How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!! — PL Olcott

Good guess, but it is actually possible. :nerd:

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!!
— PL Olcott

Good guess, but it is actually possible. — chiknsld

If you are telling a difference when it is stipulated that there is no difference
to tell then you cannot possibly be telling the truth.

If you are telling a difference when it is stipulated that there is no difference
to tell then you cannot possibly be telling the truth. — PL Olcott

You have conceded your point! :snicker:

If you are telling a difference when it is stipulated that there is no difference
to tell then you cannot possibly be telling the truth.
— PL Olcott

You have conceded your point! :snicker: — chiknsld

I am reaffirming my point.
I use self-evident truths as the basis of my reasoning.

Self-evidence
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence

The meaning of my words prove that they are true.

If you are telling a difference when it is stipulated that there is no difference
to tell then you cannot possibly be telling the truth.
— PL Olcott

You have conceded your point! :snicker:
— chiknsld

I am reaffirming my point.
I use self-evident truths as the basis of my reasoning.

Self-evidence
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence

The meaning of my words prove that they are true. — PL Olcott

Are you responding to what I said? :grin:

Removed by author

The problem is when you say, "It has to actually be true" you have to answer the question of, "How do you know it is true?" You cannot. If you can, feel free to do so. But if you cannot, then you cannot state that knowledge has truth as a necessary pre-requisite. Otherwise you say we know nothing, which is again, the abandonment of epistemology. — Philosophim

I agree with you on this. JTB theory does not explain how the word "knowledge" is used by people, hence it is a poor definition. I think it becomes even clearer when analyzing the verb "to know."

Keeping in mind the truth in JTB is independent of what I think about the matter, then according to JTB:

If I say "I know I am sitting on a chair" I am saying effectively saying "I believe I am sitting on a chair, I have justification for that belief, and it is true regardless of what I think about the matter"

But the last part of that sentence makes no sense. What I say when I utter the words "I know ..." is linked to what I think about the matter, it cannot be independent of my thoughts.

When JTB is augmented such that the justification guarantees the truth of the belief then this makes Gettier cases impossible. Although this seems intuitively reasonable for analytic truth, it also seems to make synthetic knowledge impossible.

It is self-evidently true that within the hypothesis that a space alien can be perfectly disguised as a duck such as it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, lays eggs and does everything else just like a duck. Then we can know that empirical knowledge is impossible when we require this knowledge to be true.

It seems to make no sense to have false knowledge.

When we simply assume away all of the counter-examples we can say that (for all practical purposes) synthetic knowledge is when a set of physical sensations matches an element in the model of the actual world then we can (reasonably plausibly) know that we are experiencing this element of the model of the world.

We can do this at least up until the element demonstrates properties contradicting its model in the world. As soon as we see a pig extend its wings and fly away we know it was never a conventional pig.

Great analysis.

↪PhilosophyRunner Great analysis. — Philosophim

You can "know" empirical things to a reasonably plausible degree that is less than logically justified complete certainty.

The key empirical thing is mapping a set of physical sensations to their corresponding element in the verbal model of the actual world.

The model of the world is construed as an axiomatic system. We know that {cats} are {animals} by looking this up in the knowledge tree model of the world.

Otherwise you say we know nothing, which is again, the abandonment of epistemology.
— Philosophim[/quote]

I changed my view to this on the basis of the above:
You can "know" empirical things to a reasonably plausible degree that is less than logically justified complete certainty.

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!!
— PL Olcott

Good guess, but it is actually possible. :nerd: — chiknsld

I only want to be fair and accurate in my assessment yet
it seems that you are saying something like 5 - 0 = 5 is not true.

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

What could you mean here by "justification necessitates the truth of the belief"? That there is no possible world in which the justification is true but not the truth of the belief? That's an absurdly high bar. I know the cat is on the bed because I saw him there a few minutes ago; but there are possible worlds in which he has subsequently moved, or in which what I saw was not the cat but a shadow.

Did any one in this thread spot this obvious problem?

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!!
— PL Olcott

Good guess, but it is actually possible. :nerd:
— chiknsld

I only want to be fair and accurate in my assessment... — PL Olcott

Are you proposing a difference between reality and a simulation of reality? :smile:

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible.
— PL Olcott

What could you mean here by "justification necessitates the truth of the belief"? — Banno

Apparently truthmaker theory answers this question. I just found out that all of my ideas for the last seven years have been anchored in truthmaker theory. I had never heard of truthmaker theory prior to two weeks ago.

My own unique take on this is that for analytical truth an expression of language is proved to be true if it is semantically entailed by expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

These expressions are stipulated to be true on the basis of the verbal model of the actual world. This is assumed to be stored in a knowledge ontology like the CYC project. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc

After very much discussion in this thread I have narrowed down the meaning of empirical knowledge to be when a set of physical sensations map to one or more elements within this model of the world.

Copyright 2023 PL Olcott

If there is no difference between reality and a simulation of reality then no difference
can be discerned. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_(religion) might be discernable.

If there is no difference between reality and a simulation of reality then no difference
can be discerned... — PL Olcott

Sounds to me like you are proposing a difference! :grin:

Meh. That looks to be all over the place, truth-makers coming from a different place to modal logic, and I'm not too happy about your claims to copyright, so I'll leave you to it.

Bye.

Banno
21.2k
↪PL Olcott Meh. That looks to be all over the place, truth-makers coming form a different place to modal logic, and I'm not too happy about your claims to copyright, so I'll leave you to it. — Banno

The key innovation of my seven years of full time work is that an analytical expression of formal or natural language is only true when it has a semantic entailment (necessity) connection to other expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.

This is significant because in such a formal system Gödel incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability are impossible.

Expressions stipulated to be true are related to truth conditional semantics. For simplicity we can call them verified facts or Haskell Curry elementary theorems:

Let T be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which
belong to T we shall call the elementary theorems of T; we also
say that these elementary statements are true for T. Thus, given
T, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is
true. https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

My ultimate goal of the above work is that this idea be used to create
a True(L,x) software function in AI systems providing them with the
definitive basis to divide truth from falsity. Tarski incorrectly "proved"
that this is impossible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem#General_form

This is a huge problem with current state of the art LLM AI systems such as ChatGPT
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
They just make stuff up out of thin air and cite it as verified facts.

If there is no difference between reality and a simulation of reality then no difference
can be discerned...
— PL Olcott

Sounds to me like you are proposing a difference! :grin: — chiknsld

If there is a difference then this might be a discernable difference.
If there is NO difference then entails that THERE IS NO discernable difference.

If there is no difference between reality and a simulation of reality then no difference
can be discerned...
— PL Olcott

Sounds to me like you are proposing a difference! :grin:
— chiknsld

If there is a difference then this might be a discernable difference.
If there is NO difference then entails that THERE IS NO discernable difference. — PL Olcott

if you can claim there is no difference, then someone else can claim they are the same.

If there is a difference then this might be a discernable difference.
If there is NO difference then entails that THERE IS NO discernable difference.
— PL Olcott

↪PL Olcott if you can claim there is no difference, then someone else can claim they are the same. — chiknsld

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles

When a thing is exactly the same as a duck from all external appearances including
a blood test of DNA, then you can tell it is actually a space alien when it telepathically
invades your thoughts screaming that it <is> a space alien.

When a thing is exactly the same as a duck from all external appearances including
a blood test of DNA, then you can tell it is actually a space alien when it telepathically
invades your thoughts screaming that it <is> a space alien. — PL Olcott

When you believe that there is an alien, disguised as a duck, screaming into your head telepathically, there might be deeper epistemic concerns than Gettier problems.

When a thing is exactly the same as a duck from all external appearances including
a blood test of DNA, then you can tell it is actually a space alien when it telepathically
invades your thoughts screaming that it <is> a space alien.
— PL Olcott

When you believe that there is an alien, disguised as a duck, screaming into your head telepathically, there might be deeper epistemic concerns than Gettier problems. — wonderer1

For this thought experiment it is stipulated that the space alien really
is telepathically communicating with you.

If there is a difference then this might be a discernable difference.
If there is NO difference then entails that THERE IS NO discernable difference.
— PL Olcott

↪PL Olcott if you can claim there is no difference, then someone else can claim they are the same.
— chiknsld

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles

When a thing is exactly the same as a duck from all external appearances including
a blood test of DNA, then you can tell it is actually a space alien when it telepathically
invades your thoughts screaming that it <is> a space alien. — PL Olcott

You touch on a deep truth, though I am not sure you are aware. :smile:

An infinitely irreducible simulation of reality (as it seems you are proposing) in no way addresses the categorical separation between reality and its simulation.

When a thing is exactly the same as a duck from all external appearances including
a blood test of DNA, then you can tell it is actually a space alien when it telepathically
invades your thoughts screaming that it <is> a space alien.
— PL Olcott

You touch on a deep truth, though I am not sure you are aware. :smile:

An infinitely irreducible simulation of reality (as it seems you are proposing) in no way addresses the categorical separation between reality and its simulation. — chiknsld

When the entire set of properties of a thing (including its point in time and space)
are identical to another thing then we can know that they are one-and-the-same thing.

If a thing has hidden properties that would distinguish it from other things then
we cannot correctly determine whether it is this other thing or not. We can guess
yet our guess might possibly be incorrect.

It is (by definition) impossible to tell the difference between a thing and its simulation
when there is no discernable difference.

When the entire set of properties of a thing (including its point in time and space)
are identical to another thing then we can know that they are one-and-the-same thing. — PL Olcott

Identical points in time and space? This would be illogical, and would also undermine the complexity of your simulation as the fundamental grounds of reality (which were once common) are now dissolved.

When the entire set of properties of a thing (including its point in time and space)
are identical to another thing then we can know that they are one-and-the-same thing.
— PL Olcott

Identical points in time and space? This would be illogical, and would also undermine the complexity of your simulation as the fundamental grounds of reality (which were once common) are now dissolved. — chiknsld

We ourselves are not exactly the same as we were one minute ago.

We ourselves are not exactly the same as we were one minute ago. — PL Olcott

You would have to show how this is relevant. :smile:

Also, instead of using those characters (regarding your hypothetical) it would be simpler to use yourself.

So if there is a simulation of yourself standing in front of you, you are telling me that you would not know there was a difference between you and this simulation that is standing in front of you?

We ourselves are not exactly the same as we were one minute ago.
— PL Olcott

You would have to show how this is relevant. :smile: — chiknsld

The very first time that I ever heard about the Identity of indiscernibles
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles#:~:text=The%20identity%20of%20indiscernibles%20is,by%20y%20and%20vice%20versa.

I had it completely figured out. If every single property is exactly the
same then two different things <are> one-and-the-same thing, otherwise
they are not one-and-the-same thing. My qualification addresses any
time travel paradox related to the Identity of indiscernibles.