You're not just defining "anatalist" as someone who doesn't have children. You're defining it as someone who practically assents to anti-natalism. But not having children is not a practical assent to assigning a negative value to giving birth.

You're defining it as someone who practically assents to anti-natalism. — Michael

Did I? I thought I suggested divorcing strong and weak versions of anti-natalism, seeing as the latter does not live up to the implication of the prefix. Ergo, the new term "anatalist" for it.

But not having children is not a practical assent to assigning a negative value to giving birth. — Michael

Yes, indeed, that's why I've always argued, or tried to argue (forgive me if I didn't or wasn't clear) that it is practical assent to anatalism, not anti-natalism.

Yes, indeed, that's why I've always argued, or tried to argue (forgive me if I didn't or wasn't clear) that it is practical assent to anatalism, not anti-natalism. — Thorongil

Then what's anatalism? Because I thought you were defining anatalism as a practical assent to anti-natalism.

Did I?

In your opening post you said "It could also be someone whose lifestyle negates the possibility of having children, e.g. if one is celibate, meaning that they practically assent to anti-natalism, if not theoretically."

Then what's anatalism? Because I thought you were defining anatalism as a practical assent to anti-natalism. — Michael

Anatalism can either be the belief that you don't want to there to be kids or it can be the belief that you do want for their to be kids, depending upon whether you define "assent" to me that you agree with the idea that there shouldn't be kids or whether you simply engage in behavior that will lead to their not being kids. A person who hates kids, but who has kids might be an anatalist or might be a natalist, depending upon the definition you happen to be using. The hate kids (thus an anatalist) but had kids (thus a natalist).

It's sort of like I'm a dog, where dogs are defined as people.

In my OP, I said it refers to "someone who claims that having children may not be wrong but is not right/justified either." It's a position of skepticism, in other words, which, like all positions of skepticism, does not give positive assent. I doubt the claim that procreation is immoral but also all claims that it is justified. I suppose it's a sort of liminal space, but this is my position nonetheless.

No, not quite. See my latest post. My conversation with you had to do with celibacy and its relation to what one assents to in terms of anti/anatalism. But that wasn't the primary way I defined an anatalist specifically.

In your opening post you said "It could also be someone whose lifestyle negates the possibility of having children, e.g. if one is celibate, meaning that they practically assent to anti-natalism, if not theoretically." — Michael

Yes, the weak form, which I then re-termed anatalism. What's your point?

I'm sort of wondering of what practical relevance is there in calling one's self a natalist or an anatalist using your definitions?

Let's say a 10 year old girl just loves her dolls and loves everything about little kids, believing that a world filled with kids would be the most wonderful place. Being 10, she obviously cannot engage in any activity that would result in having children, nor would she want to. She is in fact an anatalist using your strained definition. Of what value is it in designating her as such, and how does it help you to put yourself (as a celibate) and those who detest children in the same general class as her?

Yes, the weak form, which I then re-termed anatalism. What's your point? — Thorongil

My point was that not having children is not a practical assent of anti-natalism. But now that you've clarified anatalism as the doubt that having children is justified my point is that not having children is not a practical assent of anatalism. I might believe that having children is justified but still not have children.

All definitions are stipulative and based on historical usage. — Thorongil

What's your point? I don't see how that's supposedly relevant or detracts from what I've said. It's evident from various dictionaries that my initial understanding corresponds with a common definition, and is therefore a perfectly acceptable usage outside of the context of your stipulated definition.

I might believe that having children is justified but still not have children. — Michael

If "justified" is understood as an obligation, then it's inconsistent to believe, "one ought to have children", and then act in a way contrary to that belief (e.g., practice elected celibacy).

If "justified" is understood as a permissibility, then it is equivalent to "it is not wrong to have children", which is contained in Thorongil's "anatalism".

Based on your comment, it seems you mean the latter.

If "justified" is understood as a permissibility, then it is equivalent to "it is not wrong to have children", which is contained in Thorongil's "anatalism" — Soylent

Thorongil's anatalism is the position that doubts that having children is justified, and so doubts that having children is permissible. I can believe that having children is permissible and still not have children.

I can believe that having children is permissible and still not have children. — Michael

Yes you can, because not having children may also be permissible. Anti-natalism would seem to assert that having children is impermissible, or that "one ought not have children". Thorongil has rejected that view, which was previously held, or at least used to self-identify, for the weaker "anatalist" view, which falls somewhere in the middle. The benefit of anatalism for Thorongil is that it identifies a moral position (i.e., the permissibility of having children or not having children), while also describing the life-style choice Thorongil has adopted as practically "anatalist". There is some dispute about the latter, but for someone that will not seek out medical intervention to have children (Thorongil), I'm not sure where the doubt arises except in a general, "I want to use this label for everyone" sort of way.

Anti-natalism would seem to assert that having children is impermissible, or that "one ought not have children". Thorongil has rejected that view, which was previously held, or at least used to self-identify, for the weaker "anatalist" view, which falls somewhere in the middle. — Soylent

But, as I said earlier, anti-natalism and anatalism do not seem distinguishable based upon the issue of whether or not one ought to have children, since whether one commits to the claim that it's immoral to do so, or just doubts whether it's justified, wouldn't it make sense to be of the position that one ought not have children?

It would matter a great deal what fuels the doubt. Doubt about the justification for natalism might be expressed as nihilism or another meta-ethical foundation that makes justification claims dubious. An anti-natalist is not going to express meta-ethical moral doubts while simultaneously holding that one ought not have children. An anatalist might hold both the pro-natalist and anti-natalist to task for any moral obligation. A nihilist might nonetheless have children, whereas Thorongil will not.

It would matter a great deal what fuels the doubt. Doubt about the justification for natalism might be expressed as nihilism or another meta-ethical foundation that makes justification claims dubious. An anti-natalist is not going to express meta-ethical moral doubts while simultaneously holding that one ought not have children. An anatalist might hold both the pro-natalist and anti-natalist to task for any moral obligation. A nihilist might nonetheless have children, whereas Thorongil will not. — Soylent

But you agree that they're indistinguishable in terms of the conclusion that one ought not have children? That's what really matters here. I reject both positions if that is a logical implication.

I mean, that an anatalist would hold an anti-natalist to account for explicitly committing to the claim that one ought not have children, whilst they themselves do so implicitly, is like the pot calling the kettle black.

I think that the difference between the two is somewhat superficial.

I mean, that an anatalist would hold an anti-natalist to account for explicitly committing to the claim that one ought not have children, whilst they themselves do so implicitly, is like the pot calling the kettle black.

I think that the difference between the two is somewhat superficial. — Sapientia

This might get into territory that Thorongil is more suited to defend. It seems that anatalism, borrowing from weak anti-natalism, doesn't commit one way or the other in terms of the behaviour of the adherents. A weak anti-natalist as someone that believes having children is not wrong (permissible), can consistently hold the position and have children. In this sense, the prefix "a" meaning "without" might be a cognitive stumbling block to understanding the position since one might self-identify as "anatalist" and have children. In light of that, I'm not sure anatalism is susceptible to the hypocrisy criticism. There might be further obligations that an anti-natalist might feel is implicit in the position, for instance lobbying for policy change regarding infertility treatments.

One aspect I am having slight trouble understanding is the other horn of the position (i.e., but is not right/justified either). If "justified" is understood as "permissible" and "not wrong" is also understood as "permissible", the anatalist position seems to be: "having children is permissible and not permissible". I take "right" in the second half to mean "obligated" (i.e., it is impermissible to not have children), such that the anatalist holds it is permissible to have children and not impermissible (permissible) to not have children. The anatalist position is that having children or not having children are both permissible, and only in the sense describing the life-style commitment does it cash out as practically indistinguishable from anti-natalism, which I would say is a fairly uncontroversial claim.

I might identify as somewhat anatalist as I understand the position, since I have some sympathies to anti-natalism but ultimately feel the position over-reaches in the strong moral claim.

*edit* I have two children, whom I love very much.

Addendum:

For my own self-identification it would be better to stick with "weak anti-natalism" by virtue of my reproductive success. Since I have children, the "a" prefix is inappropriate, where some weak version of "anti" might be appropriate since I do have some sympathies.

Here's the addendum you all need:

The war of A-natalism vs. Anti-natalism was fought round and round the teapot, up the spout and dumped into a dozen demitasses. In the end, the tempest tossed combatants were all washed out to tea. And yet the war of unimportant terms about which no one sensibly cares greatly (including, no doubt, the soldiers in this fray) was finally inconclusive.

No ground was lost.
No ground was gained.
No heights were scaled
No depths plumbed.

A good time was had by all. Such is philosophy.

A good time was had by all. Such is philosophy. — Bitter Crank

And that's all that matters! :D

I am going to go on a hunch here and concur that if a person is ignorant of a specific topic (such as the morality/rationality of child birth), insofar as they don't even recognize that it is an issue, then I don't think a position can be applied to this person. Perhaps in a post hoc attitude, they could realize that their actions categorized them into a certain position, but truly what difference does it make if you hold a position and yet not act upon it? What you are arguing for, , is that actions precede a person's position, when it should be the opposite. A person's position (assuming they are not disingenuous) should precede their actions.

It seems that anatalism, borrowing from weak anti-natalism, doesn't commit one way or the other in terms of the behaviour of the adherents. — Soylent

It's not so much about commitment, but about whether, given their position, their behaviour is reasonable or makes sense. They may not, at least explicitly, commit one way or the other, but that does have behavioural implications. If they don't act as someone sitting on the fence would act, then it's right to question whether their professed position is genuine.

A weak anti-natalist as someone that believes having children is not wrong (permissible), can consistently hold the position and have children. In this sense, the prefix "a" meaning "without" might be a cognitive stumbling block to understanding the position, since one might self-identify as "anatalist" and have children. In light of that, I'm not sure anatalism is susceptible to the hypocrisy criticism. — Soylent

That reasoning is flawed because it doesn't take into consideration the full position of anatalism, which entails more than the belief that having children is not wrong. It can therefore be dismissed.

If "justified" is understood as "permissible" and "not wrong" is also understood as "permissible", the anatalist position seems to be: "having children is permissible and not permissible". — Soylent

Yes, it does seem so. However, the contradiction can be resolved if you replace both of the claims with a claim about one's doubt in the relevant regard. So, one could claim that one doubts whether or not it's justified or permissible to have children.

But - in regard to your earlier denial of the inconsistency/hypocrisy point - if you doubt whether it's justified or permissible to have children, then why would you intentionally have children? How is that not a performative contradiction? And why wouldn't you want to dissuade others from doing so, unless and until we know that it's justified or permissible? After all, according to the anatalist, it's possible that doing so is immoral, perhaps even greatly so. It is in this sense that the difference between the two positions is superficial. Under scrutiny, anatalism seems to be forced to collapse into anti-natalism, at least in practical terms, in order to make sense.

The anatalist position is that having children or not having children are both permissible[...] — Soylent

What? That doesn't seem to be how @Thorongil described the position. It seems to me that it's more like the position that doubts whether having children is permissible, which is why it makes sense that Thorongil abstains from acts which might cause procreation.

That he is already celibate, on the other hand, is clearly a poor reason to identify as an anatalist (that is, someone who doubts whether having children is permissible). When thinking about the ethical question of whether or not having children is wrong, why, at that stage, would you take your celibacy into consideration? It would make life as an anatalist correspond with preexisting commitments, and perhaps make life easier, but that should not influence the reasoning behind one's decision. It's the truth that matters, not which position is more convenient. Thorongil has not approached this matter impartially, and I don't agree with that approach.

I'm not sure why certain people are still so obstinately confused. I'm also puzzled by how people can pontificate on all the permutations of meaning concerning the word anatalism, when in fact I coined it myself in the original post. Do a Google search for it and you will not find anything. Anyway, let me now try to recapitulate my position yet again. Though I suppose I ought to be glad that people are interested in what I label myself. In the grand scheme of things, it matters very little to me, but as long as labels are necessary to use, I will use them and try to do so as accurately as possible.

Alright, forget about celibacy for the moment. That is clearly a bugbear for many of you and is only of secondary importance to how I define anatalism. First, I stipulate that an action is wrong if it knowingly frustrates the will of another being. Second, I take anti-natalism to be the position that regards having children as morally wrong. So is having children (procreation) wrong? My answer is no, because the mere act of procreation (consensual, unprotected sex with a fertile female) doesn't frustrate the will of another being; one can't harm that which doesn't exist. However, does the fact that procreation is not wrong thereby make it right? Of course not, for one must provide reasons to have children, which is in effect to argue for natalism. In my case, I find none of the reasons for having children compelling.

Now, at this point, things can begin to get murky, but suffice it to say that I think we can establish that I am neither an anti-natalist nor a natalist. So what am I? Well, as I have said, I think the term "anatalist" fits best. Think of it as functioning like the word "amoral" which is between "immoral" and "moral." Notice, however, that it still occupies a negative position (though a different kind of negativity from anti-natalism): one does not commit to the natalist position. Could one still have children despite not finding any reason to? Sure, but this would be to act irrationally. Hence, because I do not wish to act irrationally, I do not have children. Again, it's not because I think it would be immoral to do so, but because it would be irrational to do so. I would also claim that it's irrational for everyone to have children, in addition to myself, but that depends on an argument I have not raised in this thread. For the purposes of this thread, I'm only speaking about myself.

By Zeus I hope this helps.

Why all this hairsplitting and apologia? Jut be an anti-natalist. Birth sucks, life sucks, we all know it.

Birth sucks, life sucks, we all know it. — The Great Whatever

So succinct. Should be a meme.

What you are arguing for, ↪Thorongil, is that actions precede a person's position, when it should be the opposite. A person's position (assuming they are not disingenuous) should precede their actions. — darthbarracuda

Perhaps, perhaps not. Actions sometimes (maybe quite frequently) and properly precede positions.

How could that possibly be?

You may have a very frightening experience. Perhaps you are rock climbing with a friend who is much better at it than you are. You are led upwards on a vertical climb which is not too difficult. When you are at the top, you suddenly see how difficult getting back down is going to be. After much frightening experience you are back on safe ground, and you establish a position (which you stick with for life) that you are NEVER GOING TO CLIMB ROCKS AGAIN. And you don't.

You start graduate school because you have a vague idea that a higher degree would be a good thing. Over the next two years you have one discouraging, depressing, unhappy experience after another. There are some good experiences, but on balance, it is pretty bad. Based on experience you arrive at the position that graduate school (like life itself for some people) sucks way too much to put up with.

If you always avoid homeless people and places where homeless people hang out because they smell bad and the smell makes you feel ill, (an experience) you may arrive at the position that homeless people are disgusting--not just in their odor, but in their very being. Same thing goes for any group of people who you systematically avoid because of some feeling you have about them (repugnance, fear, annoyance, whatever). You avoid them and the act of avoidance leads to building a position to justify the avoidance.

My guess is that a lot of arguments in philosophy are based on positions which would have benefitted by the opposing philosophers having had some actual experience prior to developing their positions.

Haha, you may be right. But I still think I can't fully commit for the reasons given. I never intended to beat this horse quite so much.

For the purposes of this thread, I'm only speaking about myself. — Thorongil

Well, no, you're not. A number of times you've said that the celibate assents to this position. That's the claim we've been arguing against.

So is having children (procreation) wrong? My answer is no, because the mere act of procreation (consensual, unprotected sex with a fertile female) doesn't frustrate the will of another being; one can't harm that which doesn't exist. — Thorongil

You can't care that much about frustrating the will of another being, otherwise you'd set aside the trivial exception of the time in which there is not yet a being, and instead consider a little further down the line when there will be a being, and a being with a will that'll inevitably be frustrated from time to time.

However, does the fact that procreation is not wrong thereby make it right? Of course not, for one must provide reasons to have children, which is in effect to argue for natalism. In my case, I find none of the reasons for having children compelling. — Thorongil

Not having children without good reason is the typical, "default" position. Believing that there is no good reason to have children is practically anti-natalism, if not technically. The only difference being that anti-natalism, as you've implied, is absolute, whereas your position is contingent. I suspect that "certain people" are sort of anti-natalists in denial, or "obstinately confused" halfway anti-natalists who won't follow the logic where it eventually leads.

I would also claim that it's irrational for everyone to have children, in addition to myself, but that depends on an argument I have not raised in this thread. For the purposes of this thread, I'm only speaking about myself. — Thorongil

Did you mean everyone or anyone? I suspect you meant the latter. I think that that argument would only work if it maintains that the overall cost of having children outweighs the overall benefit, and that, I believe, is not necessarily true, nor true of every case.

Well, no, you're not. A number of times you've said that the celibate assents to this position. That's the claim we've been arguing against. — Michael

My thoughts exactly. He has made plenty of general points, the implications of which do not only effect him.

N.B. the celibate; not the Thorongil.