Are you familiar with philosophical movements like phenomenology, deconstruction, poststructuralism, postmodern hermeneutics, enactivism, New Materialism, Science studies, Cultural studies or neo-Pragmatism? Do you think what you wrote above is true of the many academics who study and teach within these approaches? — Joshs

I'm aware of all these 'ism's' and more and yes, what I wrote earlier appears to be true of most if not all of the academics who teach these subjects. I find it difficult to think of exceptions. Are you aware of any?

It seems the Perennial philosophy is not considered relevant to academic philosophy, so nobody tries to falsify it and it is simply ignored. Then we end with a muddle of phenomenology, deconstruction, poststructuralism, postmodern hermeneutics, enactivism, New Materialism, Science studies, Cultural studies and neo-Pragmatism.

This would be how folks like Dennett and Chalmers can get away with publishing books on consciousness that fail to mention the views of those who study it experimentally without being laughed out of their profession. It's the orthodox approach in their profession. , ,

Clearly this approach does not enable those who take it to understand metaphysics or construct a fundamental theory, but presumably they feel this is an acceptable price to pay for avoiding the study of mysticism.

Your list of 'isms' does not include the one I'm talking about, which perhaps supports my point.

There would be no problem if someone could falsify the metaphysics of the Buddha and Lao Tzu, but as it is the situation seems surreal. .



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As you know, there are many strands and styles of philosophy taught within academia. Some of them find a more comfortable home in academic departments outside of philosophy. Are you dissatisfied with all of these approaches or just a certain one that you feel has been allowed to dominate? — Joshs

I see the same approach being taken right across the academic world. It entails not studying the nondual philosophy of the mystics and then not being able to solve any philosophical problems or construct a fundamental theory.

Philosophy then becomes almost useless and has difficulty defending its place in the university curriculum. Nobody benefits from this blinkered approach and I regard it as a betrayal of professional standards and public trust. . . .

I think the essence of metaphysics is that it is always about what is a little bit beyond what we think we know - hence the 'meta.' Some people just flat out deny there is anything there. Like Dennett. To me, Dennett's "proofs" always amount to little more than the confession that he, himself, is incapable of envisioning anything beyond the limits of his own current understanding. Which is sad for him, but doesn't really prove anything.

It seems the Perennial philosophy is not considered relevant to academic philosophy, so nobody tries to falsify it and it is simply ignored…This would be how folks like Dennett and Chalmers can get away with publishing books on consciousness that fail to mention the views of those who study it experimentally without being laughed out of their profession. — FrancisRay

So you’re saying academic philosophers need to deploy, or at least cite the results of, scientific experimental methods of study in order to validate or falsify the claims of Perrenial philosophy? What are your own views on the validity of Perrenialism?

think the essence of metaphysics is that it is always about what is a little bit beyond what we think we know - hence the 'meta.' Some people just flat out deny there is anything there. Like Dennett. To me, Dennett's "proofs" always amount to little more than the confession that he, himself, is incapable of envisioning anything beyond the limits of his own current understanding. Which is sad for him, but doesn't really prove anything. — Pantagruel

I would agree to some extent, or in a certain sense, about metaphysics but we can know enough to know where the truth lies and this is all we need for a successful metaphysics. Logical analysis will never prove which global theory is true but it can establish that there is only one that works.

Fully agree about Dennett. I don't know how he gets away with it. In management there is a well-known phenomenon called 'articulate incompetence' and it's very dangerous. .

As you know, there are many strands and styles of philosophy taught within academia. Some of them find a more comfortable home in academic departments outside of philosophy. Are you dissatisfied with all of these approaches or just a certain one that you feel has been allowed to dominate?
— Joshs

I see the same approach being taken right across the academic world. It entails not studying the nondual philosophy of the mystics and then not being able to solve any philosophical problems or construct a fundamental theory — FrancisRay

One of the most productive current offshoots of the linguistic turn in philosophy is enactivism, whose founding authors ( Francisco Varela and Even Thompson) advanced a non-dual philosophy melding cognitive science, phenomenology and the mindfulness traditions of the buddhists.

So you’re saying academic philosophers need to deploy, or at least cite the results of, scientific experimental methods of study in order to validate or falsify the claims of Perrenial philosophy? — Joshs

I believe that the empirical methods of the natural sciences go a long way to proving the plausibility of this philosophy, when the data is interpreted in a certain way, and would cite entanglement and non-locality as immediately relevant, but this method does not allow the matter to be settled. In metaphysics, however, logical analysis allows us to produce a formal proof that all other philosophies and philosophical positions are logically absurd,

This is not a proof of the truth of the only one that remains standing, but it proves that would be perverse to suppose it is not. The proof is simple and I'll sketch it out if you wish. It is, in effect, a proof that philosophy is still relevant and always will be.

What are your own views on the validity of Perennialism?

If you mean the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy, as found in advaita Vedanta, Middle Way Buddhism and Lao Tzu's Taoism then I'd happily and confidently bet my life on its truth.and on the inability of scientists and philosophers to falsify it. I wouldn't even consider it a hostage to fortune. .

In metaphysics, however, logical analysis allows us to produce a formal proof that all other philosophies and philosophical positions are logically absurd, — FrancisRay

Logical analysis is always subject to Garbage-In/Garbage-Out. Believing oneself to have proven all other philosophies are absurd, is liable to be an epistemic trap which impedes one's ability to learn from others. That is an unfortunate state to be in.

One of the most productive current offshoots of the linguistic turn in philosophy is enactivism, whose founding authors ( Francisco Varela and Even Thompson) advanced a non-dual philosophy melding cognitive science, phenomenology and the mindfulness traditions of the buddhists. — Joshs

Good point. One could also cite Schrodinger, Bradley, Spencer Brown, Schopenhauer, Kastrup, Mohrhoff and many others. These are outliers, however, that do not reflect the mainstream. If any views are mainstream it is probably materialism and monotheism, for both of which the advaita doctrine is false and metaphysics is incomprehensible . .

Do Varela and Thompson say much about metaphysics? I'm guessing they don't go this deep. Otherwise they would be promoting their theory as the final solution for all philosophical problems. But for this it would be necessary to go beyond cognitive science and mindfulness.

Cab you recommend an article on their ideas? I know of Varella only from reading his thoughts on G S Brown and it was along time ago.

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Logical analysis is always subject to Garbage-In/Garbage-Out. Believing oneself to have proven all other philosophies are absurd, is liable to be an epistemic trap which impedes one's ability to learn from others. That is an unfortunate state to be in. — wonderer1

I understand your view but can reassure you. There is no need to put any garbage in or take any out.

It is surprisingly easy to prove that only one global theory survives analysis. Most philosophers have succeeded. It is well known that all metaphysical questions are undecidable and that the reason for this is the absurdity of all their extreme or dualistic answers. This is metaphysics 101. .

What is less well known is that this leaves only one theory standing, and it is the nondual doctrine of mysticism or or what has come to be known as the Perennial philosophy. This translates into metaphysics as a neutral metaphysical position, and this is the only theory that cannot be reduced to absurdity by analysis. When we do not know this metaphysics is a road to nowhere. . .

Almost all philosophers know about the absurdity of extreme metaphysical positions but a lack of acquaintance with the philosophical foundation of mysticism leaves them unable to see that there is a viable, ancient and popular alternative.that works and massively simplifies philosophy. . .

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I have been wanting to come back to this:

Socrates: It is a method quite easy to indicate, but very far from easy to employ. It is indeed the instrument through which every discovery ever made in the sphere of the arts and sciences has been brought to light. Let me describe it for your consideration.

Protarchus: Please do.

Socrates: There is a gift of the gods---so at least it seems evident to me---which they let fall from their abode, and it was through Prometheus, or one like him, that it reached mankind, together with a fire exceeding bright. The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying. All things, so it ran, that are ever said to be consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness. This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being , otherwise for three or some other number of forms. And we must do. And we must do the same again with each of the 'ones' thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is. But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. It is only then, when we have done that, that we may let each one of all these intermediate forms pass away into the unlimited and cease bothering about them. There then, that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of inquiry, of learning, and of teaching one another, but your clever modern man, while making his one----or his many, as the case may be----more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when has got his one proceeds to his unlimited number straightaway, allowing the intermediates to escape him, whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion. — Plato, Philebus, 16c, translated by R. Hackforth

Can you say more about what this means?

Maybe I can give a superficial reading as a foil. There seems to be an association of "unlimited" with the act in which we "cease bothering about them." This clause seems to almost indicate an endless process of investigation and inquiry: "But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number." What follows, then, is that the philosophical discussion is aimed at inquiry, perhaps endless, whereas the contentious discussion presumes that insufficient inquiry was sufficient, and then attempts to wield the product of that inquiry in various ways.

Does that get at it in part? One thing I wish to better understand is the method itself, the moving back and forth between the one and the many.

Socrates states what is at issue in the Philebus:

So, Philebus, for his part, says that what is good for every creature is enjoyment, pleasure and delight and anything in harmony with that general category. Whereas I contend that not these but understanding, reasoning, memory and their kindred, right opinion and true thinking, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all of those who are able to acquire them, and that they are supremely beneficial to anyone who can attain them now or in the future.

(11b-c, Horan's online translation)

The first thing to be noted is that Philebus' claim that what is good for every creature is questionable if there is a creature who is capable of thought and for which to think is better than pleasure. What may be good for many may not be good for all. On the other hand, what may be good for the one capable of thought will not be good for the many if they are not capable.

A bit later Socrates says:

Take understanding, knowledge, reason and anything else I proposed at the outset and declared to be good when I asked what good is.

(13e)

The question "what is good?" can be answered in many ways. Two that are given here are - pleasure and thinking. What had not been determined at the outset, however, is what the good itself, that one thing, is. There may be many or even an unlimited number of things that are said to be good. Unless we are able to determine at the outset what the good itself is the argument will not come to an end.

I will get back to you on that. I have to reactivate some of my cells devoted to that method.

Sounds good, I will revisit this text as well in the next few days.