interpret what Austin wants to mean roughly.

I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: the external, which essentially treats all things as objects and ignores the subject (that's why inP. 61 he somehow agrees with other philosophers or thinkers such as Locke, Hume, Kant, etc. in the fact that there are 'physical occupants', thus the 'bodies'), and then internal, which treats the whole of experience and objective reality as a content, as representation, of the subject. This is why in P. 85 he states: [...] or if, being subject to an illusion of double vision, I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper, I need not be implying that there really are two pieces of paper there)

Similarly, the content of the relation of perception between subject and object can be assigned by reflection indifferently to either object or subject. This is why what I see incorrectly, can be seen by you as well. The answer might not be who is right or wrong nor why we see it wrong, but both.

Agree?

For my part my intent is to continue in the way I have been, reading a lecture or two ahead and then going back to re-read in more detail to make notes mostly for myself. Lecture IV will probably be very brief, then a bit more detail, or less, as we move into the later lectures, if I loose interest. If you want to move at a faster pace, go ahead, but I've found in the past that this leads to folk getting lost and needing to go over arguments again. — Banno

Thanks very much for this. I don't want to move at a faster pace (except that I have skimmed through the book because I find it helpful to have something of an overview. But it'll be a lot easier to follow and contribute if I know where the focus is in the discussion. By now, I guess you'll be reading Lecture IV - and by the time I'm actually posting this, you have read it. I found Lecture IV quite difficult and am not confident that I've understood it.

Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. — Antony Nickles

Yes. I should have explained that I was asking the question because I didn't and don't think that "direct" perception makes any sense, except in the context of Austin's account of indirect perception. But various comments have clarified sense-data are (very like) qualia, and I'm content believe that I'm right to be puzzled.

I agree that these entities are developed in pursuit of

the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. — J

. The idea that we can, so to speak "peel off" the layers of interpretation to arrive at a purified, simple sensation seems to me a wild goose chase. That peeling off process is itself a process and the result will be another concept of the sensation which will be, paradoxically, itself a concept. There is no "before". (I wish I could construct the Austinian argument for this.)

It’s just a question of what it is we are perceiving. — NOS4A2

Yes - in the context of our mistakes. The argument from illusion, rightly seen, is not as persuasive as the more difficult cases. The more difficult problem is that, for example, Macbeth is behaving as if he sees a dagger, and not acting (pretending), so he believes that he sees a dagger. There's no (philosophical) problem until we remember that perceiving is always perceiving something. So we invent something to plug the apparent logical gap and create something that gives us philosophical certainty, and a morass of problems to go with it. That's my diagnosis of the conjuring trick, anyway.

If the law of identity holds, I cannot consider “the final place where the perceptual judgement took place” as perceived, because the brain is a component of the perceiver. Does X perceive Y, or does X perceive X? At any rate, neither precludes any intermediary. — NOS4A2

I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: — javi2541997

I don't really understand either of these models, but it is striking that Austin (so far, at least) doesn't directly consider them. I'm very suspicious of them. For a start, they are dominated by the sense of sight. But do they apply to all the senses? Perhaps to hearing, and even to smell, but touch and taste are different, and proprioception and balance different again. It's not obvious to me how helpful they are in those contexts.

We do not have to buy in to the argument that the tree falling in the forest when there is no-one to hear it does not make a sound. It depends what you choose to call a sound.

I don't really understand either of these models, but it is striking that Austin (so far, at least) doesn't directly consider them. — Ludwig V

I think Austin roughly consider them, at least that is what I interpret on the page 61 when he states:

It is a curious and in some ways rather melancholy fact that the relative positions of Price and Ayer at this point turn out to be exactly the same as the relative positions of Locke and Berkeley, or Hume and Kant. In Locke's view there are 'ideas' and also 'external objects', in Home's 'impressions' and also 'external objects', in Price's view 'sense-data' and also 'physical occupants'; in Berkeley's doctrine there are only ideas, in Kant's only Vorstellungen (things-in-themselves being not strictly relevant here), in Ayer's doctrine there are only sense-data-but Berkeley, Kant, and Ayer all further agree that we can speak as if there were bodies, objects, material things. Certainly, Berkeley and Kant are not so liberal as Ayer-they don't suggest that, so long as we keep in step with the sensible manifold, we can talk exactly as we please; but on this issue, if I had to take sides, I think I should side with them — Austin

We do not have to buy in to the argument that the tree falling in the forest when there is no-one to hear it does not make a sound. It depends what you choose to call a sound. — Ludwig V

Good point. What we have to take as granted is that the sound actually happened, but this one can be seen in two different perspectives, which each do not deny the sound itself.

Internal. Treats the whole of experience and objective reality. Thus, the tree fell and made the sound, doesn't matter whether we hear it or not.
External, the sound existed, but we verified its existence because we heard it eventually.
Here we must consider first that is not so much neither internal nor external but both that we are stuck with. This is why I attempted to understand Austin using these two perspectives, or at least looking for alternatives rather than denying them altogether, which is what Positivism does.

It's interesting to watch ↪Corvus and ↪NOS4A2 attempting to fit the actual Austin in to the account that is so prevalent here, that indirect realism is about sensory apparatus, the way in which our eyes and brain process vision, and so direct realism must also be about sensory apparatus. Corvus in particular is finding that what Austin actually says does not match the common account of what an indirect realist should say. The hard part for them is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique.
(Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.
— Banno — Banno

I was wanting to keep interacting from my own thoughts only on the topic, but perhaps I must read the Austin, and even Ayer too if the thread is about what Austin actually said in "Sense and Sensibilia", rather than what problems direct realists and indirect realist have in their accounts on perception.

Austin and Ayer were very last in my reading list, but they are brought to the current reading list due to this thread.  My reading on them will be very slow due to my other readings going in tandem with them.  

From my quick reading of Austin last night, I agree that @Banno was right in his point that Austin seems to think there is no significance in differentiating direct and indirect words in perception.  He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers'  In that sense, words like "material stuff", "direct or indirect '' don't make sense, because no one really uses these terms in daily life unless one is a philosopher.

However, he seems to acknowledge the case when "indirect" perception makes sense such as seeing objects using telescopes, binoculars and spectacles, which I have been using as an example for the indirect perception process.

Indeed I feel, there is no much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human  perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs i.e. the eye sights in visual perceptions, and ears for acoustic perceptions, and nose in case of smelling.  No one would use their nose to see a tree in the field, and no one would use their eyes to smell wine. And without the relevant sense organs and their proper functions, that particular sense perception would be impaired, if not impossible.

But if we agree on the fact that these sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain.  Therefore all perceptions are indirect. And we are not even talking about sense-datum at this point.

I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception.  In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? Are they saying that what they sense from the external objects directly arrives in their brain without any medium in between?  Are they saying that what they sense and perceive from the external world are the true existence of the beings and the world with no possibility of being uncertain or inaccurate?

This point might not be the main topic of this thread as @Banno pointed out, so it could be ignored if that is the way the thread will proceed.

I will be reading the part where Austin discusses on "Delusion and Illusion".
 

He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers' — Corvus

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind.

As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind. — RussellA

Could you explain what that is?

But if we agree on the fact that these sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain.  Therefore all perceptions are indirect. And we are not even talking about sense-datum at this point. — Corvus

:up: however people will rebut that it is the whole body and not just the brain so it’s direct in that this is how the human brain body processes the world, and you can’t get out of this as if from primary to secondary works of process integration. That’s just my guess.

Could you explain what that is? — frank

To my understanding, as Austin's interest is in language, it is not surprising that he challenges the sense-data theory that we never directly perceive material objects, as this is not how language works. In language, we do directly talk about material objects.

Linguistic Idealism may be described as the position that puts the mind at the centre of reality and language at the centre of the mind, and language does not represent the physical world as is often claimed but is the world itself. (www.researchgate.net - Nonrepresentational Linguistic Idealism). Wittgenstein has sometimes been described as a Linguistic Idealist. GEM Anscombe considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a Linguistic Idealist in her paper ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’.

Basically, the sense-data theory of Ayer and the linguistics of Austin are different aspects of knowledge, as mathematics and ethics are different aspects of knowledge. That is not to say neither is not valid, but becomes problematic when mixed up together.

https://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fmiro.medium.com%2Fv2%2Fresize%3Afit%3A656%2F1*X4OCziOUe9xYm1nN06mG5A.png&tbnid=91WtSbFg1eQ_mM&vet=12ahUKEwizpJbeprKCAxVJ0MkDHShEDt8QMygSegQIARBy..i&imgrefurl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F%40kleong54%2Fconversations-with-pi-buddha-versus-descartes-1fab2563a230&docid=heNqkIjfpn3A0M&w=656&h=481&q=ghost%20in%20the%20machine%20drawing%20philosophy&hl=en&authuser=1&ved=2ahUKEwizpJbeprKCAxVJ0MkDHShEDt8QMygSegQIARBy

Ah. That's better, isn't it?

I see. So Austin doesn't want sense data because it interferes with the way he envisions the relationship between mind and world?

That’s a good guess. The indirect realist position presents itself with a problem of self-hood, among others. It implies the perceiver is like a little viewer who observes the neural circuitry of his sense organs as they dutifully present him with impulses that turn out to look like chairs, sound like horns, and smell like lavender.

It’s a shame Austin doesn’t wade into any of these problems given the title of his book (just another play on words, I guess), and is content to split-hairs on rather trivial matters, like an entire lecture on the word “real”.

I see. So Austin doesn't want sense data because it interferes with the way he envisions the relationship between mind and world? — frank

Perhaps more the relationship of language to world. Don't you agree? Reference to sense-data is not generally used in ordinary language, as when he writes:
For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind. — RussellA

Good point. We will see what the reading and discussions will reveal in due course.

however people will rebut that it is the whole body and not just the brain so it’s direct in that this is how the human brain body processes the world, and you can’t get out of this as if from primary to secondary works of process integration. That’s just my guess. — schopenhauer1

Great point. :ok: But we are not asking who or what is responsible for perception, but how perception works.

Perhaps more the relationship of language to world. Don't you agree? — RussellA

You had said he puts mind at the center of reality, and language at the center of mind. That's why I thought the ultimate relationship would be mind to world. No?

Thanks for the quotation from Austin. It does help.

Here we must consider first that it is not so much neither internal nor external but both that we are stuck with. — javi2541997

Austin's point is that we are not stuck with them. He doesn't analyse this particular duo, but if he did, he would seek to clarify exactly what they mean, and, IMO, conclude that they don't mean anything coherent.

all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human  perception, — Corvus

Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.

I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it.

I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception.  In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? — Corvus

I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means.

Linguistic Idealism — RussellA

This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, I'm inclined to think that this is a pigeon-hole attributed to them so that they can be more easily refuted. I haven't run across Anscombe's article before, so I need to look at that before forming an opinion.

however people will rebut that it is the whole body and not just the brain so it’s direct in that this is how the human brain body processes the world, — schopenhauer1

I think that this is right, at least in the sense that I perceive things, not my eyes nor my brain. I'm dubious whether it really makes sense to say that my body perceives things either, since most physical objects are not sentient. But insofar as I am embodied, it may be helpful.

Linguistic Idealism may be described as the position that puts the mind at the centre of reality and language at the centre of the mind, and language does not represent the physical world as is often claimed but is the world itself. — RussellA

Those metaphors "at the centre" are presumably shorthand for something and need a bit of explaining. It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. (But I agree that language does not represent the world, though it certainly can be used to describe it.)

like an entire lecture on the word “real”. — NOS4A2

You miss the point. If you are going to assert that the objects of perception are unreal or that tables and chairs are real, it is a good idea to know what the word means, including what it means to other people. Unless you offer your own definition of real, other people will assume that you mean by it what it means in ordinary language. But in ordinary language, the assertion that tables and chairs are real is extraordinarily pointless, and the assertion that rainbows and sunsets are unreal is completely puzzling.

But we are not asking who or what is responsible for perception, but how perception works. — Corvus

It is true that Austin does not ask this question. But then neither does Ayer. You are right to put the question that asks in that way.

But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake.

How the human brain/body works is a good question but a question for physiology and psychology, from their different points of view. The only contribution that philosophy seems to make is to define the problem in such a way that it is insoluble and call it the "hard problem", which seems less than helpful. Perhaps they should tell philosophy to butt out and leave them to it. But then, traditional comfortable dualism would be threatened. From my point of view, that's not a problem.

Ayer wants us to take "something looks bent" and conclude that, therefore, something is bent; it's only by our being duped in this way that we will again be convinced of the existence of sense data. — Banno

Yes, it's an example of what I think of as the tyranny of the noun.

Having gotten through Lecture IV: this is an example of where Austin takes a deep-dive into the differences between ordinary "uses" of words that philosophy takes as terms for a special purpose, but I think Austin somethings buries the point of all this. — Antony Nickles

I also found Lecture IV less than exciting, because his target wasn't obvious and it wasn't easy to see how his exploration could be applied. Your summary was helpful, in particular

the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 — Antony Nickles

However, I came out thinking, not that his approach was wrong, but that a slightly different approach would have been more illuminating. He says that he offers his examples so that we can get the feel of it, but I'm afraid I didn't. I was much more comfortable with Lecture V, because the idea that "real" is grammatically comparable to "good" gave me something to hold on to.

After scratching my head for a while, I came to the conclusion that, in spite of his saying that it is the differences are important, it is the similarities - overlaps - that are most prominent. Hence my confusion. Here are some examples of what I would have found more helpful. But I'm not sure the application to his targets is as clear as it is in what he wrote.

1) He doesn't mention that "appearance" (which is not best thought of as a noun, but as a verb) has one important use that is quite distinct from either "looks" or "seems", as in "When we reached the crest of the hill, the sea appeared, twinkling in the sunshine", or "the train appeared down the track" or "the magician appeared on the stage". There are no peculiar objects involved in these events.

2) "looks" have their home, not as peculiar properties of objects, but as something that I do. I look at things. "looks" in the senses explored in Austin's discussion, are, so to speak what I see when I look at things. As Austin points out, "looks" is part of a family of verbs, each of which is specific to one sense; there are nouns that go with each verb, as in "sounds" and "smells", etc.

3) "Seems" doesn't seem to have a noun attached - as he points out, there are no such things as "seemings". It is also the only one of the three that, to put it this way, has deception or at least the idea that what seems to be so is not the whole, or proper, story, built in to it.

It's not that Austin doesn't make the point he needs and I'm not sure that I'm not being presumptuous or just changing the subject in saying all this.

I was wanting to keep interacting from my own thoughts only on the topic — Corvus

I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others.

Again, the notion of a direct perception makes sense when we know what it is being contrasted with. So we understand the difference between seeing the ship indirectly through the periscope as oppose to popping the hatch and taking a look from the conning tower; we understand the difference between seeing the tree indirectly through the binoculars as opposed to walking over to it to see it directly. But the contention offered in the forums is much odder than these cases. It's that we never see the ship or the tree or anything else directly, but only through the intervention of our eyes. And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it.

It was addresses by David Stove, an Australian philosopher, who used the example of tasting oysters. Should oysters be eaten straight, or with a squeeze of lemon? Or the whole Kilpatrick treatment? Well, if you would know what oysters themselves taste like, it might be best to try them "natural". But the argument for indirect realism is as if someone were to suggest that one never tastes oysters except with one's tongue, and therefore one never tastes oysters in themselves.

I hope the absurdity is plain, and that you see the relevance of 's joke.

I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception.  In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? — Corvus

I also hope that it will become clear that neither Austin nor I are making the claim that our perceptions are in some way always direct. Sometimes - periscopes and binoculars and mirrors - they are indirect, and in such situations we can understand what it would mean in contrast for them to be both direct and indirect.

So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science.

Are they saying that what they sense and perceive from the external world are the true existence of the beings and the world with no possibility of being uncertain or inaccurate? — Corvus

No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.

The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup.