It seems to me the nth attempt to bring back to life metaphysics, realism, objectivity, by using a false interpretation of subjectivism to support it. They say that, with relativism, the subject is taken back to the centre of the universe, but this is not true. When we say that everything is subjective, it doesn't mean that the subject is the strong reference point that determines everything. A critical relativist knows perfectly that, once we say that everything is subjective, we also know that the subject is completely unreliable, otherwise it would not be a subject, it would be an alternative source of objectivity. So, the subject is not the new centre of the universe in relativism, postmodernism, weak thought. The subject is just the outcome of the self-demolition that metaphysics cannot avoid to get. As such, the subject is just an intuitive experience, not an objective entity able to be the centre of the world.

It seems to me the nth attempt to bring back to life metaphysics, realism, objectivity, by using a false interpretation of subjectivism to support it. They say that, with relativism, the subject is taken back to the centre of the universe, but this is not true. When we say that everything is subjective, it doesn't mean that the subject is the strong reference point that determines everything. A critical relativist knows perfectly that, once we say that everything is subjective, we also know that the subject is completely unreliable, otherwise it would not be a subject, it would be an alternative source of objectivity. So, the subject is not the new centre of the universe in relativism, postmodernism, weak thought. The subject is just the outcome of the self-demolition that metaphysics cannot avoid to get. As such, the subject is just an intuitive experience, not an objective entity able to be the centre of the world. — Angelo Cannata

While I agree with you about relativism, I think the point is that speculative realism is trying to refute "correlationism". In this framing, which is essentially Kantian, "The idea is that we can only understand or access reality through our subjective experiences and mental structures." So no metaphysics can be had about things like other objects, because it is all about "objects-for-us" and not objects qua objects, or metaphysics "proper". This is trying to say that philosophy can convey metaphysics without resorting to "for-the-observer". Thus, it is always "speculative" because, though the human "form of life" so-to-say can never be avoided when conveying these concepts, the content of what is conveyed can be "about" the non-human forms of life, if you will. I take it to mean that, just because the form of the communication has to be in intelligible human constructs, this doesn't mean the world follows suit, and this "world" can be discussed in regards to how it is, in its non-human form, even if by way of the human.

In Harman, the "essence" of an object is always "withdrawn" or "hidden" such that it cannot be interacted with. Therefore, it cannot be defined, but its influence is felt through its causative interactions with other objects, so we know there is an echo of "something" within the object that "Makes it that object" — schopenhauer1

Since I have no formal training in Philosophy, I won't presume to comment on the arcane discussion in the video, as it's mostly over my pointy little head. Instead, I'll merely note that the opposing worldviews, classified under relatively new labels of OOO or Speculative Realism versus Subjective Idealism, are extant on this forum under the more general & traditional categories of Materialism/Physicalism/Realism versus Metaphysicalism/Idealism.

Harman seems to be echoing Kant with his "hidden essence" referring to the Ideal unknowable ding an sich. Whereas traditional Realism was intended to be Objective, quantum physics has re-introduced Subjectivity -- and philosophy -- into modern Science. In his Nobel lectures, Heisenberg noted that the "central concept of materialism . . . . has little resemblance to genuine materialistic philosophy". That assessment followed from his previous discussion of objectivity in sub-atomic physics. "In classical physics science started from the belief --- or should one say from the illusion? --- that we could describe the world or at least part of the world without reference to ourselves."

So, this philosophical debate seems to be centered on your question about the "something" within the object that "makes it that object". I have my own answer, but won't go into the off-topic details in this post. I'll just mention that the essential something is Generic Information (more inclusive than Shannon), which influences the world through its "causative interaction". :smile:

Generic Information (more inclusive than Shannon), which influences the world through its "causative interaction". — Gnomon

My guess is Harman would say this is the "vicarious causation" or "surface level interactions" but not the essence. He is very much non-process (contra Whitehead who actually is very similar in the focus on speculative metaphysics). The object is not to be "overmined" for its interactions, otherwise there would be nothing there that is changing, because everything is changing. There is some "thing" that withdraws whereby it could never be truly interacted otherwise there is no differentiation (all is the one) and there is no change (all is different).

I think I can add a further explanation about what I consider a misunderstanding of subjectivity, that makes possible the OOO.
OOO wants to make, as it is said in the video at 3:42, “an ontology in which no objects have any kind of special privilege, particularly the human object”.
But subjectivity is not an object. We make it an object when we talk and think about it. But, in that case, what we are talking about is not the real authentic subjectivity, it is the objectified subjectivity.
The real authentic subjectivity is the one you feel in your here and now of your present, while you are thinking about it. As a feeling, it precedes thinking.
If we objectify subjectivity, then we can get an infinite chain of timing, similar to the problem where we cannot establish if what precedes is the egg or the chicken. I mean, we can start saying that subjectivity comes first. But we are able to elaborate the idea of subjectivity by using certain mental structures, so that mental structures come first. But we make use of our mental structures from inside our subjectivity, so that, when we think of them, we do it in a situation of being already conditioned by our subjectivity. And so on. This infinite chain is possible because we are working with two kinds of objects: the object that we call “mental structures” and the other object that we call “subjectivity”. This is what makes possible to Harman to say something like “let’s make a balance between these objects”.
But, as I said, subjectivity is not an object, it is a feeling, exclusively limited to the present of when you are thinking: you feel yourself inside your body, inside your eyes, inside your thoughts, inside the structures that make you possible to talk, between you and yourself, about this feeling; a feeling inside yourself that you cannot share with anybody, because you cannot say to anybody “come in for a moment, come inside me and see what I feel in my feeling inside myself”.
Once you enter in this state of listening to your present feeling your experience of being inside yourself, you can realize that nothing else can precede it, because anything else you can think about would be an objectification, that you put in connection with your objectification of your feeling.
You cannot compare your authentic subjectivity with anything else without first objectifying your authentic subjectivity.
This comparison is what Harman makes with his OOO.

You cannot compare your authentic subjectivity with anything else without first objectifying your authentic subjectivity.
This comparison is what Harman makes with his OOO. — Angelo Cannata

So Harman I believe is trying to say that objects (other than humans or even animals) have their own way of being in the world. He doesn't discount our subjectivity, he is only saying that this is one level of interaction in the world amongst a multitude. Imagine a ball rolling down a hill. Can that be an interaction unto itself without a human observer? Is there something the ball retains without a human to pick out its properties or qualities? Is what that interaction is with the hill a sort of interaction whereby the ball retains its essence, whilst it interacts with the hill, or does lose all properties, or retain only some? Which ones? He is saying there are vicarious (intermediary) ways in which the object interacts with the hill, but there are withdrawn (essential) ways in which it can never fully interact with anything but itself.

I am open to being corrected here with what Harman means, as I too am trying to understand it. But that's my take so far.

But notice his four things he is trying to argue against that are predominant in modern science:

Physicalism- everything must be physical
Smallism- everything must exist must be basic/simple
Anti-fictionalism- everything must be real
Literalism- everything must be stated accurately.

Object is:
-anything that can't be reduced downwards or upwards
-undermining (no)
-overmining (no)
Leads to flat-ontology.

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? As I do think it more than indirectly deals with essences, by way of defining objects and their ontology. — schopenhauer1

I haven’t read Harman, though I’m interested to do so now. The video was perhaps not as enlightening as it might have been, so take what I’m going to say as referring to the videographer’s explication and the ensuing forum discussion; I don’t know how accurate any of it is to Harman’s thought.

Briefly: As with so much ontology, the big challenge is to explain how the questions being raised are not merely verbal disputes. Take the question (apparently key to Harman), “What is an object?” Exactly what sort of question is this? Is it akin to a scientific or experimental question, which could be explored and perhaps answered by an investigation of the world? Is it more like a traditional metaphysical question, which might be answered a priori using some kind of transcendental argument a la Kant, or an appeal to logical principles? Or is the question really a pragmatic one – perhaps when we ask “What is an object?” we’re really asking what, out of the many possible uses of the word “object,” is the most useful or helpful one in philosophy – and of course we’d have to specify the uses we have in mind.

I take the pragmatic answer to be, more or less, the one that replies, “It’s a verbal dispute. You can’t go out and hunt some Essence called an ‛object’ in Nature and give it a description, nor can you stay at home and produce a critique that will tell you what an ‛object’ would have to be, metaphysically.” I think this kind of response is a robust challenge to ontology at this very basic level, though not an unanswerable one. But for our purposes here, if Harman is indeed claiming to have an answer to the question “What is an object?” and if it’s pretty much along the lines the videographer has given, I’d be curious to know what you all think Harman takes himself to be doing. What kind of question is he answering? How might he reply to the charge, “This is purely verbal”?

Thus, it is always "speculative" because, though the human "form of life" so-to-say can never be avoided when conveying these concepts, the content of what is conveyed can be "about" the non-human forms of life, if you will. — schopenhauer1

This is a point that often seems to lead to confusion. Take, for example, modern geology; there is no need to take the observer into account in the theory of plate tectonics. From the perspective of geology the observer is irrelevant. It's not even clear how the observer could be incorporated into the theory.

On the other hand, of course plate tectonics is a theory that seeks to explain phenomena observed by humans; yet that seems to be a trivial factoid in regard to all the sciences bar, perhaps, quantum mechanics.

The Wikipedia article was helpful in clarifying some things for me, especially this part:

Critique of correlationism
Related to 'anthropocentrism', object-oriented thinkers reject speculative idealist correlationism, which the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux defines as "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other". Because object-oriented ontology is a realist philosophy, it stands in contradistinction to the anti-realist trajectory of correlationism, which restricts philosophical understanding to the correlation of being with thought by disavowing any reality external to this correlation as inaccessible, and, in this way, fails to escape the ontological reification of human experience. — Object Oriented Ontology | Critique of Correlationism

(This maps onto what I was claiming about realism in the other thread - .)

---

- I think your question is important and foundational. Understanding the starting point and the justification for the account of "objects" that Harman gives will be essential in understanding the theory.

On the other hand, of course plate tectonics is a theory that seeks to explain phenomena observed by humans; yet that seems to be a trivial factoid in regard to all the sciences bar, perhaps, quantum mechanics. — Janus

Except Harman isn't just calling for scientific naturalism (or scientism), because science is human-centered (it relies on human experience). He is calling for the idea of rejecting these purportedly fundamental parts of science (whilst still being a realist about objects in the world outside of humans):

Physicalism- everything must be physical
Smallism- everything must exist must be basic/simple
Anti-fictionalism- everything must be real
Literalism- everything must be stated accurately.

Object is:
-anything that can't be reduced downwards or upwards
-undermining (no)
-overmining (no)
Leads to flat-ontology. — schopenhauer1

But besides this, an idealist can view science the same way as a realist, they would still say that it is "undefined" what is outside human epistemological faculties and experience.

I think this kind of response is a robust challenge to ontology at this very basic level, though not an unanswerable one. But for our purposes here, if Harman is indeed claiming to have an answer to the question “What is an object?” and if it’s pretty much along the lines the videographer has given, I’d be curious to know what you all think Harman takes himself to be doing. What kind of question is he answering? How might he reply to the charge, “This is purely verbal”? — J

Yeah, it is interesting he can prove anything besides his best hunch. I will put up the next video to see if he goes anywhere with it. So far, his idea is the rejection of the four things mentioned, and that objects should not be undermined to their constituents or overmined to their causal properties.

Here is the second video:



My own commentary forthcoming...

"Speculative Realism" is related to the anti-correlationism I noted (). Here is how Graham Harman describes it:

“Speculative realism” is an extremely broad term. All it takes to be a speculative realist is to be opposed to “correlationism,” Meillassoux’s term for the sort of philosophy (still dominant today) that bases all philosophy on the mutual interplay of human and world. — Brief SR/OOO Tutorial, by Graham Harman

After watching the first video I opined that it was related to the ancient speculative/practical distinction. This seems vaguely true, but it is more about the way that modern philosophy sees the subject as conditioning all forms of knowing, even non-practical knowledge.

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. This draws near to classical realism.

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. This draws near to classical realism. — Leontiskos

Thank you for the clarification. It makes sense to me. If Kant represented the Copernican revolution to make everything limited to "for-the-human" (whether that be in the form of cognitive faculties or language use or existential pre-conditions), then Speculative Realism is a "counter revolution" arguing that "the great outdoors" (the external world) can be intelligibly explained.

I like the phrase and I too have an object-oriented ontology. I also express a “flat-ontology”, I suppose, at least insofar as objects cannot be identical to their relations.

But I think it’s wrong to look at objects as the ultimate stuff of the universe if each one is unique and never exhausted by its relations. The principium individuationis suggests pluralism, that there is an infinite variety of objects.

I don’t think something like The Civil War or abstract or fictional ideas are can be considered objects, either, and that to do so risks undermining the actual objects involved in thinking about and expressing those ideas.

Anyways, I'm going to take a look at the book. Thanks for sharing.

I don’t think something like The Civil War or abstract or fictional ideas are can be considered objects, either, and that to do so risks undermining the actual objects involved in thinking about and expressing those ideas. — NOS4A2

Yes an odd view from Harman at first glance, but perhaps there is something to it. I can see them being "something" in terms of their causal effects (thinking about a hobbit elicits something, for example, even if it is a bunch of neurons, or someone to pick up a book, or the mental image of a hobbit, etc.). But then, Harman thinks causal relations are overmining the object, so not sure. Any thought whatsoever being an "object" is odd, unless there is some sort of Platonic Realism of sorts. And how far does this go? Is EVERYTHING an object?

Anyways, I'm going to take a look at the book. Thanks for sharing. — NOS4A2

:up:

If you assume that everything exists (which I do), including hobbits, determining what a thing exists as becomes paramount to their ontology. For me it's as simple as writing the word "Hobbit" on a piece of paper and taping it to that object. Without being able to find a little man called a hobbit, I'd have to place it on the book "The Hobbit" or on some guy reading the book, or a bunch of neurons. These objects—the book, the guy reading it— are the ones at risk of being undermined by considering the Hobbit to be an object. Anyways, interesting stuff to think about.

These objects—the book, the guy reading it— are the ones at risk of being undermined by considering the Hobbit to be an object. Anyways, interesting stuff to think about. — NOS4A2

I see your issue with it, but I wouldn't use "undermined" here perhaps. He is using it in a very specific way to mean that the object is broken down to its constituents. If I talk to you about a person, you start talking about cells and atoms, that would be undermining the object of the person. If I talked to you about a person, and then you started talking about all the things he did, his family, etc. that might be overmining.

Sorry, I was using the word in the non-technical sense. But thanks.

Sorry, I was using the word in the non-technical sense. But thanks. — NOS4A2

:up:

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. This draws near to classical realism. — Leontiskos

The notion of knowledge being contaminated or distorted by human subjects seems absurd given that we are speaking about human knowledge. So, what could its state of purity or clarity be, such that it could be contaminated or distorted? Even to say that (human) knowledge is conditioned by humans seems redundant.

All that said knowledge (apart from animal knowledge) is human knowledge after all, and as such relates only to the world as it appears to humans, or to put it another way, the human "umwelt".

The notion of knowledge being contaminated or distorted by human subjects seems absurd given that we are speaking about human knowledge. — Janus

:100:

The notion of knowledge being contaminated or distorted by human subjects seems absurd given that we are speaking about human knowledge. — Janus

I think your caveat -- "apart from animal knowledge" -- illustrates the problem of identifying knowledge per se with human knowledge. There would also, traditionally, be the question of God's knowledge. To this day, physicists like to talk about "God's PoV" or "the mind of God" as a shorthand for describing an ideal knowledge of how things are. Why would there be some sort of guarantee that human knowledge must coincide with this? And if you discount a God hypothesis, there are still the non-human animals. What they know is surely very different from our human knowledge.

Perhaps, instead of using words like "contaminated" or "distorted," we could simply speak of "perspectival" knowledge. That way, we avoid the idea -- which I assume you don't advocate -- that the word "knowledge" can only be applied to what humans know.

Sorry took me a while to get back to this video on Harman's aesthetics.

There are some points here that I think are pretty interesting.

The first is that I have trouble understanding through the video what the "real object" in art actually means. Is it the "representation" itself (like an apple in still life) or is it something more akin to the historical information that went into the painting and the artist's intent (all the meaning and reason for the art piece from the artist). For the sake of argument, I am going to assume the latter.

If it the "real" here, the true "essence" is the artist's intent, then the observer of the art (us), inputs our own understanding of the art piece onto it by way of looking at only the "sensual objects" of the art, that which can be perceived and represented to us (the colors, the sounds, the shapes, and the forms). However, often times, we really don't know what the "intent" of the artpiece is (the true essence), but we may actually "get it right". This stumbling on the right answer is what Harman seems to call "unjustified true belief". We hit the right essence, but we didn't have any real justification for knowing this.

Metaphor also seems important here. Our imagination tries to capture an essence, playing various scenarios of what the artpiece means, what it is presenting us. It "beckons" us to its essence, but we can never get the thing-in-itself completely, only various interpretations using the sensual qualities. The real object (us) completes the picture and creates its own object (the imagined idea of the art), which is different than the essence of the artpiece itself that is presenting to us.

Here is the link to video post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14674/object-oriented-ontology-graham-harman-discussion/p1

- You are begging the Kantian question. You are not allowing yourself to see past Kant's axiom.

Take the question (apparently key to Harman), “What is an object?” Exactly what sort of question is this? Is it akin to a scientific or experimental question, which could be explored and perhaps answered by an investigation of the world? Is it more like a traditional metaphysical question, which might be answered a priori using some kind of transcendental argument a la Kant, or an appeal to logical principles? Or is the question really a pragmatic one – perhaps when we ask “What is an object?” we’re really asking what, out of the many possible uses of the word “object,” is the most useful or helpful one in philosophy – and of course we’d have to specify the uses we have in mind. — J

There is a place in the video series where this is addressed, and it seems that it is a pragmatic matter (link).

In general there seems to be a lot of vacillation between whether an object is real or whether an object is representational, and this relates to the "anti-correlationism." It seems like Harman wants to reject Kant's "Copernican" move but does not have the resources to do so. A bit like the child who wants to use a different color, but whose crayons are all shades of grey.

it seems that it is a pragmatic matter — Leontiskos

Thanks for the link to the final video. Yes, the videographer (I believe his name is Nathan Hohipuha?) argues that we need to understand "object" as a pragmatic choice. But then he goes on to say (around 8:00) that Harman doesn't see it this way -- that he regards it as basic ontology, something that could be shown to be right or wrong, not just a useful idea. So I'm still unsure how Harman would argue for this. Also, not to throw shade on Hohipuha, but I can't help wondering whether a philosopher of Harman's evident caliber would really be saying things like "This is true, period." Anyway, I'll watch Part 2, where perhaps we get some detail, and see what I can learn.

A bit like the child who wants to use a different color, but whose crayons are all shades of grey. — Leontiskos

Nice!

But then he goes on to say (around 8:00) that Harman doesn't see it this way -- that he regards it as basic ontology, something that could be shown to be right or wrong, not just a useful idea. So I'm still unsure how Harman would argue for this. — J

Yes, quite right. :up: The same thing occurs towards the end of the video, in the wrapup. Maybe it's better to say that Hohipuha sees a fundamental contradiction in the work, and attempts to reconcile it by recourse to a kind of pragmatism.

I think your caveat -- "apart from animal knowledge" -- illustrates the problem of identifying knowledge per se with human knowledge. There would also, traditionally, be the question of God's knowledge. To this day, physicists like to talk about "God's PoV" or "the mind of God" as a shorthand for describing an ideal knowledge of how things are. Why would there be some sort of guarantee that human knowledge must coincide with this? And if you discount a God hypothesis, there are still the non-human animals. What they know is surely very different from our human knowledge. — J

Well, human knowledge is the only knowledge we actually enjoy; animal knowledge we can infer from animal behaviors, and from studying their perceptual organs. "God's knowledge" is the idea of unlimited knowledge, the dialectical counterpart of limited knowledge. We find our own knowledge to be limited, but, we imagine, much more comprehensive than animal knowledge.

The idea of knowledge is the idea of something real; "illusory knowledge" does not make sense. There can be illusory belief, but 'belief' and 'knowledge' are different concepts.

You ask why there would be a guarantee that human knowledge accords with God's knowledge. First, I would say there is no guarantee that there is a God, or any absolute knowledge, and even if there were we cannot know it, so no comparison can be made.

The knowledge that animals possess may be very different than human knowledge, but that would invalidate neither, because knowledge is relational, and it seem obvious that different organisms would have different relations to their worlds.

Perhaps, instead of using words like "contaminated" or "distorted," we could simply speak of "perspectival" knowledge. That way, we avoid the idea -- which I assume you don't advocate -- that the word "knowledge" can only be applied to what humans know. — J

Yes, all knowledge is perspectival. As to what the word 'knowledge' can be applied to, I think that is a matter of stipulation, not fact.

You are begging the Kantian question. You are not allowing yourself to see past Kant's axiom. — Leontiskos

That's a bare statement and fairly useless without some explanation.

As to what the word 'knowledge' can be applied to, I think that is a matter of stipulation, not fact. — Janus

Indeed it is, but I think we need to be careful not to stipulate a usage that goes too far afield from ordinary discourse. (Otherwise, why not coin a new, technical term?). "Knowledge" is hazy and debatable, for sure, in terms of who might qualify to have it, but if an alien race made contact with us, I doubt if our first "ordinary language" position, so to speak, would be, "Well, they can't know anything, they aren't human." Again, I just want to be careful to preserve a use of "knowledge" that isn't tied to a human perspective.

Besides, my cat would be mad at me!