As for his philosophy, such as it is, it seems to me that Dewey's alleged observation that Heidegger "reads like a Swabian peasant trying to sound like me" describes whatever is of worth in it, by my understanding, if we subtract H's mysticism and Romanticism — Ciceronianus

Coming from you , that’s a compliment, given the brilliance of Dewey.

given the brilliance of Dewey. — Joshs

The alleged brilliance of Dewey. I'd love to know the alleged source of the alleged allegation. But nothing like a good ad hominem to brighten up the day.

There's a kind of magnificence in your extravagant, blithe dismissal of Heidegger's support for attempted genocide and a Germanic master race. If you read or listen to Wolin's book, by the way, you'll find that these positions have their basis in his philosophical musings (primarily in the Black Notebooks and his letters to his brother). As for his philosophy, such as it is, it seems to me that Dewey's alleged observation that Heidegger "reads like a Swabian peasant trying to sound like me" describes whatever is of worth in it, by my understanding, if we subtract H's mysticism and Romanticism. — Ciceronianus

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure? Anyone today who espoused slavery would be rightly seen as a monster. Social contexts create themselves as norms. Sometimes extremely dubious things get realized as social contexts, it's the nature of the beast. Man can be a very ugly animal. As unpleasant a fact as social reality is, it is a reality. You downplay your awareness of the exigency of the social context at your own risk. Your outrage is far more of a social than an intellectual response, anyone can see that. If it were intellectual, then it would only be a matter of letting Heidegger's writings speak for themselves, wouldn't it?

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure? Anyone today who espoused slavery would be rightly seen as a monster. Social contexts create themselves as norms. Sometimes extremely dubious things get realized as social contexts, it's the nature of the beast. Man can be a very ugly animal. As unpleasant a fact as social reality is, it is a reality. You downplay your awareness of the exigency of the social context at your own risk. Your outrage is far more of a social than an intellectual response, anyone can see that. If it were intellectual, then it would only be a matter of letting Heidegger's writings speak for themselves, wouldn't it? — Pantagruel

Good points. If Heidegger’s mistake was cultural essentialism, the eclipsing of individual difference in favor of the social whole, Ciceronianus’s mistake is subjective individualism, which downplays the social shaping of individual subjectivity. Both tendencies are formed within discursive traditions, and both can lead to potentially dangerous ethical myopia.

Yes. I don't favour social context but I have to maintain a respectful awareness of the extent of its influence. The ongoing risks of our social susceptibility to the influences of the charismatic leader are evident, in light of current events. The more desperate a social need the more susceptible it is of manipulation.

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure? — Pantagruel

There were plenty of Germans in Heidegger's time who did not fall for the Nazi foolishness, and if Heidegger is to be held up as a paragon of human brilliance I don't think this argument holds water.

I don't have much of an opinion on this matter, not being overly familiar with Heidegger. There are caricatures on both sides. I don't think there is a simple answer to be had, but given Heidegger's stature, his strong support of the Nazi regime casts a indelible shadow on him.

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure?
— Pantagruel

There were plenty of Germans in Heidegger's time who did not fall for the Nazi foolishness, and if Heidegger is to be held up as a paragon of human brilliance I don't think this argument holds water. — Leontiskos

It had better hold water, or else the concept of human brilliance needs to be done away with.

There were plenty of Germans in Heidegger's time who did not fall for the Nazi foolishness, and if Heidegger is to be held up as a paragon of human brilliance I don't think this argument holds water. — Leontiskos

Making the decision to abandon or accept Nazism certainly is a moral choice, not an intellectual one. Nicolai Hartmann even defied Nazism actively as a prominent professor who refused to allow Nazi pledges at the start of class. So should those who fled not have stayed and stood their ground with Hartmann?

So Heidegger certainly can be morally evaluated for that one decision. As we all can. Werner von Braun the father of modern rocketry doesn't seem to have problems with his good name.

Joseph Margolis told R.W. Sleeper Dewey made the remark after Margolis asked him to read some of Heidegger's work.

Joseph Margolis told R.W. Sleeper Dewey made the remark after Margolis asked him to read some of Heidegger's work. — Ciceronianus

I wonder if anyone has ever made a comment to someone about someone else couched in intimate terms the meaning of which was not meant for general translation?

Making the decision to abandon or accept Nazism certainly is a moral choice, not an intellectual one. [...] Werner von Braun the father of modern rocketry doesn't seem to have problems with his good name. — Pantagruel

That's because rocketry and philosophy are not the same thing. You seem to be implicitly admitting that Heidegger's work is like rocketry, and has no moral worth, no?

I suppose it could be. Unless, of course, we find H's "Dewey Notebooks" establishing he shamelessly plagiarized Dewey's work. That's intended as a joke, by the way.

That's because rocketry and philosophy are not the same thing. You seem to be implicitly admitting that Heidegger's work is like rocketry, and has no moral worth, no? — Leontiskos

That's a complete leap.

However he certainly isn't an ethicist and doesn't pretend to be I think. And arguably, rocketry is one whole hell of a lot more ethically important than philosophy. So, whichever direction you wanted to go with that, ok.

It had better hold water, or else the concept of human brilliance needs to be done away with. — Joshs

But that's just what the Nazis said, "Look at this brilliant man who strongly approves of our project! Surely our project is worthwhile given his approval."

Disentangling the two is not as easy as Heidegger's students would wish.

You should listen to Tom Lehrer.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEJ9HrZq7Ro

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure? — Pantagruel

Certainly nobody who actively argued in its defense, like John Calhoun. Or does the "intellectual" nature of his speeches/writings in support of slavery preclude criticism of him, as it seems Heidegger's speeches and writings in support of Nazism precludes criticism of him?

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. — Pantagruel

The Nazi death camps is not something that occurred two centuries ago and was not a widely embraced social norm. However reprehensible slavery was, to be a slave was not to be put to death. The rejection of slavery as a social norm was an acceptance of the inherent value of human life.

Your outrage is far more of a social than an intellectual response, — Pantagruel

I reject this kind of intellectualist nihilistic historical relativism that separates thinking from being. We are not talking about abstract entities but human beings. There are always those who are not intellectually imprisoned by social norms, those who look beyond what is to what ought to be. Heidegger was not one of them. But even this is to grant Heidegger too much. Any decent person at that time could see that what the Nazis were doing was wrong.

Disentangling the two is not as easy as Heidegger's students would wish. — Leontiskos

.

Let’s be clear about what are entangled here. On one side are the public record of Heidegger’s political actions, and his collected comments concerning his views about National Socialism and the Jews. On the other side are dozens of philosophical works spanning 6 decades and comprising tens of thousands of pages.

If as responsible readers we are charged with the task of using the public record and scattered diary fragments to illuminate the meaning of his published work, and vice versa, which of these two sides of Heidegger’s life do you think deserves the most attention in clarifying the ‘true’ intentions of as careful and complex a thinker as Heidegger?
I think it’s no coincidence that those, like Wolin, who are most inclined to treat Heidegger’s political activities and non-published comments as a proxy for actually mastering his published work are the ones who want to dismiss his philosophy entirely.

Joseph Margolis told R.W. Sleeper Dewey made the remark after Margolis asked him to read some of Heidegger's work. — Ciceronianus

Did you know Joe Margolis? He was my thesis advisor. Margolis, a self-professed relativist who stressed the importance of cultural and historical situatedness, would not accept the kind of Heidegger apologetic we see here.

Ciceronianus’s mistake is subjective individualism, which downplays the social shaping of individual subjectivity. — Joshs

So, Heidegger was only following orders of a sort--social orders, as it were? In that sense, so were they all, one would think.

I didn't know him. You were fortunate.

If as responsible readers we are charged with the task of using the public record and scattered diary fragments to illuminate the meaning of his published work, and vice versa, which of these two sides of Heidegger’s life do you think deserves the most attention in clarifying the ‘true’ intentions of as careful and complex a thinker as Heidegger? — Joshs

But your presupposition is that the two bodies of work are in conflict, and that we therefore must choose either one or the other. Why think that? On my (admittedly limited) view, the two are not in conflict.

When attempts to excuse Heidegger on the basis that he was an intellectual and not a moralist, he seems to implicitly commit himself to the view that Heidegger's academic work is largely non-moral, and is therefore not contrary (nor favorable) to the moral evils of Nazism. This approach also does not see the two bodies of work as conflicting.

Margolis, a self-professed relativist who stressed the importance of cultural and historical situatedness, would not accept the kind of Heidegger apologetic we see here — Fooloso4

Margolis’s relativism seems to go only so far. He appears to embrace Foucault but his critiques of Husserl, Ricouer, Heidegger, Rorty and various postmodern writers seems to indicate his inability to make the phenomenological (and beyond that, deconstructive) move into a thoroughly relational model of being. Instead, he insists on maintaining a split between the methods of human and natural science, based on his belief in a certain notion of an ‘objective' physical reality. He says cultural time is reversible but physical time is irreversible:.

”Their [cultural meanings] narrative structure—their past, for instance—is, as we have said again and again, always subject to further change by way of further interpretation. Nothing like this obtains in the physical world...The human world is significantly different from the physical—in possessing Intentional structures; it is conceptually richer and more complex in virtue of incorporating the other—and more. The physical world must be older, we say, than human life, and independent of human inquiry; otherwise, all our conjectures make no sense.”

But your presupposition is that the two bodies of work are in conflict, and that we therefore must choose either one or the other. Why think that? On my (admittedly limited) view, the two are not in conflict. — Leontiskos

No, my presupposition is that the two bodies of work are two aspects of the same thinking, and that we must use each side to better understand the other. But one side is profoundly richer, deeper , more fully elaborated than the other. Without a thoroughgoing scholarly immersion in that side, one ends misreading Heidegger’s philosophical use of the word ‘destruction’ for the conventional meaning, as Richard Wolin does. This is one of innumerable misreadings he makes in his diatribe against H.

When ↪Pantagruel attempts to excuse Heidegger on the basis that he was an intellectual and not a moralist, he seems to implicitly commit himself to the view that Heidegger's academic work is largely non-moral, and is therefore not contrary (nor promotional) to the moral evils of Nazism. This approach also does not see the two bodies of work as conflicting — Leontiskos

I would disagree that Heidegger’s work doesnt imply an ethics. It does. Both Derrida and Levinas have connected the limits of the ethicial implications of his thought with his political mistakes.

As long as I am name dropping I read Heidegger with William Richardson. This was before the current attention focusing on Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi, but even back then there were those who made the connection.

I asked Richardson about it. He was visibly troubled and admitted that he was not able to reconcile it. But we continued to read Heidegger and I continued to read him after that and read him with some of my students after that.

I agree Being and Time should be studied as an ontology thesis To what extent that thesis is inherently apolitical is a reasonable inquiry that doesn't make the text equivalent to Mein Kampf by default.

After reviewing the range of literature concerned with the political, the interpretations range from seeing his work as a culmination of Heidegger's rejection of 'modern society' developed over a long time or as a conflict in his own thinking. The latter consideration is more interesting as a problem for philosophy. But that does not make it apolitical.

seems to indicate his inability — Joshs

What do you mean by inability?

No, my presupposition is that the two bodies of work are two aspects of the same thinking, and that we must use each side to better understand the other. — Joshs

That's interesting, because most people in your position seem to try to use Heidegger's academic work to explain away the writings, beliefs, and decisions of Heidegger's which are unappealing.

In any case, I don't see how the problem goes away unless one argues that Heidegger's academic work is inherently contrary to the unappealing aspects, and that he simply failed to recognize the way in which his philosophy precludes antisemitism, or Nazism, etc. A tall task.

Yes, I would like to see more of that inherent contradiction.

I don't see how the problem goes away unless one argues that Heidegger's academic work is inherently contrary to the unappealing aspects, and that he simply failed to recognize the way in which his philosophy precludes antisemitism, or Nazism, etc. A tall task. — Leontiskos

I hope this helps:

Eugene Gendlin was a Viennese Jew who , at age 13 , just barely made it out of Austria alive in 1939. As a philosopher and psychologist at the University of Chicago, he avoided reading Heidegger for years because of his political activities.After finally reading and embracing aspects of his philosophy, Gendlin wrote a remarkable analysis of the historical context of Heidegger’s actions. He didn’t excuse Heidegger or explain away what he did , but , like another famous Jewish philosopher who suffered at the hands of the Nazis, Emmanuel Levinas, he showed Heidegger’s faults to be symptomatic of a weakness endemic to European thinking. Rather than conveniently indulging in a pose of moral superiority, patting himself on the back for his righteousness, he looked beyond the individual to a climate of thinking common not just to the Nazis but to those who opposed them.

Here’s the first part of Gendlin’s article , plus the last paragraph:

“Jung offers deep and indispensable insights. I did not like knowing that Jung had said: "Hitler is the embodiment of the German spirit." The Nazis knew his views. Records show that they considered sending for Jung to help Rudolph Hess with his mental trouble.

Similarly, I had not wanted to know that Dostoevsky hated Jews, Germans, and Poles. He gave influential speeches in favor of the Panslavic movement. That movement was a direct cause of the Russian-French alliance and the World War.

What I heard of Heidegger's Nazi views made me decide not to read him at all. I read him when I was almost 40 years old. Then I realized that Heidegger's thought was already in mine, from my reading of so many others who had learned from him.

With these three we are forced to wonder: Must we not mistrust their seemingly deep insights? How could we want these insights for ourselves, if they came out of experience so insensitive to moral ugliness? Perhaps it might not matter if the insights were less deep. But they open into what is most precious in human nature and life. The depth is beyond question. The insights are genuine.

So one attempts to break out of the dilemma on the other side: Is there a way Nazism or hatred of other peoples might be not so bad? Could it have seemed different at the time? No chance of that, either. I am a Jewish refugee from Vienna, a lucky one to whom nothing very bad happened. I remember what 1938 looked like, not only to a Jew, but to others. I remember the conflicts it made in people. They could not help knowing which instincts were which. Many writers and ordinary people had no difficulty seeing the events for what they were, at the time.

So we return to question the insights again. But by now they are among our own deepest insights. We go back and forth: Nothing gives way on either side.

Did these men simply make mistakes? We can forgive mistakes. A human individual can develop far beyond others, but surely only on one or two dimensions. No one can be great in more than a few ways. And Heidegger did write of his "mistakes" in his application to be allowed to teach again at Freiburg (1946). He also distanced himself from the Nazi party already in 1934, long before most Germans. I have no difficulty understanding any person's mistake, and less difficulty if someone is highly developed in other ways. No human can have every kind of strength and judgement. On a personal level there is really no problem.

Why he was so silent about the mistake is also more than personal. It is the silence of a whole generation. I will return to this silence.

The problem is not about him, personally, at all. I pose a problem for us. The problem is, why his kind of philosophy---our kind of philosophy---fails to protect against this "mistake." That is the philosophical question.

His philosophy allowed for this mistake. It is therefore not just the personal accident. There is an inherent, systematic connection. These deep insights permit inhuman, racist views. To find the systematic connection, we must look exactly where these views---our views---are deepest, most precious, and not false but true. What was lacking at that most true point?

Something very important was lacking at the deepest point. We don't notice the lack, because when we read these writings today, we assume and add what is lacking.

I became an American when I was 13. As a child I had not belonged in, or identified with, Austria. I had been alienated in some confused and inarticulate way. I found I could really be an American, and I am one.

But, some European peculiarities remain from before. At the Heidegger Circle I laugh silently to myself, when other Americans discuss and share Heidegger's view that to be human is to dwell historically as a people on a soil. How do my fellow Americans manage to dwell with Heidegger on German soil?

My colleagues read this in a universalized way. For us, in the Heidegger Circle, the human is the same everywhere in this respect, and equally valuable. Humans are culturally particularized, certainly, but this particularization is itself universal. Humans are one species. They are all culturally particular. This universal assertion holds across us all, and we see no problem.

Indeed, after 1945 Heidegger writes of the dangers of technological reason on a "planetary" level. But it is reason, which is thus planetary---the same universal reason he says he had always attacked. (Spiegel Interview.) Heidegger's planetary view differs from our more recent understanding of human universality. The difference has not been much written about, so there are no familiar phrases for it. For Heidegger there is no common human nature which is then also particularized and altered in history. There is no human nature that lasts through change by history. There is only the historical particular, no human nature.

Humans eat and sleep differently in different cultures. They arrange different sexual rituals, build different "nests," and raise their young differently. In an animal species the members do all this in the same way. Humans are not even a species. So, at least, it seemed to those thinkers who entered into what is most deeply human.

To them, the deepest and most prized aspect of humans was the cultural and historical particular.

In our generation we easily and conveniently universalize the particularization. Not Heidegger. For him, what is most valuable is the necessarily particular indwelling in one people's history and language, on its land, and not another's. We change it without noticing, to read: any indwelling in any people's history is this most highly valued aspect.

**************************
Last paragraph:

It is partly the influence of his work in us, which now makes us unable to grasp how he could have failed to sense the nonrational universality of humans. Today, in Chicago, when we look at Louis Sullivan's buildings, the ones that created modern architecture, we wonder why he used so much granite. Why didn't he use just steel and windows?

To understand may be to forgive, but it is certainly not to excuse. Without pretending to lighten the horror, we need to understand why that tradition of thought also brought
horror. Only so can we think through what we draw from our immediate past. Only then can we recover the other past, right behind that one. We need both, to articulate our own, non-rational universalization of human depth.“