Russia's position on Ukraine / Georgia NATO membership was known well before the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and not 'unexpected' at all. The Russian view is discussed at length in several memos written by former CIA director William Burns. — Tzeentch

Above I have given a quote from Putin's official site. So yes, I agree it is quite stunning.

You’d be surprised. I would argue Canada places more power in the hands of its leader than does any other western country. Trudeau invoked the Emergency Act to quell protests critical of his government’s handling of the pandemic, for example. These powers allowed him to engage in nefarious activity against his own citizens, like directing banks to freeze their accounts. Imagine if the US president tried to do that.

What even is your argument? :chin:

The bottomline is your assertions are objectively untrue. We've got Washington officials going on record saying the exact opposite of what you're saying.

The bottomline is that Putin's declarations on Ukraine's joning NATO completely changed between 2002 and 2008. Given that it was only six years in between and NATO did not really do anything to change that perception, that reaction very well could be considered unexpected and irrational.

Maybe next time just read what you comment on. Then you would not have to complain about your own poor reading skills. Or ask what is the argument about after you comment on it.

Given that it was only six years in between and NATO did not really do anything to change that perception, ... — Jabberwock

'Not really anything', except for expanding NATO by another 7 countries, and planning another 2 - Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.

NATO expansionism had received wide-spread criticism, even from people within the administrations that carried out the policy. You can read the memoires of people like Madeline Albright or Robert Gates.

George Kennan termed NATO expansion as 'starting a new Cold War' back in 1998!

And here you are arguing the 'Russians acted unexpected and irrational'.

What can I say? It's a joke.

Maybe next time just read what you comment on. Then you would not have to complain about your own poor reading skills. Or ask what is the argument about after you comment on it. — Jabberwock

Very impressive, kiddo. :rofl:

:D Nice photoshop there. Pink, too. Message?

No, it is not the most direct cause, as it was not a cause of war with Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. — Jabberwock

Is this serious?

NATO did not actively do anything in that period that would make it a bigger threat to Russia. — Jabberwock

Oh good — glad you feel that way. The Russians felt differently. Our own ambassador acknowledges the sentiment in the memo I cited above. I guess none of that matters, since according to some internet dude Russia had no reason to view NATO as a threat. :up:

Thus the difference between 'Ukraine in NATO is not a big concern to us' in 2002 and 'it is a grave threat' in 2008 has nothing to do with its location. — Jabberwock

But it does have to do with the events that occurred after 2002.

And the idea that Russia was OK with Ukraine membership in NATO in 2002 is flawed anyway— and contradicted by the same article. But even accepting it wholesale, there’s a concept called “time”, and so things change between one year and the next. Worth paying attention to.

'Not really anything', except for expanding NATO by another 7 countries, and planning another 2 - Ukraine and Georgia. — Tzeentch

The seven countries started admission in 1999, so in 2002 when Putin said that the expansion 'does not cloud the relations' he was fully aware of the process, so that could not have changed his mind.

NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.
— Tzeentch

NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.

NATO expansionism had received wide-spread criticism, even from people within the administrations that carried out the policy. You can read the memoires of people like Madeline Albright or Robert Gates. — Tzeentch

So you STILL have not read the quote you have decided to discuss? Incredible... Poor reading indeed.

Is this serious? — Mikie

Yes, because militarily NATO in Ukraine is not much different than NATO in the Baltics. One might argue that losing 'friendly' access to Kaliningrad (with its missiles directed at Berlin) and cutting off most of the Baltic shore would be viewed as much more threatening. So it is not about NATO as such and it never was.

Oh good — glad you feel that way. The Russians felt differently. Our own ambassador acknowledges the sentiment in the memo I cited above. I guess none of that matters, since according to some internet dude Russia had no reason to view NATO as ac threat. — Mikie

I do not question that Russian attitudes have changed, but you still have failed to explain what NATO actually DID in that period that would change them. You cited two things - the Orange Revolution, but it is not something that NATO did, and Kosovo, which does not really explain the turnabout. So please, tell me what NATO did.

But it does have to do with the events that occurred after 2002.

And the idea that Russia was OK with Ukraine membership in NATO in 2002 is flawed anyway— and contradicted by the same article. But even accepting it wholesale, there’s a concept called “time”, and so things change between one year and the next. Worth paying attention to. — Mikie

I am glad you feel that way, but Putin has clearly stated that it would not 'cloud the relations' and it is really Ukraine's choice. So who has the right view of Putin's or Russia's attitudes - Putin or you, a random Internet dude? Surely you see a difference between 'they were not too happy about it' and 'they were ready to start war about it'?

Yes, because militarily NATO in Ukraine is not much different than NATO in the Baltics. — Jabberwock

It is very different in fact.

So it is not about NATO as such and it never was. — Jabberwock

It has been all along. But things do change at different points in time— which you’re apparently unwilling to understand.

2004, when the three countries you mentioned joined NATO, was after your 2002 quote. That changed things too, but Russia couldn’t do much about it.

but you still have failed to explain what NATO actually DID in that period that would change them — Jabberwock

From the Russian point of view — not mine. I can run through the history if you’d like, but there’s plenty of resources available.

Orange Revolution, but it is not something that NATO did, and Kosovo, which does not really explain the turnabout. — Jabberwock

The 2004 enlargement was one. Orange revolution wasn’t caused by NATO, but neither was Nosovo independence — but NATO supported it, and even led troops there. This did not go unrecognized.

But I don’t really see the sense in this. What are you arguing? Not that the Russians didn’t say it was a threat, but that they were lying — or had no actual reason to fear NATO? If the latter, that’s not up to us to say. Maybe the US has nothing to fear if China decides to make a military pact with Mexico — but listening to the US’s concerns would be wise regardless.

Again, listen to our own ambassador. Was he lying too? If not, then 2008 was the beginning of a great mistake, with foreseeable consequences.

I am glad you feel that way, but Putin has clearly stated that it would not 'cloud the relations' and it is really Ukraine's choice. — Jabberwock

He didn’t say it in 2008, did he? If he did, I’d agree that the reaction to Bucharest would be baffling indeed.

But he didn’t. So apparently you’re much more interested in listening to Putin when it fits your purposes—in 2002– but unwilling to do so from 2008, which is far more relevant, when he says that NATO including Ukraine is a “direct threat.”

Also from 2008:

So, about Kosovo. Mr. Сhairman has said that everybody respects Resolution 1244, but if everybody respected Resolution 1244, there would not be any one-sided declaration of independence. But I do not want to discuss this issue, we have discussed it at the G8, as well as at other forums, and we made a decision that we consider it illegal and able to cause serious consequences. But, if you noticed, we do not force anything. We formulated our position, and our position is open, but we do not go off into hysterics on this issue, and you should have paid attention to how reserved we were in the Caucasus on this issue. Of course, this policy puts us into a very complicated position at the post-Soviet space, because we have there enough situations similar to that with Kosovo – it is Transdniestria, Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh – there are many such situations. And you put us into a very complicated position, but we are trying to wriggle and behave very carefully, without destroying the situation there and without provoking military conflicts. That is why, however sad it may seem, but we here are also ready to look for any consensus, or a way out of the situation. Now I do not specify which exactly situation, I do not want to anticipate anything, in any case, we are ready to hear you, ready to think, ready to work somehow together.

As for the policy of expanding the alliance, we have been attentively watching your discussion yesterday. On the whole, of course, we are satisfied with your decisions, which took place. But If I speak about Georgia and Ukraine, it is clear that the matter concerns not only security issues. For our Georgian friends, of course, it is one of means to restore their territorial integrity, as they believe. Besides, by means of force, under the aegis of NATO. It is an old, many-years, lasting for more than a hundred years, ethnic conflict between Georgians, between Abkhazians (it is a small ethnic group, it numbers a mere 200 thousand people), between Ossetians, for a hundred years, and more, these conflicts are ethnic. To solve these problems they need not to enter NATO, they should have patience, establish dialog with small ethnic groups. And we have been trying to help them, besides, to help Georgia restore its territorial integrity. And even despite the decisions on Kosovo, we will not recognize the independence of these quasipublic formations, though they have been calling on us since long ago, for decades already. We have been very responsible, very weighted, and call on you to be careful as well.

But in Ukraine, one third are ethnic Russians. Out of forty five million people, in line with the official census, seventeen millions are Russians. There are regions, where only the Russian population lives, for instance, in the Crimea. 90% are Russians. Generally speaking, Ukraine is a very complicated state. Ukraine, in the form it currently exists, was created in the Soviet times, it received its territories from Poland – after the Second World war, from Czechoslovakia, from Romania – and at present not all the problems have been solved as yet in the border region with Romania in the Black Sea. Then, it received huge territories from Russia in the east and south of the country. It is a complicated state formation. If we introduce into it NATO problems, other problems, it may put the state on the verge of its existence. Complicated internal political problems are taking place there. We should act also very-very carefully. We do not have any right to veto, and, probably, we do not pretend to have. But I want that all of us, when deciding such issues, realize that we have there our interests as well. Well, seventeen million Russians currently live in Ukraine. Who may state that we do not have any interests there? South, the south of Ukraine, completely, there are only Russians.

https://www.unian.info/world/amp-111033-text-of-putin-s-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html

The President stressed that Russia has taken numerous steps to build confidence and hoped for a similar response from NATO, but has so far yet to see it. Russia will defend its positions, he said, but is always open to cooperation based on equality and mutual trust.

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/44078

The Kremlin realizes it doesn't have the power to force the West to reverse its recognition of Kosovo's independence or persuade Washington to drop its plan to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic.

But Putin has had notable success in blocking NATO membership for its former Soviet neighbors — Ukraine and Georgia.

"Georgia's accession into NATO will be seen here as an attempt to trigger a war in the Caucasus, and NATO membership for Ukraine will be interpreted as an effort to foment a conflict with Russia," said Sergei Markov, a Russian parliament member with close links to the Kremlin.

https://web.archive.org/web/20080410213408/http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080331/ap_on_re_eu/russia_vs_nato_1

What is unclear about the bolded part?

What’s the response? “Well 6 years ago Putin said something different and nothing has happened to justify a change in heart.” Again, is this serious?

It is very different in fact. — Mikie

Unsupported assertion.

It has been all along. But things do change at different points in time— which you’re apparently unwilling to understand.

2004, when the three countries you mentioned joined NATO, was after your 2002 quote. That changed things too, but Russia couldn’t do much about it. — Mikie

In 2002 Putin was perfectly aware that the Baltics will join NATO soon, as the process was started in 1999. In fact, the conference with NATO from which the quote was given would be a perfect opportunity to voice his concerns. Yet he did not, he just praised NATO-Russia cooperation and said that Ukraine may choose its alliances.

From the Russian point of view — not mine. I can run through the history if you’d like, but there’s plenty of resources available. — Mikie

Please do. The very fact that you believed that Putin in 2002 was unaware of the planned 2004 expansion shows that your knowledge in this respect might be somewhat lacking.

The 2004 enlargement was one. Orange revolution wasn’t caused by NATO, but neither was Nosovo independence — but NATO supported it, and even led troops there. This did not go unrecognized. — Mikie

The 2004 enlargement was a done deal in 2002. And Russians recognized that NATO led troops in Kosovo AFTER 2002? Then they must have been rather unattentive, given that the troops were there since 1999... together with Russians! Yes, please tell me about history...

But I don’t really see the sense in this. What are you arguing? Not that the Russians didn’t say it was a threat, but that they were lying — or had no actual reason to fear NATO? If the latter, that’s not up to us to say. Maybe the US has nothing to fear if China decides to make a military pact with Mexico — but listening to the US’s concerns would be wise regardless.

Again, listen to our own ambassador. Was he lying too? If not, then 2008 was the beginning of a great mistake, with foreseeable consequences. — Mikie

Yes, I know you do not see the sense in this, because, as i wrote, on your theory it is completely inexplicable. Putin was great friends with NATO in 2002 and was just slightly annoyed with the expansion, and in 2008 it was unacceptable and the red line, even though nothing much changed about NATO which would not have been known to him in 2002. Unless you know and understand why the sudden change of heart, you will be missing the bigger picture. But obviously you cannot, given your rather inaccurate guesses. Your theory also is unable to explain why Putin practically shrugged off the joining of the Baltics.

He didn’t say it in 2008, did he? If he did, I’d agree that the reaction to Bucharest would be baffling indeed.

But he didn’t. So apparently you’re much more interested in listening to Putin when it fits your purposes—in 2002– but unwilling to do so from 2008, which is far more relevant, when he says that NATO including Ukraine is a “direct threat.” — Mikie

Yes, Putin said one thing in 2002 and quite another in 2008, even though nothing much happened that had to do with NATO. That is the exact issue I am drawing your attention to.

What is unclear about the bolded part?

What’s the response? “Well 6 years ago Putin said something different and nothing has happened to justify a change in heart.” Again, is this serious? — Mikie

On the contrary, quite a lot happened to justify his change of heart, but it has very llitle to do with NATO.

Yes, Putin said one thing in 2002 and quite another in 2008, even though nothing much happened that had to do with NATO. That is the exact issue I am drawing your attention to. — Jabberwock

Not completely accurate, but irrelevant in any case.

On the contrary, quite a lot happened to justify his change of heart, but it has very llitle to do with NATO. — Jabberwock

Whatever the causes of Russia’s stance, it was indeed their stance in 2008, which is where this current crisis began in earnest.

Whatever point you’re trying to make with 2002, or the lead up to 2008, just state it outright. Maybe Putin found God. Maybe he decided to take over Eastern Europe. Whatever speculation you have, it’s still irrelevant. Russia’s position was clear in 2008. (In fact clear since the 90s, but that’s not relevant so there’s no need discussing it.)

The very fact that you believed that Putin in 2002 was unaware of the planned 2004 expansion — Jabberwock

He was very well aware, yes. Never said otherwise.

on your theory it is completely inexplicable — Jabberwock

No, there are explanations. But all of them are completely irrelevant.

No, there are explanations. But all of them are completely irrelevant. — Mikie

No, on your theory there are no such explanations, as it is pretty obvious after your completely unsuccessful attempts to provide them. That is why you try to dismiss them as irrelevant. I believed that if I have shown you that your theory has a big gaping hole, that might prompt you to seek an actual explanation, but it seems I was wrong, you are perfectly fine with overlooking it. God told Putin to change the policy? Right, that must be it.

The point is that the cause of the change of the politics is essential for the explanation of the current situation. And that cause is domestic: Putin in those years was faced with serious and economic problems, his rule was threatened by the wave of 'color revolutions' (you got that one right, but it still had nothing to do with NATO) and Russians were increasingly resenting the fall of the USSR, turning to those who openly embraced nationalistic and imperialistic ideas, like Zhirinovsky. In order to capture the support of hardliners Putin has made the turn from praising European cooperation toward near-open hostility in such a short period. Yes, NATO was one of the talking points, but it was pretty low on the list - more important was maintaining and expanding the sphere of influence in the 'Russian mir'. That is why he called the fall of the USSR 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century' in 2005, that is why he openly denied Ukraine's statehood in 2008 while still in 2002 he considered it to be a sovereign country that can decide about its own fate. That is why the concept of the 'near abroad' has resurfaced again. Objectively, NATO did not become a greater threat, it just became a convenient tool for making internal politics. But without the NATO expansion perspective that internal politics would have proceeded exactly the same - Russian imperialists are not so much threatened by the former republics joining a military alliance, but by the very idea of their independence. The Baltics are an exception here, as the Russian influences were much weaker there even in the USSR, that is why their joining NATO and the West in general was just shrugged off.

Thus the idea that if there were no NATO expansion plans, Russia would happily live peacefully along its neighbors, has little to do with reality. Let me remind you why the Euromaidan happened - it was a reaction of Ukrainians to Russia forcing Yanukovych to renege on his promises for trade integration with the EU - this had nothing to do with NATO. When Russia invaded Crimea, Ukraine actually had military neutrality enshrined in the constitution. So no, NATO did not provoke the conflict, the conflict at its core is caused by Ukraine's (and other republics) drive to sovereignty. Whether it chose to join NATO, EU or just tightened informal cooperation with the West while ditching Russian influence, the result would be the same.

Let me remind you why the Euromaidan happened - it was a reaction of Ukrainians to Russia forcing Yanukovych to renege on his promises for trade integration with the EU - this had nothing to do with NATO. — Jabberwock

Except that NATO's big daddy, the US, was directly involved in the coup.

We've even got Nuland on tape, designing the new Ukrainian government before the coup happened. :lol:

Nope, Euromaidan began three months before that.

This is a non sequitur. — neomac

Learn what these words mean before using them. — Mikie

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression literally meaning “it doesn’t follow” and that would be already enough, if you understood my charitable objection: "There was no reason to do so" doesn't informally follow from "Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line". But, if one wants to be more pedantic, it’s also a well-known label for the following logic fallacy: “in logic and philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy), which your argument - as it is formulated, namely “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” - SO OBVIOUSLY is.
Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with?

your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences — neomac

Nope. That was your projection — Mikie

.

Oh really?! So pray tell, what else was the point of “Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago” exactly? Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. Give me an example of how else you would formulate the same content to sound dismissive.

Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed — neomac

I just did above. Plenty more. — Mikie

Well that’s very disappointing wrt what I expressly asked. Indeed, if that’s Putin’s full quote you are referring to is “The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc, whose members' actions are regulated, among other [documents], by Article 5 of the Washington [North Atlantic] Treaty, will be taken in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia." (https://www.rferl.org/a/1079735.html) is rather equivocal wrt the nature of the security threat and indeterminate about its consequences.
1 - First of all, why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? Was Russia implying that they wanted to aggress Ukraine, therefore they didn’t like the idea that Ukraine could invoke article 5, and defend itself with the support of NATO countries? Or that Ukrainians felt that once Ukraine was protected by NATO they were determined to military aggress Russia? But in that case Ukraine couldn’t invoke Article 5 right? Besides Russia is a military nuclear power (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) that any country fears, how plausible would be to have Ukraine to attack Russia (nuclear missiles in European bases remain under the control of the US, not of the hosting countries)? Not to mention that history clearly tells us that Russia oppressed Ukraine not the other way around. And there are official Russian quotes that are very open about letting Ukraine decide what organisation to join. So which is it? Besides did Russia ever express declared intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty. I’d say yes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum), so did Putin between 2000-2008 ever declare intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty? If not, what did this missing declaration imply? That Putin was committed or not committed to Budapest memorandum? Besides, as the Budapest memorandum suggests, one of the main concern of the US was the fate of the Russian nuclear arsenal after the collapse of Soviet Union, as it still would be if Russia collapses. But then there would be two perceived strong reasons about Russian military nuclear power INDEPENDENTLY from Putin or any other Russian President that would make an aggression of Russia by NATO unlikely, and which are stronger than the threat of Putin’s feeling provoked as such: indeed the US wouldn’t have to be so much worried if Iran feels provoked and sets red lines, because it is not a military nuclear power yet, right?
2 - Putin’s claim doesn’t specify what will happen if lines are crossed AT ALL. Did Putin mean that if Ukraine joins NATO Russia will start a nuclear war with NATO states right away? Or just a conventional war against NATO? But if he ALREADY had no fear to do that, why a defensive art.5 invoked by Ukraine inside NATO would be a security threat to Putin which would have the same effect? And if a full-out war was too risky to him, why not supporting far-right terrorism in Europe/US/Ukraine? Why not provoking civil wars in Europe, inflating national identities, or immigration crisis? Or it means that Putin would start a war just in Ukraine? But then why didn’t Putin declare war to Ukraine much earlier (during Trump, Obama, Bush administrations)?! Ukraine and the West would have been totally unprepared back then, why give them the chance to prepare themselves for a war?! If the Western plan of having Ukraine joining NATO was such a threat, why did he take a good decade to such unbreakable threat which NATO wasn’t prepared for?! Or Putin simply meant that he needed to find a security framework that would include Russian concerns in some satisfactory form with no specifications attached to it? Or else, did he mean he would be ready to annex Crimea in 2014 back then? Or invade Ukraine in 2022? The alleged genocide of Russians in Donbas were an issue back then too?! How about Finland? Also Finland joining NATO matches that claim, will Putin aggress Finland too now?! If not, why not?!

Do you have quotes from 2000-2008 clarifying these points , because if you haven’t and we want to stick to declared intentions then you too could be the one who is trying to interpret retroactively what Putin meant back in 2008 in light of what it happened since 2014, thanks to the fact Putin’s threat could mean and, and in your eyes, even justify literally any hostile reaction against the West at any time, because he felt provoked, right?
BTW if we should care only about declared intentions to assess security threats, why is Putin dispensed with doing the same (“And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia.")? Maybe it’s because threat assessment by state leaders are not necessarily based on mere declared intentions? Notice also that there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment).
In any case, economic or military blackmails may not work as one might think or wish on countries with hegemonic ambitions: if that’s true for Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, that should be very much expected to be true also for the hegemonic power too.

The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc ... will be considered by Russia as a direct threat to our country's security,

Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, — neomac

That Russia has imperial ambitions, that they seek to conquer not just Ukraine but other countries, etc. Claims that have been made by the US and others since 2014, and retroactively made as justification for 2008 — which isn’t true.

NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. — neomac

I’ve already acknowledged this. — Mikie

You didn’t quote any of such claims nor proved that they are “retroactively” made as justification for 2008. Indeed arguments for NATO expansion came prior 2014 and 2008, and prior to Putin’s presidency, and do not need to rely on Putin’s declared intentions but on the evidences of Russian-Ukrainian history (evidences you acknowledged). So much so that Putin himself is still picking from Russian (also Imperial) history to justify his war and his territorial annexations, go figure. Besides Putin’s politics during 2000-2008 didn’t do anything to contradict Russian imperialist ambitions, on the contrary all he has done is to ENABLE the pursuit of imperial ambitions after necessary power consolidation (so much so that Russia changed its military doctrine already in 2010 which would most certainly come in handy in any possible annexation of territories in neighbouring countries with Russian minorities). And Putin is member of the Cold War mentality Russian elites so trust issues with him shouldn’t come as a surprise AT ALL.
Again you didn’t explain what counts as evidence to support the claim “Russia has imperial ambitions”. For Ukraine, Georgia and Poland, any attempt to question post-Soviet Union countries independent foreign policy was expression of Russian imperial ambitions even during 2000-2008 (https://www.aei.org/articles/love-and-hate-polish-russian-relations-marred-by-russian-unpredictability-and-eu-and-nato-uncertainty/, https://jamestown.org/program/poland-plays-strategic-role-in-ukraines-orange-revolution/, https://euobserver.com/world/22861). Why are they wrong and you right? Notice that one can extend or narrow the semantic of a notion at convenience: example, “Russia has not imperial ambitions, because no Russian president proclaimed himself emperor”. But then why are we talking about American imperialism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_imperialism)? There are no American emperors either.
What about “hegemonic ambitions” instead of “imperial ambitions”? Do you like that expression better? If so (why so?), do you exclude that Putin’s Russia had hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine in 2008 as well? And that Putin’s “provocation” claims didn’t presuppose it? What would constitute relevant evidence to assess hegemonic ambitions in geopolitics?

Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed. — neomac


It wasn’t poorly planned, and of course there are reasons and justifications given. The actual reason is that the US wanted to make Eastern Europe like Western Europe, and figured Russia was to weak to do anything about it. So in 2008, despite warnings, they started the process anyway.

You can buy the US rationale if you want to. I don’t. But either way, the outcome was clear: it would provoke Russia. This was known since the early 90s, in fact. — Mikie

“It wasn’t poorly planned” is a claim not an argument, and I don’t need to buy any rationale. Yet. I limit myself to try to understand what it was and get you to do the same exercise to sound more challenging. I acknowledge the fact that Russia was sensitive about it, and vocally so. But these are not all the relevant facts about the relation between the US and Russia: indeed, Putins’ 2000-2008 Russia might have been weaker than it was in 2013, but not as weak as it was Russia under Yeltsin in terms of power consolidation and domestic popularity. However even then, during Yeltsin, Ukraine didn’t join the West despite all reasons in favour of that (it was because the West couldn’t care less to have Ukraine joining NATO or because Russian opposition was diplomatically taken into account?!). Besides in that period the most imminent threat to the US or broadly the West was Islamist terrorism, and Russia was willing to cooperate with the West against a common enemy, so that was likely a strong reason on both sides to not escalate reciprocal hostilities. Besides the US pushed Ukraine to give back nuclear weapons to Russia (benefiting Russia), and then Western countries wanted to do business with Russia (that’s why states like Germany were against Ukraine joining NATO, and yet Finland had no problems, why the difference?). At the same time Russia enjoyed the benefits of globalisation so he kept playing as friendly as he could for its own convenience until he felt the right moment to invaded Ukraine. Russia used its resources capitalized during the globalization not to increase democracy, welfare state in Russia and quell revanchist ideologies against the West, but to project military/political power and anti-American propaganda beyond its borders, in the West (through political corruption, trolling farms, support to far-right movements), in the Middle East, in Africa, build alliances with authoritarian regimes like China and Iran to counterbalance the hegemon. All these are FACTS to be acknowledged. Right? Finally “provoking Russia” should be taken in the geopolitical context of a hegemonic competition. Otherwise it doesn’t make any sense. Right?

but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine — neomac

Are you really not convinced that at least by 2008, Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be threatening to Russian security? They said so explicitly. It’s not about what you or I feel, it’s about how they felt about it. The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway. So Crimea and now the Ukraine War shouldn’t be a mystery. — Mikie

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security, but I understand threats in terms of power struggle for hegemony, which have their game rules driven by security dilemmas and their historical background. Not for the puerile reason that “Putin said so” and the universe knew it since ever.
“The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway” is expected also in light of your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive realism which is all about states being security maximisers (ideas that are echoed in American officials like the Wolfowitz Doctrine and “many of its tenets re-emerged in the Bush Doctrine” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfowitz_Doctrine). However your guru Mearsheimer didn’t seem to take much into account Western globalization nor how much it benefited America’s hegemonic competitors (Russia included). Nor take into account that the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO didn’t damage Russia's national security AT ALL because it never materialised and nobody started a military aggression against Russia from Ukraine, on the contrary the narrative of Ukraine joining NATO as a provocation (which your guru Mearsheimer also spins) literally empowered and emboldened Russian anti-American propaganda in the West , revanchist and imperialist views in domestic country, and its business with West Europe, especially with Germany (which means wealth to invest in military ramp-up and projection that MOST CERTAINLY ENABLED the Ukrainian war whatever the fuck Putin’s declared intentions were in 2000). See? Yet another example of self-fulfilling prophecy. Hegemonic competitors need no help to find and voice pretexts about national security and national interest to pursue their power struggles, what they may desperately need is the ENABLING means to effectively pursue their hegemonic goals.
Notice also the difference in our approaches. You are discussing Ukrainian war to assess blame based on whatever naive and implicit understanding of geopolitical conflicts makes you happy, I discuss Ukrainian war to understand geopolitical conflicts as such first, independently from my preferences.

your guru Mearsheimer) — neomac
your guru Mearsheimer — neomac
your guru Mearsheimer — neomac

You seem obsessed with this guy. I haven’t cited him once— except in response to your referencing him.

So, are you just ignorant or what? — Mikie

Oh do you mean that it is pure coincidence that you brought up the same arguments that Mearsheimer abundantly defended (starting with “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault?”), popularised (everywhere he could as other fantastic superheroes like Chomsky and Sachs) and got so viral in the internet (including this thread)? BTW why didn’t you protest earlier if I was so awfully “ignorant or what”?
Don’t waste your time convince me otherwise, because that’s a totally irrelevant issue: indeed, even if we want to pretend that Mearsheimer is not your guru, all the points I made still hold against your as much as Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin views.



[1]
Article 5
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

The tape surfaced on February 6th 2014. Yanukovych didn't cede power until February 21st, and the worst of the violence happened on February 20th.

But nice try, I guess.

Is this all you have? Blowing smoke in the hopes people aren't well-informed enough to see through it?

The Maidan protests began on 21 November 2013, first clashes with the police happened on 24 November. So yes, you are not well-informed enough.

You've really got nothing, do you? :rofl:

You have claimed that Nuland's conversation was before Euromaidan, which is factually incorrect. That the worst violence happened on 20th February does not change the fact that they have continued since November, long before Nuland's conversation. You may lol as much as you want, the fact is that you know very little about things you discuss.

Russian imperialists are not so much threatened by the former republics joining a military alliance, but by the very idea of their independence. — Jabberwock

Russian imperialists? I guess that’s just assumed. Given that, we can make up a nice story that removes any US responsibility. How convenient.

Thus the idea that if there were no NATO expansion plans, Russia would happily live peacefully along its neighbors, has little to do with reality. — Jabberwock

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others.

this had nothing to do with NATO — Jabberwock

US influence isn’t restricted to NATO. The US’s plans for Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, had several aspects. The “democratization” pretext is always there. Making the world safe for freedom, etc.— like Iraq and every other country we interfere with.

So no, NATO did not provoke the conflict, the conflict at its core is caused by Ukraine's (and other republics) drive to sovereignty. Whether it chose to join NATO, EU or just tightened informal cooperation with the West while ditching Russian influence, the result would be the same. — Jabberwock

That’s nice. Whether it’s true, who knows? Maybe, maybe not.

But irrelevant. Why? Because we don’t continue plans to welcome Ukraine to NATO when Russia, and our own ambassador, warns explicitly (rather than reading minds) that it would be considered a provocation. That is very clear. Which is why all you have in response that’s concrete — and not a nice story — are reports from 2002, six years prior.

So your entire point was to fill in the “gaps” with the typical United States propaganda. I figured.

“Hey Russia is telling us Ukraine is a red line. Our ambassador agrees. Let’s go ahead and push for it anyway, because they were fine with it years ago and they’re real motive is that they hate freedom.”

No, sorry.

Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with? — neomac

It wasn’t close to a non sequitur. Try learning what words mean before trying to sound smart.

The only one embarrassing themselves is you.

Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. — neomac

NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat,” which is the point. I’ll go with what was actually said over what long-winded stories you want to share.

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me.

Maybe Canada joining a “defensive” military alliance with China would be fine in the US— who knows? But I’m guessing the US would consider it a threat— and if I were China, or Canada, I would take that seriously.

declared intentions — neomac

No one is talking about “declared intentions,” only what was considered a provocation and threat — which was clear enough for our own ambassador to understand.

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?

In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period.

your guru Mearsheimer)
— neomac

your guru Mearsheimer
— neomac

your guru Mearsheimer
— neomac

So, are you just ignorant or what? Hard to take you seriously when you repeatedly sound so silly. — Mikie

your guru Mearsheimer’s — neomac

So you’re just an ignoramus I guess. Oh well.

Russian imperialists? I guess that’s just assumed. Given that, we can make up a nice story that removes any US responsibility. How convenient. — Mikie

I have made up Zhirinovsky? Is that your poor attempt at masking your lack of knowledge on the subject?

Here is an article covering Russian propaganda, mostly on Ukraine. You can see on the charts that the demands to 'liberate Ukraine' have peaked after 2004 (i.e. the Orange Revolution). 'Ukraine is a fake country' has a pronounced peak around 2005:
[url]http://file:///C:/Temp/Downloads/EJTS_2022_Vol_10_No_2+(5)+(3).pdf[/url]

I can provide quite a few other examples, including from Russian TV.

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others. — Mikie

How exactly can you know that?

US influence isn’t restricted to NATO. The US’s plans for Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, had several aspects. The “democratization” pretext is always there. Making the world safe for freedom, etc.— like Iraq and every other country we interfere with. — Mikie

Your claim was that the expansion of NATO was provocation to war. If you want to change your mind and say that it was actually general US influence and not the expansion as such, just say so.

But irrelevant. Why? Because we don’t continue plans to welcome Ukraine to NATO when Russia, and our own ambassador, warns explicitly (rather than reading minds) that it would be considered a provocation. That is very clear. Which is why all you have in response that’s concrete — and not a nice story — are reports from 2002, six years prior. — Mikie

And that is exactly what happened - after 2008 the plans of Ukraine joining NATO were shelved and in 2010 Ukraine adopted legislation that would prevent it from joining military alliances. Yet in 2014 Russia has still invaded it, taking Crimea. Given that NATO expansion could no longer serve as a pretext, they have made up different ones. So it seems giving up on NATO does not prevent Russian invasions.

So your entire point was to fill in the “gaps” with the typical United States propaganda. I figured.

“Hey Russia is telling us Ukraine is a red line. Our ambassador agrees. Let’s go ahead and push for it anyway, because they were fine with it years ago and they’re real motive is that they hate freedom.” — Mikie

No, I have filled up the gaps with specific facts from Russian history which you were blissfully unaware of, as is quite evident. You just pretend that the change of the policy did not happen, because the explanation for that change undermines your whole narrative.

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others.
— Mikie

How exactly can you know that? — Jabberwock

Because it was stated explicitly, for years, that there would be consequences and that Russia would react to further provocation. When they actually did, it should have come as no surprise -- especially after Biden administration actions in 2021. (Which we could go over if you like -- but I'm not getting into the weeds on any issue when the general argument isn't even understood. If this gives the appearance that I am "unaware" of history, I don't care.)

That's the most direct cause. But there are others, as I've repeatedly said. Incorporating Ukraine wasn't restricted to NATO. That was simply the most threatening. Attempts to liberalize and join the EU were others.

Russian stance on NATO was known clearly in 2008, when this began. It was known by the United States, in fact. Again:

Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.

The above is not Russian propaganda. It was Bush's own ambassador. So Burns was wrong, but you, who act as if you're the only one who's read up on this subject -- apparently consisting of a few Wikipedia articles -- are privy to the "true" motives of Putin's. And the evidence given is that he has supposedly changed his position since 2002. Too bad you weren't around to inform Germany and France that Russian warnings should be ignored, and given them lectures about how the "real" motives were fear of democracy.

Your claim was that the expansion of NATO was provocation to war. If you want to change your mind and say that it was actually general US influence and not the expansion as such, just say so. — Jabberwock

NATO membership is one part of overall US influence, yes. How you think I'm changing my mind on this is baffling. NATO isn't part of United States influence? I see them as one and the same thing -- but even if we're to separate the two somehow, NATO expansion on it's own was the main driver of the Ukraine war.

But irrelevant. Why? Because we don’t continue plans to welcome Ukraine to NATO when Russia, and our own ambassador, warns explicitly (rather than reading minds) that it would be considered a provocation. That is very clear. Which is why all you have in response that’s concrete — and not a nice story — are reports from 2002, six years prior.
— Mikie

And that is exactly what happened - after 2008 the plans of Ukraine joining NATO were shelved and in 2010 Ukraine adopted legislation that would prevent it from joining military alliances. Yet in 2014 Russia has still invaded it, taking Crimea. Given that NATO expansion could no longer serve as a pretext, they have made up different ones. So it seems giving up on NATO does not prevent Russian invasions. — Jabberwock

For someone who feels entitled to give lectures on history, you sure do leave out of a lot when it's convenient. So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea. Is this supposed to be serious? What were the reasons given, and should we at least know them, if not take them seriously? Do you know what they were? Or do you not care, given that you have a direct line to Putin's soul?

In any case, the events after 2014 are also interesting. Was this also a time when NATO expansion was off the table? You would think so, after Crimea. But no -- the push continued, even stronger.

You just pretend that the change of the policy did not happen, because the explanation for that change undermines your whole narrative. — Jabberwock

What change in policy?

To quote the one source in which you have so far based your entire argument:

But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia

But again, it's really not worth arguing over that. I've already granted you that point. So I hardly am "pretending" otherwise. What I've repeatedly said is that it has nothing to do with 2008. The position then was quite clear. You want to pretend that position, in 2008, can be ignored because of the 'sudden change of heart' from 2002. I think that is and was a grave mistake.

If China, today, announces that they support Taiwan independence, how should we react? Should we say, "Well just last year their stance was completely different"? Should we ignore what they say because it's a change from statements in the past? I don't think so. I think we should listen and take it seriously.

Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with? — neomac

It wasn’t close to a non sequitur. Try learning what words mean before trying to sound smart.
The only one embarrassing themselves is you. — Mikie

So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof?
What else do you think it means, prof? Teach me, I’m eager to learn from your superior knowledge.
And then apply your own definition to your own argument:
“Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so”.
In what sense this crystal clear textbook example of non sequitur according to the definition I provided, is not a non sequitur?

Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. — neomac


NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat,” which is the point — Mikie

.

Dude, should we or shouldn’t we dismiss accounts based on historical rationales? I accused you of being dismissive, you protested that it was my projection. Who is right? If we should dismiss them, then your comment was indeed dismissive, not my projection, if we shouldn’t dismiss them in explaining NATO expansion, then they hold. So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” .
Besides you keep repeating claims without providing much to supporting them, not to mention your reluctance to clarify your grounding assumptions, despite all my questions.
NATO has an "open door policy" for candidate members, right? Did candidate members from East Europe express concern for perceived “Russian threat” (from Visegrad, Vilnius group, Ukraine, or Georgia) given past history while seeking NATO protection and triggering explicit opposition from Russia? Yes or no? If yes, this is a relevant and persistent driving factor of NATO expansion. Otherwise it isn’t. Which is it?
I don’t need to state that’s the only driving factor, indeed one should take into consideration also the hot debate between national security advisors (among them, experts like Brzeziński), the Congress and President’s administrations in understanding the American national interest in the post-cold war wrt NATO and how it impacted NATO enlargement. Surely those Clinton’s and Bush Jr’s administrations (differently from Bush senior’s administration) may have suffered from excessive overconfidence about their understanding and pursuit of NATO enlargement vis-a-vis of the Russian threat.

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me. — Mikie

No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? Unless it would be fine with you if Russia (and its emulators: China, Iran, Nord Korea, Islamic regimes) voiced all sorts of made-up security concerns and red lines to make whatever exploitative demands against the West with the complacency and submissiveness of Western “useful idiots”, right? In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda?
BTW I can’t help but notice yours is another typical dodgy answer that happens to coincide with Mearsheimer’s when challenged on that.

Maybe a Canada joining a “defensive” military alliance with China would be fine in the US— who knows? But I’m guessing the US would consider it a threat— and if I were China, or Canada, I would take that seriously.

declared intentions — neomac

No one is talking about “declared intentions,” only what was considered a provocation and threat — which was clear enough for our own ambassador to understand. — Mikie

And on what geopolitical grounds, is it so decisive to you to talk “only what was considered a provocation and threat” by Putin for explanations or justification of the current war?

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period. — Mikie

Another non sequitur. “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” is a fact (which I’m acknowledging). “The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years” is a normative claim (that you are making).
How does the latter claim logically follow from the former claim?
As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well.
Again, if you do not explicit your assumptions, your claims look dogmatic and myopic, or worse illogic. Non sequiturs.

So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof? — neomac

I'm sorry that your reading comprehension is poor. But that's not my fault. I assume you're not a native English speaker, and in that case I'm not making fun -- I certainly wouldn't be good at understanding the nuances of Russian or Spanish.

So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” . — neomac

What was the threat in 2008, and why was it never mentioned? If kept quiet about, where is the evidence that Russian invasion or aggression was imminent at that time?

I won't hold my breath -- because there was none. Just vague appeals to old tensions, most of them within Ukraine itself (which was deeply split, as is seen from election results/language distribution comparisons).

So if there was no imminent threat from Russia, why did NATO expand? Well, they told us why at the Bucharest Summit. No mystery.

Brzeziński — neomac

Shouldn't that be "your guru Brzenzinski"?

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me.
— Mikie

No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? — neomac

So you ask me, not the Russians, because you assume I'm going to repeat what the Russian's have said about this?

Your logic is baffling.

The Russian position on NATO was clear that they considered it a threat. You ask why they felt it was a threat, as if this hasn't been explained a thousand times.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference?

In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda? — neomac

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington.

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period.
— Mikie

Another non sequitur. — neomac

And again you don't know what that means, or you fail to see the connection. I'll assume the latter, so I'll make it clearer:

(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.

Apparently you're arguing it wasn't a mistake, that somehow pushing for NATO expansion, despite Russian warnings, was a good move. So I assume you think this war is a good thing too. I don’t share that sentiment.

I suppose you believe it was wise for the USSR to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, right? That wasn't a mistake either, by your logic.

As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well. — neomac

So when a war finally breaks out because of this expansion, we still think it's just fine?

You'd fit right in with the Washington crowd.

Because it was stated explicitly, for years, that there would be consequences and that Russia would react to further provocation. When they actually did, it should have come as no surprise -- especially after Biden administration actions in 2021. (Which we could go over if you like -- but I'm not getting into the weeds on any issue when the general argument isn't even understood. If this gives the appearance that I am "unaware" of history, I don't care.)

That's the most direct cause. But there are others, as I've repeatedly said. Incorporating Ukraine wasn't restricted to NATO. That was simply the most threatening. Attempts to liberalize and join the EU were others. — Mikie

But that does not answer the question. You are supposed to argue that Russia would NOT attack Ukraine if not for NATO expansion. If Ukraine's increasing independence and its EU aspirations are also the reasons, you have to give a proper argument that Russia why none of those would be a reason for invasion. That might be a bit hard, given that Russia did invade Ukraine in 2014 exactly for those reasons.

NATO membership is one part of overall US influence, yes. How you think I'm changing my mind on this is baffling. NATO isn't part of United States influence? I see them as one and the same thing -- but even if we're to separate the two somehow, NATO expansion on it's own was the main driver of the Ukraine war. — Mikie

No, it was not, because the conflict started when Ukraine's prospect of joining NATO were dim.

For someone who feels entitled to give lectures on history, you sure do leave out of a lot when it's convenient. So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea. Is this supposed to be serious? What were the reasons given, and should we at least know them, if not take them seriously? Do you know what they were? Or do you not care, given that you have a direct line to Putin's soul?

In any case, the events after 2014 are also interesting. Was this also a time when NATO expansion was off the table? You would think so, after Crimea. But no -- the push continued, even stronger. — Mikie

No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part?

And sure, Ukraine rejected its neutrality pledge after Russia has invaded it, in hope of seeking the protection. How is that unreasonable?

What change in policy? — Mikie

You argue that there was no change in the policy between 2002 and 2008 based on the quote from 2002? You do know that 2002 happened before 2008?

But again, it's really not worth arguing over that. I've already granted you that point. So I hardly am "pretending" otherwise. What I've repeatedly said is that it has nothing to do with 2008. The position then was quite clear. You want to pretend that position, in 2008, can be ignored because of the 'sudden change of heart' from 2002. I think that is and was a grave mistake. — Mikie

No, I fully acknowledge the change of the policy and the rhetoric, I was just pointing out that it was part of a bigger process in which the stance of NATO was only a minor point. Yes, Russians used fierce rhetoric about the NATO expansion, but at that time they used similar rhetoric about Ukraine's and other republics' independence, status of minorities, state integrity and other topics. Picking just NATO expansion and arguing as if it was the only one point in that rhetoric is missing the bigger picture.

So, again: make the argument that Russia would NOT invade Ukraine if it e.g. tried to join the EU or broke its ties with Russia.

You are supposed to argue that Russia would NOT attack Ukraine if not for NATO expansion. — Jabberwock

So I’m supposed to argue for something that didn’t happen. No thank you.

No, I don’t think there would be a war today if it weren’t for NATO involvement in Ukraine — if that’s what you’re asking. But you keep switching topics. Above I was referring to the current war in Ukraine, the invasion of 2022— not 2014, which is related but not the same.

No, it was not, because the conflict started when Ukraine's prospect of joining NATO were dim. — Jabberwock

It started at the Bucharest summit and escalated from there. But if you’re referring to Crimea, then yes— that occurred for a different reason which you deliberately ignored: the ouster of Yanukovych, which the United States supported. All the while, in the background, NATO membership was of course still on the table.

The connection here is obvious, and you want to gloss over with word games: “Well NATO wasn’t directly involved with overthrowing Yanukovych, so clearly it wasn’t a factor in annexing Crimea.” But you know very well what Yanukovych’s stand was regarding NATO.

So no, NATO prospects were far from dim after the “coup” (according to Russia) that the US and its allies supported.

So much for Crimea. What I’ve been discussing, however, is the current war. The prospects of NATO were there all along, and played a significant (but varied) role in various events prior. The most direct result of the current war was NATO provocation, in the years after 2014 but especially 2021.

The most direct cause of Crimea was Yanukovych‘s overthrow. But again, that’s not the same thing— and in any case, NATO was still a significant factor. The world is complex, and these things are connected. I don’t make a huge distinction between NATO and general “US influence,” as I’ve said. If that’s confusing, fine — I’ll be more precise. But anyone who can’t see how these things are at least interrelated isn’t paying attention.

In any case, the events after 2014 are also interesting. Was this also a time when NATO expansion was off the table? You would think so, after Crimea. But no -- the push continued, even stronger.
— Mikie

No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part? — Jabberwock

I assume you saw “after Crimea.” So by “Ukraine invasion” you’re referring to 2022, which is a reaction to Euromaidan? That’s your explanation? Very odd. Quite a delayed reaction.

I was just pointing out that it was part of a bigger process in which the stance of NATO was only a minor point. — Jabberwock

The reaction to the Bucharest Summit was over NATO. This occurred in 2008. So I really don’t know what you’re talking about here.

So, again: make the argument that Russia would NOT invade Ukraine if it e.g. tried to join the EU or broke its ties with Russia. — Jabberwock

I don’t have to, since it didn’t happen. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 — which was different from 2022. Both involved US influence, but the latter’s cause (of the much larger war) was mostly NATO.

So we can see the differences based on reaction. When the EUUAA was signed — a pretty big deal to Russia— there wasn’t the level of reaction of 2022.

Maybe there would be one if Ukraine tried to join the EU— who knows? If so, then that would be the direct cause of the reaction. But since it hasn’t happened, there’s no point discussing it.

@Tzeentch you might want to watch the Nieuwsuur episode from last Tuesday if you haven't seen it yet. https://www.npostart.nl/WO_NTR_20079363

It reconfirms the Ukraine hypothesis but they stop at making a link to the government. I wonder how private players can get their hands on TNT without consent ow knowledge from the local authorities. There has to be an evidence trail of multiple witnesses somewhere.

My personal most likely scenario is that either this was ordered by or done with the knowledge of the Ukrainian government. In the latter case they chose not to intervene.

The second most likely is that it doesn't stop there and other EU(?) countries were involved.

The third is a US or Russian submarine and all this is a big distraction. And here I find US involvement more likely due to the interests involved.