Who is the "we" here? Are you talking about what conditions for support the US or EU population might find acceptable? — Echarmion

Odd, that's the second time in the last few days someone has picked me up on that particular usage, perhaps an American vs English thing? Using 'we' this way is just the same as saying 'one' only slightly less formal - it's just a generic 'everybody'. I'm making an ethical claim. Read it as 'one ought...' Did your mother never say "we don't drop litter", or somesuch?

He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on. — Isaac


Three times. He attacked Crimea in early 2014. Then in late 2014 regular russian forces crossed the border and attacked AFU formations in the Donbas as they were about to mop up the separatists there.

Russia has repeatedly attacked across the border into Donbas whenever the situation of the separatists seemed endangered, so we could run the tally higher if we wanted to. — Echarmion

We could. The context was in the breaking of peace agreements, so support for separatists didn't seem to fit. The conclusion is the same either way. If the fact that a nation has previous attacked another were held as reasons not to negotiate with them we'd be in an almost permanent state of war. So if Russia were some kind of serial attacker, we might have something to go on, but their history of attacks in Eastern Ukraine is little more than to restate that there is a dispute over that territory.

Anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of the strategic situation realises that neither side can achieve a decisive victory that would enable them to dictate peace terms.

Which obviously means that the parties involved need to continuously evaluate how they could end the conflict. I'm sure this is already happening all the time, though obviously behind closed doors.

But again this is merely the basic understanding of the situation. It does not include any actionable suggestions. It doesn't even really offer any useful framework to develop such a plan.

The crux of the issue is not that people don't want to negotiate. The crux is that both sides have vital interests in play which they are unable to align, and thus the outcome is continued fighting. As a rule, humans are willing to accept a lot of suffering to defend their interests. Pointing out the suffering won't help. — Echarmion

You're making the same assumption @Jabberwock makes with...

Yes, he suggests that the diplomatic channel should be opened now. But he is saying that it should be done in parallel with supplementing the counteroffensive, which is the opposite of what you suggest: — Jabberwock

... that there's a binary choice. What I'm advocating, what Charap is saying is not that some switch needs to be flicked to 'turn on' negotiations and 'turn off' war, but that the emphasis is currently in the wrong place. Negotiations are under-supported, and war is over-encouraged.

What I'm standing against in this thread is the utter rejection of anything remotely misaligned with the mainstream view that Ukraine should be wholly supported in any effort it chooses to do, which currently is full scale war to reclaim all of it's territories. I think that's naive and shows a callous disregard for those others affected. The framing of brave democracy-loving freedom fighters fending off evil authoritarian imperialists is absurd (with the exception of the evil authoritarian bit - that's about right). It's a regional conflict over disputed territory because of separatism, the same kind of separatism which elsewhere has lead to independence, and a general siding with the separatists in the liberal West. Either way, the West's involvement has been almost universally, in such cases, to broker peace, not to take sides (at least the public portrayal has been such). So supplying arms to one side, which in most countries constitutes a war crime, whilst barely moving on talks, even shutting them down at time, is a change in emphasis which is unwarranted by the circumstances.

As we have seen, there are factors which barely change the indicator (like rising authoritarian rule in Russia) — Jabberwock

Third time lucky... Authoritarian rule is an indicator, not a factor affecting indicators. The HFI attempts to include in its measure degrees of authoritarianism, it is therefore already included in any comparison. Things like the actions of predatory monopolies like Black Rock (or Halliburton in Iraq), are not measures already included in the HFI, so we have to speculate on the effect they might have had. If you still don't get it this time, it's probably best we just drop this.

You mean he is biased? Of course he is. Does that mean that he makes wild speculations? Rather unlikely, it would be rather damaging to his reputation if he made military predictions completely divorced from reality. — Jabberwock

Yes. The same applies to Sachs, but it didn't stop you attempting to downplay the relevance of his statements with this accusation of bias.

And since when ha making predictions divorced from reality hampered the career of retired military advisor. Have you looked at the track record of the current crop of ex-military advisors? accuracy isn't an issue. Cushy jobs consulting for arms dealers and government agencies are far more important and those are not gained by accuracy, they're gained by loyalty.

No, we choose war when other options are unlikely to bring lasting peace and bear negative consequences. — Jabberwock

Well then we've reached the limit of our disagreement. I think it is inhumanely monstrous to simply 'choose' war as if it were an equal option to peace dependant only on the chances of success.

which of your experts you mentioned said that all options must be spent, no matter how likely or with what consequences? — Jabberwock

None. That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. It clearly failed.

Comparing the economies is important to show the scale - even if the West cuts its assistance by half, it will still be a significant burden on Russia which it will be unlikely to meet. — Jabberwock

So you claim, but without evidence. You've yet to supply anything with relative amounts. Sure, if the West cuts aid in half it will still be enough. But are they going to cut aid in half? or third? or quarter? There's significant calls in America to cut it to zero, likewise Germany.

She writes that achieving lasting peace with Putin through negotiations is very unlikely, which is the very thing you propose. — Jabberwock

I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I've asked you time and again for a very simple and very reasonable request that you cite what I have claimed in your post rather than make up what you think I've claimed. It's really the bare minimum of decent honest debate that you argue against the claims I've made. I simply will not answer again to claims I've not made. there is a quote function, it's not hard to use.

The ongoing grain thing ... — jorndoe

Though Africa has benefited from the deal indirectly by stabilizing global supply and prices, they have not been the ones to benefit directly. While only 12% of the grain has reached Africa, 40% went to Western Europe, according to the World Food Program. The biggest recipients of Ukraine’s grains have been China, Spain, Turkey, Italy and The Netherlands. 80% of the grain has gone to upper-middle and high income countries, with 44% going to high income countries, while only 2.5% has made its way to low-income countries, according to the most recent UN data. — https://original.antiwar.com/ted_snider/2023/07/26/russia-decides-not-to-renew-grain-deal-some-context/

Odd, that's the second time in the last few days someone has picked me up on that particular usage, perhaps an American vs English thing? Using 'we' this way is just the same as saying 'one' only slightly less formal - it's just a generic 'everybody'. I'm making an ethical claim. Read it as 'one ought...' Did your mother never say "we don't drop litter", or somesuch? — Isaac

I guess it's because your approach didn't suggest an ethical statement to me.

When making such a judgement, I wouldn't consider the chances of success the most relevant aspect, though they're not irrelevant either.

We could. The context was in the breaking of peace agreements, so support for separatists didn't seem to fit. The conclusion is the same either way. If the fact that a nation has previous attacked another were held as reasons not to negotiate with them we'd be in an almost permanent state of war. So if Russia were some kind of serial attacker, we might have something to go on, but their history of attacks in Eastern Ukraine is little more than to restate that there is a dispute over that territory. — Isaac

Fair enough, though it still suggests that the current russian leadership has decided they're in this for the long game. That means the kind of short term freezing of the conflict with intent to then negotiate a long term solution once cooler heads prevail is unlikely to work.

... that there's a binary choice. What I'm advocating, what Charap is saying is not that some switch needs to be flicked to 'turn on' negotiations and 'turn off' war, but that the emphasis is currently in the wrong place. Negotiations are under-supported, and war is over-encouraged. — Isaac

I see your point, but I'm not sure what evidence you're expecting to see pointing towards negotiations.

What I'm standing against in this thread is the utter rejection of anything remotely misaligned with the mainstream view that Ukraine should be wholly supported in any effort it chooses to do, which currently is full scale war to reclaim all of it's territories. — Isaac

This kinda suggests you're expecting Ukraine or it's allies to pre-emptively concede territory before negotiations have actually begun, or to publicly set limits to further support.

That sounds pretty naive to me. We're talking about two parties who are involved in a full scale war to assert their interests. And Ukraine's partners not only have to consider the immediate material impact of a peace deal but also it's psychological impact on geopolitics. To put it bluntly, the West cannot afford to be seen as an unreliable ally.

Negotiations are going to be conducted via secret backchannels. They're going to be publicly disavowed. This is necessary both to preserve your leverage as well as to safe face in the international arena.

The framing of brave democracy-loving freedom fighters fending off evil authoritarian imperialists is absurd (with the exception of the evil authoritarian bit - that's about right). It's a regional conflict over disputed territory because of separatism, the same kind of separatism which elsewhere has lead to independence, and a general siding with the separatists in the liberal West. Either way, the West's involvement has been almost universally, in such cases, to broker peace, not to take sides (at least the public portrayal has been such). So supplying arms to one side, which in most countries constitutes a war crime, whilst barely moving on talks, even shutting them down at time, is a change in emphasis which is unwarranted by the circumstances. — Isaac

I disagree with your assessment of the separatist movement. It would have fizzled out and been quashed within months had not the russian military directly intervened.

It's also a very different situation in that Russia has started a fully fledged invasion in order to destroy Ukraine as it currently exist and absorb most of it's territory. That's old school imperialism.

That's a direct challenge to the previous status quo of "imperialism by invitation". It's a significant breach of the post-war order and at the same time a challenge to the West. The west has every reason to defend it's "empire" by supporting Ukraine which is, after all, in this by their choice and for their own interests.

Third time lucky... Authoritarian rule is an indicator, not a factor affecting indicators. The HFI attempts to include in its measure degrees of authoritarianism, it is therefore already included in any comparison. Things like the actions of predatory monopolies like Black Rock (or Halliburton in Iraq), are not measures already included in the HFI, so we have to speculate on the effect they might have had. If you still don't get it this time, it's probably best we just drop this. — Isaac

No, what Putin does to his people is not an indicator, it is a factor affecting the indicator. You are just confused.

Yes. The same applies to Sachs, but it didn't stop you attempting to downplay the relevance of his statements with this accusation of bias.

And since when ha making predictions divorced from reality hampered the career of retired military advisor. Have you looked at the track record of the current crop of ex-military advisors? accuracy isn't an issue. Cushy jobs consulting for arms dealers and government agencies are far more important and those are not gained by accuracy, they're gained by loyalty. — Isaac

I did not down play the relevance of Sachs' statements, I just pointed out he is not an impartial witness to the negotiations, which was implied.

You have accused me of making things up, i.e. the specific operation plan, because it was not from an expert, so you claimed we are both in the same boat. I gave you the plan from the expert, so you are in the boat of unspecificed operating plans alone.

Well then we've reached the limit of our disagreement. I think it is inhumanely monstrous to simply 'choose' war as if it were an equal option to peace dependant only on the chances of success. — Isaac

As I wrote long time ago, I understand that you feel that way, however, most people do not. You also seem to believe that it is an imperative that everyone felt like you, but again, it is just you.

None. That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. It clearly failed. — Isaac

If your moral sense is different than that of most people, then all I can do is to empathize with you. Your insistence that the majority abandons their moral view (which, as you say, does not need backing up), is a bit unrealistic, though.

So you claim, but without evidence. You've yet to supply anything with relative amounts. Sure, if the West cuts aid in half it will still be enough. But are they going to cut aid in half? or third? or quarter? There's significant calls in America to cut it to zero, likewise Germany. — Isaac

The military American aid to Ukraine amounts to 42 bln USD. It is harder to find data on help from other countries, but estimates put it at about the same figure. This year the whole military budget of Russia is about 80 bln USD. However, not all of it or possibly even most of it is not directed to the war effort - Russia has military personel and bases all over the country, fleets etc., which still must be maintained. But this constitutes one fourth of the annual budget, as the Economist pointed out, Russia will not be able to keep it at this level, especially that not all costs of war are directly related to the military.

And yes, the aid may be cut to zero and the Russian economy may collapse overnight. Both options are possible, but unlikely.

I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I've asked you time and again for a very simple and very reasonable request that you cite what I have claimed in your post rather than make up what you think I've claimed. It's really the bare minimum of decent honest debate that you argue against the claims I've made. I simply will not answer again to claims I've not made. there is a quote function, it's not hard to use. — Isaac

I am very sorry then, what do you propose? Because it is extremely hard to extract that small bit of information out of you. Repeating 'negotiations' is not very helpful, for the reasons given by Fortna.

Recently you have quoted Charap, so it seemed like you endorse his plan. Do you? Do you advocate solid support for the Ukrainian offensive along starting the negotiations? Do you believe that coercion should be as strong as diplomacy? I was under impression that you do not, but I do not want to misinterpret you again.

It's a regional conflict over disputed territory because of separatism, the same kind of separatism which elsewhere has lead to independence, and a general siding with the separatists in the liberal West. — Isaac

Are you saying Sachs was writing nonsense? Putin had nothing to do with this at all? It was never about NATO? 'Free and prosperous' Ukraine is not a threat to Putin, as you have claimed? If separatists got their independence, Putin would just look happily as Ukraine joins NATO and EU? Really...

...
Accident? (случайно) Incompetence? Not knowing there's a bit of tension at the moment?
Provocation? Russians have done some of that lately anyway.
Probing? Testing? If so, then they got some responses (though no Polish/NATO air appearance).

Who knows; I'm not sure it's easy to determine.

There have been some activities to do with Poland. Targeted by the Kremlin: exposed, made public (embarrassment?), crɘeǝpy crap, what's next?

Attacking Poland directly involves NATO directly; I doubt they'd want that (despite the tiptoeing around them).

They're just being buttheads.

I guess it's because your approach didn't suggest an ethical statement to me. — Echarmion

Well, that explains a lot. For my part, all the arguments I've made here have been ethical. I'm simply saying we have an ethical duty to support the options which most promote human well-being.

it still suggests that the current russian leadership has decided they're in this for the long game. That means the kind of short term freezing of the conflict with intent to then negotiate a long term solution once cooler heads prevail is unlikely to work. — Echarmion

Indeed. I think most are hoping for different heads rather than merely cooler versions of the same ones. Armistice whilst that change takes place is simply a more humanitarian option that simmering war whilst that change takes place. Either solution requires a change in leadership (or a force of hand if not a direct replacement). The question is how we handle the interim.

Some seem to think that the slightly increased chance of leadership change resulting from war (maybe battlefield losses, or mass morale failure) are worth the enormous casualty rate, destruction and risk of escalation. I'm saying those harms massively outweigh any slight increase in the chance of regime change. Armistice and political pressure is perhaps slower and has a lower chance of success, but is by far the more humanitarian option and should only be discarded if it absolutely fails (I'd even go as far as saying repeatedly fails), or causes more material harm.

I'm not sure what evidence you're expecting to see pointing towards negotiations. — Echarmion

I'm not so much here criticising the powers involved, though I would do that, but the lay voices clamouring for more war, repeating the clarion calls in favour of it (Russia are weak, Ukraine are going to win any minute, Ukrainians are all brave freedom fighters and deserve everything we can give them... etc). Political leaders might pay only scant attention to their populace, but the least we can do is clamour for peace, not war.

This kinda suggests you're expecting Ukraine or it's allies to pre-emptively concede territory before negotiations have actually begun, or to publicly set limits to further support.

That sounds pretty naive to me. We're talking about two parties who are involved in a full scale war to assert their interests. And Ukraine's partners not only have to consider the immediate material impact of a peace deal but also it's psychological impact on geopolitics. To put it bluntly, the West cannot afford to be seen as an unreliable ally. — Echarmion

I don't think the West are quite so constrained as that. A few European leaders have been quite blunt recently about not simply giving Ukraine whatever they want, and have in some cases rebuked Zelensky quite severely.

The West also has to consider the risks of escalation, the costs to domestic politics, the continuing harms to trade and finance... They've more accounts to balance than simply being allies.

Negotiations are going to be conducted via secret backchannels. They're going to be publicly disavowed. This is necessary both to preserve your leverage as well as to safe face in the international arena. — Echarmion

Yes, We'll obviously never be quite sure how much is being negotiated, but both parties have electorates and polities to satisfy who may well not be placated by the mere hint that something might be going on.

I disagree with your assessment of the separatist movement. It would have fizzled out and been quashed within months had not the russian military directly intervened. — Echarmion

Sure. I don't think that makes it less of a separatist issue. Less would hold the DPR to be a mere happy coincidence to Putin's imperialism. Separatism has been around in the region since the early 20th century so it would be odd indeed if it just so happened to be about to 'fizzle out' just as Russia were about to take advantage of it.

Gaining powerful allies doesn't make separatism less separatism, though I suspect most are now bitterly regretting their choice of ally.

It's also a very different situation in that Russia has started a fully fledged invasion in order to destroy Ukraine as it currently exist and absorb most of it's territory. That's old school imperialism. — Echarmion

If we could be sure of that, then yes, but I don't think that's clear at all. I'm sure you're aware of the evidence and counter-evidence, I won't rehash it unless needed, but clearly there are schools of opinion which dissent from the preferred narrative about Putin's original intentions. I think his intention now is far less disputed, however. He clearly intends to destroy Ukraine.

What is clear though, is whatever could be said of Putin's intentions some months into the invasion, it was not thought so clearly at the start, yet the intention to arm and push Ukraine, if necessary, became policy quickly. I think even if it were true now that we know Putin's true intent is imperialist aggression, we still acted excessively hawkish when we did not know that.

The west has every reason to defend it's "empire" by supporting Ukraine which is, after all, in this by their choice and for their own interests. — Echarmion

'Reason' I agree. But as I said, I'm here making an ethical argument. Putin had every reason to invade Ukraine. It was just morally wrong to do so.

You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing? — Isaac

Well no, but something like what's in the first sentence wouldn't surprise me honestly. The US has a lot of problems but a biggie is the legacy of chattel slavery. If we provide aid and support to country not burdened by such a history, they might very well do better than we do.

Plus, there's that whole "do as I say not as I do" effect. I'm just saying a result like this might not be that ludicrous.

Well no, but something like what's in the first sentence wouldn't surprise me honestly. The US has a lot of problems but a biggie is the legacy of chattel slavery. If we provide aid and support to country not burdened by such a history, they might very well do better than we do. — Srap Tasmaner

That's probably not what's going on here, though. Remember, Russia attacked Ukraine and Obama let it go. This is Biden's call. He chose to publicly threaten every entity in the world which does business with the US to sanction Russia or suffer the consequences. Big decisions frequently come down to the personalities on the scene at the time, not principles.

?

I know this is a thread about the war in Ukraine, but I was addressing the general question about how countries in the US sphere of influence develop.

I know this is a thread about the war in Ukraine, but I was addressing the general question about how countries in the US sphere of influence develop. — Srap Tasmaner

Oh, sorry.

I gave you the plan from the expert, so you are in the boat of unspecificed operating plans alone. — Jabberwock

Charap...

Squaring this circle will be challenging and politically fraught. One potential model is the U.S.-Israel 1975 memorandum of understanding, which was one of the key preconditions for Israel to agree to peace with Egypt. The document states that in light of the “long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel’s security or sovereignty by a world power.” It goes on to say that in the event of such a threat, the U.S. government will consult with Israel “with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.” The document also explicitly promises “remedial action by the United States” if Egypt violates the cease-fire. This is not an explicit commitment to treat an attack on Israel as an attack on the United States, but it comes close.

A similar assurance to Ukraine would give Kyiv an enhanced sense of security, encourage private-sector investment in Ukraine’s economy, and enhance deterrence of future Russian aggression. Whereas today Moscow knows for sure that the United States will not intervene militarily if it attacks Ukraine, this kind of statement would make the Kremlin think more than twice—but it would not raise the prospect of new U.S. bases on Russia’s borders. Of course, Washington would need confidence in the durability of the cease-fire so that the probability of the commitment being tested would remain low. Avoiding war with Russia should remain a priority.

When the time comes, Ukraine will need other incentives such as reconstruction aid, measures of accountability for Russia, and sustained military assistance in peacetime to help Kyiv create a credible deterrent. In addition, the United States and its allies should supplement the coercive pressure being applied to Russia with efforts to make peace a more attractive option, such as conditional sanctions relief—with snapback clauses for noncompliance—that could prompt compromise. The West should also be open to a dialogue on broader European security issues so as to minimize the chance of a similar crisis with Russia breaking out in the future.

The first step toward making this vision a reality over the coming months is to stand up an effort in the U.S. government to develop the diplomatic track. An entire new U.S. military command element, the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine, has been devoted to the aid and training mission, which is led by a three-star general with a staff of 300. Yet there is not a single official in the U.S. government whose full-time job is conflict diplomacy. Biden should appoint one, perhaps a special presidential envoy who can engage beyond ministries of foreign affairs, which have been sidelined in this crisis in nearly all relevant capitals. Next, the United States should begin informal discussions with Ukraine and among allies in the G-7 and NATO about the endgame.

In parallel, the United States should consider establishing a regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, U.S. allies, and Russia. This channel would not initially be aimed at achieving a cease-fire. Instead, it would allow participants to interact continually, instead of in one-off encounters, akin to the contact group model used during the Balkan wars, when an informal grouping of representatives from key states and international institutions met regularly. Such discussions should begin out of the public eye, as did initial U.S. contacts with Iran on the nuclear deal, signed in 2015.

... But as I said, I don't think it's relevant at this stage. If you're at the point of assuming there is no such plan, then my providing evidence of one is irrelevant. Anyone with even a passing interest in this conflict would have come across arguments like Charap's so your rhetorical demands for the details show either an incredibly well-structured set of media-blinkers (that somehow you've managed to get through the last year without even accidentally reading any opposing views), or a really odd arguing style in which you think that perhaps if I don't know what the arguments are, that somehow... works as a mark against them?

You also seem to believe that it is an imperative that everyone felt like you, but again, it is just you. — Jabberwock

I don't know if you've much experience with moral claims, but that's pretty much the modus operandi. Moral claims are about how we ought behave, their whole purpose is that others are also bound by them, otherwise they're not moral claims, they're merely statements of preference.

Your insistence that the majority abandons their moral view (which, as you say, does not need backing up), is a bit unrealistic, though. — Jabberwock

As above, it wouldn't be a moral claim if it was in the form "I prefer X, but you guys do as you please"

And yes, the aid may be cut to zero and the Russian economy may collapse overnight. Both options are possible, but unlikely. — Jabberwock

Really? Then what was this... https://www.businessinsider.com/which-house-republicans-voted-gaetz-end-military-aid-ukraine-2023-7?op=1&r=US&IR=T ?

Or https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/05/american-support-ukraine-poll/ ?

Germany's initial cause for hesitation hasn't suddenly disappeared... https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60155002

In what way does this add up to "unlikely"?

I am very sorry then, what do you propose? Because it is extremely hard to extract that small bit of information out of you. Repeating 'negotiations' is not very helpful, for the reasons given by Fortna.

Recently you have quoted Charap, so it seemed like you endorse his plan. Do you? Do you advocate solid support for the Ukrainian offensive along starting the negotiations? Do you believe that coercion should be as strong as diplomacy? I was under impression that you do not, but I do not want to misinterpret you again. — Jabberwock

I thought I'd been clear. In line with people like Charap, and numerous others, I'm in favour of a much stronger effort toward negotiated solutions than we're currently seeing to end the immediate fighting. I'm also (unlike Charap, I expect), opposed to nationalism so I'm less concerned about territorial occupation. Russia were manifestly wrong to forcibly take control of the Eastern territories, Ukraine are equally manifestly wrong to do so as well. What is wrong is using military force to take control of territory, who 'owned' it is the first place does nothing to mitigate that wrong unless one can very strongly demonstrate that the humanitarian benefit of changing ownership will outweigh the harms from the war required to do so. Here they do not.

As to the "lasting peace with Putin" claim. I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I support lasting peace. Full stop. I don't see much of a way in which that can happen with Putin as leader of Russia (I don't see much of a way that can happen with Zelensky as leader of Ukraine either).

Well, that explains a lot. For my part, all the arguments I've made here have been ethical. I'm simply saying we have an ethical duty to support the options which most promote human well-being. — Isaac

I think this needs to be qualified though by allowing people to choose what they consider well-being. This might involve making the whole world worse off.

Indeed. I think most are hoping for different heads rather than merely cooler versions of the same ones. Armistice whilst that change takes place is simply a more humanitarian option that simmering war whilst that change takes place. Either solution requires a change in leadership (or a force of hand if not a direct replacement). The question is how we handle the interim.

Some seem to think that the slightly increased chance of leadership change resulting from war (maybe battlefield losses, or mass morale failure) are worth the enormous casualty rate, destruction and risk of escalation. I'm saying those harms massively outweigh any slight increase in the chance of regime change. Armistice and political pressure is perhaps slower and has a lower chance of success, but is by far the more humanitarian option and should only be discarded if it absolutely fails (I'd even go as far as saying repeatedly fails), or causes more material harm. — Isaac

I think the core disagreement here is how we evaluate harm. You said in another post that you're not a nationalist and don't particularly care about who "owns" what territory. I agree with that. But, for better or worse, sovereign states are the building blocks of them current international order and the people living in the quite evidently do care. They're willing to die for it, apparently.

Of course the quality of an argument counts, not whether people accept it, but that's only half the issue. Must not people have the last word when it comes to what they regard as harm and how severe they consider is?

If we accept that people have such a freedom, then this means there must be a set of rules that's not concerned with minimising harm but instead with creating some rule-based order that creates spheres of freedom. And those who put themselves out of this order must then be opposed, violently if necessary.

Thus I don't think it's actually clear that a status quo ceasefire is preferable to continued fighting from a moral perspective. There are moral costs to accepting the results of aggression.

I don't think the West are quite so constrained as that. A few European leaders have been quite blunt recently about not simply giving Ukraine whatever they want, and have in some cases rebuked Zelensky quite severely.

The West also has to consider the risks of escalation, the costs to domestic politics, the continuing harms to trade and finance... They've more accounts to balance than simply being allies. — Isaac

True, but it is a time-honored tradition that in situations like this, the big superpowers often find that the tail is wagging the dog with respect to their smaller allies. It happened quite a lot during the cold war. It's a bit of a sunk costs fallacy, but also the reasonable concern that a failure to support an ally in a critical situation might have a ripple effect and destroy trust more generally. To give an example: What might Taiwan think about an US that pressures Ukraine to accept a loss of territory at least temporarily?

What is clear though, is whatever could be said of Putin's intentions some months into the invasion, it was not thought so clearly at the start, yet the intention to arm and push Ukraine, if necessary, became policy quickly. I think even if it were true now that we know Putin's true intent is imperialist aggression, we still acted excessively hawkish when we did not know that. — Isaac

I'm not quite sure what you're referring to as "excessively hawkish". The west has been arming and training Ukraine since 2014. But certainly once a massive invasion force - which could have no plausible goal other than to conquer most of Ukraine - crossed the border, there was no longer any way to limit the conflict. From that point it was total war for Ukraine, and it's not clear to me how it could have been anything else.

'Reason' I agree. But as I said, I'm here making an ethical argument. Putin had every reason to invade Ukraine. It was just morally wrong to do so. — Isaac

I would find a moral philosophy that doesn't include the right to self defense somewhat absurd though.

... But as I said, I don't think it's relevant at this stage. If you're at the point of assuming there is no such plan, then my providing evidence of one is irrelevant. Anyone with even a passing interest in this conflict would have come across arguments like Charap's so your rhetorical demands for the details show either an incredibly well-structured set of media-blinkers (that somehow you've managed to get through the last year without even accidentally reading any opposing views), or a really odd arguing style in which you think that perhaps if I don't know what the arguments are, that somehow... works as a mark against them? — Isaac

So which of the two options you presented Charap's plan is more compatible with:

There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions.

Given that Charap supports further counteroffensive and military pressure, it would seem that he is for the option two, while you have specifically opted for the option one, however badly formulated. Presenting half of his plan, while ignoring the other half (i.e. the coercion) is somewhat disingenious. If I wrote 'Charap's plan is to keep fighting!', you would most likely object.

I don't know if you've much experience with moral claims, but that's pretty much the modus operandi. Moral claims are about how we ought behave, their whole purpose is that others are also bound by them, otherwise they're not moral claims, they're merely statements of preference. — Isaac

Sure, but do not surprised that others will simply ignore your 'oughts', given they have exactly as strong grounds for their moral claims as you do.

Really? Then what was this... https://www.businessinsider.com/which-house-republicans-voted-gaetz-end-military-aid-ukraine-2023-7?op=1&r=US&IR=T ?

Or https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/05/american-support-ukraine-poll/ ?

Germany's initial cause for hesitation hasn't suddenly disappeared... https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60155002

In what way does this add up to "unlikely"? — Isaac

Yes, the opponents of the aid were outvoted 70-358. Sure, it is a significant opposition, but it still makes cutting help to zero unlikely.

And the poll from half a year ago... I can whip up a few as well:

https://www.reuters.com/world/most-americans-support-us-arming-ukraine-reutersipsos-2023-06-28/

https://news.gallup.com/poll/508037/americans-support-ukraine-war-effort.aspx

That is the way with the polls.

As for Germany, I think that quoting an article from before the war might not be the best indicator of current Germans' attitudes given that in the meantime some things happened, e.g. Russia has attacked Ukraine. Don't you think that might be a factor that would change some minds? It certainly did in case of the quoted Baerbock, who now says:

And my third point I would like to make, because also in Germany, I think always around the world, people ask, “But if you wouldn’t have delivered weapons in the beginning, maybe there wouldn’t be so much fighting.”

I think we have to ask the question the opposite way around: If we wouldn’t have decided on the 27th of February in German parliament – or on the 24th around the world – to support Ukraine, there wouldn’t be 13 million refugees in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine – one million in Germany. The total population of Ukraine is 42 million people. If we wouldn’t have supported Ukraine since February 27th, then we would have seen Bucha, Mariupol, everywhere in the whole country.

Seems her views changed a bit since the article... The article also mentions 'economic ties' which, together with the Nord Stream 2, do no longer exist, so it is even less relevant. Have you read it at all?

I thought I'd been clear. In line with people like Charap, and numerous others, I'm in favour of a much stronger effort toward negotiated solutions than we're currently seeing to end the immediate fighting. I'm also (unlike Charap, I expect), opposed to nationalism so I'm less concerned about territorial occupation. Russia were manifestly wrong to forcibly take control of the Eastern territories, Ukraine are equally manifestly wrong to do so as well. What is wrong is using military force to take control of territory, who 'owned' it is the first place does nothing to mitigate that wrong unless one can very strongly demonstrate that the humanitarian benefit of changing ownership will outweigh the harms from the war required to do so. Here they do not. — Isaac

So Charap's plan is not your plan after all.

Efforts toward negotiated solutions are commendable and actually made (for example, Zelensky is going to the peace summit in Saudi Arabia to hammer out a plan that could be presented to Putin), they are just unlikely to bring any lasting positive result at this point. You do not care about occupation or independence, OK, other people obviously do. I am surprised though that you do not care that the HFI of those occupied will be much lower than those who are not. The rest are just your moral claims which are simply different than the moral claims of others, so they do not need to be addressed.

As to the "lasting peace with Putin" claim. I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I support lasting peace. Full stop. I don't see much of a way in which that can happen with Putin as leader of Russia (I don't see much of a way that can happen with Zelensky as leader of Ukraine either). — Isaac

OK, so you support an option that is unlikely to happen, fully accepting that your suggestions will not be even considered given their impracticality. However, in the meantime people must be prepared for what is likely to happen and take appropriate action.

910 of 58,000 Belarusian citizens, and 254 of 16,000 Russian citizens, were given a month to leave Lithuania or can appeal the decision in court:

Lithuania declares more than 1,000 Belarusians and Russians to be national security risks
^{— Liudas Dapkus, Yuras Karmanau · AP · Aug 4, 2023}

Lithuania borders Latvia (close ally), Belarus, Poland, Kaliningrad (Russian). Lithuania and Poland ramp up security with respect to Russia and Belarus.

The border/country-free world won't happen this year, @Isaac. I suppose Schengen was one small move in that direction. With leaders like the current Kremlin around, it seems less likely to form.

Forced Passportization in Russia-Occupied Areas of Ukraine
^{— Yale Humanitarian Research Lab · Aug 2, 2023}

Second, Russia’s occupation officials have imposed de facto restrictions on those without Russian citizenship that make it impossible to live in Russia-occupied areas without accepting a passport. These include denial of medical services, social benefits, the ability to drive and to work, and overt threats of violence and intimidation.
These efforts create a series of ultimatums for residents of occupied areas of Ukraine who did not choose to move to Russia, but rather saw Russia impose its control on them. The incrementally added restrictions on residents without Russian citizenship make it increasingly difficult for them to meet basic needs for, among other things, shelter, food, employment, and medicine. — Executive Summary

The Yale link above lists some of the Kremlin's law moves. Incidentally, straightforward land-grabbing citizen-converting imperialism. And sham.

Law Adopted that will Detain or Deport Residents Without Russian Passports
Starting July 2024, residents without Russian citizenship will be considered “foreigners” or “stateless”
Presidential Decree № 307 — Apr 27, 2023

2022 annexation referendums in Russian-occupied Ukraine
^{— Wikipedia}

If we provide aid and support to country not burdened by such a history, they might very well do better than we do. — Srap Tasmaner

Fair point. Plus I suppose that could be extended to any free use of money. To the extent that the US leaves any wriggle room at all in it's loan agreements, a country using that leeway to be more socialist might be the best of both worlds... But... Surely those chickens would have to come home to roost at some point.

Also the US is still getting worse on most measures, so historical burdens can only get you so far as an excuse.... Sorry.

(But look at the UK for consolation - almost identically as bad. What are we like...)

I think this needs to be qualified though by allowing people to choose what they consider well-being. This might involve making the whole world worse off. — Echarmion

The first part I get, the second not so much. If what some people choose to consider well-being harms others, then I don't see why we wouldn't have quite reasonable justification to prevent that. After all, if harming others isn't sufficient justification to prevent an act, then we're stuck for much moral intervention at all, aren't we?

or better or worse, sovereign states are the building blocks of them current international order and the people living in the quite evidently do care. They're willing to die for it, apparently.

Of course the quality of an argument counts, not whether people accept it, but that's only half the issue. Must not people have the last word when it comes to what they regard as harm and how severe they consider is? — Echarmion

Again, I agree with the first half, but not the second. For the reasons given above. It what some group of people regard as harm (or easier to express this as non-harm - desirable goals) actually harms others, or puts them at risk of harm, then we do have grounds to proscribe that behaviour or else we have no grounds to proscribe any behaviour at all.

If we accept that people have such a freedom, then this means there must be a set of rules that's not concerned with minimising harm but instead with creating some rule-based order that creates spheres of freedom. And those who put themselves out of this order must then be opposed, violently if necessary.

Thus I don't think it's actually clear that a status quo ceasefire is preferable to continued fighting from a moral perspective. There are moral costs to accepting the results of aggression. — Echarmion

So yes, for better or worse, democratic units (countries, electoral wards, etc) are how we tell what it is the people want. But these units are mere pragmatic administrative divisions. In an ideal world we'd all vote on how the entire world was run in decreasing degrees dependant on our stake, but since such an arrangement is technically impossible, we have a system of wards/counties/countries/UN. But since this is merely pragmatic, we don't need to defend any one arrangement with any kind of vigour. It's annoying at most for someone to come along and re-arrange an otherwise perfectly functioning arrangement. It's definitely not worth thousands of lives just to put it back again.

This cuts to what you say later that...

I would find a moral philosophy that doesn't include the right to self defense somewhat absurd though. — Echarmion

I agree, to a point, but this isn't direct self-defence is it? Russia didn't come in and just start shooting people. It came in with the intention to steal land. So it's land-defence, not self-defence. If I attack you, you're clearly entitled to defend yourself, even violently. But if I merely threaten you, say with a gun, to steal your car, you're not entitled to just shoot me. It might be held proportionate in some specific circumstances, but most likely wouldn't.

Likewise, and more like the situation we have with war, if a band of thieves broke into a car showroom, shot everyone in cold blood and stole a car, the police are not morally entitled to raid the thieves' hideout, shoot everyone in cold blood and retrieve the car. The fact that the car rightfully belongs to the owner doesn't somehow entitle the police to use the same methods to retrieve it as the thieves used used to obtain it. We expect better of them, we expect them to attempt to arrest the thieves and retrieve the car that way - even though that makes their job harder and the retrieval of the car more likely to fail. We treat human life as having a higher sanctity that property.

I don't see any moral argument as to why the same should not be applied to a government's territory. If another country comes and steals it using military force, they are not entitled to use the same lethal force to retrieve it just because it's rightfully theirs.

If anything, I think they have less right because at least the car owner can claim the lack of car impedes on their autonomy (they presumably had plans in mind which entailed possession of a car). The government have no such claim, they are merely landlords (custodians perhaps) and have no autonomous plans involving the land. The people who actually use the land are still there using it, they just pay taxes to a different custodian.

So no, I don't really see any justification for force applied to retrieving territory above the proposition that it actually causes less harm than not doing so would. And as I've shown in the case of Ukraine. Russia's worse record on human rights, awful though it is, is simply nowhere near the devastation of war.

As for 'punishment'. Again, capital punishment is banned in most civilised countries. We do not generally consider like for like punishment to be morally acceptable. So yes, aggressors should not be allowed to get away with aggression, but like any civilised country would not seek to simply kill a murderer, a civilised society should not seek to simply 'invade back' an aggressor who has taken territory by force. we should rise above that and apply more civilised punishments.

Presenting half of his plan, while ignoring the other half (i.e. the coercion) is somewhat disingenious. If I wrote 'Charap's plan is to keep fighting!', you would most likely object. — Jabberwock

Yes, I would. You are continuing to ignore the asymmetry of a burden of proof. If I said "we need to jump off that cliff, I know it's a long way down and we'll probably break both legs, but I really think we need to", and you said "no, we can just take the steps", we do not have an equal burden of proof to show our courses of action are necessary. I have a much higher burden because we really, really don't want to jump off the cliff. We don't really care if we walk down the steps, so showing we need to is no big deal.

I'm proposing we don't fight a devastating war, we just leave Russia where they are and negotiate a ceasefire. That's the option any non-psychopath would want anyway if it were possible, so merely showing it could be should be enough to advocate the option. Charap's partial argument does that. He didn't link negotiations to continued fighting, ha hasn't made the argument that an armistice will only work if we also continue fighting, he's just saying that (a) we can, and (b) we ought. I agree with (a), but disagree with (b) because I don't share Charap's view on the sanctity of territory.

If, however, you were arguing that Charap said we ought continue fighting, I'd dispute that because to make an argument for war you need more than a mere preponderance of evidence, you need a very strong case that it is, regretfully, absolutely necessary.

Sure, but do not surprised that others will simply ignore your 'oughts', given they have exactly as strong grounds for their moral claims as you do. — Jabberwock

I would be very surprised if, on a philosophy forum, people simply ignored my 'oughts'. If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out?

the opponents of the aid were outvoted 70-358. Sure, it is a significant opposition, but it still makes cutting help to zero unlikely.

And the poll from half a year ago... I can whip up a few as well: — Jabberwock

The point is that political opinions change over time. Germany is currently facing a new problem from the rise of the right wing, who are also opposed to arms sales - for their own political reasons. The US went from Obama to Trump overnight.

I am surprised though that you do not care that the HFI of those occupied will be much lower than those who are not. — Jabberwock

Part of my argument is exactly the opposite. The differences really aren't that great, especially in the occupied regions. Russia's record in Crimea wasn't very different from Ukraine's record in Donbas. I don't doubt for a minute that conditions will worsen and progress toward freedom will be set back, but likewise with another decade of war.

There aren't any good options, we're picking the least worst, so merely pointing out how awful one option is doesn't really make an argument, you need to compare them. Seeing as the war currently involves conscription, imprisonment, restrictions of movement, the banning of political opposition, the banning of opposition media, the deaths to thousands of young men and women, the destruction of vital services, the disruption of livelihoods and the deeper indebtedness to institutions which have a history of restricting economic freedom and worsening inequality, not to mention the risks of starvation in other countries, and the risk of nuclear war... you have an awful lot of 'bad' to stack up against.

You might get it your way @Isaac:

Most say Congress should not authorize more funding for Ukraine: survey
^{— Julia Shapero · The Hill · Aug 4, 2023}

At least as far as US Republicans (and the Kremlin) are concerned.

Putin's Russia demonstrably instigates lengthy destabilization and land-grabbing campaigns. By assimilating a fifth of Ukraine, those folk ^{(Aug 2, 2023, Aug 4, 2023)} are auto-enrolled in such efforts.

The first part I get, the second not so much. If what some people choose to consider well-being harms others, then I don't see why we wouldn't have quite reasonable justification to prevent that. After all, if harming others isn't sufficient justification to prevent an act, then we're stuck for much moral intervention at all, aren't we? — Isaac

The problem I see is that every choice can harm others, even seemingly benign ones, if only in distant and minor ways. This being the case, it would seem to me that a strategy to minimise total harm or likewise maximise total wellbeing would have to result in a total dictatorship where everything is strictly regulated.

This might seem like a technical and arcane possibility but I think there are real world examples. Take sports, for example. Many sports can cause significant injury. That's fine, you may say, since people willingly participate. But even if we assume that noone gets hurt against their will (which I find unrealistic) it still imposes costs in society. All for the benefit of a minority. Perhaps then we should only allow activities with a certain level of risk.

Speaking of risk, what about dietary choices? Or when you move where? All possible to optimize for the greater good.

So yes, for better or worse, democratic units (countries, electoral wards, etc) are how we tell what it is the people want. But these units are mere pragmatic administrative divisions. In an ideal world we'd all vote on how the entire world was run in decreasing degrees dependant on our stake, but since such an arrangement is technically impossible, we have a system of wards/counties/countries/UN. But since this is merely pragmatic, we don't need to defend any one arrangement with any kind of vigour. It's annoying at most for someone to come along and re-arrange an otherwise perfectly functioning arrangement. It's definitely not worth thousands of lives just to put it back again. — Isaac

I think you're too narrowly focused on the immediate material effect of such "rearrangement" and aren't considering the indirect effects.

How are you going to keep any system in place - pragmatic as it may be - people need the security that it's stable. Otherwise it will quickly be replaced by other arrangements, which are rarely better. One can see this effect in lots of weak states, where more informal systems - often controlled by some kind of patriarchal elite - take over.

I agree, to a point, but this isn't direct self-defence is it? Russia didn't come in and just start shooting people. It came in with the intention to steal land. So it's land-defence, not self-defence. If I attack you, you're clearly entitled to defend yourself, even violently. But if I merely threaten you, say with a gun, to steal your car, you're not entitled to just shoot me. It might be held proportionate in some specific circumstances, but most likely wouldn't. — Isaac

I mean technically they did start shooting people, but I get your point.

But I'm not really seeing the principle here. You're saying it's sometimes ok, but you're not stating what the relevant factor is. So someone can take my property. How much of it? Can they hurt me, so long as it's not deadly force?

I don't see any moral argument as to why the same should not be applied to a government's territory. If another country comes and steals it using military force, they are not entitled to use the same lethal force to retrieve it just because it's rightfully theirs.

If anything, I think they have less right because at least the car owner can claim the lack of car impedes on their autonomy (they presumably had plans in mind which entailed possession of a car). The government have no such claim, they are merely landlords (custodians perhaps) and have no autonomous plans involving the land. The people who actually use the land are still there using it, they just pay taxes to a different custodian.

So no, I don't really see any justification for force applied to retrieving territory above the proposition that it actually causes less harm than not doing so would. And as I've shown in the case of Ukraine. Russia's worse record on human rights, awful though it is, is simply nowhere near the devastation of war. — Isaac

The problem I have with this is that it hands all the cards to the aggressor. It this inherently disadvantages the weakest targets. If I'm really strong and scary, I might not need force to dissuade a would-be aggressor. But it I'm facing someone who is stronger, how am I going to defend my rights?

How is the system going to remain credible if the aggressor is allowed to control the situation? And if you're taking even proportional retaliation off the table, then you're also weakening all other forms of pressure because any aggresor knows they have a monopoly on force.

A moral philosophy needs a way to address rule breaking. If it only works if everyone always follows it, it's simply not useful for actual humans.

As for 'punishment'. Again, capital punishment is banned in most civilised countries. We do not generally consider like for like punishment to be morally acceptable. So yes, aggressors should not be allowed to get away with aggression, but like any civilised country would not seek to simply kill a murderer, a civilised society should not seek to simply 'invade back' an aggressor who has taken territory by force. we should rise above that and apply more civilised punishments. — Isaac

The reason we can avoid capital punishment is because, compared to an individual, the state has such overwhelming power that it can simply imprison someone, for life if necessary. But outside of these "civilised" circumstances, deadly force is sometimes the only plausible punishment.

If another country comes and steals it using military force, they are not entitled to use the same lethal force to retrieve it just because it's rightfully theirs. — Isaac

Yes they are. That's the whole point of "sovereignty". The state has the legitimate monopoly of force within a territory. And that's a moral point too.

Yes, I would. You are continuing to ignore the asymmetry of a burden of proof. If I said "we need to jump off that cliff, I know it's a long way down and we'll probably break both legs, but I really think we need to", and you said "no, we can just take the steps", we do not have an equal burden of proof to show our courses of action are necessary. I have a much higher burden because we really, really don't want to jump off the cliff. We don't really care if we walk down the steps, so showing we need to is no big deal. — Isaac

The example is silly, because it completely ignores the consequences and their probabilities. I have already given you the better suited example: we do not propose to disarm ourselves in the hope that everyone in the world will follow, even though global disarmament is a glorious cause and it would save us many horrible wars. We do not do that, because the likely consequences would be much worse. Very unlikely very positive result does not trump very likely negative results.

And your burden of proof is still the same: 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'.

I'm proposing we don't fight a devastating war, we just leave Russia where they are and negotiate a ceasefire. That's the option any non-psychopath would want anyway if it were possible, so merely showing it could be should be enough to advocate the option. Charap's partial argument does that. He didn't link negotiations to continued fighting, ha hasn't made the argument that an armistice will only work if we also continue fighting, he's just saying that (a) we can, and (b) we ought. I agree with (a), but disagree with (b) because I don't share Charap's view on the sanctity of territory. — Isaac

No, because that option is likely to bring about negative consequences, the most negative of them being the likely future war with Russia in better position. And Charap very much links negotiations to continued fighting, he specifically writes:

An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other.

'require' and 'cannot' being the operative words. Him being non-psychopath, he advises that only because he considers that necessary, and he is a fucking expert in these exact questions, by your own words.

If, however, you were arguing that Charap said we ought continue fighting, I'd dispute that because to make an argument for war you need more than a mere preponderance of evidence, you need a very strong case that it is, regretfully, absolutely necessary. — Isaac

Do you genuinely think Samuel Charap, in researching his position for RAND, just didn't think of all the factors when he declared fighting necessary? Slipped his mind, perhaps? Again, if you think you've come up with some important factors to consider that he's missed he'd be delighted to hear from you, It's his job, after all, to make accurate predictions about these things. You'd be saving him face.

I would be very surprised if, on a philosophy forum, people simply ignored my 'oughts'. If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out? — Isaac

Given that we do not need to support moral claims in any way, as you say, then there is not much point of discussing them, is there? You recite your moral claims, I recite mine, we are done.

The point is that political opinions change over time. Germany is currently facing a new problem from the rise of the right wing, who are also opposed to arms sales - for their own political reasons. The US went from Obama to Trump overnight. — Isaac

Sure, but we do not assume that the policy will turn over overnight, because then no policy could be implemented at all. Again, your mere claim is that it is possible, you need a bit more to say that it is likely.

Part of my argument is exactly the opposite. The differences really aren't that great, especially in the occupied regions. Russia's record in Crimea wasn't very different from Ukraine's record in Donbas. I don't doubt for a minute that conditions will worsen and progress toward freedom will be set back, but likewise with another decade of war. — Isaac

The differences between countries in the Russian sphere of influence and those outside of it are pretty significant. Therefore, Ukraine should leave the Russian sphere of influence to increase its HFI.

There aren't any good options, we're picking the least worst, so merely pointing out how awful one option is doesn't really make an argument, you need to compare them. Seeing as the war currently involves conscription, imprisonment, restrictions of movement, the banning of political opposition, the banning of opposition media, the deaths to thousands of young men and women, the destruction of vital services, the disruption of livelihoods and the deeper indebtedness to institutions which have a history of restricting economic freedom and worsening inequality, not to mention the risks of starvation in other countries, and the risk of nuclear war... you have an awful lot of 'bad' to stack up against. — Isaac

If the proposed course of action is very unlikely to bring about the least worst option and quite likely to bring about the worst option, then we ought to choose the course of action which will do neither.

And stacking up is quite simple: Minsk 3 will bring about both oppression AND another war in the near future, with all those consequences, when Russia recovers a bit and has a yet better staging ground for another attack on Ukraine. Therefore, we should not choose Minsk 3. Charap, the FE, agrees.

You still maintain that there is an alternative - because you say so, because you do not have to argue anything. You cited Fortna, she disagrees with you, you cited Charap, he disagrees with you. You oppose war, but do not give any reasonable alternative, beside a crap Minsk 3, because this time, maybe it might possibly, hopefully just work, even though your own experts say it is very unlikely. Policies cannot be shaped by wishful thinking.

If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out? — Isaac

Precisely. Moral conflicts can as well lead to war.

The problem I see is that every choice can harm others, even seemingly benign ones, if only in distant and minor ways. This being the case, it would seem to me that a strategy to minimise total harm or likewise maximise total wellbeing would have to result in a total dictatorship where everything is strictly regulated.

This might seem like a technical and arcane possibility but I think there are real world examples. Take sports, for example. Many sports can cause significant injury. That's fine, you may say, since people willingly participate. But even if we assume that noone gets hurt against their will (which I find unrealistic) it still imposes costs in society. All for the benefit of a minority. Perhaps then we should only allow activities with a certain level of risk.

Speaking of risk, what about dietary choices? Or when you move where? All possible to optimize for the greater good. — Echarmion

Absolutely. Yet we navigate this don't we? We don't throw our hands in the air and say "anything goes then". I think you've given a perfect account of why moral decisions are fraught, but that's not the same thing as giving an account of what any moral claim is wrong.

I think war, in this instance, is not even one of the difficult edge cases. It's absolutely devastating in terms of harms - thousands dead, many more thousands injured, livelihoods destroyed, millions put at risk of starvation, the entire world at risk from nuclear escalation... I can't see anyone reading that list and thinking "well... some people like racing motorbikes though.... so who know what people's idea of harm is...?"

And are you willing to extend this relativism to, say holocaust denial, rape, murder? I get what you're saying, but without qualification it sounds like special pleading for territorial war.

How are you going to keep any system in place - pragmatic as it may be - people need the security that it's stable. Otherwise it will quickly be replaced by other arrangements, which are rarely better. One can see this effect in lots of weak states, where more informal systems - often controlled by some kind of patriarchal elite - take over. — Echarmion

This is true, but compared to the costs of keeping the system unchanged the harms are minimal and can be fought against by other means. War is clearly not the only way of changing political systems for the better and it is by far the most devastating.

But likewise, I'm saying the same of those advocating for a military response. Not considering the consequences on things like global hunger.

You're saying it's sometimes ok, but you're not stating what the relevant factor is. So someone can take my property. How much of it? Can they hurt me, so long as it's not deadly force? — Echarmion

I don't think these questions are easily answered, but my point is that they are asked and answered nonetheless. We do not merely throw up our hands because we can't decide when lethal force is appropriate against a threat of violence. We work out an approach based on an acceptance that (a) there is a line, and (b) it's not easy to see where it is. The attitude typically taken to military responses to invasion shows none of this, and I think the reason for that is nationalism, not moral nuance.

The problem I have with this is that it hands all the cards to the aggressor. It this inherently disadvantages the weakest targets. If I'm really strong and scary, I might not need force to dissuade a would-be aggressor. But it I'm facing someone who is stronger, how am I going to defend my rights?

How is the system going to remain credible if the aggressor is allowed to control the situation? And if you're taking even proportional retaliation off the table, then you're also weakening all other forms of pressure because any aggresor knows they have a monopoly on force.

A moral philosophy needs a way to address rule breaking. If it only works if everyone always follows it, it's simply not useful for actual humans. — Echarmion

Yes, but we do not only have military responses at our disposal. We have sanctions, we have non-violent resistance, we have violent (but non-military) resistance, we have control of the media and IT space, we have financial instruments, we have political instruments...

And as punishments go, what kind of punishment for aggression is military response? It doesn't harm Putin in any way other than indirectly (by making him less popular if he loses). We can punish Putin far more directly then that by freezing his international assets, enabling legal proceedings against him, barring him from travel, refusing to deal with his companies... Him loosing this war is at best an indirect punishment.

And this is the problem with seeing something like this from this 'zoomed out' perspective. Who is actually, literally being punished by military resistance? The conscript. The Russian soldier who was pretty much forced to serve (or lied to) is the one having his legs blown off by a Ukrainian shell, not Putin.

The reason we can avoid capital punishment is because, compared to an individual, the state has such overwhelming power that it can simply imprison someone, for life if necessary. But outside of these "civilised" circumstances, deadly force is sometimes the only plausible punishment. — Echarmion

I don't see any such circumstances arising. I can see how deadly force is often the only 'defence', but not really seeing how it's ever the only 'punishment'.

The example is silly, because it completely ignores the consequences and their probabilities. — Jabberwock

No, because that option is likely to bring about negative consequences — Jabberwock

If the proposed course of action is very unlikely to bring about the least worst option and quite likely to bring about the worst option — Jabberwock

... The matter about which we disagree is the consequences and their likelihoods, so you can't invoke your judgement of the consequences and likelihoods as arguments, that's begging the question.

My argument is that because war is so awful, it requires a very strong argument in favour (much stronger than more peaceful options) showing how the consequences will be better and the likelihoods higher.

You can't counter that by saying that it doesn't have this extra burden because the consequences are better and the likelihoods higher. That's the argument we're talking about the burden of.

It's like if I said "It's really important that you prove the cup is empty" and you answer "It isn't important because the cup is empty". It's begging the question. I'm sure I can find a Wikipedia article about begging the question if you're having trouble with the concept.

Given that we do not need to support moral claims in any way, as you say, then there is not much point of discussing them, is there? You recite your moral claims, I recite mine, we are done. — Jabberwock

Who said we don't have to support moral claims? Moral claims are not empirical, they're not supported with facts but with appeal to rational and emotional values like coherence, empathy, consistency...

Charap very much links negotiations to continued fighting, he specifically writes:

An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other. — Jabberwock

I agree that coercion will be required. I disagree with using military offensives for that purpose. I disagree for the moral reasons I've laid out above (I value pacifism higher than I value war's potential as a coercive tool). Since these are matters of value, there's no question of deferring to Charap. Charap is an expert on foreign affairs so we ought defer to him in the matter of which strategies might work. We have no need to defer to him on value judgements. He nowhere says that negotiations will fail without decades of military offensives.

The differences between countries in the Russian sphere of influence and those outside of it are pretty significant. Therefore, Ukraine should leave the Russian sphere of influence to increase its HFI. — Jabberwock

If it considers that being outside of the Russian sphere of influence is the cause of those increased HFIs, and believes so so strongly that it is willing to risk utter devastation to achieve it. I've shown (by using the US as an example) that merely being outside of Russia's sphere of influence is not a very good predictor of HFI improvements, and I've argued that the devastation of war demands a very high level of confidence in its benefits before committing. There is no such high level of confidence in the theory that Ukraine will gain massive improvements in HFI merely by being outside of Russia's sphere of influence. The causal connection is weak at best.

You cited Fortna, she disagrees with you, you cited Charap, he disagrees with you. — Jabberwock

Neither author disagrees with me. That's why I cited them. I Fortna in support of the idea that armistice conditions can be strong enough to support long-term ceasefires. She does not disagree with that. I cited Charap in support of the the idea that (a) we are not currently putting enough effort into negotiation, more is needed, and (b) that and armistice could work in this specific case.

Both experts support both arguments. Fortna is pessimistic about long term peace with Putin. So am I, I expect we will have to see regime change before long-term peace can be achieved. Charap considers it morally acceptable to continue military offensives alongside negotiations on the grounds that they will act as coercive tools. I disagree that this benefit is sufficient to outweigh the cost. Since that is a value judgement, it's irrelevant that Charap disagrees with me on that. I expect Fortna does too.

... The matter about which we disagree is the consequences and their likelihoods, so you can't invoke your judgement of the consequences and likelihoods as arguments, that's begging the question.

My argument is that because war is so awful, it requires a very strong argument in favour (much stronger than more peaceful options) showing how the consequences will be better and the likelihoods higher.

You can't counter that by saying that it doesn't have this extra burden because the consequences are better and the likelihoods higher. That's the argument we're talking about the burden of.

It's like if I said "It's really important that you prove the cup is empty" and you answer "It isn't important because the cup is empty". It's begging the question. I'm sure I can find a Wikipedia article about begging the question if you're having trouble with the concept. — Isaac

I have specifically argued why your chosen course of action is unlikely to bring the positive consequences and likely to bring about the negative consequences. I have given for that the support of experts (many of your own, it so happens). That is all I am required to do. On the other hand, you are required to show that your course of action is likely to bring the positive consequences and not negative ones. You have failed to do that as, upon examination, both experts you cited claim something else. So what are the reasons you believe that the course of action you propose (whatever it is, as we are still missing any details) will likely bring about the positive consequences and not negative ones?

Who said we don't have to support moral claims? Moral claims are not empirical, they're not supported with facts but with appeal to rational and emotional values like coherence, empathy, consistency... — Isaac

You wrote something else:

That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. — Isaac

My moral sense does not support your moral claims, nor does moral sense of most people.

I agree that coercion will be required. I disagree with using military offensives for that purpose. I disagree for the moral reasons I've laid out above (I value pacifism higher than I value war's potential as a coercive tool). Since these are matters of value, there's no question of deferring to Charap. Charap is an expert on foreign affairs so we ought defer to him in the matter of which strategies might work. We have no need to defer to him on value judgements. He nowhere says that negotiations will fail without decades of military offensives. — Isaac

Then again you need your own proposition of a plan backed up by an expert who says that non-military coercion together with diplomacy will likely work. You were unable to produce one for about two weeks now. As we have seen, just 'look it up' does not work that well, given that you did look up and came up with the plan which, it turns out, you do not support.

If it considers that being outside of the Russian sphere of influence is the cause of those increased HFIs, and believes so so strongly that it is willing to risk utter devastation to achieve it. I've shown (by using the US as an example) that merely being outside of Russia's sphere of influence is not a very good predictor of HFI improvements, and I've argued that the devastation of war demands a very high level of confidence in its benefits before committing. There is no such high level of confidence in the theory that Ukraine will gain massive improvements in HFI merely by being outside of Russia's sphere of influence. The causal connection is weak at best. — Isaac

Yet Ukrainians do see the causal link and are willing to risk the devastation of war to achieve it.

Neither author disagrees with me. That's why I cited them. I Fortna in support of the idea that armistice conditions can be strong enough to support long-term ceasefires. She does not disagree with that. I cited Charap in support of the the idea that (a) we are not currently putting enough effort into negotiation, more is needed, and (b) that and armistice could work in this specific case.

Both experts support both arguments. Fortna is pessimistic about long term peace with Putin. So am I, I expect we will have to see regime change before long-term peace can be achieved. Charap considers it morally acceptable to continue military offensives alongside negotiations on the grounds that they will act as coercive tools. I disagree that this benefit is sufficient to outweigh the cost. Since that is a value judgement, it's irrelevant that Charap disagrees with me on that. I expect Fortna does too. — Isaac

It is not supermarket, you do not get to pick and choose fragments of their arguments which suit you, ignoring the rest. If you agree that long-term peace is unachievable with Putin, then nothing you can propose will lead to avoiding devastation and horrors of war. You cannot 'argue for peace' if you agree that it does not have a reasonable chance, by your own words.

Charap clearly says that the success of negotiations depends on the pressure exerted on Putin, and he does not see any other options of doing that beside military means. Do you think he, the F.E. on foreign affairs, missed all the non-military means of coercion that would likely work?

You still do not have a viable alternative, not to mention an expert who supports one.

Absolutely. Yet we navigate this don't we? We don't throw our hands in the air and say "anything goes then". I think you've given a perfect account of why moral decisions are fraught, but that's not the same thing as giving an account of what any moral claim is wrong. — Isaac

Sure, but my argument is that we navigate it by using a set of rules that's distinct from utilitarianism - we're using the essentially deontic concept of rights and freedoms.

I think war, in this instance, is not even one of the difficult edge cases. It's absolutely devastating in terms of harms - thousands dead, many more thousands injured, livelihoods destroyed, millions put at risk of starvation, the entire world at risk from nuclear escalation... I can't see anyone reading that list and thinking "well... some people like racing motorbikes though.... so who know what people's idea of harm is...?"

And are you willing to extend this relativism to, say holocaust denial, rape, murder? I get what you're saying, but without qualification it sounds like special pleading for territorial war. — Isaac

No, that would not be the argument. My argument is that we need to accept a deontic philosophy which sets out the boundaries of freedoms and responsibilities, and only within that framework do utilitarian calculations take precedence.

One of the essential boundaries, to me, is that whoever is on the defensive - and of course discussing what that means is an entirely different topic - does not need to concern themselves with utilitarian calculations. In principle you may defend yourself à outrance, because it's the attacker who is putting themselves outside the framework.

This is true, but compared to the costs of keeping the system unchanged the harms are minimal and can be fought against by other means. War is clearly not the only way of changing political systems for the better and it is by far the most devastating. — Isaac

Well I disagree. What I know about human psychology tells me that humans react very badly to situations where rule-breaking is no adressed effectively, and the result is usually a far less draconian system of punishment.

If we stay in the war scenario, the alternative to an organised military defense by a state might be a protracted insurgency, which decreases the intensity of the fighting but spreads it wider.

I don't think these questions are easily answered, but my point is that they are asked and answered nonetheless. We do not merely throw up our hands because we can't decide when lethal force is appropriate against a threat of violence. We work out an approach based on an acceptance that (a) there is a line, and (b) it's not easy to see where it is. The attitude typically taken to military responses to invasion shows none of this, and I think the reason for that is nationalism, not moral nuance. — Isaac

We take that same line when it comes to individual self defense though. And I also think this kind of "rally around the flag" effect predates nationalism in the modern sense. Humans have an ingrained sense of in-group and out-group, and whenever we perceive an out-group threat the response is extreme - both in terms of violence on the outside, but also in terms of cooperation and compassion on the inside.

Nationalism causes tons of stupid behaviour, but I don't think this one in particular can be ascribed to nationalism, apart from nationalism defining the in- an out-groups.

Yes, but we do not only have military responses at our disposal. We have sanctions, we have non-violent resistance, we have violent (but non-military) resistance, we have control of the media and IT space, we have financial instruments, we have political instruments... — Isaac

We have, but there's also long experience that shows that nothing replaces a guy with a rifle on the ground. All the other means more or less require that whoever you're trying to get to change their behaviour cares to still play by your rules. Against someone who simply does not care, that will not work.

This is also a core lesson when using pacifism as a political strategy. Pacifism can be very effective if you opponent cares about appearances. If they don't though, you're just making it easier for them.

And as punishments go, what kind of punishment for aggression is military response? It doesn't harm Putin in any way other than indirectly (by making him less popular if he loses). We can punish Putin far more directly then that by freezing his international assets, enabling legal proceedings against him, barring him from travel, refusing to deal with his companies... Him loosing this war is at best an indirect punishment.

And this is the problem with seeing something like this from this 'zoomed out' perspective. Who is actually, literally being punished by military resistance? The conscript. The Russian soldier who was pretty much forced to serve (or lied to) is the one having his legs blown off by a Ukrainian shell, not Putin — Isaac

This is of course quite true. But the problem is not limited to individual punishment. If you look at legal philosophy, the means to defend a given legal order are usually split into two broad categories: Deterrence, either by physical force of by implied threat, and identification, in terms of individual security and the feeling that the system is overall fair. Research indicates that actual punishment of offenders after the fact is only a minor factor in "keeping the peace". Far more relevant is the probability to get caught in the first place and the sense of having a stake in the system.

I bring this up to illustrate that even from a purely utilitarian point of view, there is good reason to oppose aggression and make it fail. The best way to avoid war is to demonstrate that wars don't work.

I don't see any such circumstances arising. I can see how deadly force is often the only 'defence', but not really seeing how it's ever the only 'punishment'. — Isaac

Well in a society with very little coercive power, and no structures for things like prison sentences, it has sometimes been the case that there was either no official punishment at all or exile/ death.

Looks like Bayer agrees with @boethius, sort of, in a way, partially...

It's time for Zelensky to get tough with Biden - opinion
^{— Alexei Bayer · The Jerusalem Post · Aug 6, 2023}

Bayer suggests an opportunist angle/pressure, though it may not be quite that simple. There are all kinds of discussions back-and-forth, not just Biden making a phonecall and that's that. Maybe old Joe wouldn't take it that well either, who knows.

Sure, but my argument is that we navigate it by using a set of rules that's distinct from utilitarianism - we're using the essentially deontic concept of rights and freedoms. — Echarmion

But how do we determine what those rights and freedom ought be? We don't escape the trap of having to have some means of judgement. Our rights and freedoms are not exhaustive, nor are they non-contradictory, so there remains some higher order means of both determining their extents and arbitrating between their contradictions. That is all that is happening here. To simplify to one single issue. The Ukrainians have a right to self determination, the Yemenis have a right to life. Since Ukraine is Yemen's source of food, a war to regain the Ukrainian's right to self-determination is in conflict with the Yemei's right to life. This is just one example among many that occur simply because peoples are not isolated groups.

One of the essential boundaries, to me, is that whoever is on the defensive - and of course discussing what that means is an entirely different topic - does not need to concern themselves with utilitarian calculations. In principle you may defend yourself à outrance, because it's the attacker who is putting themselves outside the framework. — Echarmion

But that's not the case, unless you suggesting that our laws are all unethical in this regard? Self-defence is not a defence against any action at all, there's still a question of both proportionality and contemporaneousness. For self defence to be a defence in law the act has to be proportionate to the level of threat a reasonable person would understand and has to be relatively contemporaneous with the threat. You can't, for example, go to a muggers house three days later and shoot them because they took your handbag at knifepoint.

Though we might hate it, the Russians now occupy Crimea and Donbas. To propose war to retrieve them is to commit to an act of extreme violence in order to gain a material possession. The rightfulness of ownership doesn't justify the level of violence.

What I know about human psychology tells me that humans react very badly to situations where rule-breaking is no adressed effectively, and the result is usually a far less draconian system of punishment. — Echarmion

Yes, but, as I mention below, punishment is just not an appropriate response here. One of the greatest errors of war is the grossly offensive and destructive nationalism and racism that is allowed to develop (encouraged often) because of the propaganda utility of this punishment narrative. Many Russians soldiers are conscripted, as are many Ukrainians. Both are also lied to. It is not possible to determine if they rightfully share the blame for their actions on the battlefield, so battle is not an appropriate punishment, even where punishment were necessary. Wars punish the working class soldiers on both sides. The actual perpetrators tend to get away with barely a dent in their fortunes.

If we stay in the war scenario, the alternative to an organised military defense by a state might be a protracted insurgency, which decreases the intensity of the fighting but spreads it wider. — Echarmion

Yes. Guerilla warfare, active resistance, protest (violent if necessary). Now we also have tremendous tools in information warfare too, financial instruments, and trade which prior to globalisation would not have been nearly so effective. In all cases the death rates compared to war are whole orders of magnitude lower and the risk to the rest of the world much smaller.

Humans have an ingrained sense of in-group and out-group, and whenever we perceive an out-group threat the response is extreme - both in terms of violence on the outside, but also in terms of cooperation and compassion on the inside.

Nationalism causes tons of stupid behaviour, but I don't think this one in particular can be ascribed to nationalism, apart from nationalism defining the in- an out-groups. — Echarmion

But that's the point. Nationalism is inappropriate as a definition of in-group and out-group. The fact that it hooks into quite fundamental human instincts doesn't render it either inevitable or right. There's no in-group solidarity in Ukraine. The rich screw the poor with utter contempt, same as in any country (and same for the homophobe and the homosexual, the racist and the minority, the misogynist and the woman...). Rallying round the flag is a distraction from the real in-group/out-group fight.

We have, but there's also long experience that shows that nothing replaces a guy with a rifle on the ground. All the other means more or less require that whoever you're trying to get to change their behaviour cares to still play by your rules. Against someone who simply does not care, that will not work.

This is also a core lesson when using pacifism as a political strategy. Pacifism can be very effective if you opponent cares about appearances. If they don't though, you're just making it easier for them. — Echarmion

Do you think Putin is going to run out of men? Or is he going to have to, at the last, take to the battlefield himself? Because absent either of those scenarios, you're still trying to change his behaviour (when he doesn't seem to care). You're not fighting Putin with the apocryphal rifle, you're shooting other people in the hope that their deaths will change Putin's behaviour. How is that any different to freezing trade in his lucrative business activities in the hope that he'll change his mind? In neither case is the violence directed at the person responsible, at the person whose mind needs changing, they are both proxies.

Research indicates that actual punishment of offenders after the fact is only a minor factor in "keeping the peace". Far more relevant is the probability to get caught in the first place and the sense of having a stake in the system.

I bring this up to illustrate that even from a purely utilitarian point of view, there is good reason to oppose aggression and make it fail. The best way to avoid war is to demonstrate that wars don't work. — Echarmion

Very true, but have defence and retaliation satisfied that aim thus far in history? Has a long drawn out war of attrition somehow demonstrated to anyone that wars don't work? Or has it been globalisation, the increase in international trade, disarmament, international fora for negotiation (like the UN), and international law which have done most to demonstrate that wars don't work?

I agree with your sentiment entirely, but another decade of fighting isn't going to show Putin that wars don't work. Putin's goal was to remove Ukraine as a threat to his power, he can do that by taking it over Belarus-style, or destroying it. Another decade of war isn't going to teach him anything other than that he might as well have set out to destroy it in the first place. Is that really the message we want to send to a nuclear armed country?

Well in a society with very little coercive power, and no structures for things like prison sentences, it has sometimes been the case that there was either no official punishment at all or exile/ death. — Echarmion

Again, who are we punishing? I don't see Putin being put at risk of either. I see ordinary Russian conscripts being shot at by ordinary Ukrainian conscripts whilst the fucking oligarchs in control of them both still actually trade with each other for profit.