When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

So when knowledge is defined as something that can only be had by an omniscient being there is no Gettier problem?

Seems a bit drastic to me to define knowledge out of the range of humans to avoid Gettier problems.

Unless at least one mind has a belief B about subject S such that the justification of this belief necessitates its truth then B is not an element of {knowledge} because no one knows it. An expression can be true without anyone knowing it is true.

I don't think it necessities omnipotence for knowledge. For example, the Dude in the Big Lebowski knows "he's had a hard day and he fucking hates the Eagles man." He can't be wrong about this because his knowing he hates the Eagles necessitates that it is the case that he hates the Eagles.

Likewise, I know necessarily true things about whether certain chess moves are legal without being omnipotent.

However, it does seem to cut us off from making knowledge claims about many things in the world we seem to know about.

I can't envision any element of the set of knowledge that can avoid being a necessary consequence of something else. This applies across the analytic/synthetic distinction. What specific boundary case do you have in mind?

Unless at least one mind has a belief B about subject S such that the justification of this belief necessitates its truth then B is not an element of {knowledge} because no one knows it. — PL Olcott

I am skeptical towards justificationism/foundationalism. It looks to me like human attempts at justification are always built on intuitions which are not in themselves logically justified. (Which is not to say that intuitions cannot be extremely reliable.)

I think that in the strictest sense the, JTB definition of knowledge would require a sort of intuition free omniscient ability to construct logical justifications that is not available to social primates like us. Which is not to say the notion of human knowledge is something we should toss, but that we should recognize that JTB is insufficient as a way of understanding knowledge.

I don't think it necessities omnipotence for knowledge. For example, the Dude in the Big Lebowski knows "he's had a hard day and he fucking hates the Eagles man." He can't be wrong about this because his knowing he hates the Eagles necessitates that it is the case that he hates the Eagles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't pragmatically argue with that. :up:

Though it is inconceivable that someone could hate the Eagles. So I suspect The Dude might be a fictional character.

JTB is insufficient as a way of understanding knowledge. — wonderer1

I agree. It doesn't describe how real people know things or what they mean when the say they know something.

"I am skeptical towards justificationism/foundationalism.
It looks to me like human attempts at justification are always
built on intuitions which are not in themselves logically justified."

{The justification necessitates the truth of the belief} as in the
modal logic: □P ≡ ¬◇¬P // Necessarily(P) ≡ Not Possibly Not P
If Fluffy is a cat then Necessarily Fluffy is an animal.

JTB is partially correct in that knowledge must be a truth that is held in at least mind. If no one knows X then X is not knowledge. X must also be true. The key error is an insufficient connection between the justification and the belief. If the justification makes the belief necessarily true then the belief is impossibly false. Modal logic: □P ≡ ◇P // Necessarily(P) ≡ Not Possibly Not P

I solved the Gettier problem, as well as most classical epistemological problems such as the problem of induction here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

The problem with Gettier is he uses justification as being "true". Truth has nothing to do with knowledge. Knowledge is about creating identities in our minds first. We have the image of a creature, and we call it a cat for example. Then when we encounter something in reality, to know its a cat in reality, we must match what we find essential about our identity of a cat, to the creature before us. If we can successfully do so without induction, then we know its a cat.

If it turns out its actually some weird dog breed, but only because society created the identity of that creature as a dog, and we did not know that attribute that would have made it a dog, that doesn't negate what we know at the time. At that time, we know it as a cat. Once society introduces this new identity, or definition to us, we can decide to accept it, or reject it. If we accept it, now we know longer can know that creature as a cat, but a dog. But if we reject societies identity, we still know it as a cat.

In sum, knowledge is about what identity you accept in your mind, then applying that identity in a deductive manner to ascertain whether it matches based on your context. Truth has nothing to do with it. So when its claimed "Smith has five coins in his pocket" its not a deduced application of identity, but an induction of identity as the claimant doesn't actually have evidence that at that specific moment, Smith has five coins in his pocket. Belief that happens to be the case is not knowledge if the reasons we came to that belief are not deduced correctly. That's just an accident.

I always view these things in terms of pure logic. If a thing in the world can be empirically validated to have all of the properties of a cat including the DNA of a cat then this thing is necessarily a cat, all opinions to the contrary are counter-factual. The belief aspect of JTB is required because unless at least one person knows X then X is not knowledge even if X is true.

↪Philosophim I always view these things in terms of pure logic. If a thing in the world can be empirically validated to have all of the properties of a cat including the DNA of a cat then this thing is necessarily a cat, all opinions to the contrary are counter-factual. The belief aspect of JTB is required because unless at least one person knows X then X is not knowledge even if X is true. — PL Olcott

To clarify, it is not that it is necessarily a cat. It is that you can logically conclude no other identity at the time of your identification. One could have the belief that its a space monster in disguise. In truth, it could be. But there's no way we could ever say, "I know its a space monster in disguise". Because knowledge is a tool of logic about what we can conclude with the information we have, not an assertation of truth itself.

A space monster in disguise would not have the DNA of a cat. We could add that one of the properties of a cat is that the thing <is> a cat. Thus a perfect duplicate of a cat is not a cat.

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

And how do we know its true? I have a creature that's a space monster, and its absolutely beyond any human to find out its a space monster. We know it as a cat. Its not true that its a cat, but that's what we know it as. Under your point, no one could say they knew it as a cat. In which case, we can only say they believe it is a cat.

The problem is, you need some way to measure a belief against truth. How do you make it possible in this instance? How do we know that many things that we claim to know, are actually not knowledge if we discovered some new aspect of reality? We can't. This is why knowledge cannot be a claim of necessary truth.

My adapted version of JTB does seems to perfectly divide knowledge from presumption and falsity and utterly eliminate the Gettier cases.

Somehow the replies got out of order. My point above is in regards to

↪Philosophim My adapted version of JTB does seems to perfectly divide knowledge from presumption and falsity and utterly eliminate the Gettier cases. — PL Olcott

As for the the cats DNA, you're missing the point of the thought experiment. The point is that we're in an instance where there is something outside of our ability to know, but from everything we observe and are capable of concluding, the only reasonable thing we can know is that its a cat. Thus we know something that isn't true.

"instance where there is something outside of our ability to know"
Does not count as knowledge under my adaptation of JTB.

"instance where there is something outside of our ability to know"
Does not count as knowledge under my adaptation of JTB. — PL Olcott

I'm putting forth some effort here, please do more than a few sentences if you're serious about engaging. Think about it. If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?

I have pondered this again and again for years.
"If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?"
Truth is a necessary yet insufficient condition for knowledge.

Knowledge requires:
Awareness that an expression is true on the basis of complete proof that the expression is true.

I have pondered this again and again for years.
"If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?"
Truth is a necessary yet insufficient condition for knowledge.

Knowledge requires:
Awareness that an expression is true on the basis of complete proof that the expression is true. — PL Olcott

The reason you've pondered it for years is that there is no answer. Logically, the only conclusion is its impossible. Therefore the only conclusion is that knowledge does not rely on truth as a necessary condition. That doesn't mean that knowledge isn't incredibly useful, or that we can suddenly start believing whatever we want. Check out my paper. There's a great summary of the ideas from another poster a few replies down from the paper.

It is certainly not impossible to know with 100% complete certainty that a dog is an animal and my adaptation to JTB specifically excludes anything that is not known on the basis of complete proof.

By addressing the problem categorically gaps in reasoning are impossible.

JTB is partially correct in that knowledge must be a truth that is held in at least mind. If no one knows X then X is not knowledge. X must also be true. The key error is an insufficient connection between the justification and the belief. If the justification makes the belief necessarily true then the belief is impossibly false. Modal logic: □P ≡ ◇P // Necessarily(P) ≡ Not Possibly Not P — PL Olcott

JTB is a definition, not a fact. I think it's a bad definition. Any definition that says Isaac Newton didn't know that gravity is a force 340 years ago because we now think about it as a bending of spacetime is silly.

↪Philosophim It is certainly not impossible to know with 100% complete certainty that a dog is an animal and my adaptation to JTB specifically excludes anything that is not known on the basis of complete proof. — PL Olcott

You ignored the key question about truth. How do you know its true? How do you know you have complete proof?

My adaptation to JTB makes it a necessary truth.
Complete proof is a semantic tautology. Cats are stipulated to be animals.

That the animal in front of you seems to have all of the properties of
a cat is evidence and not proof that it is a cat.

That the animal in front of you seems to have all of the properties of
a cat is evidence and not proof that it is a cat. — PL Olcott

Then how would we prove its a cat? How would we prove that its true that its a space monster, especially if its a perfectly disguised cat? Because it can't accidently be true right? That's the whole point of the Gettier argument.

Only the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction has proof.
The synthetic side (that I call the empirical side) only has evidence.

We can know with complete logical certainty that a cat is an animal.
We cannot discern the difference between a cat and a space alien
perfectly disguised as a cat (including DNA).

My adaptation of JTB requires proof that the belief is true, with less
than proof we only have presumption and thus not knowledge.

The whole point of the Gettier argument is that unless the justification
necessitates the truth of the belief then the belief <is> insufficiently
or incorrectly justified.

Only the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction has proof.
The synthetic side (that I call the empirical side) only has evidence. — PL Olcott

My adaptation of JTB requires proof that the belief is true, with less
than proof we only have presumption and thus not knowledge. — PL Olcott

Then according to your JTB, no one can ever know anything synthetically. Meaning I can't know if I'm really in my house or if I'm a brain in a vat. The Gettier argument is not a criticism of analytic, but synthetic arguments.

Until you answer the question, "How do I know what I know is true?" you've solved nothing. If we don't have a method to know that what we know is true, then we never have synthetic knowledge about anything. Its all beliefs. Is that where you want to go?

Reviewing some of the Gettier cases it seems that they involve
an incorrect mapping from a set of physical sensations to their
corresponding elements in the model of the actual world.

Because of this incorrect mapping the justification for the belief
does not necessitate that the belief is true.

When we require that the justification for the belief necessitates
that the belief is true, then the incorrect mapping is excluded
from justification.

When a set of physical sensations correctly map to elements
of the model of the actual world and the semantic connections
within this model of the world necessitate the truth of the belief
then we have knowledge.

This gets rid of the problem of a space alien perfectly disguised
as a cat. If it is not an actual cat then the mapping is incorrect then
we do not have knowledge.

Reviewing some of the Gettier cases it seems that they involve
an incorrect mapping from a set of physical sensations to their
corresponding elements in the model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

And again, the same question. How do we know we have the correct mapping, or know that what we know is true?

When we require that the justification for the belief necessitates
that the belief is true, then the incorrect mapping is excluded
from justification. — PL Olcott

Sure, if it was as simple as that the argument would have instantly died. But how do we know that the belief is true? You can't. Therefore you cannot have truth as a necessary pre-requisite for (synthetic) knowledge. No matter how much you try to avoid this, it will always be there.

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!!