I doubt anyone disputes that the only types and examples of consciousness we are aware of cannot exist without their physical components. But that only tells us where is happens. But that only tells us where it takes place. The way we might say walking takes place in the legs, or flight takes place in the sky. We would not accept such statements as explanations of how walking and flight are accomplished.

As I said in my previous post, a leading expert in neurology and the study of consciousness, and a leading expert in the properties of particles, forces, and the laws of physics, say we do not know how consciousness is produced by neurons, properties of particles, forces, and the laws of physics. It is a mystery how physical things and processes are accompanied by subjective experience, and the awareness of themselves. Impulses travel along nerves, causing a hand to pull away from a hot surface. But something else is also taking place. The physical things and processes define and describe the physical events. Why do, and how would, they also define and describe the mental events? Leading experts in physics, neurology, and consciousness are stumped.

I'm just directly responding to the question of evidence.

I think the hard problem of consciousness IS a hard problem. I don't disagree with you that it's a hard problem.

The effect of general anesthesia in suppressing consciousness.

The effect of mind altering drugs.

The fact that human intuition 'looks like' the result of the way information processing occurs in neural networks.

All sorts of ways minds can be impacted by brain damage. — wonderer1

All good examples. They're all about the information processing aspect of cognition, however, and leave open the possibility that this functional level of consciousness is superficial. I was being sloppy suggesting there is no evidence,and should have said no overwhelming evidence.

There is no physical experiment that could prove consciousness has a physical basis, and while this does not prove it doesn't it might be argued that it's an unscientific claim. What would be your view on this?

As I said in my previous post, a leading expert in neurology and the study of consciousness, and a leading expert in the properties of particles, forces, and the laws of physics, say we do not know how consciousness is produced by neurons, properties of particles, forces, and the laws of physics. — Patterner

I want to emphasize aspects of what Brian Greene wrote:

We have yet to articulate a robust scientific explanation of conscious experience. We lack a conclusive account of how consciousness manifests a private world of sights and sounds and sensations. We cannot yet respond, or at least not with full force, to assertions that consciousness stands outside conventional science.

We don't know nearly as much as we would like. However, I've been watching progress in neuroscience for the past 36 years, and that progress has been huge. Don't mistake, "There is a huge amount left to learn.", for, "We don't know anything about it."

I like this response. I don't really jive with the logic that "science doesn't have a complete account of consciousness, therefore science will never have a complete account of consciousness". Or "I can't think of a way to explain this with matter, therefore it can't be explained by matter".

Sure, we can't yet explain it with matter. It's not like we can explain it with something else either. It's not like there's some other more complete alternative that sufficiently gives an account of consciousness.

All good examples. They're all about the information processing aspect of cognition, however, and leave open the possibility that this functional level of consciousness is superficial. I was being sloppy suggesting there is no evidence,and should have said no overwhelming evidence. — FrancisRay

:up:

There is no physical experiment that could prove consciousness has a physical basis, and while this does not prove it doesn't it might be argued that it's an unscientific claim. What would be your view on this? — FrancisRay

Strictly speaking, science doesn't prove anything. On the other hand, science has provided us with some of the most reliable beliefs we have. That human consciousness is the result of evolution of brains within a social primate lineage seems an enormously well supported and reliable belief to me. Arguably, of more scientific interest is whether you can present evidence falsifying physicalism.

From a scientific perspective, I'd say physicalism should be seen as a working hypothesis for which there is a lot of supporting evidence and a dearth of reliable falsifying evidence.

The effect of general anesthesia in suppressing consciousness.

The effect of mind altering drugs.

The fact that human intuition 'looks like' the result of the way information processing occurs in neural networks.

All sorts of ways minds can be impacted by brain damage. — wonderer1

That is all consistent with idealism. Why should we suppose there exists a physical brain made of non-mental stuff? Also, do you think all instances of information processing give rise to subjective experience? Or only some? Are you a proponent of IIT?

Why should we suppose there exists a physical brain made of non-mental stuff? — RogueAI

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the question, but my impulse is to answer that we've seen physical brains by opening up skulls. That's why I suppose they exist. Do you suppose physical brains don't exist?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the question, but my impulse is to answer that we've seen physical brains by opening up skulls. That's why I suppose they exist. Do you suppose physical brains don't exist? — flannel jesus

I suppose that physical matter doesn't exist, let alone physical brains. It's all mental stuff. The hard problem vanishes.

That is all consistent with idealism. — RogueAI

Inasmuch as idealism is unfalsifiable, it is rather uninteresting that you find the evidence I presented doesn't falsify idealism.

Why should we suppose there exists a physical brain made of non-mental stuff? — RogueAI

I don't see "should" as having all that much to do with what we suppose. However, in the case a loved one of yours having a stroke in your presence, I hope it will occur to you that your loved one has a physical brain, and getting your loved one to a doctor who knows about brains is important.

I don't see "should" as having all that much to do with what we suppose. However, in the case a loved one of yours having a stroke in your presence, I hope it will occur to you that your loved one has a physical brain, and getting your loved one to a doctor who knows about brains is important. — wonderer1

That too is consistent with a dream. What's your next move, kick a rock? :razz:

You talk about information a lot. What theory of consciousness is your favorite?

I'm just directly responding to the question of evidence.

I think the hard problem of consciousness IS a hard problem. I don't disagree with you that it's a hard problem. — flannel jesus

It's possible we disagree about what the evidence is saying, and what the hard problem is. I do not think the evidence is insisting that consciousness is produced by the physical things and processes we know so much about, despite the fact that it doesn't exist in their absence. Maybe. But if so, there's no hint of how. So maybe not.

I don’t think the solution to hard problem is figuring out how the physical produces the mental. I think the solution is figuring out what else is there with the physical.




Fair enough. But I want to emphasize things, as well.

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings?

Yes, we know a ton about the physical processes of the brain. But nothing the world's leading experts know "remotely" explains consciousness. Plenty of correlation. Plenty of location. But no explanation. Greene doesn't give a non-robust scientific explanation. There is no partial explanation. There is only It happens here, and It just happens.. The fact that it doesn't seem to exist without the physical means, obviously, the physical is involved. But that's not a robust explanation. It's only an assertion that physical is involved.

Sure, we can't yet explain it with matter. It's not like we can explain it with something else either. It's not like there's some other more complete alternative that sufficiently gives an account of consciousness. — flannel jesus

Maybe there is something else we can explain it with. Maybe something non-physical is also present. We have no problem accepting that space and time are one, or that matter warps it. And wet have no problem accepting the impossible, contradictory nature of quantum mechanics. I don't think the idea that there is something non-physical involved with consciousness is any more outlandish, considering none of the people who know the most about physics and neurons can find an explanation that only involves the physical.

Greene doesn't give a non-robust scientific explanation. — Patterner

Greene is a physicist, not a neuroscientist. Try Damasio's The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.

That's of course fine for you to think that, but your question was 'why should we suppose?' and the answer is 'because everything we can sense and detect tells us we should suppose.'

You can of course disagree with those things, but the supposition isn't like some outlandish idea. We're supposing it because it's right in front of us to suppose. If I see a duck swimming in a pond, I'm going to suppose that that pond has a duck swimming in it.

Sure, we can't yet explain it with matter. It's not like we can explain it with something else either. It's not like there's some other more complete alternative that sufficiently gives an account of consciousness.
— flannel jesus
Maybe there is something else we can explain it with. Maybe something non-physical is also present. We have no problem accepting that space and time are one, or that matter warps it. And wet have no problem accepting the impossible, contradictory nature of quantum mechanics. I don't think the idea that there is something non-physical involved with consciousness is any more outlandish, considering none of the people who know the most about physics and neurons can find an explanation that only involves the physical.

When I said it's not like we can explain it with something else, that wasn't an ontological statement - that wasn't me saying, ontologically, i KNOW nothing else exists that can explain it. I'm saying we, as human beings, and specifically the scientific community, doesn't have to hand some other thing, some other promising realm of non-physics that gives us some clear unambiguous explanation of consciousness. There might BE some non physical thing that explains it in the end, but that explanation doesn't exist right now, for us to study.

So when someone says "materialism can't explain consciousness", that's true, right now - right now materialism can't explain consciousness - but that's not some unique failing of materialism. Right now, NO ONE can explain consciousness - not with matter, and not with anything else either. Materialism can't explain it right now, non-materialism can't explain it right now, it's entirely (or just mostly?) unexplained right now. The explanation is yet to be found.

To me, that shouldn't really count as a point against materialism - it's often presented like it is.

From a scientific perspective, I'd say physicalism should be seen as a working hypothesis for which there is a lot of supporting evidence and a dearth of reliable falsifying evidence. — wonderer1

I would disagree strongly and suspect you just haven't examined the counter evidence.

But leaving that aside, how can an untestable theory be scientific? Physicalism is an ideological position or guess, not a scientific theory. Even if we discount the fact that it fails in metaphysics and explains nothing there is no scientific reason for endorsing it. For physics it makes no difference whether it is true or false.

Try Damasio's The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. — wonderer1

Yes. I found some of what he wrote really convincing.

Greene is a physicist, not a neuroscientist. Try Damasio's The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. — wonderer1

Thanks! I am LOATHE, (LOATHE I tell you), to buy physical books. But this is not available as an e. It should be delivered Tuesday.

I'll point out, however, that Koch is a neuroscientist, and he also says they can't explain it.

But leaving that aside, how can an untestable theory be scientific? Physicalism is an ideological position or guess, not a scientific theory. Even if we discount the fact that it fails in metaphysics and explains nothing there is no scientific reason for endorsing it. For physics it makes no difference whether it is true or false. — FrancisRay

I agree with this, although I think there is a scientific reason of sorts - without an assumption of physicalism, science can't be done. Scientific = measurable (or at least observable) = physical.

That doesn't mean I don't think consciousness experience can be studied scientifically.

So when someone says "materialism can't explain consciousness", that's true, right now - right now materialism can't explain consciousness - but that's not some unique failing of materialism. Right now, NO ONE can explain consciousness - not with matter, and not with anything else either. Materialism can't explain it right now, non-materialism can't explain it right now, it's entirely (or just mostly?) unexplained right now. The explanation is yet to be found. — flannel jesus

:100: :up:

The dogma "not yet means never will" (i.e. unknown = unknowable :roll:) has always been mysterian / idealist – pseudo-philosophical (i.e. religious / magical thinking) – nonsense.

I'll point out, however, that Koch is a neuroscientist, and he also says they can't explain it. — Patterner

Sure. To me it seems quite explainable that we can't totally explain it. Humanity is still developing the conceptual and techological tools that would be required to do so in any comprehensive way. (Making the big assumption that human minds are capable of grasping an explanation that would necessarily have extraordinary complexity.)

Like many matters of scientific understanding, understanding of the mind's relationship to the brain is a matter of looking at many scientific findings relevant to piecing together an enormous jigsaw puzzle. There is a lot to learn, to have a well informed opinion of what the picture looks like. (And facing that picture is something a lot of people have a negative emotional reaction to, at least for a time.)

To me, that shouldn't really count as a point against materialism - it's often presented like it is. — flannel jesus

I gotcha. But I would argue that the opposite also happens. Many say there is no question that materialism is the answer. With no hint of physical properties or processes that can explain properties of consciousness, that's as much a leap of faith.

Sure. To me it seems quite explainable that we can't totally explain it. Humanity is still developing the conceptual and techological tools that would be required to do so in any comprehensive way. (Making the big assumption that human minds are capable of grasping an explanation that would necessarily have extraordinary complexity.)

Like many matters of scientific understanding, understanding of the mind's relationship to the brain is a matter of looking at many scientific findings relevant to piecing together an enormous jigsaw puzzle. There is a lot to learn, to have a well informed opinion of what the picture looks like. (And facing that picture is something a lot of people have a negative emotional reaction to, at least for a time.) — wonderer1

What picture are you saying is already drawn that people have a negative emotional reaction to?

Right now we don't know how a bachelor could be a married man, but that doesn't mean we won't discover it in the future.

:lol:

I agree with this, although I think there is a scientific reason of sorts - without an assumption of physicalism, science can't be done. Scientific = measurable (or at least observable) = physical.

That doesn't mean I don't think consciousness experience can be studied scientifically.
18 hours ago
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Options — T Clark

Agreed. I wasn't suggesting it can't be done.

he dogma "not yet means never will" (i.e. unknown = unknowable :roll:) has always been mysterian / idealist – pseudo-philosophical (i.e. religious / magical thinking) – nonsense. — 180 Proof

I;d say it has been explained. The point is that it can't be explained within a materialist framework, and can't be studied by poking around in the brain. This is not a religious position or conjecture about the future but a result of analysis and a kosher philosophical view. . .

I;d say it [consciousness] has been explained. — FrancisRay

How is this explanation tested? Do any unique predicttions follow from this explanation? Please elaborate. Thanks.

I;d say it has been explained. — FrancisRay

I broadly agree, with caveats. There's still a bunch of questions left over with my view. I'm interested though, what explanation do you favour?

How is this explanation tested? Do any unique predicttions follow from this explanation? Please elaborate. Thanks. — 180 Proof

It may be tested in experience and logic. The problem for me is that this is a big topic and deserves a thread of its own.

Perhaps the most obvious test is that the explanation I have in mind predicts that all metaphysical questions are undecidable, and they are. No other fundamental theory can explain this.

In physics the proofs tend to be negative, but it seems telling that the explanation allows a workable interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is explained by Ulrich Mohrhoff.in his book The World according to Quantum Mechanics: Why the world Makes Sense After All.

I feel this is too big a topic to deal with here and also I have other things to do right now, but it's a great question and if you were to start a thread asking it I'd participate. . .

I broadly agree, with caveats. There's still a bunch of questions left over with my view. I'm interested though, what explanation do you favour? — bert1

The Perennial philosophy, aka mysticism, nondualism, advaita. This states that consciousness and realty are the same phenomenon. It is endorsed by all those who study consciousness deeply and first-hand rather than speculate. What questions do you have left over? I could perhaps give the answers this philosophy would have for them. . .
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