It just doesn't seem like Ukraine can take it back...without getting destroyed in the process...and the Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas want to stay part of Russia — Jack Rogozhin

To give an alternative possibility than the frozen conflict hypothesis of @ssu, the weapons systems being used are too advanced and too destructive to result in any sort of stability resulting in a war of attrition that the Ukrainians are losing.

Ukrainians are losing the war of attrition not simply because they are smaller country that can absorb less losses, but because they lack all sorts of capabilities entirely.

We could go weapons system by weapon system, but the overall reason is that NATO is designed primarily as an air force with the approach of gaining air superiority and then air dominance and then dealing with things on the ground by relentless bombing.

Whether this is the best strategy for NATO to have or not is of little importance in the current conflict since NATO doesn't want to and arguably can't effectively transfer this equipment to Ukraine anyways, and Russian air defence systems can shoot down all such planes, even F-35 and F-22, if they're close enough even without any particular technology to shoot down stealth air-craft. Stealth aircraft don't allow you to just go fly over the front and drop bombs at will with zero risk. Of course, perhaps US / NATO as a whole could effectively suppress and attrit Russian air defence and then be able to bomb at will or largely at will, which would be a different conversation.

What matters in the current situation is that even if NATO could establish air superiority / air dominance, itself against Russia, there's zero way to transfer these capabilities to Ukraine. Likewise, even more flexible (in terms of ground facilities) air assets like helicopter gun ships can't just be sent to Ukraine.

Long story short, Russia is prepared to fight exactly this kind of war and NATO is not for reasons that are easy to explain: 1. Russia is there 2. the US isn't there. Moreover, the US has no plausible threat of being invaded by land and so focuses on both defence projecting force globally by sea and air.

Even if NATO wanted to, it's simply impossible to just transfer the NATO way of war fighting to Ukraine.

For these reasons, support to Ukraine was most effective during the phase of just scrounging up old soviet equipment, and sending in NATO equipment instead has shown essentially zero results as Ukrainians have barely and training on these systems and they aren't designed for the conditions ... and you still need air power and air defence which Ukraine has essentially run out of.

To put it simply, Ukraine doesn't have the capacity to fight a war of attrition indefinitely and NATO doesn't have what Ukraine would need to even attempt to do so and Ukrainian man power and will is not some magical given but has a breaking point.

And the above is only in material and capacity terms, if you then consider in addition the strategic situation, Russia has a massive advantage.

For, the front line is not constrained to the South-East of Ukraine but is in fact the entire border with Russia and Belarus. Russia chooses to only fight in the South-East of Ukraine during this attritional phase of the conflict not simply because that's where the Russian speakers are and the land they want to keep, but also it's the farthest point from NATO supply lines in Poland. To supply the front in the South-East Ukraine needs to travel a maximum of distance which creates delays and all sorts of logistical problems while maximising the amount of time Russia has to observe material and troop movements and plan accordingly.

Not only has NATO forbid Ukraine to invade Russia proper but there's essentially no strategic advantage in doing so ... there's not really anywhere to go once you're in Russia.

So, if Ukraine wants to make gains it's only realistic choice is to attack the Russian heavily fortified lines in the South-East as there's nothing to accomplish in Russia and the purpose of the Ukrainian war effort is to liberate previously held Ukrainian territory. Ukraine can only attack where it will face the deepest mine fields and maximum fortifications.

However, no where is it written that Russia will just stay in the South-East along the built-up line of contact and can only attack Ukraine where it has build up defences. At any time Russia can move into Ukraine along any part of the border in "big arrow" offensive mode.

Balance of trade and capital flows and so on can go one way one year and another way the other year ... or, you know, consistently have a trade deficit for decades such as in the case of the United States. — boethius

Sure, if you ignore all the differences between certain countries, then they are exactly the same. I am pointing specific issues which make Russia's situation difficult and you just ignore them and go back to your generalities.

He's saying the same thing as me: — boethius

Lol. No, he is not. He gives examples of specific sectors which indicate the bigger problem which is the overreliance on raw resource exports - that is the whole point of the meeting (and his speech). I have asked you to provide the examples of the sectors (beside the military one, which is also not doing that great) which are booming and seemingly you are unable to give any.

Any economy will have sectors that rely heavily on imports, that is not indicative of the whole. — boethius

Yes, but Russia is not 'any economy', it is Russian economy. When I point out specific issues with it, you just dismiss them and go back to your generalities. Anyone even vaguely familiar with Russian economy knows that it is overreliant on resource exports (like many economies with access to significant resources) and knows that its industry is underdeveloped. Here is an Al Jazeera article on that, just in case you will not believe biased Western media. It is commendable that you have general knowledge, but it does not replace specific knowledge of the actual situation.

I have zero problem accepting massive discounts in 2022 and 2023, as I explain these are massive flows of material and finance over decades and centuries and what matters is the medium and long term and not any given year or two. I even explain why Russia needs to offload the oil at nearly any price as the oil wells can't easily be turned off and on. However, there is zero evidence Russia is somehow stuck with those discounts for any significant period of time.

You seem to just randomly assign points to me in total disconnect to anything I've written or the points you've made, and then argue against those points sometimes repeating my arguments I've made against your points that you've actually written. — boethius

The actual issue is that you do not engage with any specific points, you just fall back on your general economic knowledge, which does not address the actual issues. For example, you wrote this long reply without addressing the issue of demand at all, even though I have pointed out repeatedly why Russia might have a problem with increasing revenue from supplies to India and China (which are its main clients now).

Russia built up massive foreign currency reserves as well as gold and other precious metals reserves.

The priority in 2022 was not maintaining revenue (whole point of having a war chest) but to maintain market share, especially in fossil fuels.

The reason maintaining market share is important is that industrial projects and capacity can have long lead times and cost significant capital and may not be easy to just shut off and on again (in terms of the state of equipment, skills, supply lines, etc.), especially oil fields of which shutting off may damage the oil fields permanently.

So, Russia offered deep discounts to be sure to move it's stuff and maintain market share.

It would take many, many years for Russia to entirely deplete it's war chest and running a budget or trade deficit for a single year might be a warning sign or might be smart investment that will create larger growth and surpluses down the line, depends on what the money is spent on and what capacities imports help build. — boethius

You forgot to mention that over half of that massive war chest is frozen by the West... Revenue might not be priority at the beginning of the war, but it is now. Budget spending ballooning by over 40% is not exactly a trifle. Running deficit might be a smart investment, if you expect that your revenues will increase or that your spending will decrease in near future, but neither seems likely in case of Russia. But sure, do your basic math: take the unfrozen part of the war chest, compare it to the amount Russia's budget spending increased this year and calculate how many are 'many, many years'.

It's basic math.

Maybe I'll explain it tomorrow with the actual volume and price numbers of the recent oil market to show what price increases make the price cuts worth it in terms of revenue and the how much bigger an effect it has on profits (which is what matters). — boethius

No, it is not. 'Basic math' will not tell you how much oil China and India will buy if you increase the prices. If you disregard that factor, your 'basic math' calculations are utterly useless.

Well, the main point of my analysis is that this isn't the case.

Insofar as Russia sells a lot of commodities denominated in foreign currencies (how the international commodities market works) there will be the forex available to buy whatever imports Russia needs. — boethius

The problem is that the main point of your analysis is not supported by any facts. Insofar Russia sold a lot of commodities to clients who took advantage of their low prices, as it lost its other clients. Expecting that the new clients will buy the same amounts if the prices are significantly higher or that they will buy much more at the same prices requires a bit more stronger argument than just arithmetic projection. So give the actual argument. 'Export revenues can grow in any country' will not cut it.

As long as Russia has a large foreign currency revenue from selling commodities it is easy for the Russian government to subsidise any given sector it wants to protect / grow. — boethius

Lol. That is most curious, given that Russia did not subsidize them properly when it had higher revenues and much lower expenditures. Are you even aware that Russia's economy peaked in 2014 and after Crimea failed to recover under much lighter sanctions?

Sure, if you ignore all the differences between certain countries, then they are exactly the same. I am pointing specific issues which make Russia's situation difficult and you just ignore them and go back to your generalities. — Jabberwock

Russia's economic situation would be difficult if it was in or we had reason to believe it was heading towards recession, that's what all these various macro economic variables synthesise to.

If all the things you point to were a "difficult situation" then why isn't there a recession or analysts predicting a recession?

Analysts have gradually been improving economic growth forecasts, now seeing Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rising 0.7% this year, up from 0.1% in the early May poll, and increasing 1.4% next year, slightly lower than previously thought. — Reuters - Russia to hold rates next week, 2023 GDP growth may improve, Reuters poll shows

And in the same article:

Analysts have gradually been improving economic growth forecasts, now seeing Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rising 0.7% this year, up from 0.1% in the early May poll, and increasing 1.4% next year, slightly lower than previously thought. — Reuters - Russia to hold rates next week, 2023 GDP growth may improve, Reuters poll shows

So there is zero "difficult situation".

Lol. No, he is not. He gives examples of specific sectors which indicate the bigger problem which is the overreliance on raw resource exports - that is the whole point of the meeting (and his speech). I have asked you to provide the examples of the sectors (beside the military one, which is also not doing that great) which are booming and seemingly you are unable to give any. — Jabberwock

You're literally repeating my arguments to me.

You point to sectors reliant on exports as some sort of economic problem, I explain that (in the context of there being no recession) it would be only a problem if there's some strategic consideration; you then cite someone explaining the same thing, I point that out and then you re-explain this argument that reliance on imports is not a economic problem in itself (if there's no recession caused by said reliance, just normal economic phenomena of specialising in some things and importing others) but would be a strategic problem.

I.e. we both agree these imports do not represent some structural economic problem which was and is your argument.

Whether there's some strategic vulnerability, such as over-reliance on China, these imports represent is a different question, but you'd need to elaborate an actual argument of how China both intends and is going to actually exploit such reliance. For, China is also reliant on Russia for a significant amount of the commodities it needs.

And again, I don't claim Russia's economy is or will be booming.

I literally state:

Where do I argue some sort of commodities boom is coming? Generally speaking or even for Russia?

This literally comes from literally no where. — boethius

You claim there is a "difficult situation".

What was you're original argument:

↪Changeling The exchange rate of ruble against all major currencies (USD, EUR, CNY) is climbing very fast. That means that all imports are more and more expensive for Russians. Whatever they bought for 75 RUB in December soon will cost 100. But that is even more devastating for Russian war effort, as they have to import lots of parts (e.g. electronics). Due to sanctions they had to pay much more for parts bought through intermediaries, now it will cost them even more. But even before the war due to 'easy' money from the natural resources (and rampant corruption) Russia's economy has been underdeveloped in many areas and relied on imports. — Jabberwock

You literally use the word "devastating".

Devastating for what? "for the Russian war effort".

Which is relevant to this conversation of the war in Ukraine.

You've now moved the goal posts to Russian economy is not "booming" after accepting all my arguments.

The key one is that Russia can effectively pay for whatever imports it needs for it's war effort with commodities: Russia sells commodities relative the international price (that has nothing to do with the value of the Rouble) and brings in foreign exchange which Russia can then use to buy imports it requires for military equipment.

At no point is Russia forced to try to buy foreign exchange with Roubles to then buy imports for military equipment.

You have zero clue what you're talking about and now just flailing around strawmen and throwing the goal posts off the field entirely.

If you're now no longer arguing that the currency devaluation is "devastating for the Russian war effort", then not being clear that you've retracted and reformulated your position to "not booming" and "weak in some strategic sectors" is tiresome, bad faith, and the sign of a weak mind that is not even aware of what it has said in the past, or then you're just a no-good, damn dirty liar.

Have these Russification programs and kidnapping of children been established? — Jack Rogozhin

If the ICC has made the case against these actions and the numbers are well in the many thousands, including cases where Russia has then released back Ukrainian children who had been taken earlier, the idea of it not happening is absurd.

Issuing Russian passports has been one way to advance Russification:

I know many disagree, but I believe the Donbass--which Russia certainly hasn't captured--was their territorial goal. — Jack Rogozhin

I think you make a separation of what the objectives were prior to the assault and what they have become after a year and a half of fighting. One assumption was that the Ukrainians wouldn't put up a defense and thus the "lightning strike" attempt for example towards Kyiv, which ended badly. It's a bit eary just how close to what Russia tried to get is to what Russian propaganda earlier published as the boundaries of Novorossiya:





Even if securing the land bridge to Crimea was successful, the obvious failure was to reach Odessa and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. Yet now it looks like Russians attempt to hold on what they have and not attempt (at least now) to go on the offensive. Building huge defensive lines also limits your own forces.

The ICC arguing a case does not make it true. The fact the ICC has made no cases against the US for Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Libya shows them to be heavily biased for NATO/US and against Russia. So taking an ICC case as fact would be absurd

As to propaganda, there has been loads coming from both sides. The fact Russia has made clear only the Donbas is not on the table, and they would be free to negotiate without taking anymore does give some weight to the fact the Donbas was/is their goal....not proof, but weight.

And simplistic charts hardly express real human ambitions and/or realpolitik. It completely ignores the US-backed Maidan coup that overthrew a democratic election greatly backed by the citizens of the Donbas, the rise of the AZovs following the coup whose crimes against Donbas Ukrainians were chronicled by Amnesty international, and Poroshenko's banning of the Russian language...all leading to Donbass calls for independence Putin told them not to do. Do you have any sympathies for these Russian Ukrainians or do you just see them as vile separatists Ukraine can treat however they like. I would imagine it's the former

Stories from Zaporizhia:

‘We expected less resistance’: Ukrainian troops on southern front learn not to underestimate their enemy
^{— Nick Paton Walsh, Kosta Gak, Olha Konovalova, Florence Davey-Attlee, Brice Laine · CNN · Aug 9, 2023}

Hatred is very strong. — Julia (frontline medic)

:/

Russia has made clear only the Donbas is not on the table — Jack Rogozhin

Crimea?

Russia rightly doesn't consider Crimea taken land. It had been Russian territory for centuries until Ukrainian Kruschev gave it to Ukraine in a narcissistic, ceremonial move not anticipating the Soviet Union's breakup...Kruschev wasn't a brainiac. Also the majority of Crimeans have made it clear they don't want to live under Ukrainian rule, which had cut off their water source and now have likely cut off another with the dam

As to resistance, nobody doubts Ukraine's soldiers' grit and courage, although many, rightly, have no desire to be in a grinder their courage can't surpass. That's not cowardice; it's intelligence. It came out last week that US/NATO were disappointed Ukraine wasn't willing to sacrifice more men for a more aggressive approach. The Ukrainian military leader, to his great credit, said "why don't they come fight then."

Why do you think Russia invaded Ukraine? What was their primary motivation?

What do you mean by "Russia"? What would you mean by "America" if you asked "Why did America invade Iraq and why is America spending hundreds of billions on Ukraine?"

"What do you mean by "Russia"?"

I mean the country Putin is president of. If you prefer: why did Putin invade Ukraine? Although, that's an awkward sentence. Why did Putin direct his armed forces to invade Ukraine?

Putin is Russia? I'm asking this to make this clear, were Dubya or Trump "America" and is Zelensky "Ukraine"?

Putin is Russia? I'm asking this to make this clear, were Dubya or Trump "America" and is Zelensky "Ukraine"? — Jack Rogozhin

Putin is the leader of Russia. Had he not wanted to invade Ukraine, it wouldn't have been invaded. Why did Putin want Ukraine attacked? What do you think was his primary motivation?

I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist. I would say every leader's--including Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's--are primarily selfish and self-centered. I do, however, think sometimes a leader's self-interest can alighn with his country's. I don't think Putin was primarily acting out of his country's interests, but Ukraine and NATO created a legitmate threat against his country and himself when Ukraine refused to remain neutral and NATO refused to not put missiles in Ukraine. I think the US and Ukraine created a legitimate border threat to Russia (and Putin's power) with the Maidan coup and the subsequent shelling and terrorizing of the Russian Donbass ukrainians who lived there peacefully before the coup. Ukraine breaking the Minsk Accords exacerbated this

So, I think Putin did this for Putin, but it was also a smart, beneficail move for his country as a NATO-member Ukraine could wipe out the Donbass Russians with NATO's full backing and The US could use Ukraine to continually attack Russia through their NATO base. And does Putin care about the Donbass Russians? Probably not. But Russians do and certainly wouldn't want them erased

Newcomer here, so tell me if I'm repeating. — Jack Rogozhin

Yes, you are repeating claims that have been repeated already many many times in this thread.

OK. Have they and the claims against them be resolved? Judging by the discourse around the topic, and the changing support for US funding of the war. I imagine they haven't.

What is the rule here? Are positions only allowed to be said once?

Russia rightly doesn't consider Crimea taken land. — Jack Rogozhin

In similar fashion dozens of countries ought to have the "right not to consider" other countries and territories similarly. But once you acknowledge the independence of a country and it's borders, be it Ukraine, Ireland or Finland, you don't make statements of that country being "artificial" or that it's independence was an error or accident. Or that the borders are wrong. The insanity of Russian imperialism would perhaps be more clear to people if some other country would start similar rhetoric about their neighbors. Perhaps Austria should declare it's objective to re-establish the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the UK would declare that it's objective is to get the whole of Ireland back into the Kingdom, because Home Rule etc. was an error. After all, the two countries have language and cultural ties quite as long as Russia and Ukraine share.

But once a country doesn't recognize the borders of it's neighbors, it becomes instantly a genuine threat to it's neighbors. The preferable method would be everything in the neocolonial playbook to influence your neighbors, but annexation of territory goes too far.

This is the reason just why Europe has gotten so against Russia's actions. It is also the reason why NATO has enlarged itself as it has, because Finland and Sweden would have never, ever, joined NATO and would happily have good relations with Russia if it wasn't for the 2022 invasion.

I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist. — Jack Rogozhin

You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given.

I don't think Putin was primarily acting out of his country's interests, but Ukraine and NATO created a legitmate threat against his country and himself when Ukraine refused to remain neutral and NATO refused to not put missiles in Ukraine. — Jack Rogozhin

What missiles are you talking about? Besides, Ukraine wouldn't have become a NATO member. It wouldn't have been just the countries like Hungary that would have opposed this, it actually would have been Germany. But then February 24th 2022 happened. Ukraine's path to NATO would have been blocked just the way Turkey's EU membership is off and no way happening, but theoretically (hypocritically) possible.

What is the rule here? Are positions only allowed to be said once? — Jack Rogozhin

Well, it's a bit difficult to catch up to a thread that is over 500 pages long, I guess.

OK. Have they and the claims against them be resolved? Judging by the discourse around the topic, and the changing support for US funding of the war. I imagine they haven't. — Jack Rogozhin

It depends on what you take to be a resolution of such claims. For sure there is enough disagreement.

What is the rule here? Are positions only allowed to be said once? — Jack Rogozhin

The rule here is that positions ought to be repeated many more times than God can count.

Russia rightly doesn't consider Crimea taken land — Jack Rogozhin

Probably not that simple, and rightly isn't quite right. :)
But you're right that Crimea has had an increasing population of Russians.
Whether Khrushchev was wrong or not ^{("was carried out in accordance with the 1936 Soviet constitution")}, the previous ethnic cleansing was wrong.

Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?
^{— Mark Kramer · Wilson Center · Mar 23, 2014}
Shifting Loyalty: Moscow Accused Of Reshaping Annexed Crimea's Demographics
^{— Rostyslav Khotin, Rostyslav Khotin, Robert Coalson · RFE/RL · May 31, 2018}
Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution
^{— Steven Pifer · Brookings · Mar 18, 2019}
Myth 12: ‘Crimea was always Russian’
^{— Orysia Lutsevych · Chatham House · May 13, 2021}

In similar fashion dozens of countries ought to have the "right not to consider" other countries and territories similarly. But once you acknowledge the independence of a country and it's borders, be it Ukraine, Ireland or Finland, you don't make statements of that country being "artificial" or that it's independence was an error or accident. Or that the borders are wrong. — ssu

They almost all do, or at least act as if they have that right. Look what's going on in Niger; France and USA are threatening and terrorizing it as if its their country. The US currently has bases there and in Syria, which they bombed as if it was their territory, and are stealing their oil. They did it to Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, too, and with the NATO--a supposedly defensive alliance's--help. They bombed Yugoslavia and cut Kosovo out of it with no respect for those borders at all. So we clearly have no set rules about border respect. And again, Crimea was never part of Ukraine proper but part of it when it was a territory for 40 years, after being part of Russia for hundreds. Even if there is a rule about borders, it wouldn't quite apply here

The insanity of Russian imperialism would perhaps be more clear to people if some other country would start similar rhetoric about their neighbors. — ssu

The insanity of Russian imperialism would perhaps be more clear to people if some other country would start similar rhetoric about their neighbors — ssu

This isn't an issue of imperialism at this point. It is a security and territorial dispute. You can argue its a wrong one on Russia's part, but this isn't--at least not yet--an act of imperialism. Also, there's no "insanity" here, unless you think France and the US are acting insane now in Niger

It is also the reason why NATO has enlarged itself as it has, because Finland and Sweden would have never, ever, joined NATO and would happily have good relations with Russia if it wasn't for the 2022 invasion. — ssu

You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given. — ssu

Actually, you do. Do you actually think Putin, or any somewhat functional world leader, tells us their exact motivations? I'm no Putin fan, like Biden, Macron, Zelensky, Trump, and Obama, he is an oppressive, neoliberal Capitalist leader who has robbed his own people. That being said, I don't think it's wise to assume leaders you don't like are stupid. Putin may be a lot of things, but he hasn't survived in Russia for so long by being stupid

What missiles are you talking about? Besides, Ukraine wouldn't have become a NATO member. It wouldn't have been just the countries like Hungary that would have opposed this, it actually would have been Germany. But then February 24th 2022 happened. Ukraine's path to NATO would have been blocked just the way Turkey's EU membership is off and no way happening, but theoretically (hypocritically) possible. — ssu

NATO missiles. And none of this is true. It is fact the US refused to take Ukraine membership off the table; considering NATO's spread, that rightly threatened NATO and Russia. It is fact Ukraine refused to promise NATO neutrality, meaning they would have been fair NATO territory for NATO missiles, weapons, and soldiers. This also rightly threatened Putin and Russia

It's cliche by now, but remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Was Kennedy wrong to feel threatened

Yes, "rightly" is a bit too pat. However, and the ethnic cleansing was wrong, the will of the Crimeans, the Russian history of Crimea, and the Poroshenko/Zelensky treatment of Crimea does make it best for the Crimeans to stay in Russia. If, after all this, they choose to move to Ukraine, I would support that

They almost all do, or at least act as if they have that right. Look what's going on in Niger; France and USA are threatening and terrorizing it as if its their country. — Jack Rogozhin

France and it's former colonies should have another thread, but France isn't annexing it's former colonies back!

The perfect example in this case is Belarus compared to Ukraine. Russia has (also) aspirations for Belarus, it has troops in the country, close ties yet it hasn't annexed territories of Belarus or questioned it's sovereignty. And nobody is openly complaining about this, because Belarus a sovereign state.

Russia has usually used proxy forces, which it has backed up with it's armed forces if (or when) the proxies have gotten into trouble. This has happened in Transnistria, Georgia and in Ukraine with the so-called "frozen conflicts". And this kind of warfare by Russia was tolerated by Western Europe for long. Yet the annexations of large parts of Ukraine simply went over the line.

This isn't an issue of imperialism at this point. It is a security and territorial dispute. — Jack Rogozhin

Nonsense.

Russian imperialism has been, all the time in history, about security and territory. Yeah, there's no large oceans separating Russia from what isn't Russia, but in their place Russia just has a huge steppe. Hence Russian imperialism has always been about going as far as possible you can go, no matter how un-Russian these Asian or European territories have been. It is the version of Russian imperialism and colonialism. After all, Russia is genuinely an empire, not a nation state, even now. Catherine the Great put it quite aptly when she said: "“I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”

That is in the heart of Russian imperialism.

Do you actually think Putin, or any somewhat functional world leader, tells us their exact motivations? — Jack Rogozhin

Not their exact motivations, but do you then totally dismiss what they state for their reasons for the actions they do? If you do so, you should explain why. Because what Putin says about Ukraine does matter. Just as important as is his opposition to NATO.

NATO missiles. — Jack Rogozhin

Again, what "NATO missiles" in Ukraine are you talking about?

It is fact the US refused to take Ukraine membership off the table; — Jack Rogozhin

And the fact is that NATO is an international organization where the US doesn't decide everything and new members have to be accepted by all members. Just look at how difficult the road for Sweden has been. Hungary openly opposes NATO membership of Ukraine (see here) and there's not much the US can do. Remember how many times the US and it's presidents have been disappointed in NATO.

It's cliche by now, but remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Was Kennedy wrong to feel threatened — Jack Rogozhin

Notice that this thread started before February 24th 2022. Hence the name of the thread is Ukraine crisis, not Ukraine war. And we aren't talking about the US invasion of Cuba or the US-Cuban war.

Hence if Putin would have just staged a huge exercise and gotten the promises that NATO wouldn't enlarge to Ukraine (which it did get from Germany), then that would be similar to Cuban Missile Crisis.

And this just shows how weak the argument is that it was all about NATO expansion that made him do it, because obviously when listening to Putin, it wasn't. Sure, NATO was one perfect reason especially for the anti-US propaganda, but forgetting other reasons (Crimea, Novorossiya) is simply wrong. If Ukraine would have a constitution like Moldova that forbids NATO membership, it's still likely that Putin's Russia would have started this war. Crimea being the best example of this.

France and it's former colonies should have another thread, but France isn't annexing it's former colonies back! — ssu

France has miltary bases in Niger the country wants out, they have half their financial reserves in their bank, and they are crossing into Niger's airspace. That is imperialism and disrespect of borders, period. Anyone OK with that has no place complaining about Russia

The perfect example in this case is Belarus compared to Ukraine. Russia has (also) aspirations for Belarus, it has troops in the country, close ties yet it hasn't annexed territories of Belarus or questioned it's sovereignty. And nobody is openly complaining about this, because Belarus a sovereign state. — ssu

No, this is a terrible analogy. Belarus and Russia are allies with shared ethnic groups. France is a racist white colonizer of Niger, a country like all the countries they have inhabited--they have brutalized and robbed of their resources

Nonsense.

Russian imperialism has been, all the time in history, about security and territory. Yeah, there's no large oceans separating Russia from what isn't Russia, but in their place Russia just has a huge steppe. Hence Russian imperialism has always been about going as far as possible you can go, no matter how un-Russian these Asian or European territories have been. Catherine the Great put it quite aptly when she said: "“I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”

That is in the heart of Russian imperialism. — ssu

No. Great sense

Sorry, but the history of Russian imperialism can't compete with that of the NATO countries like the US, Spain, Germany, the UK and France. So, if you'r going back to Catherine the Great--love Elle Fanning by the way--then we have to discuss all of theirs. Yes histories are important, but we still have to evaluate acts on their own to a great degree. This invasion needs to be evaluated with history in mind, but not as the determinant. Same with the US and France's imperialist actions in Niger

Not their exact motivations, but do you then totally dismiss what they state for their reasons for the actions they do? If you do so, you should explain why. Because what Putin says about Ukraine does matter. Just as important as is his opposition to NATO. — ssu

No I dont' and I never did. You seem to treat them like gospel, though and that is in error

Again, what "NATO missiles" in Ukraine are you talking about? — ssu

The missiles NATO regularly puts in their NATO countries, many of them pointing to Russia. If you think the US has made public what exact missiles they put in, that would be naive, no?

And the fact is that NATO is an international organization where the US doesn't decide everything and new members have to be accepted by all members. Just look at how difficult the road for Sweden has been. Hungary openly opposes NATO membership of Ukraine (see here) and there's not much the US can do. Remember how many times the US and it's presidents have been disappointed in NATO. — ssu

Thinking the US doesn't control NATO is just naive. They spend the most money, have the most bases, and they are the only country who starts their own wars and drag evereyone else into it, bossing around the other NATO countries as they do. Hungary and Orban are outliers and they already want him out, just like they got out Imran Khan

Notice that this thread started before February 24th 2022. Hence the name of the thread is Ukraine crisis, not Ukraine war. And we aren't talking about the US invasion of Cuba or the US-Cuban war. — ssu

The Cuban Missile crisis is extremely relevant, both historically and strategically. So, I used it as analogy. That's how discourse often works

And this just shows how weak the argument is that it was all about NATO expansion that made him do it, because obviously when listening to Putin it wasn't. Sure, NATO was one perfect reason especially for the anti-US propaganda, but forgetting other reasons (Crimea, Novorossiya) is simply wrong. If Ukraine would have a constitution like Moldova with forbids NATO membership, it's still likely that Putin's Russia would have started this war. Crimea being the best example of this. — ssu

So it doesn't show how weak this argument is or that it is weak at all. Again, you think you know Putin's motivations; I don't get that. And correctly crticizing the US is not anti-US propaganda. I coordinated protests of the Iraq war...lot of people called that criticism "anti-US propagana too." And no, they wouldn't have started it. Ukraine had been a country for almost 25 years before Maidan, many of those years run by Putin. There was no conflict before Maidan

Hmm Getting into repeats. :/

They almost all do, or at least act as if they have that right. Look what's going on in Niger; France and USA are threatening and terrorizing it as if its their country. The US currently has bases there and in Syria, which they bombed as if it was their territory, and are stealing their oil. They did it to Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, too, and with the NATO--a supposedly defensive alliance's--help. They bombed Yugoslavia and cut Kosovo out of it with no respect for those borders at all. — Jack Rogozhin

France has miltary bases in Niger the country wants out, they have half their financial reserves in their bank, and they are crossing into Niger's airspace. That is imperialism and disrespect of borders, period. Anyone OK with that has no place complaining about Russia — Jack Rogozhin

↑ This would be a common fallacy.

It's been a while since Crimea was a part of Russia. It's been a legitimate part of Ukraine for a while. In 2014 Putin's Russia launched the land-grab. The UN concurs. "Period" (to use your word). But of course human rights should be respected in Crimea. And in Russia, Belarus, etc. Ukraine has to fulfill this and a few other things to be accepted into the EU. From memory, Ukraine has to be a transparent democracy to be accepted by NATO. Putin's Russia has regressed, Ukraine has progressed some (barring PTSD). Putin's supposed NATO-phobia has also been discussed (not sure I'm up to digging it all out).

↑ This would be a common fallacy.

It's been a while since Crimea was a part of Russia. It's been a legitimate part of Ukraine for a while. In 2014 Putin's Russia launched the land-grab. The UN concurs. "Period" (to use your word). But of course human rights should be respected in Crimea. And in Russia, Belarus, etc. Ukraine has to fulfill this and a few other things to be accepted into the EU. From memory, Ukraine has to be a transparent democracy to be accepted by NATO. Putin's Russia has regressed, Ukraine has progressed some (barring PTSD). Putin's supposed NATO-phobia has also been discussed (not sure I'm up to digging it all out). — jorndoe

No, it's not a common fallacy; it's not a fallacy at all. It has not been a legitimate part of Ukraine for a while; it has been a part of it for a short while compared to how long it has been part of Russia. It's like saying if Kruschev gave Ukraine to Belarus for the same amount of time, Ukraine would legitimately be part of Belarus...it wouldn't

Putin's Russia has not regressed, their economy is going strong, Brics is going well, and it looks like they're getting the Donbass...and they're now China's number one pal. Ukraine hasn't progressed. They've had civil war and strife since the Maidan coup, they've been consistently listed among the most corrupt countries in Europe, they've lost hundreds of thousands of their citizens--and probably the Donbass--and NATO and US are losing patient with them.

, as mentioned, repeats, including regress/progress. :/ Yes, that's a fallacy :D (the linked one, this is a philosophy forum).

No, it's not a fallacy. I know this is a philosophy forum and your claim what i said was a fallacy is philosophically wrong:grin:

If you think what I said was a fallacy then show how. Just linking to a random fallacy and not doing so is neither philosophical or adequate. I look forward to your doing so and responding

No, this is a terrible analogy. Belarus and Russia are allies with shared ethnic groups — Jack Rogozhin

Lol.

Just as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso were allies with France ...until a change in leadership! And the huge protests against Lukashenko earlier (until Russia sent help) and that some Belarussians are fighting for Ukraine show that all is not fine and dandy in Belarus. Many Belarussian commentators have been worried that Russia will take over their country for a long time.

Thinking the US doesn't control NATO is just naive. — Jack Rogozhin

What is naive is totally dismissing how the organization actually works.

Again, you think you know Putin's motivations; I don't get that. — Jack Rogozhin

Again, you should give reasons just why you ignore the reasons Putin has given for his annexations of territory. I don't get that.

Putin's Russia has not regressed, their economy is going strong, Brics is going well, and it looks like they're getting the Donbass...and they're now China's number one pal. Ukraine hasn't progressed. They've had civil war and strife since the Maidan coup, they've been consistently listed among the most corrupt countries in Europe, they've lost hundreds of thousands of their citizens--and probably the Donbass--and NATO and US are losing patient with them. — Jack Rogozhin

Glorious Russia going from triumph to triumph!!! Hail Putin!!!

(Corruption Perceptions Index)
Ukraine: 116th
Russia: 137th

I wonder if Russia making a large scale attack on Ukraine has had an effect on just why Ukraine has it so bad now...

If you accuse others

you think you know Putin's motivations — Jack Rogozhin

and then claim

I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist. — Jack Rogozhin

why are you so confidently expressing the following?

This isn't an issue of imperialism at this point. It is a security and territorial dispute. You can argue its a wrong one on Russia's part, but this isn't--at least not yet--an act of imperialism. — Jack Rogozhin

I would say every leader's--including Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's--are primarily selfish and self-centered. I do, however, think sometimes a leader's self-interest can alighn with his country's. I don't think Putin was primarily acting out of his country's interests, but Ukraine and NATO created a legitmate threat against his country and himself when Ukraine refused to remain neutral and NATO refused to not put missiles in Ukraine. — Jack Rogozhin

OK let's not talk about Putin's, Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's motivations, or simply assume they are selfish and self-centered. Let's talk about "legitimate threat against the country and himself", what makes a threat perception (NOT based on leaders' actual motivations because we do not know that other than assuming they are selfish) but on potential and precedent (like placing NATO missiles on the border between Ukraine and Russia that could kill Russian people and trigger a regime change in Russia) "legitimate"? And what would need to happen for you to believe that is an act of imperialism yet?