Use gives meaning to symbols. — Michael

And an abstract Turing Machine can't be said to be using symbols, even if we wrote out the entire computation for being in grief, but a computer can, because it has electricity flowing through it between different parts?

What does it mean for something abstract to use symbols? I don't understand what you're asking. We're talking about physical computers here. Give it an input and it provides some output. Give a human the same input and it provides the same output. What evidence shows that the computer doesn't understand but that the human does?

What does it mean for matter to be using symbols? What is it about a computer which results in use of symbols such that there is meaning?

That's what mathematical proofs are, right?

No; that is what proofs in a formal deductive system are. The most interesting mathematical proofs are not formal.

You give it something, it does something with it, and then it gives you something back.

Do you actually have anything meaningful to say about the difference between humans and computers such that we have reasons to believe that the one can understand grief and the other can't? Or are you just trying to avoid answering the question? This is a two-way conversation. It would be nice if you could actually answer my questions too.

You give it something, it does something with it, and then it gives you something back. — Michael

And what makes that meaningful?

Do you actually have anything meaningful to say about the difference between humans and computers? — Michael

Humans give meaning to symbols, not the other way around. What a computer computes is only meaningful to the degree it's meaningful to us. We built them, after all, to compute things for us.

1 + 1 = 2 is only meaningful to the extent that we give it the symbols meaning. Otherwise, it means nothing.

Humans give meaning to symbols, not the other way around. What a computer computers is only meaningful to the degree it's meaningful to us. We built them, after all. — Marchesk

You're just reasserting the claim that humans can understand and computers can't. I want to know what evidence supports this claim.

We build humans too, you know.

And what makes that meaningful?

Being used. I've just said.

You're just reasserting the claim that humans can understand and computers can't. I want to know what evidence supports this claim. — Michael

Computers are instantiations of Turing machines (limited by physics), correct? You agreed that an abstract Turing machine can't compute grief. What makes an instantiated Turing machine different?

You might retort that abstract machines don't compute, but that's not quite right, because we can write out the algorithm for whatever computation, if we wanted to take the time and effort (within the limitations of our resources).

So if there exists an algorithm for grief, why wouldn't the algorithm itself feel grief, or a written out version of Turing machine computing that algorithm? Is there something that an instantiated computer does with symbols that an abstraction doesn't?

Is it the electricity flow through the gates? Does electricity give meaning to symbols?

You agreed that an abstract Turing machine can't compute grief. What makes an instantiated Turing machine different? — Marchesk

It's a real thing. An abstract person can't compute grief, either.

Is there something that an instantiated computer does with symbols that an abstraction doesn't?

An actual computer actually does something, just as an actual person actually does something. Whereas a hypothetical computer or a fictional person don't actually do things.

Correct, abstract (and fictional people in stories) people don't actually grieve. — Michael

But here's the thing. The computer is taking in symbols, manipulating those symbols, and outputting symbols, correct? So what's the difference between that and a human writing out the algorithm for computing grief?

A human could take the symbols for a funeral, write down the computations a Turing Machine would make, and output the symbols for grief, or whatever. In theory. Maybe a billion Chinese could do it. Would that system grieve?

The computer is taking in symbols, manipulating those symbols, and outputting symbols, correct? So what's the difference between that and a human writing out the algorithm for computing grief? — Marchesk

The correct question is "what's the difference between a computer taking in, manipulating, and outputting symbols and a human taking in, manipulating, and outputting symbols?" It's the one I've asked you, and it's the one I'm still waiting an answer for.

The correct question is "what's the difference between a computer taking in, manipulating, and outputting symbols and a human taking in, manipulating, and outputting symbols?" It's the one I've asked you, and it's the one I'm still waiting an answer for. — Michael

Humans provide meanings to the symbols in the first place, which is what you're ignoring.

Humans provide meanings to the symbols in the first place, which is what you're ignoring. — Marchesk

Which means what? And what evidence shows that humans can provide meanings to the symbols but computers can't?

Again, you're just dogmatically asserting that humans can understand and computers can't.

Which means what? — Michael

We use symbols to communicate meaning.

And what evidence shows that humans can provide meanings to the symbols but computers can't? — Michael

Searle's argument, as I understand it, is that computers (or any system) are unable to do this if all they're doing is manipulating symbols. Humans are doing something in addition when we produce symbols. The fundamental reason is that symbols aren't meaningful, rather they connotate meaning. They're symbols for a reason.

Searle's argument, as I understand it, is that computers (or any system) are unable to do this if all they're doing is manipulating symbols. Humans are doing something in addition when we produce symbols. It should be remembered that we evolved from creatures who at some point did not use symbols. — Marchesk

As I've said before, this doesn't work because the computer is put under different conditions to the person (a person under the same conditions also wouldn't understand - at least not in the same way as the person who's taught different rules for how to use the language). A proper analogy must have the computer and the person having the same input (e.g. sensory detection of water falling from the clouds) and the same output ("it is raining"). Where's the evidence that shows that human understands but the computer doesn't.

Grief isn't a symbol, it's an experience. It can be communicated with symbols, but the symbols aren't grieving. As such, outputting grieving symbols in the right situation is not at all the same as experiencing grief.

As such, outputting grieving symbols in the right situation is not at all the same as experiencing grief. — Marchesk

And I want to know what evidence shows that people can experience grief but that computers can't.

This sort of thing seems disingenuous -- if someone honestly claimed that if there was a computer designed to display 'it's raining' when water hits it, it thereby understood that it was raining whenever it was, it would seem to me he just doesn't know what 'understand' means.

Or think of it this way -- tables calculate pressure by their tolerance for pressure before they break. So if they break, they've in a way outputted 'I'm broken,' or a cipher of it -- so do tables understand that they've been broken?

This sort of thing seems disingenuous -- if someone honestly claimed that if there was a computer designed to display 'it's raining' when water hits it, it thereby understood that it was raining whenever it was, it would seem to me he just doesn't know what 'understand' means. — The Great Whatever

Then what does it mean to understand "it is raining", and what evidence shows that humans can and computers can't?

Whatever it is, it is obviously not a mechanical response with an output such as "it's raining" upon feeling moisture. I take it we can agree that is not a serious hypothesis.

What exactly do you think grief is?

Whatever it is, it is obviously not a mechanical response with an output such as "it's raining" upon feeling moisture. I take it we can agree that is not a serious hypothesis. — The Great Whatever

I think it's a serious hypothesis. When I consider my own understanding of "it is raining" all I can consider is the input and the subsequent output.

What exactly do you think grief is?

Perhaps the input to which "grief" is the output? And if we go with something like the James-Lange theory then the input is physiological arousal.

Perhaps the input to which "grief" is the output? And if we go with something like the James-Lange theory then the input is physiological arousal. — Michael

Grief is the input to which "grief" is the output? As in, the English word? What does that even mean?

How about this: grief is a feeling.

Grief is the input to which "grief" is the output? As in, the English word? What does that even mean? — The Great Whatever

It means that if when presented with something I consider "I am grieving" to be the appropriate response then that thing is grief.

How about this: grief is a feeling.

And feelings are? And what evidence shows that humans can have them but computers can't?

It means that if when presented with something I consider "I am grieving" to be the appropriate response then that thing is grief. — Michael

So people who don't speak English can't feel grief?

And feelings are? And what evidence shows that humans can have them but computers can't? — Michael

I understand what a feeling is better than what a symbol is. We think other people feel because we relate to them in certain ways, and we don't relate in those ways to computers.

Are you seriously claiming computers feel?

So people who don't speak English can't feel grief? — The Great Whatever

No. I didn't say that "I am grieving" is the only appropriate response.

I understand what a feeling is better than what a symbol is. We think other people feel because we relate to them in certain ways, and we don't relate in those ways to computers.

So it is just dogma?

Are you seriously claiming computers feel?

I didn't say that. I'm asking what evidence shows that computers can't. Marchesk said that there is evidence. I think it's just dogma.

No. I didn't say that "I am grieving" is the only appropriate response. — Michael

???

So what is grief then???

I didn't say that. I'm asking what evidence shows that computers can't. Marchesk said that there is evidence. I think it's just dogma. — Michael

The evidence is that they display none of the qualities that make us think people feel, such as rigorously inspiring empathy.

I understand what a feeling is better than what a symbol is. We think other people feel because we relate to them in certain ways, and we don't relate in those ways to computers.

Are you seriously claiming computers feel? — The Great Whatever

First of all, let's try to keep the inflammatory commentary to a minimum.

Second, simply because we do not relate to a computer as well as we do to other humans doesn't mean a computer doesn't feel. The recent movie Ex Machina explores this. To treat humans above computers simply because we don't have an emotional attachment to the latter is to have an anthropic bias.

Furthermore, consciousness could be an emergent property of a system.

???

So what is grief then??? — The Great Whatever

I've already told you. Consider, you might ask me what a horse is. I'd say it's the thing I'd name "horse". You then ask me if I'm saying that the French don't ride horses. I'd say no, because the thing I'd name "horse" can be named something else by other people.

The evidence is that they display none of the qualities that make us think people feel, such as rigorously inspiring empathy.

So the presence of emotions is determined by public behaviour. Then if a robot behaves the same way a person does, e.g. saying "I'm sorry for your loss" when you tell them that your father has died, accompanied with the appropriate facial expressions and body language, then the robot has demonstrated his capacity for emotions.

Is this not the type-token distinction?

Which part?