What I am saying makes sense and is factual. We didn't consent to be born. — Andrew4Handel

....

It is irrelevant whether someone can consent to be born — Andrew4Handel

What if no one ever had kids again.. would that mean the souls are finished wanting to be embodied in the physical world? Did they put up a mass strike?

I don't believe that is a genuine possibility unless humanity were somehow rendered infertile en masse. There may be billions of other planets, infinitely many if the universe is infinite, with sapient beings; perhaps the souls would then have to choose from among those. What leads you to presume that Earth is so important in the Grand Scheme?

What if all the sapient beings chose not to procreate? No, there very well might be more sapient beings. I don't think Earth or anywhere is that important in the Grand Scheme. However, you seem to think that embodied souls is a part of the Grand Scheme, and they need some physical host to be embodied.. Reminds of interesting sci-fi plots.

It hardly seems likely that an infinite number of sentient beings all across the universe would suddenly decide not to procreate. I haven't said that I think embodied souls are part of the Grand Scheme; I have said that if the possibility that souls pre-exist bodily life and choose the circumstances of their birth were true, then the OP is false. It would also seem to follow then that embodied souls would be part of the Grand Scheme, but I haven't said that I believe any of this is the case; I am merely trying to unpack what would be entailed by two of the imaginable possibilities.

It is irrelevant whether someone can consent to be born — Andrew4Handel

The relevance is whether they did consent.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. Do you mean the soul would only choose if it couldn't know that it was choosing a "bad life"? — John

There is such a thing as informed consent.

There is no point having consent if you have no idea what you are consenting to. For a soul to give consent to enter this world they would have to know what they were consenting to i.e. see into the future.

The reason we can consent to things now is prior knowledge of outcomes. I wouldn't consent to someone throwing a rock at me because prior knowledge of the damage to would cause.


I have absolutely no evidence that I chose my parents so why should I believe it? You appear to saying we should be believe anything that is a possibility with no evidence.

A soul could not set up a consenting relationship anyway, unless it communicated with its future parents and there is no evidence of that. Consent involves two or more people communicating with each other and not one person simply desiring something.

Yes, and according to our two alternative scenarios, you either chose this prior to life or the very notion of choosing it is incoherent; take your pick. — John

The notion of being forced into existence is not incoherent. The idea that we did not consent to be born is not incoherent.

If I decided to create a child tomorrow I would be choosing to make someone else exist. I would be solely responsible for them existing they would exist based on my desire to create them.

Now if I see a child wandering near a busy road I feel a responsibility as a capable adult to prevent them from wandering in the road. I think most adults would feel responsible for any vulnerable child in danger because they have the capacity to save him or her from harm.

So if we can assume responsibility for a stranger's child why the aversion to taking full responsibility for deliberately exposing your own child to serious harm? Self exculpation it seems.

The theory that souls do not pre-exist bodily life is equally unfalsifiable, so again what you say here is irrelevant. — John

It's not a theory it is the null hypothesis.

I know parents who wanted to have children and had them based on their own desires with no reference to pre existing souls. Considering there was no communication between them and the souls they can be separately held accountable for their action.

For example Imagine Jane is suicidal and is standing by a bridge about to jump but then she is hit by a drunk driver and Killed. Her desire to die does not mitigate the criminal offence of the driver.

The point of theory being falsifiable is so it can do some work in explanation so it's got go beyond pure speculation in my opinion. A thought experiment can be fantastical and be used to create "ad absurdum" or provoke thought. But to apply something to real life it has to offer to explain the evidence imo. In this case it seems simply be an attempt to shift accountability.

That's nonsense; for example when people consent to marry they never know how it will turn out.

That's only if you believe that life is suffering and if you believe that it is morally preferable to avoid suffering (and of course that's only to the person who thinks this). The kid who wasn't born maybe would have wound up thinking that life is suffering and that suffering is preferable to not suffering, or any other sort of alternative. — Terrapin Station

I agree. The biggest ''IF'' is about the notion life is suffering.

You said:

In that I think that

(a) "All of these potential people that we're not creating might be really upset that we didn't create them, so we'd better try to have as many kids as possible"

and

(b) Antinatalism

are equally ridiculous, for the same reasons. — Terrapin Station

Denying both (a) and (b) leads to a contradiction. That stance is possible only if morality is subjective - a matter of preference, perhaps moulded by religion and culture, etc.

But is morality subjective as you say?

If you look at the past, morality was subjective. Different cultures had their own moral standards. Infanticide was common. Child marriage was practiced. Women extra-marital affairs were stoned to death, an eye-for-an-eye was a form of punishment, etc.

But take at a look at now. All the above are now considered immoral universally. To make the long story short, we are, undeniably, approaching moral objectivity. Does this trend in the moral world have a sound rational basis? I don't know but what we can glean from it is, deep down in the subconscioud(?), we do believe morality is objective.

"People can't consent to being born."

Don't know if anyone has made this comment yet, but this is essentially the concept of thrownness in existentialist writing. We are thrown into the world whether we like it or not. That is part of our ontological constitution, as is the fact that we are also inevitably headed towards death. which we don't necessarily consent to either.

While I don't think that suicide is always wrong, I think it is often a sad choice and oftentimes it is deeply influenced by either mental illness, addiction, or both. I think the majority of people with relatively healthy brains consent to being alive once they are actually in-the-world.

If you see life as a secular miracle (or a religious one for that matter), you will spontaneously be glad to exist and I think in that case you retroactively consent to having been born. If you don't want to continue living, on the other hand, your point makes an interesting addition to the argument for euthanasia being a legal option in some circumstances.

That's nonsense; for example when people consent to marry they never know how it will turn out. — John

As I said you can't consent to be born on your scenario because their is no contract between parent and child (or contact)

Usually in marriage you know the person you are marrying and can gather all sorts of information on them. We are talking about children living in a slum,war zone or famine area here not someone marrying someone who turns out to be bad.

Personally i don't think marriage is anything real. I don't know what you think is involved. By marrying someone you do not consent to be forced to have sex with them. as far as I am aware marriage gives you no rights over the person you marry and you cannot force them to do anything. (ironically it on divorce that you can take half their stuff)

And I don't think consent allows anyone to harm you anyway. If someone ask for an assisted suicide it is usually to end there suffering and is done in a humane way. if you consent to uncomfortable surgery it is to improve your wellbeing.

(..)and I also agree with you about how tiresome and childish the anti-life, anti-natal sheep are. — John

I came to antinatalism by myself with no outside influence. Most antinatalist are the least sheeplike most skeptical people I meet.

Your attitude highlights the problem. We are talking about suffering from Genocide to Chronic depression, famine and slavery and you are calling people childish for not wanting to propagate this.

Even If I had children I would always be concerned and vocal about famine, disease, abuse, inequality and all other forms of suffering. It seems you just don't want to be exposed to other peoples suffering. People have to suffer quietly and discreetly so you can enjoy your life.

And with your fantastical scenario people chose this life so can't complain about their suffering and have to behave ethically and embrace that they chose their cancerous body and or callous parents.

Hmmm

You don't think so, even though what I said in the quote above can be demonstrated by example when it comes to pets and children? — Sapientia

I actually don't think this pet - children equivalence will go down well with some people. Anyway...

Prevalent practice permits of guardianship on moral issues - pets and children. However, this is like an improvised speech, just a place holder. It hasn't been subject to rigorous analysis. This is the point of the OP. To add, simple practice doesn't mean it's morally right. Slavery was a practice but we realize it's immoral.

No, that kind of complex abstract thinking is far beyond the capabilities of pets and toddlers. Mutually beneficial? Yes. Mutual consent? No, obviously not — Sapientia

So, if someone is mentally immature it's ok to decide on his/her behalf? This to is just a place holder - an improvisation that prevents paralysis of thought and action.

But is morality subjective as you say?

If you look at the past, morality was subjective. Different cultures had their own moral standards. Infanticide was common. Child marriage was practiced. Women extra-marital affairs were stoned to death, an eye-for-an-eye was a form of punishment, etc.

But take at a look at now. All the above are now considered immoral universally. To make the long story short, we are, undeniably, approaching moral objectivity. Does this trend in the moral world have a sound rational basis? I don't know but what we can glean from it is, deep down in the subconscioud(?), we do believe morality is objective. — TheMadFool

I hate when people routinely write long replies--I try to keep mine short, so I apologize for the length of this one, but I think it's important to clear a few things up here:

First, what it refers to for morality to be subjective is that moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (I'm using that goofy term to try to avoid loaded connotations by using particular words), such as "It is wrong to murder," "It is morally recommendable to help little old ladies across the street," "It is morally obligatory be honest" etc.only occur mentally. Those things do not occur elsewhere in the world.

That morality is subjective does not necessarily imply that different people espouse different moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems. Imagine that every single person in the world, from the start of time to the end of time, were all to agree on things such as "It is wrong to murder" etc That has no bearing on whether morality is subjective. Why? Because morality being subjective ONLY refers to the idea of moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems only occurring mentally. As long as "It is wrong to murder" only occurs mentally, it's subjective, even if everyone always agreed on it and always will.

Re "universality," there's some confusion over its relation to subjectivity becuse of two different common senses of the term. One sense, the one that you're using, has to do with commonality. If every x has property F (well, or we could say close to it, because people sometimes allow exceptions while still applying the term "universal"), then property F is universal on this sense. On that sense, something can be universal but subjective. How? It's simply a phenomenon that only occurs mentally, but the phenomenon occurs in every mind.

The other sense is whether we're talking about a universal a la the universalism versus nominalism debate (aka the "realism" vs. nominalism debate (on universals).) The idea there is whether there are types or kinds or forms and the like, where those types, kinds, etc. exist somehow extramentally (that is, outside of minds), simply as the type, kind, form, where that type, kind, form etc. can then be multiply but identically instantiated in different substances. On that sense of the term, universalism is incompatible with subjectivity (in the sense that if F is a universal, F isn't subjective).. Note that on this sense of universalism, not everyone has to agree on anything if "murder is wrong" is a universal. Something being a universal in this sense is mind independent. And in fact, everyone could agree that "murder is morally permissible" while "murder is wrong" is still a universal. In that situation, people are simply getting the universal wrong, perceiving it wrong, etc.--however one wants to claim that people can become aware of universals. In other words, on this sense of universal, universals are basically "things" that exist, outside of our minds, somehow in the universe, and thus we can get them wrong, just like we could get it wrong whether the Earth is a flat, stationary center of the universe. Universals on this sense have nothing to do with whether we all agree on something..

On my view, universals can certainly occur in the first sense (everyone or close to it can agree on something), although there contingently are no moral universals (I'll clarify this in a moment) in this sense (I do believe there are other sorts of universals), while in the second sense of universals, there are no universals period. In other words, I'm a nominalist.

So, I believe that moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems only occur mentally. Thus my "fill-in" for "whatever-you-want-to-call-them" is "judgment." Now, moral judgments are realative to cultures in one sense, but in a more important sense, they're relative to individuals. It's individuals who have minds, not cultures. And plenty of individuals disagree with the morality that's dominant in their culture. This is why there are contingently no moral universals at the moment. (And by the way, I'm an individual who disagrees with a lot of the dominant moral views in my culture.) Talking about cultures as if there are cultural beliefs, cultural judgments, etc. is metaphorical, not literal. (Or actually I believe there's some better literary term for that sort of projection from an x with quality F to a broader thing where we metaphorically attribute quality F to it but it dosn't literally have quality F, but I forgot what that term would be.) Cultures are literally comprised of individuals with minds interacting in particular ways, and cultural mores and stuff are just conventions or norms re how those individuals interact, whether they agree with each other and act in concert, whether they're able to enforce certain things due to raw power and influence and etc.

So morality is subjective and it's relative to individuals, and this would be the case even if every person agreed on their moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems. The upshot of that is this: let's say that everyone says, "It is morally obligatory to wear orange clothing on Wednesdays," and one really weird person comes along and says, "No, it is morally wrong to wear orange clothing on Wednesdays," it doesn't follow that that one person is wrong or incorrect.* (see footnote) Why not? Because there are no moral facts other than the fact that everyone else's mind is working however it is for them to feel that it is morally obligatory to wear orange clothing on Wednesdays, but this one person's mind is simply working differently. It's not wrong for someone's mind to work differently. And we can't argue that "It is morally obligatory to wear orange clothing on Wednesdays" is correct just because everyone thinks it, because that's the argumentum ad poplum fallacy. In order for it to be correct, it has to be the case that there's a fact in the world, independent of what anyone thinks, and we're getting that fact right (via our perception of it, our claims about it, etc.) But there are not any such moral facts, because morality is only what people happen to think--it's only mental. This odd person is just thiking something different.

(*footnote: when it comes to morality, no one is right or wrong or correct or incorrect. Why not? Because there's nothing to get right or wrong or to be correct or incorrect about. It's simply a matter of how people feel. There are no extramental facts that we can be mistaken about. Also, note that even if there were extramental moral facts, there would be nothing to oblige anyone to conform to them. For example, say that we discovered that somehow, "It is morally obligatory to wear orange on Wednesdays" were "embedded" in the extramental universe. Well, if Joe says, "Fine, but I don't like wearing orange (on Wednesdays). I'm not going to follow that. I feel that one should be allowed to wear all yellow on Wednesdays" then we can't say that he's wrong for feeling that way. He simply doesn't care for the extramental moral facts, and he's doing his own thing instead. The only thing that could stop that is people who feel that they should follow the moral facts and who have the enforcement power to at least arrest Joe. But that's really no different than if there were no extramental moral facts. People are simply following what they feel in both cases.)

(footnote2: There aren't actually many--if there are any--philosophers who believe that morality is objective in the sense that they believe that there are moral whatever-you-want-to-call-thems somehow embedded in the extramental world and that for some reason, we're supposed to be obliged to follow those extramentally embedded moral facts (how that's supposed to work--who knows?) Often all that's really going on is this: humans have a tendency to conform, to want to follow the pack. We know that argumentum ad populums are fallacious, though. But there's still a deep-seated desire that we can't get rid of, much stronger in some people, to conform simply because something's a norm (and in fact the word "normative" in itself is basically a term to refer to something suggesting behavioral conformity simply because it's common behavior), so there is all sorts of rationalizing done, with people going to great pains to build up elaborate theories, to justify conforming to the pack just because they're the pack, but where people are careful to avoid suggesting that they're merely advocating conformity, argumentum ad populums, etc.--but really, that's all they're doing, no matter how much bullshit they couch it in)

That wasn't a straw-man. I'm simply asking you to follow through with the implications of what you believe. Act on your beliefs if you actually believe them. If this is what you believe, then free all the murderers for ending the suffering of their "victims", and make them heroes.

I like the distinction you make between the two kinds of universals. One is just a form of convention and the other is grounded in facts.

So, you think what I refer to as objective moral facts is of the former type - basically a matter of convention, following-the-pack sort of thing.

How do you define objectivity then? The definition I'm familiar with is a certain observation is objective to the extent it can be corroborated by as many individuals, instruments as possible. Keep in mind that the credibility is directly proportional to the number of confirmatory data points. In addition, this is important, the issue being evaluated is subject to rational analysis.

You think this is the ad populum fallacy BUT note that this fallacy is committed when the argument depends exclusively on the number of people holding a particular belief. This is not the case with moral issues. There's reason behind a moral belief e.g. killing someone deprives him of a meaningful, enjoyable life. So, no, there's no ad populum fallacy going on. And I think we can be objective about morality.

How do you feel about the suffering of non-human animals capable of feeling pain? Is it wrong for them to procreate?

How do you feel about the suffering of non-human animals capable of feeling pain? Is it wrong for them to procreate? — Srap Tasmaner

Animals appear not to be able conceptualise issues like right and wrong. Some extreme utilitarians have come to the conclusion we should destroy all sentience and some utilitarians advocate intervening to make animals unable to experience pain.

It is hard to prove things about animals conscious states. Also they can't form a contract for consent. Which raises a related issue. People take care of the pets until they die (good owners) the pet has no obligations. That is what ideally should happen with children.

If it is wrong to procreate, is it also wrong to allow others to procreate?

If it is wrong to procreate, is it also wrong to allow others to procreate? — Srap Tasmaner

The main issue for me is consent followed closely by the issue of suffering. It is wrong to make something happen to someone else without their consent in my opinion.

I think it is an issue between parent and child though and that a person is only responsible for their decision to procreate.

I can't think of any justification for creating a child.

But we haven't even got near antinatalism because people can just have children as they please with minimal consequences and we don't discuss the ramifications (outside of this type of debate)

How do you define objectivity then? The definition I'm familiar with is a certain observation is objective to the extent it can be corroborated by as many individuals, instruments as possible. Keep in mind that the credibility is directly proportional to the number of confirmatory data points. In addition, this is important, the issue being evaluated is subject to rational analysis.

You think this is the ad populum fallacy BUT note that this fallacy is committed when the argument depends exclusively on the number of people holding a particular belief. This is not the case with moral issues. There's reason behind a moral belief e.g. killing someone deprives him of a meaningful, enjoyable life. So, no, there's no ad populum fallacy going on. And I think we can be objective about morality. — TheMadFool

So if "subjective" refers to things occurring only in minds, "objective" is the complement--things occurring outside of or independent of minds.

That an observation can be corroborated by many individuals is a characteristic of objective things, because many different individuals can observe the same thing that exists in the world independent of minds. The observations or the corroboration aren't themseves objective. The thing observed is objective. In the case of something objective, there's something to get right or wrong. Either you clearly observe the extramental thing (and make accurate deductions etc. and then statements about it) or you do not.

In the case of something that's mental only, there's nothing to observe aside from the fact that you and others have whatever dispositions, opinions, etc. that you do.

"It's wrong to deprive someone of a meaningful, enjoyable life" is no more an objective fact than "It is wrong to kill them" is. You can't get to factual moral or value statements.

But take at a look at now. All the above are now considered immoral universally. — TheMadFool

Um, just no?

Why are the possibilities, assuming that that's what they are, (1) that people have souls, and (2) that souls exist prior to birth, and (3) that souls consent to being born, far fetched? I suspect that they're far fetched for a similar reason that the possibilities (4) that pigs can fly, and (5) that one just flew past my window, and (6) that it said "Hello" as it flew past, are judged to be far fetched. (I accept that there might be better analogies, perhaps with ghosts or the Lock Ness monster).

The reason why I am revising my claim to a suspicion is because John, as far as I'm aware, has yet to define what a soul is. If (1) were to turn out to be analogous to the claim that, say, people have brains, then I would readily concede that people have souls. However, I find that doubtful, given the other possibilities that he linked possibility (1) to, which would remain problematic. And even it this were the case, it might amount to misleading wordplay.

What do I mean by far fetched? Something which, even if logically possible, nevertheless has little else going for it in terms of evidence or likelihood.

So, what evidence or likelihood is there for these supposed possibilities? Perhaps John thinks he can answer that question differently to how I would. But in my assessment, there seems to be only weak evidence - not really enough to warrant anything other than an acknowledgement of possibility, assuming it's even possible, and does not run into contradiction with what we know. My methodology would consist in, or incorporate, empirical or scientific methods, and I don't think that the results in either case would be substantial. Perhaps John has in mind some dusty old argument from ancient times which could be rehashed. I don't know.

I actually don't think this pet - children equivalence will go down well with some people. Anyway... — TheMadFool

Some people are overly sensitive, easily offended, and idiotic. It's not an equivalence, it's a comparison. They both have limitations in terms of ability when compared with an average adult human. That's not at all controversial.

Prevalent practice permits of guardianship on moral issues - pets and children. However, this is like an improvised speech, just a place holder. It hasn't been subject to rigorous analysis. This is the point of the OP. To add, simple practice doesn't mean it's morally right. Slavery was a practice but we realize it's immoral. — TheMadFool

I'm not saying it's right because it's practice, so that isn't an argument against anything I've said. It's right if it's mutually beneficial, or even sometimes if it isn't, for example, if acting in what is understandably interpreted to be in their best interest. Given that consent is a non-factor, since we already know that they can't consent, we must look to other factors.

So, if someone is mentally immature it's ok to decide on his/her behalf? This to is just a place holder - an improvisation that prevents paralysis of thought and action. — TheMadFool

Can they consent? Are you their rightful guardian? Are you acting responsibly in your role as guardian? If they can't, if you are, and if again you are, then yes, that's okay. If, for example, it was an emergency situation, then you don't even have to be their guardian: just do what's right. Getting your priorities straight matters.

Parents may or may not consent (intend) to have a child. Obviously they cannot consent to have the particular child they end up with, but if they intend to have a child they consent to take what is given. Also, consent is still consent if it comes from only one side. Consent is not necessarily mutual consent, there is a valid distinction there.

You appear to saying we should be believe anything that is a possibility with no evidence. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not saying that at all. You need to read more carefully. I'm not saying that we should believe anything; either that souls pre-exist bodily life and consent to be born or that they do not pre-exist bodily life. The point is that considering the imaginable possibilities shows that your claim is necessarily either false or incoherent.

Well, actually there are further possibilities: that souls pre-exist bodily life and are forced to be born. But if that is the case then we exist in a diabolical universe; an inherently evil universe. Actually some of the early Christian gnostics believed something like this, if my memory serves. They believed the God of the old testament was a mistaken creation of Wisdom or Forethought, a deluded being who falsely came to believe that he was the one and only creator, and demanded to be worshiped, and threatened to punish 'sinners' who would not worship him. And the Gnostics were actually anti-natalists on the basis of this belief.

William Blake was an anti-natalist too, because he believed that procreation causes a soul to fall out of eternity into the darkness of time. I never had, and never wanted to have, children, so I guess you could say I'm an anti-natalist for myself, but it's really much more a lack of desire for children than any definite attitude about having children. If I were to be an anti-natalist with attitude it could only be on the basis of some definite belief like the Gnostics' or Blake's, but I have difficulty believing anything i don't have good evidence for. I would at least need to have some kind of religious experience that convinced me.

In any case your argument is based on the idea that souls do not pre-exist; and in that context the idea of consent is incoherent. That is the problem with your argument. So. maybe you need to adopt some kind of religious belief to render your cherished anti-natalism coherent. ;)

Here's the thing: Relationships not based on consent are, essentially, a last resort. That is to say, on the ladder of morality it occupies the lowest rung. Doesn't this speak something? Such non-consensual pacts are hovering on the border between what is moral and what is immoral.

I don't think the distinction mental vs extramental is valid, nor is it useful.

It's not valid because, thinking along these lines, nothing mental can be objective, even philosophy. It also renders your arguments self-defeating.

It's not useful because it doesn't provide us anything prescriptive. Like a doctor who doesn't prescribe medications. One wonders at why the title ''Doctor''.