OK, I see how you want to define "matter". You define it as the verb in the definitions above, "to be important or significant". Do you agree, that "importance and significance" implies a judgement of value? Importance and significance only have meaning in relation to something which is valuable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Importance and significance implies value, yes - but be careful not to assume that all value is judged by human minds, or according to a single system of logic. And no, importance and significance (value) can be meaningful simply in relation to other values.

First of all, I didn’t say that ‘immaterial’ implies inactive. I said it implies that the activity in question doesn’t matter. What you’re arguing is that the only way this kind of activity can matter is if it actually matters to living human minds FIRST. Quantum mechanics refutes this, and so does neuroscience.
— Possibility

So I cannot understand what you are trying to say here. What "matters" is what is important or significant, and this is only judged in relation to human minds. Why do you believe that quantum mechanics refutes this? Does it demonstrate importance and significance in relation to values which are non-human? What are you saying? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why must importance and significance only be judged in relation to human minds? Because we say so? What gives humans that authority? The difference here between language and quantum mechanics - as the authority by which we determine importance or significance - is accuracy that goes beyond human limitations of perception.

When value is recognised as a variable (as in mathematical logic), it is freed from the affected judgement of human minds (that assume they are logical), and perceived only in potential relation to other variables. This enables us to structure a logic of potential relation that is not limited by human sensibility (eg. homeostasis). Of course, it’s only useful if we can apply it in an embodied intra-action with the world. This is where scientific method is needed, to test and refine this relational structure that enables us to make increasingly accurate predictions about how humans can intra-act.

What has been routinely ignored in this scientific progress is the fact that humans are NOT logical creatures. The involvement of mathematics in science prior to quantum mechanics has downplayed how much our intra-actions are profoundly affected by our sensible limitations, and vice versa. With each new technology we appear more invincible, more unaffected, more rationally-minded. But we’re really just more ignorant, isolating and excluding.

Quantum mechanics demonstrates that humans don’t have infinite access to energy, qualitative attention or time. And we are not passive, independent and logical observers of reality, but rather involved and affected participants in each intra-action, lately in an increasingly minor role. So when we describe science in terms of what we can do and how we can change the world, we need to be more responsible and accountable to the broader meaningfulness of agency and materiality that enable us to predict and actualise accurate intra-action with reality beyond our sensible limitations. We need to include non-human matter in discussions about agency, importance and significance. Or we will continue to undermine our homeostasis, by ignoring our interdependence in collaboration.

This requires a new logical framework, most noticeably in the area of grammatical logic. But this is not a matter of quantum mechanics dictating changes to grammatical logic, but rather bringing discursive practices into the intra-active process, acknowledging their significance as inseparable from the material practices of ‘doing science’. Because I think grammatical logic, properly understood and configured, is actually the key to our sustainable future.

Categories are not mutually exclusive in the existence of real things, like dichotomies are. That is the whole point of using categories rather than dichotomies, to allow for the overlapping of concepts, which would not be allowed by dichotomous divisions. So in Aristotle's hylomorphism, physical objects consist of both matter (potential), and form (actual). In fact, a particular is by definition both. Yes, "potential" is distinct, as a separate category from "actual", so that one is not the other, but the categories don't serve to divide up reality, they serve to divide up the conceptual structure for the purpose of better understanding reality.

For example, we might have the categories of sight and sound, and we could divide up a conceptual structure accordingly. But this is not to divide up reality, as the same thing might be both seen and heard, though the property which is heard is distinct from the property seen, according to that conceptual structure. it is a tool to help us understand reality, but if you think that it is actually dividing up reality, that is a misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an important area to clear up, because I’m talking about events here, not physical objects. So, does Aristotle acknowledge a particular event as both potential and actual, without breaking it down into physical objects? Consider that a hurricane consists of both actual and potential matter, as well as actual and potential form. How we understand the conceptual structure of reality affects how we intra-act in material-discursive practices. Dividing it up into categories is only part of understanding it. In what way does potential relate to actual? If you have to keep referring to a ‘living human mind’ or a ‘divine being’ to make the system work, then you have a self-shaped gap in your understanding. Humans are not necessary beings.

I do not know what you might mean by "fully actual" here. If an event has "begun", it is active, therefore actual. To suggest that there is a time when the event is partially active, yet not fully active is incoherent. Take the concept of "acceleration" for example. Suppose something is assumed to be at rest, it is not active. At some point in time it begins to move, accelerate. At that point, it is fully active, though it hasn't reached its top speed. We do not say that it is nof fully active, or not fully actual. As soon as it has motion it is active, actual, and it make no sense to say that it is partially actual, but not fully actual.

So I really don't know what you're trying to say here. If the supposed event is not occurring, not actual, then it requires a cause to become actual. That cause itself must be actual, and the cause is prior to the actuality of the event which is the effect. So if the universe is that event, then there must be something actual which is prior to it as the cause of its actuality. We cannot simply say that the potential for the universe was prior to the universe, because that pure potential could not act to cause the universe, so there must have been something more than just the potential, there must have been something actual. There must be something actual which was prior to the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

You keep trying to explain events in terms of objects, but it’s not the same structure. ‘Active’ and ‘actual’ have different qualitative structures for an event and for an object. Try to explain “acceleration” without reference to an object. Try to describe an entire acceleration event. You cannot use your current understanding of grammatical logic to describe the event - you are forced to change your perspective. But do you even notice that you’ve changed perspective? Do you recognise that you are describing an instantiated observation of the event, when I’ve asked for a description of the actual event? How can you describe ‘acceleration’ by simply describing an object at the point it begins to move? How is this describing actual acceleration?

Well, thank you for posting. I think like Jean-Paul Sartre said, what is subjective is always directed to something outside itself. Like Sartre says, solipsism fails because solipsism cannot account for the idea of the gaze that can trigger responses that are distinct from our private, unique, mental activity and that we can in essence, direct our gaze on the other to influence their perceptions, and thus, their perspectives. So being immersed in the world involves like Martin Heidegger would say, potentiality-for-being because we are creators in a world dictated by facticity and historicity. Consciousness would then be the crux on which our experiences can derive from. In other words, if subjectivity were predicated on methodological solipsism, then we would fail to consider the interactions that occur on a physical level or we would fail to reconcile the other's perspective. So, philosophy can only cut corners when its foundation is built on its value which is rooted in its utility that takes into consideration the subjectivity of others. If we did not do this then we would not be able semantically relate to one another and would fail to use language appropriately. For example, if I tried to express ideas without recognizing the other's consciousness, I would be unable to have terms that express relation.

True and mathematical Newtonian time exists; it is a real entity; it is the gravitational field
— Carlo Rovelli

Time cannot be reduced to gravitation, that is a misconception. — Metaphysician Undercover

He’s not reducing time to gravitation, he’s describing the mathematical variable of Newtonian time as the gravitational field. There’s a difference.

For his part, Aristotle is right to say that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are always located in relation to something. But this something can also be just the field, the spatio-temporal entity of Einstein, because this is a dynamic and concrete entity, like all those in reference to which, as Aristotle rightly observed, we are capable of locating ourselves.
— Carlo Rovelli

And this is also a misconception, because a field must itself be a property of something. So we cannot truthfully say "this something can also be just the field", because fields are always known to be the property of something which creates the field, therefore to assume "just the field" is in violation of physical evidence and inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, fields have been previously assumed to be the property of something, but evidence from quantum experiments has brought this assumption into question. Your first clue should have been your appeal of ‘always known to be’. You have to remember that we’re talking about relational structures of significant variables as active (not actual) entities in a four-dimensional system.

Understanding is not about grounding concepts in just one ‘logical’ system
— Possibility

Yes understanding is about having one logical system, because that is what produces consistency and coherency. To have multiple different conceptual systems which are unrelated allows for contradiction and incoherency, and this is misunderstanding. The only way to eradicate contradiction, incoherency, and misunderstanding is to have one overall system within which all the parts are coherent. To have parts out side one system, which are incoherent to that system, but are allowed to be maintained because they are coherent within a different system, is a symptom of misunderstanding.

To put this into your perspective, the perspective of "matter", or "what matters", what is required is a hierarchy of values. What is important or significant is determined relative to something valued. But when two competing values produce contradiction, or inconsistency in what is important, or not important, then we must appeal to a higher value to make the judgement as to whether the thing is important or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Values don’t exist in a single hierarchy, anymore than all events exist on a linear timeline. This is reductionism, and is a fault of mathematical logic that ignores the sensibility of dimensional reality. When two competing values produce a contradiction in what is important or not important, then we must first consider that we may be oversimplifying the relational structure of the two values in question, as an aspect of four-dimensional reality.

Reduction to a single logical system is broader than this, but it’s still a reduction. Ignoring information on the grounds of unintelligibility is still ignorance. Inconsistency and incoherence are symptomatic of misunderstanding, but the solution is not to eradicate information, but to consider the possibility that the system itself is inadequate, and that a broader relational framework is required (with some adjustment to configuration of the three systems) that would enable them to co-exist.

Not at all, truth is sought for the sake of knowing the truth, not for some usefulness. That is why philosophy is known as being useless. Surely you must see this? — Metaphysician Undercover

How can you be so certain you ‘know the truth’ of reality, if you cannot use it? Philosophy is the love of wisdom - wisdom being knowledge of correct action, not simply knowledge.

Compatibility does not require a ‘higher purpose’, only a broader understanding of each discipline.
— Possibility

This is clearly not true, as explained above. There is very clear evidence of a difference between various disciplines as to what is important, what matters. When it is the case that what is important to one discipline is not important to another discipline, there is incompatibility. The "broader understanding" which you refer to is just a higher purpose, a higher value, which can arbitrate the incompatibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not a ‘higher value’, but a broader relational framework, in which to understand the perception of incompatibility.

To seek the truth is not to "blindly follow doctrine", in fact it is the very opposite of that. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet you automatically exclude what doesn’t adhere to the doctrine of grammatical logic, despite being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science. That sounds like blindly following doctrine to me.

Accuracy is a necessary aspect of truth, as is rationality and sensibility. Intelligibility may be rational and sensible, but can make no claims to accuracy. And grammatical logic is just one form of intelligibility (and English one kind of grammatical logic), as ‘defined’ by human conceptualisation of ideas, under the assumption of independent and pre-determined boundaries and properties.

By the same token, mathematics aims for accuracy and rationality, but can make no claims to sensibility. And scientific methodology aims for accuracy and sensibility, but without mathematics would have no claim to rationality. I’m not arguing for physics and maths, per se, but for the collaborative efforts they have made towards a more accurate truth as a common focus, despite the lack of mathematical interest in (and resistance to) a broader sensibility, and the lack of modern scientific interest in (and resistance to) a broader rationality.

What I’m calling for is the same collaborative open-mindedness and desire for truth from those who place their faith in rational sensibility. But all I’m getting is fearful, circular reasoning, as if I’m rejecting the foundations of your truth. If those foundations are at risk from a critique on accuracy, then they were never really ‘truth’ to begin with.

Importance and significance implies value, yes - but be careful not to assume that all value is judged by human minds, or according to a single system of logic. And no, importance and significance (value) can be meaningful simply in relation to other values. — Possibility

I definitely agree that value is not necessarily judged according to one system of logic, that's why values are commonly said to be subjective. But what else, other than human beings, do you think is capable of making value judgements? Would this be some other animals? I can agree that animals, maybe even plants, are capable of doing something which we might call making value judgements. Is this what you had in mind?

Why must importance and significance only be judged in relation to human minds? — Possibility

Human minds are the type of thing which makes value judgements. We know that from experience. It is possible that other types of things. like animals and plants have a sort of mind which could make a value judgement. Is this what you are suggesting?

When value is recognised as a variable (as in mathematical logic), it is freed from the affected judgement of human minds (that assume they are logical), and perceived only in potential relation to other variables. — Possibility

No, recognizing a value as a variable does not free it from the judgement of a human mind, because a human mind is making that judgement to recognize it as a variable.

I agree in principle with much of what you say following this, but I have difficulty with this:

We need to include non-human matter in discussions about agency, importance and significance. — Possibility

I don't understand how you can talk about non-human matter, importance or significance without referencing God. Suppose some other creatures, plants and animals are capable of making value judgements (this would be a requirement if we are going to talk about what is important to them, they would have to be able to make such a judgement, because we cannot decide for them what is important to them, just like I cannot decide for you what is important to you). Don't you see that there would be so many contradictions between the various creatures, concerning what is important? Creatures eat other creatures. How do you propose that we could ever sort out this massive mess of conflicting matters (things of importance) without referencing some sort overlord judge, like God? Clearly us human beings are not capable of making such decisions and judgements, because what is important to me already conflicts with what is important to you. So each of us is going to insist "I am the one to decide what is important".

This requires a new logical framework, most noticeably in the area of grammatical logic. But this is not a matter of quantum mechanics dictating changes to grammatical logic, but rather bringing discursive practices into the intra-active process, acknowledging their significance as inseparable from the material practices of ‘doing science’. Because I think grammatical logic, properly understood and configured, is actually the key to our sustainable future. — Possibility

But above, you argued for separate values, by recognizing values as variable. How can you argue the two opposing sides of the coin, variable values which are separable (above), and now, values which are inseparable form other values. What makes a value non-variable is its relations with other values. These relations set or fix the value within a concept. If there was such a thing as a separate, variable value, it would just be free floating, not attached to any other value to set its worth as "x value", therefore it would actually have no value at all.

Consider that a hurricane consists of both actual and potential matter, as well as actual and potential form. — Possibility

Sorry, I cannot decipher what you are trying to say here. As far as I know, a hurricane does not make value judgements, so we cannot say that a hurricane consists of matter, by your definition. There is nothing which is inherently important to the hurricane itself, because the hurricane makes no such judgements, there is only what a person, or persons might say is important to the hurricane, but this is a completely different matter. It is an importance which people impose on another, and that is what produces contradiction, and conflict, such attempts at forcing one's values on others.

If you have to keep referring to a ‘living human mind’ or a ‘divine being’ to make the system work, then you have a self-shaped gap in your understanding. Humans are not necessary beings. — Possibility

It is you who has chosen to define "matter" as importance or significance, and this is what requires reference to a mind which makes a value judgement. I had a different way of defining matter, which did not require referencing a mind which makes value judgements in order to understand the concept of "matter". Mine is the traditional concept of "matter", adopted by the sciences. The problem you refer to here is a problem with your ontology, your proposed definition of "matter", not mine.

You keep trying to explain events in terms of objects, but it’s not the same structure. ‘Active’ and ‘actual’ have different qualitative structures for an event and for an object. Try to explain “acceleration” without reference to an object. Try to describe an entire acceleration event. You cannot use your current understanding of grammatical logic to describe the event - you are forced to change your perspective. But do you even notice that you’ve changed perspective? Do you recognise that you are describing an instantiated observation of the event, when I’ve asked for a description of the actual event? How can you describe ‘acceleration’ by simply describing an object at the point it begins to move? How is this describing actual acceleration? — Possibility

Like I've told you, and explained why to you, a number of times already, a particular "event", or "activity", without something which is active, is incoherent as a category mistake. You claim otherwise, but have provided nothing to back up your bald assertions. You simply continue to deny the obvious.

No, fields have been previously assumed to be the property of something, but evidence from quantum experiments has brought this assumption into question. Your first clue should have been your appeal of ‘always known to be’. You have to remember that we’re talking about relational structures of significant variables as active (not actual) entities in a four-dimensional system. — Possibility

Actually, quantum mechanics has provided absolutely no evidence of fields which are not the property of something. What is the case is that the failure of quantum mechanics in its ability to provide an understanding of reality, has made people speculate about the possibility of such fields. That's merely speculation which is unsupported by science.

Values don’t exist in a single hierarchy, anymore than all events exist on a linear timeline. — Possibility

I know, this is obvious, and it's the reason why there is contradiction and conflict. The goal is a single hierarchy to dispel conflict and contradiction, but it is clearly not the case within the world we live in.

How can you be so certain you ‘know the truth’ of reality, if you cannot use it? Philosophy is the love of wisdom - wisdom being knowledge of correct action, not simply knowledge. — Possibility

We are seeking the truth, not claiming to know it. As philosophers we apprehend that the truth about reality is a long way off, but that does not stop us from heading in that direction. It's a march down a long road, which provides nothing useful to us who are doing the marching.

And yet you automatically exclude what doesn’t adhere to the doctrine of grammatical logic, despite being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science. That sounds like blindly following doctrine to me. — Possibility

Contradiction is a repugnancy, and repugnancy is not determined by grammatical logic, but intuition. So it's a matter of adhering to intuition, not a matter of adhering to grammatical logic. But naturally grammatical logic is intuitive. as grammatical logic is derived from intuition.

Mathematics and science are both so full of contradictions its pathetic. So your claim of "being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science", is nonsense because the various different logical structures of mathematics are not consistent with each other, nor are the various different logical structures of science.

.

I definitely agree that value is not necessarily judged according to one system of logic, that's why values are commonly said to be subjective. But what else, other than human beings, do you think is capable of making value judgements? Would this be some other animals? I can agree that animals, maybe even plants, are capable of doing something which we might call making value judgements. Is this what you had in mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

To judge is simply to form an opinion about importance, worth, significance, usefulness, etc - to configure a relation of potential to a particular perception of meaning configured as purpose or intentionality. Value can only be judged subjectively. But a value judgement is not value as an objective structure of reality. It’s much more complex than this narrowly perceived relation configured as a linear hierarchy or sliding scale.

To understand value, we need to take into account the capacity of non-human materiality to contribute to a broader perception of meaning. The oscillation frequency of an electron in a caesium atom matters to us ‘reading’ an atomic clock, but does this matter if no-one is ‘telling’ the time? And isn’t the number we attribute to this frequency just a value judgement - a measurement derived from our collaboration with the materiality of the clock components in ‘telling time’? The notion that meaning and value are structures exclusive to the human mind is symptomatic of grammatical conventions falling behind in understanding our broader relationality with the world.

I recognise that this can be confusing and disorienting without being able to rely on the conventions of grammatical logic as a foundation. But that’s no reason to go back and hide behind ignorance. Not if truth is what we’re genuinely seeking. The logical system of grammar is still there - we just need to broaden our understanding of the conceptual structures that make up the system. Agential subjects, attributed actions and fundamentally inert objects are no longer sufficient structural elements with which to construct this broader understanding of reality.

The first paradigm shift recognises the elements of reality as consisting of interrelating events rather than ‘objects’ and their attributable ‘properties’. Agency is recognised as a property of the system itself, and these so-called ‘subjects’, ‘actions’ and ‘objects’ are all fundamentally active elements, their apparent ‘properties’ a purposeful configuration of the particular intra-action, within which we should recognise ourselves as necessarily involved.

A subsequent paradigm shift recognises the elements of reality as consisting of variable values, each with a logical, qualitative and dynamic relationality for meaningful intra-action. Beyond this is pure relational possibility, without distinction.

Human minds are the type of thing which makes value judgements. We know that from experience. It is possible that other types of things. like animals and plants have a sort of mind which could make a value judgement. Is this what you are suggesting? — Metaphysician Undercover

We understand that from human experience, which is not to say that we know objectively. A mind is not required to respond to the variability of value, only to render it as a judgement, an opinion.

No, recognizing a value as a variable does not free it from the judgement of a human mind, because a human mind is making that judgement to recognize it as a variable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Recognising a value as a variable is not judgement. Judgement assigns a particular number (hierarchical value) to that variable, ie. measurement.

I agree in principle with much of what you say following this, but I have difficulty with this:

We need to include non-human matter in discussions about agency, importance and significance.
— Possibility

I don't understand how you can talk about non-human matter, importance or significance without referencing God. Suppose some other creatures, plants and animals are capable of making value judgements (this would be a requirement if we are going to talk about what is important to them, they would have to be able to make such a judgement, because we cannot decide for them what is important to them, just like I cannot decide for you what is important to you). Don't you see that there would be so many contradictions between the various creatures, concerning what is important? Creatures eat other creatures. How do you propose that we could ever sort out this massive mess of conflicting matters (things of importance) without referencing some sort overlord judge, like God? Clearly us human beings are not capable of making such decisions and judgements, because what is important to me already conflicts with what is important to you. So each of us is going to insist "I am the one to decide what is important". — Metaphysician Undercover

We can reference God if you’d like, but I would argue that God is not an actual being who makes value judgements, but is the pure, undifferentiated source of logical, qualitative and dynamic relationality, with which all judgements are but a localised (limited) intra-action of perceived meaning. Value judgement - the assumption that WE determine meaning, purpose and agency in the world according to our constructed language conventions (logos) - is the original sin. One can only correctly judge (assign a comprehensive value to) an event once it is complete, and we have all the information. So who is anyone to assign value judgement, when we ourselves are still becoming in relation to it all, and rely so much on collaboration with other materiality (ie. technology) for the comparatively little information we can access at any one time?

But above, you argued for separate values, by recognizing values as variable. How can you argue the two opposing sides of the coin, variable values which are separable (above), and now, values which are inseparable from other values. What makes a value non-variable is its relations with other values. These relations set or fix the value within a concept. If there was such a thing as a separate, variable value, it would just be free floating, not attached to any other value to set its worth as "x value", therefore it would actually have no value at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m hoping what I wrote above has clarified this a bit better for you. Mathematical logic agentially separates value into intra-acting variables (algebra) for the purpose of understanding the structure of relations between them. The value of ‘x’ is not non-existent, only indeterminate (variable) without a logical structure of relations.

Consider that a hurricane consists of both actual and potential matter, as well as actual and potential form.
— Possibility

Sorry, I cannot decipher what you are trying to say here. As far as I know, a hurricane does not make value judgements, so we cannot say that a hurricane consists of matter, by your definition. There is nothing which is inherently important to the hurricane itself, because the hurricane makes no such judgements, there is only what a person, or persons might say is important to the hurricane, but this is a completely different matter. It is an importance which people impose on another, and that is what produces contradiction, and conflict, such attempts at forcing one's values on others. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does a hurricane respond to the variability of values? A hurricane’s potential relies on certain variables (barometric pressure, temperatures, etc) to stay within a certain range of values. As those variables change, its form and matter change, and its potential shifts. So we understand that what is important to the hurricane are some variables and not others - regardless of how it might be perceived in terms of ‘value’. The hurricane therefore has its own value structure, limited though it may be. Assigning a numerical hierarchy doesn’t change how the hurricane ‘perceives’ those variables, only how we describe it to ourselves in an attempt to understand the relational structure that exists between the variables, regardless of hurricane or human.

How can you be so certain you ‘know the truth’ of reality, if you cannot use it? Philosophy is the love of wisdom - wisdom being knowledge of correct action, not simply knowledge.
— Possibility

We are seeking the truth, not claiming to know it. As philosophers we apprehend that the truth about reality is a long way off, but that does not stop us from heading in that direction. It's a march down a long road, which provides nothing useful to us who are doing the marching. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how can you be sure you’re on the right road, or even heading in the right direction?

Contradiction is a repugnancy, and repugnancy is not determined by grammatical logic, but intuition. So it's a matter of adhering to intuition, not a matter of adhering to grammatical logic. But naturally grammatical logic is intuitive. as grammatical logic is derived from intuition.

Mathematics and science are both so full of contradictions its pathetic. So your claim of "being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science", is nonsense because the various different logical structures of mathematics are not consistent with each other, nor are the various different logical structures of science. — Metaphysician Undercover

That feeling of ‘repugnance’ is intuition telling you there’s something amiss, but there's no determining from affect alone whether what’s amiss is in what you’re describing or the system you’re using to describe it. And you can only critique the system from outside it. So what are you afraid of?

Values don’t exist in a single hierarchy, anymore than all events exist on a linear timeline.
— Possibility

I know, this is obvious, and it's the reason why there is contradiction and conflict. The goal is a single hierarchy to dispel conflict and contradiction, but it is clearly not the case within the world we live in. — Metaphysician Undercover

So why cling to the goal? Why not try to understand the complexity as it exists?

But a value judgement is not value as an objective structure of reality. It’s much more complex than this narrowly perceived relation configured as a linear hierarchy or sliding scale. — Possibility

OK, I will admit that it is possible to say that a value is not itself a value judgement. We can say that it is the result, or consequence of a value judgement. And, this is a necessary relation, a value does not exist independently of a value judgement, it is dependent on a value judgement, as only being capable of being produced by a value judgement. We can say, this is what a value is, what is produced from that type of judgement.

Also, please note that a value judgement, is an activity, an event. But a value, if we allow it separate existence, as something created by such a judgement, is now static, an object, because it has been separated from the agent, and the activity which created it. This is why we can say that a value is dependent on that agency, and is not properly independent from it.

To understand value, we need to take into account the capacity of non-human materiality to contribute to a broader perception of meaning. The oscillation frequency of an electron in a caesium atom matters to us ‘reading’ an atomic clock, but does this matter if no-one is ‘telling’ the time? And isn’t the number we attribute to this frequency just a value judgement - a measurement derived from our collaboration with the materiality of the clock components in ‘telling time’? The notion that meaning and value are structures exclusive to the human mind is symptomatic of grammatical conventions falling behind in understanding our broader relationality with the world. — Possibility

In this paragraph you describe value structures as being dependent on the human mind, then you conclude by saying that this is a " falling behind in understanding". But there is no other way to understand values, except as being dependent on minds, so how can this understanding be a" falling behind", rather than a moving forward. In reality, to deny that values are dependent on value judgements, which are dependent on minds, is what ought to be called a falling behind in understanding.

Agency is recognised as a property of the system itself, and these so-called ‘subjects’, ‘actions’ and ‘objects’ are all fundamentally active elements, their apparent ‘properties’ a purposeful configuration of the particular intra-action, within which we should recognise ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

All systems are artificial. We have mechanical systems, logical systems, as well as representative systems such as models. But all types of systems are fundamentally artificial, therefore agency in the sense of an intentional action of an intentional being, is required for the creation of any system. So agency is prior to a system, as cause of it, and any form of agency which inheres within the system is distinct from the type of agency which acts as a cause of the system. Now we have a very obvious need for dualism, to account for these two very distinct types of agency.

A mind is not required to respond to the variability of value, only to render it as a judgement, an opinion. — Possibility

All you are saying here is that a mind is required for the existence of the value, as a value. That is exactly what I am arguing.

We can reference God if you’d like, but I would argue that God is not an actual being who makes value judgements, but is the pure, undifferentiated source of logical, qualitative and dynamic relationality, with which all judgements are but a localised (limited) intra-action of perceived meaning. — Possibility

If God does not make value judgements, then we cannot reference God as the source of values independent from human minds. Therefore we ought to accept what the inductive reasoning and evidence shows us, that there are no independent values. All values are dependent on minds of the type that are human minds.

So we understand that what is important to the hurricane are some variables and not others - regardless of how it might be perceived in terms of ‘value’. — Possibility

This is very obviously a misunderstanding. Those particular values which are called "variables" are not important to the hurricane itself, but are important to the human understanding of the hurricane. The human beings are modeling the storm as a "system" and these are the variables which are important to them in their understanding of the storm. They are not important to the storm itself, because the storm has no intention, purpose, and doesn't care about anything whatsoever.

Then how can you be sure you’re on the right road, or even heading in the right direction? — Possibility

As I said, intuition. And, very often I am on the wrong track, that's the problem with intuition, it's not super reliable. However, the open mind which is a necessary aspect of seeking the truth allows a person to readily change one's mind, as the need arises. That's the Socratic position of not knowing, the lack of certitude provides for an open mind.

That feeling of ‘repugnance’ is intuition telling you there’s something amiss, but there's no determining from affect alone whether what’s amiss is in what you’re describing or the system you’re using to describe it. And you can only critique the system from outside it. So what are you afraid of? — Possibility

I don't follow this. The whole point of dualism is to allow for this position, that the thing being described, and the system describing it, are distinct. You reject dualism, but now you use a premise which requires dualism, "you can only critique the system from outside it", to make your argument. Without dualism, there is no such thing as outside the system, so the describing would be done with the same system which is being described. I believe this is why you seem to have a hard time with the category separation between the representation and the thing represented resulting in the category mistake I've pointed to. An activity, as a type, a description, or a model, does not require a particular thing which is active, because any specific activity is a type, a universal. But a particular activity, meaning a particular instance of activity, always involves something which is active.

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So why cling to the goal? Why not try to understand the complexity as it exists? — Possibility

Contradictions are impossible to understand. When they arise, we must respect the fact that the method being used, which creates contradiction, is faulty, rather than trying endlessly to understand what is impossible to understand.

But a value judgement is not value as an objective structure of reality. It’s much more complex than this narrowly perceived relation configured as a linear hierarchy or sliding scale.
— Possibility

OK, I will admit that it is possible to say that a value is not itself a value judgement. We can say that it is the result, or consequence of a value judgement. And, this is a necessary relation, a value does not exist independently of a value judgement, it is dependent on a value judgement, as only being capable of being produced by a value judgement. We can say, this is what a value is, what is produced from that type of judgement.

Also, please note that a value judgement, is an activity, an event. But a value, if we allow it separate existence, as something created by such a judgement, is now static, an object, because it has been separated from the agent, and the activity which created it. This is why we can say that a value is dependent on that agency, and is not properly independent from it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that a value judgement is an activity, an event. But I’m not talking about a particular value created by such a judgement - a measurement. That is a position in a hierarchical (linear) relation to our momentary involvement in that event. It is not an object. What I’m referring to is qualitative or potential value as variability, not a value as a reductionist relation to intra-action.

In this paragraph you describe value structures as being dependent on the human mind, then you conclude by saying that this is a " falling behind in understanding". But there is no other way to understand values, except as being dependent on minds, so how can this understanding be a" falling behind", rather than a moving forward. In reality, to deny that values are dependent on value judgements, which are dependent on minds, is what ought to be called a falling behind in understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I’m saying is we assume that value structures are dependent on the human mind, but this is a misunderstanding. The number is a measurement, a momentary intra-action with value, not value itself. It is the human mind that consists of ongoing value judgement - ongoing relationality to the inherent variability of potential/value.

Agency is recognised as a property of the system itself, and these so-called ‘subjects’, ‘actions’ and ‘objects’ are all fundamentally active elements, their apparent ‘properties’ a purposeful configuration of the particular intra-action, within which we should recognise ourselves as necessarily involved.
— Possibility

All systems are artificial. We have mechanical systems, logical systems, as well as representative systems such as models. But all types of systems are fundamentally artificial, therefore agency in the sense of an intentional action of an intentional being, is required for the creation of any system. So agency is prior to a system, as cause of it, and any form of agency which inheres within the system is distinct from the type of agency which acts as a cause of the system. Now we have a very obvious need for dualism, to account for these two very distinct types of agency. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let’s look at another definition:

System (noun): 1. a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an interconnecting network; a complex whole.
2. a set of principles or procedures according to which something is done; an organized scheme or method.

The only requirements for a system are complexity and relationality. Any system description must include a degree of artificiality (human involvement), but that doesn’t make artifice fundamental to the system itself. That just means there is no way to describe the entire system, so that description always occurs from within. As Bohr says, “We are part of that nature that we seek to understand.”

This is very obviously a misunderstanding. Those particular values which are called "variables" are not important to the hurricane itself, but are important to the human understanding of the hurricane. The human beings are modeling the storm as a "system" and these are the variables which are important to them in their understanding of the storm. They are not important to the storm itself, because the storm has no intention, purpose, and doesn't care about anything whatsoever. — Metaphysician Undercover

Stop trying to anthropomorphise the hurricane. Regardless of our models, a hurricane would not exist without certain intra-acting variables (not particular values), which also determine its duration, movement, intensity, etc. Whether or not anyone cares or understands, these variable aspects of reality are important and significant to the hurricane in its becoming.

Then how can you be sure you’re on the right road, or even heading in the right direction?
— Possibility

As I said, intuition. And, very often I am on the wrong track, that's the problem with intuition, it's not super reliable. However, the open mind which is a necessary aspect of seeking the truth allows a person to readily change one's mind, as the need arises. That's the Socratic position of not knowing, the lack of certitude provides for an open mind.

That feeling of ‘repugnance’ is intuition telling you there’s something amiss, but there's no determining from affect alone whether what’s amiss is in what you’re describing or the system you’re using to describe it. And you can only critique the system from outside it. So what are you afraid of?
— Possibility

I don't follow this. The whole point of dualism is to allow for this position, that the thing being described, and the system describing it, are distinct. You reject dualism, but now you use a premise which requires dualism, "you can only critique the system from outside it", to make your argument. Without dualism, there is no such thing as outside the system, so the describing would be done with the same system which is being described. I believe this is why you seem to have a hard time with the category separation between the representation and the thing represented resulting in the category mistake I've pointed to. An activity, as a type, a description, or a model, does not require a particular thing which is active, because any specific activity is a type, a universal. But a particular activity, meaning a particular instance of activity, always involves something which is active. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m saying that the system of grammatical logic is incomplete as a structure of reality. I’m pretty sure that you and I both agree here. It’s why dualism seems to be your only solution. There is the human mind governed by grammatical logic, and some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent.

But dualism as an ontology is a cop-out in this respect. It’s a refusal to posit and seek to understand a broader relational framework in which two systems can intra-act. It simply stops there and declares two distinct systems. And yet these systems are not independent, not mutually exclusive - they co-exist in a relational framework. But you’re limited by outdated grammatical conventions, that keep you from understanding it.

I’m suggesting that you consider the possibility that this logical system dictated by grammatical conventions exists in a broader relational framework which includes those aspects of mathematical and scientific findings that appear to contradict within the narrow framework of grammatical logic. Consider the possibility that you’re on the wrong track, if it must stop at dualism.

I agree that a value judgement is an activity, an event. But I’m not talking about a particular value created by such a judgement - a measurement. That is a position in a hierarchical (linear) relation to our momentary involvement in that event. It is not an object. What I’m referring to is qualitative or potential value as variability, not a value as a reductionist relation to intra-action. — Possibility

Do you not agree that a "value" is the worth, desirability, or usefulness of a thing? And that this is the product of a judgement? If a particular thing has a "variable" value, then the thing has a different worth, desirability or usefulness depending on its context of existence relative to the mind that makes the judgement. How could a thing possibly have a variable value unless its value is a feature of its relationship with the mind which determines its value?

What I’m saying is we assume that value structures are dependent on the human mind, but this is a misunderstanding. The number is a measurement, a momentary intra-action with value, not value itself. It is the human mind that consists of ongoing value judgement - ongoing relationality to the inherent variability of potential/value. — Possibility

I really cannot see how you are proposing to separate the value from the judgement, in order to support you claim that it is incorrect, or a misunderstanding, to say that value structures are mind-dependent.

What you appear to be saying, is that the number produced by a measurement, is the result of an interaction between a mind, and a value, such that both the value and the mind pre-exist the judgement. When the mind and the value come into relationship with one another, the mind measures, or makes a judgement, and the result is a number. The number represents the value, but the value maintains its independent status. So numbers are not values, they are representations of values.

In order for me to understand what you are proposing, I'm going to replace "number" which is a quantitative representation of value, with "good", which is qualitative. So we have goods which exist independently of the minds which apprehend them, as independent values. I like to call these goods "objects", instead of values (but maybe you don't like this), and I reserve "value" as the result of the judgement which the mind makes concerning the independent thing, which is considered as the "good" here. But I'll consider that the independent thing, the good itself, is a value, as you propose, and allow that the mind simply makes a representation of the real value, which exists independently.

Now, let's consider the matter of "variability". From my perspective, I would say that the variability of a value is a product of the relationship between the thing being valued, and the mind which values it. Differences in this relationship are responsible for the variability of the value. Variability is a product of the process of evaluation. But your proposal does not allow this. The value is independent from the mind which evaluates, so variability must inhere within the value itself.

How do you propose that a mind could ever determine the true representation of a value if the truth is that the value itself is variable? Any determination, or representation of a value, made by a mind, could be proven to be false, because the value itself, being represented, is intrinsically variable. Therefore no representation could be the true representation, or else contradicting representations could be true. If your proposal represents the truth about the way that values exist, then it would be absolutely impossible to determine the true representation of the value, because the value itself would be inherently variable, and any representation of it, produced by a mind, would be equally true and false.

On the other hand, the way that I look at values, "value" being the result of the relationship between a thing, object, and a mind, we can readily account for variability as a result of differences within this relationship. There can be a truth about the thing, the object, and variability is just a product of differences in the variety of possible relationships between mind and object.

Accordingly, your proposal excludes the possibility of truth concerning 'that which is independent', while the way that I look at 'that which is independent' allows for the possibility of truth. This is why I say that philosophers, metaphysicians, who are seeking truth, must necessarily reject proposals such as yours, because they render truth as impossible, and they ought to proceed in a direction such as what is outlined here by me, because this direction leaves truth as possible.

The only requirements for a system are complexity and relationality. — Possibility

Not quite, #1 assumes a "working together" as a "complex whole". This implies cooperation in relation to a purpose. And this means that such a "system" is created by intention. Also, #2 expresses intention toward getting something done. Therefore both #1 and #2 express more than complexity and relationality, but also purpose and intent. That is why I say that all systems are artificial, it's simply within the nature of what "a system" is, by any conventional definition.

Stop trying to anthropomorphise the hurricane. Regardless of our models, a hurricane would not exist without certain intra-acting variables (not particular values), which also determine its duration, movement, intensity, etc. Whether or not anyone cares or understands, these variable aspects of reality are important and significant to the hurricane in its becoming. — Possibility

This clearly exemplifies the philosophically repugnant and unintelligibility of you perspective, as explained above. You position "values" as within the thing itself (the hurricane in this example), and therefore the variability of the values is also within the thing itself, rendering the truth about the thing as impossible to determine because the values themselves are indeterminate. Why did the hurricane make a last minute change which was not predicted? Because there was an amplified number of quantum fluctuations of value, which are actually impossible to predict, and this made it decide to do that.

There is the human mind governed by grammatical logic, and some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent. — Possibility

This is what is derived from your perspective, "some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent", because you place variability as inherent within that external "system". The human mind cannot possibly represent the external system of reality in a truthful way, because variability inheres within the independent reality, as contradicting properties within the thing itself. My perspective, on the other hand allows that the human mind can accurately represent the external reality because variability is a result of the relationship between the mind and the thing, it just has not yet developed that representation. Understanding this relationship, and properly representing it as a feature of our representations of reality allows for accurate representation.

It’s a refusal to posit and seek to understand a broader relational framework in which two systems can intra-act. — Possibility

the idea of two systems intra-acting is completely useless as an approach to understanding the truth about natural reality. This is because the division of nature into separate systems would be completely arbitrary so the relations between systems would not represent any true relations between true things, but arbitrary boundaries imposed for various purposes, just like "model-dependent reality". This is evident in your hurricane example. We could model a high pressure area as "a system", and a low pressure area as "a system", or two low pressure areas as "two systems", and map these distinct systems with boundaries. However, any such boundaries are completely artificial, and arbitrary, and are not truthfully representative of the true nature of the atmospheric processes.

I’m suggesting that you consider the possibility that this logical system dictated by grammatical conventions exists in a broader relational framework which includes those aspects of mathematical and scientific findings that appear to contradict within the narrow framework of grammatical logic. Consider the possibility that you’re on the wrong track, if it must stop at dualism. — Possibility

I have very often, in the past considered the possibility that I am on the wrong track, and I continue to do so today. That is why I consider your posts very seriously, as I said, an open mind is a requirement for the seeking of truth. However, I have discussed this type of metaphysics already at this forum, and the deficiencies of the approach are becoming more and more apparent. Therefore this discussion with you serves more to strengthen my opinion rather than to change my mind. It's becoming more and more apparent to me, that the reason why mathematical and scientific findings seem to contradict the narrow framework of grammatical logic (the very few true principles I've found to cling to), from which I approach, is because the logic of these fields of discipline is severely compromised.

What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity. — Possibility

This seems a step beyond metaphysics in vagueness and incomprehensibility. Perhaps a link would help. :chin: