1) The word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence, such as "I want five apples". Even before I use the sentence "I want five apples" in the world, the word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence.

2) The word "five" has a meaning because the sentence it is within has a use in the world. For example, my saying "I want five apples", the shopkeeper hearing me, who then starts to count out five apples. If the shopkeeper doesn't hear me, and doesn't count out five apples, then as the sentence has no use in the world, the word "five" has no meaning.

Which reading is correct. Or is there another reading? — RussellA

I'm inclined to say that 2) is the correct reading, but I don't think there's any real distinction between 1) and 2). In short, because all use - including the use of a word in a sentence - is a use in the world.

In 1) you seem to be referring to conventional meaning, or how the word is commonly (actually) used. A dictionary lists such conventional meanings. Obviously, many words have more than one conventional meaning/use. But it is in actual use - in a specific context (embedded in specific acts in the world) - where a word finds its actual meaning(s); where it is used to have one or more of these conventional meanings, or possibly an unconventional meaning.

All the conventional ways that a word is commonly used (or all the meanings that a word commonly has) is not necessarily the meaning that a word does have in an actual instance of use. Consider poetry, metaphor, double entendre, proper nouns, etc.

It is not yet clear what "I want five apples" means apart from any particular use of that sentence in the world. Obviously, we can imagine how the sentence might commonly or conventionally be used, but there are likely to be other ways that it could be used, and therefore other meanings that it could have. For example, "Five" could be a variety of apple or "five apples" could be a brand name or a code phrase or a double entendre or a nickname, etc.

If the shopkeeper doesn't hear you, then just say the same thing again but louder. It doesn't imply that the sentence has no use in the world or that the word has no meaning. You could use the same sentence again here or elsewhere with the same meaning. But the one word or sentence doesn't necessarily have to be used the same way, to have the same meaning, in every situation.

In short, because all use - including the use of a word in a sentence - is a use in the world. — Luke

The example of the shopkeeper and the apples is in response to the picture of language as words naming objects. — Fooloso4

As you say, Wittgenstein is responding to Augustine.

I agree with Wittgenstein that Augustine's position, as Wittgenstein presents it, is too simplistic. It seems sensible to say that language only has meaning if it has a use in the world.
PI 1: In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands

Words can name objects in the world, but they have other uses as well. They can name properties, such as the colour red, they can be definitions, such as "a unicorn a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", they can be metaphors, poetic, exclamations, feelings such as pain, etc.

As words only exist in language, then it logically follows that everything a word is depends on it being part of language, including its meaning. It is hard to argue against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use in language
PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer

What Wittgenstein doesn't mention in PI 43 is the next necessary step in our understanding of the meaning of words, and that is that the meaning of language is its use in the world.

Wittgenstein does talk about things in the world, such as slabs, for example PI 20:"Hand me a slab", "Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs", but this can be understood in two ways.

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text.

I can understand 1), in that language is grounded within the world, but I cannot understand 2), where language becomes self-referential without any possibility of being grounded in the world .

I agree with Wittgenstein that not all words refer to objects in the world, but I am unclear as to his position. Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ?

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text.

I can understand 1), in that language is grounded within the world, but I cannot understand 2), where language becomes self-referential without any possibility of being grounded in the world .

I agree with Wittgenstein that not all words refer to objects in the world, but I am unclear as to his position. Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ? — RussellA

Wittgenstein is critical of Augustine's picture of language for failing to consider that words can have other possible uses besides naming objects (as nouns):

These [Augustine's] words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names. —– In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not mention any difference between kinds of word. Someone who describes the learning of language in this way is, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. — Wittgenstein, PI 1

However, Wittgenstein does not deny that some words do name objects, or can refer to things in the world. He is critical of the view that language primarily names objects and the rest is just a sort of filler. He criticises Augustine's picture for failing to consider that there can be other kinds of words, or that words can have other uses besides naming objects, and that the meaning of a word is not always or only the object to which the word refers. Consider the builder's language game in section 2. "Slab!" is not used merely as a reference to the object, but as a command to have the object brought to the builder. See sections 19-20.

As you say, Wittgenstein is responding to Augustine. — RussellA

This picture of language is the picture drawn in the Tractatus.

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text. — RussellA

The word slab as used in the builder's language does not simply refer to the slab in the world, to a piece of stone. It functions as a command. It means "bring me a slab". The builder's language does not occur in a text, but rather in the context of the activity of building.

Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ? — RussellA

He does not deny that some words refer to objects. What he rejects is that EVERY word functions in this way. The builder's language makes this point by showing that the names of objects is an incomplete picture of the language.

He does not deny that some words refer to objects. What he rejects is that EVERY word functions in this way. — Fooloso4

Yep.

I think it worth adding that he also shows that pointing, referring, and indeed ostension of any form are already aspects of some language game. They cannot therefore serve as a foundation from which language games are to be built. Reference does not ground language.

However, Wittgenstein does not deny that some words do name objects, or can refer to things in the world. — Luke

He does not deny that some words refer to objects. What he rejects is that EVERY word functions in this way — Fooloso4

After a bit of pondering, I will stick my neck on the line and say that, at the core of Philosophical Investigations, with its language games, family resemblances and Forms of Life, no word names an object in the world. IE, the PI rejects a referential theory of meaning (aka Direct Reference Theory, Referentialism, Referential Realism).

How does a child learn a new word, such as "table". They are shown many examples of things, similar in some way, but all different, and as Wittgenstein says, having family resemblances. Each particular thing is a token of a general type.

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word.

But as each child has had different life experiences, has had a unique Form of Life, and has been shown a unique set of examples, each child's concept of a "table" must be unique to them. My concept of "table" must be different to your concept of "table", as my concept of pain must be different to yours. Similar in many ways but different in others.

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table".

But as Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 293, our private experiences, whether that of pain or the concept of a "table", drop out of consideration in the language game. In the language game we can talk about "pains" and "tables", even though I don't know your pain or concept of "table" and you don't know my pain or my concept of "table".

Therefore, when I hear "bring me a table", this in fact a figure of speech, and replaces the sentence "bring me something in the world that is an example of your concept of a "table"".

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game.

As I have in my mind my own concept of "table", having learn the concept from seeing in the world many examples of things that have been named "table" by a community, when I hear someone say "bring me a table", I can reverse the process and find a thing in the world that is a particular example of my own concept.

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world, to an object in the world, but is referring to the many examples of things in the world experienced over decades and multiple locations as having a family resemblance and been named "table" by a community, of which the thing in front of me is just one particular example.

After a bit of pondering, I will stick my neck on the line and say that, at the core of Philosophical Investigations, with its language games, family resemblances and Forms of Life, no word names an object in the world...

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word. — RussellA

Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"?

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table". — RussellA

Those particular instantiations of our concept of the word "table" are tables, which are objects in the world.

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game. — RussellA

You're asking me to bring you a table, not to bring you my concept of "table". If a child can successfully point to a table, then I can successfully bring you one.

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game. — RussellA

That's right, the word "table" is not referring to either of our concepts of "table", but to the object in the world that we call a "table". Why, then, do you think that "no word names an object in the world"?

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world, to an object in the world, but is referring to the many examples of things in the world experienced over decades and multiple locations as having a family resemblance and been named "table" by a community, of which the thing in front of me is just one particular example. — RussellA

Is this thing in front of you - this object in the world; this particular example of a table - not a table?

How does a child learn a new word, such as "table". They are shown many examples of things, similar in some way, but all different, and as Wittgenstein says, having family resemblances. Each particular thing is a token of a general type.

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" ... — RussellA

This is a very odd picture. No one goes around pointing to various things in the child's world and naming them. A child learns the word 'table' in the context of her life. Where her food or toy is on the table, or she is under the table, or has bumped into the table and hurt herself.

They know how to use the word. — RussellA

Pointing to objects is not how we use words. We know she understands the word 'table' not because she points to it but because when we tell her the toy is on the table she knows were to look.

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table". — RussellA

For the child what exists are not examples or instantiations of concepts. What exists are the things she encounters and uses, the things she learns to call 'table' and 'chair'. She does not begin at the level of concepts.

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world ... — RussellA

Of course it is! What is she to bring if not a table in the world? She learns that some of the things she might brings are tables and others are not. She learns that the coffee table is a table even though it different than the kitchen table and that the stool is not a table even though her toy is on it.

Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"? — Luke

The Philosophical Investigations rejects Referentialism. In Referentialism, the child would point to an object in the world. If the child is not pointing to an object in the world, according to the PI, then what exactly is the child doing.

From Wikipedia Direct Reference Theory, the PI opposed Referentialism.
A direct reference theory (also called referentialism or referential realism) is a theory of language that claims that the meaning of a word or expression lies in what it points out in the world. The object denoted by a word is called its referent. Criticisms of this position are often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1953, with his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against referentialism, famously saying that "the meaning of a word is its use."

As the SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, as regards the PI, one should forget about meaning as representation and look to use.
“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43). This basic statement is what underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein’s thought: a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation"

What is an object? The SEP article Object discusses the nature of objects. Is it really the case that the child is pointing at a table as an object, or is the child pointing at a set of atoms that have a momentary location in time and space, and have taken the form of one particular example of the general concept "table". To say that the child is looking at an object is to say that what exists in the mind of the child as a concept also happens to ontologically exist in the world.
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p. 143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”. They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”, “it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as “there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs too.

Perhaps the PI is following what Strawson calls a feature-placing language, where such sentences as "it is a table" don't quantify over anything, and therefore don't commit the speaker to having to refer to any ontologically existent object.

No table as such exists in the world. What exists in the world are examples of tables, some grey in colour and some brown in colour, some with four legs and some with three legs, some new and some old, some made of plastic and some made of wood. No one can point to The Table about which all other tables are copies. No one table takes precedence over any other. Only the concept table can exist as a singular thing, and that exists in the mind and not the world.

The child points at a table, but a moment later the thing being pointed at it has lost a few atoms, gained a scratch or two and has warped slightly. Is it the same table? Can one argue that something can physically change yet remain the same object.

When one says "the child points at a table", this is a figure of speech for "the child points at an example of its concept of "table""

No one goes around pointing to various things in the child's world and naming them — Fooloso4

If things in the child's world are not named, how does the child learn the names of things.

Pointing to objects is not how we use words. We know she understands the word 'table' not because she points to it but because when we tell her the toy is on the table she knows were to look. — Fooloso4

The child must already know what a table is if the child knows the toy is on top of it.

For the child what exists are not examples or instantiations of concepts. What exists are the things she encounters and uses, the things she learns to call 'table' and 'chair'. She does not begin at the level of concepts. — Fooloso4

Every table in the world is different in some way. Some are brown in colour and some grey, some with four legs and some with three, some pristine and new and some old and scratched, etc. The child couldn't learn a different name for every different table, all they can do is learn the concept of "table", a single word incorporating family resemblances.

If things in the child's world are not named, how does the child learn the names of things. — RussellA

They are named, but the name of things in the child's world are not generally learned by going around pointing.

The child must already know what a table is if the child knows the toy is on top of it. — RussellA

This is how he learns what a table is - it is what the toy is on. It is where we sit to eat.

Every table in the world is different in some way. — RussellA

Yes, and some things that are not tables may be the same as a table in some way. A child might call a horse a big dog. He is eventually corrected. He might then call a cow a horse. He is eventually corrected. For the time being, however, 'big dog' may be sufficient. In time he learns that some differences do not matter for what a thing is called and others do.

The either/or expressed by moving from "meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation", assumes that the challenge W is making to treating words as pointing to essences should be replaced by a competing explanation of essence. I think this interpolates an intention to make an ontological claim that is not Wittgenstein's concern.

That we may misunderstand our relation to "essence" does not mean that we can fix that with another general approach. Working with 'family resemblances' comes from our limitations to provide what some words seem to give us. By that token, the approach does not give us that something through another means.

What is an object? The SEP article Object discusses the nature of objects. Is it really the case that the child is pointing at a table as an object, or is the child pointing at a set of atoms that have a momentary location in time and space, and have taken the form of one particular example of the general concept "table". To say that the child is looking at an object is to say that what exists in the mind of the child as a concept also happens to ontologically exist in the world.
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p. 143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”. They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”, “it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as “there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs too. — RussellA

Ironically, even though I disagree perhaps with this ontologically nihilistic claim, the fact that he (Cortens) spends any time explaining objects (as well as the SEP article in general it came from), is infinitely more informative, and interesting than Witty's Tractatus where he just starts with the assumption about objects, as if the ontological work of positing this view doesn't even need to be explained.

I can't even get away with that shit on a philosophy forum! He gets defenders. As long as I have a claim like, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." I get a pass and don't have to defend anything. :roll: :rofl:

Witty's Tractatus where he just starts with the assumption about objects, as if the ontological work of positing this view doesn't even need to be explained. — schopenhauer1

The objects and names discussed in the PI are not the simple objects and names of the Tractatus.

The objects and names discussed in the PI are not the simple objects and names of the Tractatus. — Fooloso4

Indeed they aren't. That is barely discussed in PI. Indeed, it's all language games, all the way down. But this doesn't say much about metaphysics or epistemology. It's a long treatise on language so, not much to mine from it other than meaning is "language games". Indeed, in very different ways, both the Tractatus and the PI don't make many references to epistemological or ontological claims at all.

For the Tractatus, he can always hide behind the "Whereof one cannot speak.." quote. For the PI, he can hide behind "language games", and thus no commitment shalt be made. Thus the defenders pick up the slack and such and do "something" with it.

In a way, good for Witty. He let the blowhards stuff his ideas into various academic BS. He was able to avoid it himself.

That is barely discussed in PI. — schopenhauer1

Risible.

Risible — Banno

I actually did a "Find" on the word "objects" in PI, just in case I missed something, and it showed up 38 times. None of the instances discussed objects in any philosophical way beyond the language game thing. There were no commitments to "what" "how" etc. So, yeah I refer you to this:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/838538

From Wikipedia Direct Reference Theory, the PI opposed Referentialism — RussellA

Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. As we pointed out to you earlier, Wittgenstein does not deny that words can be used to refer to objects. What he rejects is that words are only used to refer to objects.

When one says "the child points at a table", this is a figure of speech for "the child points at an example of its concept of "table"" — RussellA

This implies that it is impossible for the child to be wrong; that the child must always point to a table, no matter what they point to, as long as it aligns with the child’s concept of “table”.

However, this is inconsistent with your earlier comment:

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word. — RussellA

If the child’s concept determines what is or what isn’t (an example of) a table, then here we cannot talk about “success” or “failure”.

Do you want to say that it is impossible to determine whether the child has successfully pointed to a table? Can we never teach anyone to speak a language?

@Banno @Luke @Joshs @Sam26 @Paine

After reading some of the recent comments, I wanted to offer what help I can on reading Wittgenstein (following the Cavell essay I attached earlier):

Yes, words sometimes refer to objects (and are meaningful as names), but that is only one of many ways the world (and meaning) works. The PI is an investigation of examples to show how varied other ways are, and why we want it to only be one way.

He is using a particular method (this is not ordinary writing). He looks at the evidence of what we say—shorthanded as: “language”, but not as the subject (except as another example) nor the salvation—when we are doing activities (the examples, which he groups under the term “concepts”, like chess playing, rule-following, meaning, seeing, pointing, etc.) and he either offers an appropriate situation (context) in which we would say it (or he imagines that) in order to see how vast are the ways that the world works (their “grammar” and criteria), and how and when they don’t.

You have to be able to see what he is describing for yourself (at times only hinting at it or in a riddle-like phrase), because he can’t tell you (he is trying to change our mindset, how we see the world, others). Look at what he says as speculative (he is almost running it by himself at times), because we must agree in our judgment of the situation—what we would also say in that situation. (Thus why @schopenhauer1 and @RussellA balk at the unsubstantiated accept-or-reject nature of his statements.) It is almost like it isn’t a matter of understanding him as much as seeing (the vision) the perspective, as he puts it, the attitude (as in: the position in relation to).

The goal is to see how and why we are (philosophy is) tempted to want a single theory for everything that is simple, logical, and certain (he says “pure”); to look at the desire philosophy has to have the problems of skepticism and other minds solved by something we can know. But Witt is not offering a better solution or some foundation for the limitations of knowledge—as people take: language games, “use”, forms of life, etc., to be. The reason he finds is that there is an open possibility of meaninglessness (uncertainty, doubt, skepticism) which scares us away from our ordinary criteria into a myopic view of how the world works so we can be sure about it, know it (but that knowledge is not the only relation to the world).

Also: “Use” is not some operation done to, or result held by, language (say, by the casual power of “our intention”); it is part of his method to look and see that what is said can be meaningful in different ways, from different vantages, in different situations (have different “uses” or “senses” he also calls them) depending on the concept, the context, who, when, where, to whom, etc. He is saying look at all the factors and criteria from the whole history of all our lives that hold what we are interested in, what matters in what we do, our criteria of judgment about what is meaningful. “Meaning” is not put into language by you, it is judged as meaningful (or not) by our ordinary criteria.

He gets defenders. — schopenhauer1

For example, the Decision Lab writes of Wittgenstein as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th C:
Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. There were few philosophical fields left untouched by the British-Austrian genius; he worked with logic, mathematics, ethics, the mind, and most notably, revolutionized the way that we understand language.

The article writes that part of his importance was in moving philosophy from trying to discoverer the truth of the world to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.
He believed that in the 1900s, philosophers had become too concerned with trying to discover a magical doctrine that explained the ‘truth’ of the world.................Instead, he believed the purpose of philosophy was to find explanations that allowed people to picture the world.

Perhaps he can be seen as starting to lay the foundation for today's Postmodernism, which, according to Britannica is characterized by scepticism, subjectivism and relativism.
Postmodernism, also spelled post-modernism, in Western philosophy, a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad scepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.

The PI, in opposing Referentialism in favour of Relativism, whereby words can only be understood within the context in which they appear, has perhaps contributed to the situation today whereby in one context I can think of myself as an Italian, male engineer, but in another context I can think of myself as an Indian, female shot putter. Today, perhaps partly in thanks to Wittgenstein, it is my truth that is important now, not facts in the world.

This is how he learns what a table is - it is what the toy is on — Fooloso4

As you say "A child learns the word 'table' in the context of her life."

The child asks "where is my toy". Its parent says "your toy is on the table". The child sees the toy and knows that it is on something. But from a single example, the child cannot know what "table" is referring to. Is it referring to a tablecloth, a table, something made of wood, something with four legs, etc.

Only by experiencing many examples will the child be able to discover a family resemblance in the examples and narrow down the meaning of "table" to what we know as the concept "table".

The either/or expressed by moving from "meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation", assumes that the challenge W is making to treating words as pointing to essences should be replaced by a competing explanation of essence. — Paine

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence.

The PI proposes that the meaning of a word is its use in language, for example in the sentence "bring me a table". In this case, what is the essence of the word "table"? One possibility is that the essence of a word such as "table" is as a concept, something that only exists in the mind of the speaker of the language.

The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence. — RussellA

The observation that a particular use governs the meaning of a word does not cancel the fact that language is referring to entities and events we encounter in the world. It is that particularity that gives us confidence that such is the case. We can distinguish between cases.

To say: "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer", is to observe that some naming is sufficient through simple pointing ala Augustine. By arguing that we do not learn language that way is not an argument that what we talk about is not actually in the world we live in.

Saying objects "must have some kind of essence" is metaphysical supposition of the sort Kant said we could not confirm through experience. I don't think the discussion of meaning here is a part of that supposition.

The PI is opposed to Referentialism, whereby words refer to objects in the world. To be an object existing in the world in space and time it must have some kind of essence. — RussellA

Does the "object" also include mental objects such as fear, anger, pain, joy and hope ...etc? Or does it just mean material objects in the external world?

Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. As we pointed out to you earlier, Wittgenstein does not deny that words can be used to refer to objects. What he rejects is that words are only used to refer to objects. — Luke

The key paragraph is PI 43 which says that the meaning of a word is its use in language. But what about the second part "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.". Is this Wittgenstein accepting Referentialism - not at all.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 40 makes the point that the meaning of a word doesn't disappear if the object it is referring to disappears. IE, the meaning of a word doesn't depend on there being an object in the world. If the object Mr N N disappears, the word "Mr N N" still has meaning.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

Within the PI are sentences such as "bring me a slab". Wittgenstein is making the point in the PI that the word "slab" doesn't have meaning because it is referring to an object in the world, ie Referentialism, but in fact gets its meaning from how it used in language, which is a completely different thing.

As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world.

This implies that it is impossible for the child to be wrong; that the child must always point to a table, no matter what they point to, as long as it aligns with the child’s concept of “table”. — Luke

The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .

However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table".

This is the point of PI 246, in that if I have a pain, then I have a pain. There is no knowing that I have a pain. If I have concept, then I have a concept, right or wrong.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

But from a single example, the child cannot know what "table" is referring to. — RussellA

Right, but life with a child is not a matter of single examples.

Only by experiencing many examples will the child be able to discover a family resemblance in the examples and narrow down the meaning of "table" to what we know as the concept "table". — RussellA

The child does not think in terms of 'family resemblance', but rather she learns which things are and are not called tables. It is only much later that she might ask what all these things have in common other than being tables. But whether such a question occurs to her or not, that is not how a language is learned or how it functions.

Does the "object" also include mental objects such as fear, anger, pain, joy and hope ...etc? Or does it just mean material objects in the external world? — Corvus

In Referentialism, the objects in the world are observable material things, including things such as mountains, trees, crying, wincing and other behaviours, but not internal sensations such as fear, anger, etc.

This is why the Logical Positivists liked Referentialism, in that it aimed at creating a "perfectly descriptive language purified from ambiguities and confusions" (Wikipedia, Direct Reference Theory).

This is why the Logical Positivists liked Referentialism, in that it aimed at creating a "perfectly descriptive language purified from ambiguities and confusions" (Wikipedia, Direct Reference Theory). — RussellA

Right, but then where did the internal states "go"? "What" were they for them? Why didn't they care?

Right, but then where did the internal states "go"? "What" were they for them? Why didn't they care? — schopenhauer1

Logical Positivism stated in the 1920's. Their central thesis was the verification principle, whereby only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content (Wikipedia Logical Positivism).

It is probably not surprising that the movement came to an end in the 1960's, though they had a good run.

Logical Positivism stated in the 1920's. Their central thesis was the verification principle, whereby only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content (Wikipedia Logical Positivism).

It is probably not surprising that the movement came to an end in the 1960's, though they had a good run. — RussellA

Yes, that is what seems to have happened more-or-less, but I was being rhetorical as to present what is problematic with these approaches in general. That whole "behaviorism" nonsense and the like. Or not accepting mental states of "ontologically" existing or some such. Weirdly non-commonsensical for a common sense-touting strand of thought.