These things are not beliefs but intimate and inevitable elements of human experience. — Janus

I'm not sure how you came to that conclusion. If you note the first sentence, it's beliefs about these things, hands, mountains, trees, etc. So we have primitive beliefs (animal beliefs) that are shown in our actions. I'm specifically referring to prelinguistic beliefs or nonlinguistic beliefs.

I think 'beliefs' which carries the connotation of judgement is a less apt way of talking about the primordial (animal) features of human experience than 'elements'.

For me it seems misleading to refer to the background, consisting of those things which are necessarily involved in our everyday lives. like hands, feet, legs, arms, ears, eyes, mouths, hills, valleys, mountains, rivers, lakes, oceans, fish, clouds, sun, stars, moon, human technology in all its forms, architecture, music, painting, poetry, philosophy to name but a few in a list of countless numbers, as a system of beliefs. — Janus

You're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying. You're not even close.

You're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying. You're not even close. — Sam26

OK, so what exactly am I misunderstanding?

think your critique of Moore is a bit over the top. — Sam26

Perhaps you're right. I don't know him but am focusing on his argument about hands. If he cannot see the obvious flaws in this argument then I'm not tempted to read him.

The term 'hinge' occurs three times. The first:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Much of the discussion of hinges focuses on doubt and neglects the questions that we raise. He draws our attention to hinges not simply to address the problem of skepticism:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

The idea of hinges replace the ideas of foundationalism.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

The "door" is our investigations. Rather than resting on foundations they turn on hinges.

Wittgenstein only gives us one example of a hinge:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

The mathematical hinge is not pre-linguistic. Neither are others:

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

It is the movement of the work of the community bound together by science and education by which our propositions, beliefs, and knowledge are held fast. The axis is not timeless or immutable, but change is not piecemeal.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

What I'm saying is that our inherited background (that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, clouds, hands, feet, etc), which is not a system of beliefs, but informs what we believe, both linguistically and non-linguistically. So, there are, for example, prelinguistic beliefs (animal beliefs, bedrock beliefs, or basic beliefs), which are shown in our actions (OC 284, 285) alone, viz., digging a hole, using a hand, or even making a primitive tool. I'm not saying that the inherited background is a system of beliefs, but that the inherited background has a strong relation to what we believe, maybe it’s causal. So, if there were no hands, there would be no beliefs that correspond with the action of using our hands. The confusing part is parsing out the difference between the linguistic belief, “This is a hand,” as a statement, with an action alone that reflects a belief, they are quite different, and in many cases prior to language. This latter category of beliefs is foundational to language, which means bedrock (prelinguistic) beliefs are a prerequisite to language. Just as a chess board and pieces are a prerequisite to playing a game of chess.

The point of course is that the inherited background gives rise to bedrock beliefs, and also gives rise to language itself. This means that without the inherited background the language-games of epistemology (justification and truth) wouldn’t get off the ground. In other words, knowing and doubting are necessarily dependent on prelinguistic beliefs. This is why both Moore and the skeptics are wrong. I believe that Wittgenstein identified something that no other philosopher, that I’m aware of, has identified, viz., the foundation of epistemology. The place where justification ends. It’s something prior to any talk of epistemology, something primitive. It’s the limit of epistemology in many respects.

I want to say two final things. First, there are many kinds of bedrock beliefs, not just prelinguistic bedrock beliefs. There are bedrock beliefs that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock beliefs, but they are linguistic.

Second, Wittgenstein never edited OC, so whatever one believes about this or that text is speculation (at least in many cases), because we have no idea what Wittgenstein would’ve removed or added to the text. Although I and other philosophers have arrived at very similar conclusions.

Shared intentionality- one way towards a theory of prelinguistic bedrock.

I don't see how that has much to do with I'm saying.

I don't see how that has much to do with I'm saying. — Sam26

Prelingustic foundations for language? It’s necessary bedrock foundations without which, no language is possible.

Did you give me the correct link? That abstract is more about intentionality than bedrock beliefs? Much of what I'm referring to is bedrock beliefs and their relationship to our inherited background.

What I'm saying is that our inherited background (that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, clouds, hands, feet, etc), which is not a system of beliefs, but informs what we believe, both linguistically and non-linguistically. — Sam26

This is an odd and questionable use of the term 'inherit'. While it is true that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, and clouds, they are not ours to be transferred from person to person.

The inherited background is a picture of the world:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

I'm not saying that the inherited background is a system of beliefs ... — Sam26

But, if I understand him, Wittgenstein is:

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. — Fooloso4

the foundation of epistemology. — Sam26

I argued above that:

The idea of hinges replace the ideas of foundationalism. — Fooloso4

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

It is the movement of the work of the community bound together by science and education by which our propositions, beliefs, and knowledge are held fast. The axis is not timeless or immutable, but change is not piecemeal. — Fooloso4

And, as I pointed out earlier in this thread, (repeating 94 cited above):

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

There's a pinch of truth in saying language games do not reflect the facts, since the facts, being truths, are a part of the language games around truth. Better perhaps to say that the games are embedded in the world – so the builder's game inherently involves slabs and blocks and cannot be played without them. — Banno

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths. They are two different things. Truths are about propositions, and what makes a proposition true is that it reflects or mirrors a fact or state of affairs. I see this as a common mistake, viz., mixing up these two concepts. One could say that the language-game of truth is about facts, and whether a proposition say, "The Earth has one moon," is reflecting a fact.

There's also the ill-informed supposition that language games only ever involve language, which even a cursory reading will evict. — Banno

I agree with this.

This is an odd and questionable use of the term 'inherit'. While it is true that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, and clouds, they are not ours to be transferred from person to person. — Fooloso4

Who in the world said this? Where did I even imply that the inherited background can be transferred from person to person? My point is exactly the same as how Wittgenstein uses it in OC 94. The inherited background is the world we find ourselves in, i.e., a world of mountains, trees, hands, etc. All of us inherit this background in virtue of the fact that we live in the same reality. Also, the inherited background is how we get our picture of the world.

My point is exactly the same as how Wittgenstein uses it in OC 94. The inherited background is the world we find ourselves in, i.e., a world of mountains, trees, hands, etc. All of us inherit this background in virtue of the fact that we live in the same reality. — Sam26

Once again:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

The inherited background is not the world but a picture of the world. Consider the "Mountains and Waters Sutra" of Zen Master Dogen:

The green mountains are always walking ...

(3)

This is the inherited background picture he has inherited and gives to his disciples. To state the obvious, it is not our background picture.

... the inherited background is how we get our picture of the world. — Sam26

This is not what Wittgenstein says. "it", what is inherited, refers to the picture not the things pictured.

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths. — Sam26

I don't know what to make fo that. Are you claiming there are untrue facts? Or truths that are not facts?

There is a recent tendency to take "fact" to mean "empirical evidence" or similar. I do not use "fact" in this way.

Truths are about propositions, — Sam26

Nor this; it is propositions that are true, or not. A truth is a proposition.

DO we differ in that you would suppose there to be truths that cannot be put into propositional form, whereas I would not call such things truths, but perhaps intuitions or sentiments?

I have no argument with any of what you've said there, except I would not frame the background as a matter of belief, but as a matter of being, more akin to the idea of a "form of life" or "umwelt" than to the idea of "hinge propositions", That we have hands, mountains, oceans, planets and so on has, primordially speaking, nothing to do with propositions or beliefs, but these are simply attributes of the human-shaped lifeworld.

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths.
— Sam26
I don't know what to make fo that. Are you claiming there are untrue facts? Or truths that are not facts? — Banno

If we go by the definition of a proposition in logic, then propositions/statements (which are not exactly the same, but close enough for our purposes) are either assertions that something is or is not the case. My e.g., "The Earth has one moon," is an assertion that something is the case. The assertion is making a claim about reality, viz., that there is a state of affairs that corresponds with the assertion. It mirrors reality. If it does mirror reality, then it's true, if not then it's false.

Facts are neither true or false in themselves. It's assertions in the form of propositions/statements that are true or false. To say a fact is true or false is a misunderstanding of the concept. Facts are what make statements true or false. We check our statements against the facts, against the empirical observation that the Earth indeed has one moon. So, no, I'm not claiming there are "untrue facts." there are only untrue or false statements.

And no, I would not say that there are truths cannot be put into propositional form. When we speak of true and false we are necessarily speaking about our claims (propositions/statements).

I will be responding to @Fooloso4 and @Janus soon.

Oh, I remember now. You take the picture theory seriously. That is, you carry it over into the PI, and presumably into On Certainty.

As a question of exegesis, I remain unconvinced that this is right; But apart from exegesis, the picture theory is too close to what we might call 'conceptual schema' for my liking - after Davidson.

So I don't see the distinction you seem to think sits between the fact that the moon is a satellite of Earth and that the moon is a satellite of Earth. It's as if you would say that "The moon is a satellite of Earth", apart from our language games about the moon and the Earth, or that "The moon is a satellite of Earth" requires no interpretation. On that view, truth is relative to this or that scheme. Better, I think, to give away the duality of scheme (picture) and world, and so "reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false".

I don't take the picture theory of the Tractatus seriously. However, I do think there is something to the idea that some true propositions picture, correspond to, mirror, or reflect reality. In other words, I think the correspondence theory is generally better than other theories of truth, at least the theories I'm familiar with.

fair call it all seems a bit useless. I’d join you if I had much choice.

When someone's worldview is not possible until some particular state of affairs happens, that particular sequence of events is necessary for that worldview to emerge. That worldview is existentially dependent upon those events. Someone cannot believe that what so and so says at time t1 is true until it is first written by the author and then read by the reader/potential believer...

Here we may have a proposition that acts like a hinge... opening the door of possibility to subsequent beliefs about the proposition... namely, whether or not it is true.

One of the most important ideas that arose out of Wittgenstein's unfinished final notes (On Certainty) is the logical connection between knowledge and doubt (both require a good justification). His emphasis is on the foundational (not the traditional meaning of foundational epistemology) and practical side of epistemology. For Wittgenstein, there seem to be propositions, of a sort (hinge propositions), that consist of very basic beliefs that form the foundation of our claims of knowledge and our expressions of doubt. One such hinge belief, is the belief that "I have hands," which comes from Moore's paper, Proof of the External World. The idea is that certain beliefs arise based on our inherited background of reality. These beliefs (hinge propositions) are not generally justified or true. Their foundational nature gives rise to our epistemological language, i.e., without these very basic beliefs, not only would there not be language but more specifically there would not be epistemological language. Moreover, doubting itself only functions within a particular framework of foundational beliefs, otherwise doubting would lose its meaning. And, just as our epistemological language needs a justification, so does doubting. Without hinge propositions, the whole system of knowledge and doubt would collapse.

This, I believe, is one of the most important ideas to arise out of On Certainty, and it's critical to our understanding of knowledge.

The idea is that certain beliefs arise based on our inherited background of reality. These beliefs (hinge propositions) are not generally justified or true. — Sam26

The "belief" that I have hands does not arise from an inherited background but from the activities of using our hands. Sticking them in my mouth, grasping things, and so on.

Hinge propositions are regarded as true, but the question of their truth does not usually arise, except for some philosophers or when we can no longer hold to propositions such as, the sun revolves around the earth.

The "belief" that I have hands does not arise from an inherited background but from the activities of using our hands. Sticking them in my mouth, grasping things, and so on. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. Part of what I mean by our inherited background is not only the fact that we have hands but also the use of our hands within the context of the reality we find ourselves in.

Hinge propositions are regarded as true, but the question of their truth does not usually arise, except for some philosophers or when we can no longer hold to propositions such as, the sun revolves around the earth. — Fooloso4

This I disagree with, i.e., what hinge propositions are according to Wittgenstein (at least it seems like a general consensus), are those basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology). So, generally speaking, hinge propositions are the foundation of all talk of justification and truth. The key is the phrase "generally speaking," there are exceptions and Wittgenstein points these out. Of course, this only happens where a doubt makes sense.

"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false (OC 94)."

So, what might a theory of knowledge look like for Wittgenstein given the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty? Of course, this question might be antithetical to Wittgenstein right from the start given his propensity to eschew philosophical theories. So, maybe one could give some guiding principles instead of a theory of knowledge. What might be some guiding Wittgensteinian principles that would hold us in good stead when thinking about knowledge?

1. First and foremost, the inherited background that forms the backdrop for our actions, linguistic and non-linguistic. This is the very framework that allows all of our talk about epistemology and doubt. The context of knowledge and doubt can only occur where there is a framework of foundational beliefs.

2. The formation of our beliefs against this backdrop, and here I'm thinking of Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs, examples include, "I have hands," "There are other minds," "The Earth has existed for a long time," and "I am a being separate from other beings." These beliefs are generally or mostly outside our epistemic language games of knowledge and doubt, which means they fall outside any need to be justified, and any need for them to be referred to as true or false. This seems to be part of the progression of the development of language, i.e., much simpler language games developed before the language games of epistemology.

3. Wittgenstein's view of language games within the context of our cultural forms of life. So, we need to be mindful of the different ways we justify a belief within the context of different language games. We might see, for example, correct reasoning (logic), testimony, linguistic training, sensory experiences, and some other methods or uses of justification within our forms of life. The same applies to the use of the concept of truth.

4. The meaning of these concepts (e.g. justification and truth) needs to be seen under the rubric of Wittgenstein's family resemblance. This helps to keep us from dogmatic definitions.

These are just some of the ideas that might inform my thinking on epistemology.

This is just a cursory view of the subject, but I think it's a good place to start.

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them [my emphasis] (OC 100)." Of course, Moore does not know what he claims to know, that's part of Wittgenstein's point, and if he does not know them, then he doesn't know they are true, at least not in an epistemological sense of being justified and true. Moore's use of know, even though he believes it to be an epistemological use, is more akin to the use of know as a conviction of what one believes. I believe we can trace Wittgenstein's thinking on this from OC 6 where he points out that Moore is misusing the concept know by pointing to his hand as something he knows. Wittgenstein continues, "And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state is revealed." What mental state? The "mental state of conviction." One's conviction can be the same whether it's "knowledge or false belief (OC 42). Moore conflates, as many people do, the use of "I know..." as an expression of a conviction, as opposed to an expression of epistemology (JTB). "Suppose I replaced Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)?"

This I disagree with, i.e., what hinge propositions are according to Wittgenstein (at least it seems like a general consensus), are those basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology). — Sam26

Isn't the proposition that the earth revolves around the sun one of the basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology)?

The one example of a hinge given in OC is:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

It is true, but its truth is not in question. It has been given the stamp of incontestability.

The term hinge appears two more times:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

I think that at the root of our disagreement is with regard to our inherited background. I do not think it is fixed and immutable. Our inherited background is the history of a form of life. Our inherited background is not the same as the inherited background of someone living one hundred or one thousand years ago, or someone living in an isolated tribe.

Before we go on, what makes you think that I believe the inherited background is fixed and immutable?

Before we go on, what makes you think that I believe the inherited background is fixed and immutable? — Sam26

If it is not then it will be from time to time subject to doubt. What had held fast as a hinge no longer does and will no longer be regarded as true.