Certainly not. I don’t know why you are asking me that. I never intended to suggest such a thing. Maybe I worded something badly? Rainbows do exist. And we understand the physical reductionist explanation for them. — Patterner

I asked the question because I wanted to check that you agreed with me and to make the point that we don't need any more explanation. But I hesitate to call it reductionist because it is called reductionist to suggest that it somehow implies that because there is a physical explanation, rainbows somehow don't exist.

We should not posit such a thing. I dare say that explanation is impossible. — Patterner

Don't give up too easily. We don't have an explanation yet. But the future is a long time and we can't rule anything out.

Physical processes lead to my brain being able to perceive, and discriminate between, frequencies of visible light. But distinguishing between frequencies of light is a different thing than what it is like to see blue and red. Understanding those processes in perfect detail does not describe experiencing colors, and does not help a person who sees in great detail, but is color-blind, understand what blue is. — Patterner

Yes, a distinguishing between frequencies of light is different from distinguishing between colours. Neither is an attempt to describe experiencing colours. But a description is never the same as the real thing. A description of a table isn't a table. A description of a chess move isn't a chess move. A description of an smile isn't a smile. And so on. Why would a description of an experience (though I'm not really sure what that might be) be an experience?

Someone who is colour-blind is unable to experience see colours. Why would a description of a colour (whatever that might be) substitute for that? It's like trying to substitute money for food. Money can be exchanged for food, but it can't substitute for it.

There's an interesting question whether understanding something includes experiencing it. It's comparable to the question whether understanding something in theory, without practical experience of it is complete or not. That's complicated. In some cases, the answer seems to be Yes and in others it seems to be No.

I asked the question because I wanted to check that you agreed with me and to make the point that we don't need any more explanation. But I hesitate to call it reductionist because it is called reductionist to suggest that it somehow implies that because there is a physical explanation, rainbows somehow don't exist. — Ludwig V

I would think that being physically reducible is the surest was to prove that something exists. Physical reductionism is how science works, more or less. It’s how we prove things. No? We know something exists. The fact that consciousness is not physically reducible is the reason some people say it doesn’t exist. Because we can’t prove it with our scientific tools and methods.

Don't give up too easily. We don't have an explanation yet. But the future is a long time and we can't rule anything out. — Ludwig V

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see. Also, how would it reshape itself in order for us to hear or smell?

Yes, a distinguishing between frequencies of light is different from distinguishing between colours. Neither is an attempt to describe experiencing colours. But a description is never the same as the real thing. A description of a table isn't a table. A description of a chess move isn't a chess move. A description of an smile isn't a smile. And so on. Why would a description of an experience (though I'm not really sure what that might be) be an experience?

Someone who is colour-blind is unable to experience see colours. Why would a description of a colour (whatever that might be) substitute for that? It's like trying to substitute money for food. Money can be exchanged for food, but it can't substitute for it. — Ludwig V

What I mean is, if I listed every single physical event that takes place within a robot that can perceive different frequencies of the visible spectrum, and act in different ways depending on the frequency, nobody would conclude that the robot is consciously experiencing colors. There is no hint of qualia. Same for if I listed all the physical events that take place within us, beginning with a photon hitting a retina. I would not be giving a description of someone experiencing blue.

If aliens quite unlike us, who knew nothing at all about us, ran across that list, they would have no reason to assume we were conscious beings. They might wonder if we are, just as we might wonder if any given AI is. But we don’t, and might never, know about the AI. And these aliens might never know about us. Because the chain of physical events on this list does not describe two different things - our ability to perceive and differentiate frequencies of electromagnetic radiation within a certain range and our experience of seeing colors. We need a different list to capture the experience. But such a list does not exist.

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible.

The fact that consciousness is not physically reducible is the reason some people say it doesn’t exist. — Patterner

Consciousness may not be physically reducible now. But that doesn't mean it always will be. One day, I'm sure, there will be a physical account.

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see. — Patterner

If you are asking for an explanation how we see the table, it doesn't help to say that a copy or imitation or model of a table appears in our heads. Even if we found a little model of a table, how would that explain anything?

There is no hint of qualia. — Patterner

Of course, a list of physical events won't include any qualia. They are defined as non-physical things.

We need a different list to capture the experience. — Patterner

What do you mean by "capture"?

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible. — Patterner

Lists aren't necessarily helpful. But it is certain that a list of all the parts of a car isn't a description of a car, nor an explanation of how it works, and a car is not the same thing as a list of its parts, or a description of it, or an explanation of how it works.

Consciousness may not be physically reducible now. But that doesn't mean it always will be. One day, I'm sure, there will be a physical account. — Ludwig V

Why do you think we don’t have one now? Do you suspect there are physical things or properties that we cannot yet detect? Or do you think we have not yet figured out how the things we can detect are doing the job? Or another idea?

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see.
— Patterner

If you are asking for an explanation how we see the table, it doesn't help to say that a copy or imitation or model of a table appears in our heads. Even if we found a little model of a table, how would that explain anything? — Ludwig V

True enough. Although I would never suspect such a copy or imitation or model.

There is no hint of qualia.
— Patterner

Of course, a list of physical events won't include any qualia. They are defined as non-physical things. — Ludwig V

Do you think the definition is correct?

We need a different list to capture the experience.
— Patterner

What do you mean by "capture"? — Ludwig V

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible.
— Patterner

Lists aren't necessarily helpful. But it is certain that a list of all the parts of a car isn't a description of a car, nor an explanation of how it works, and a car is not the same thing as a list of its parts, or a description of it, or an explanation of how it works. — Ludwig V

We already have the assembled car. I said a list of physical events. If we made such a list for a car, starting with turning the key, then saying what turning the key would do within the engine, then saying what would happen next, and next, and next, we would understand the purpose of the car, and everything it does. That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all.

If we did the same for a brain, a much more gargantuan task, we would understand how it perceives the world through the senses; how its stores information; how it moves parts of the body; how it learns so that it comes to move parts of the body in the best ways, and at the best times, to increase its chances of survival and reproduction; etc.

But we would not understand everything the brain does. Like the car, the list of physical events only describes, or helps us understand, the physical functions of the brain. It does not touch upon consciousness. Each physical event within the car helps bring about what the car physically accomplishes. Each physical event within the brain helps bring about what the brain physically accomplishes. How do the physical events bring about the brain’s physical functions and its mental functions. Two things accomplished, by one means, and one of those two things is of a different nature than the means.

It's really hard to know how to proceed with this. I'll do my best.

Do you think the definition is correct? — Patterner

It depends what you mean by correct. It's not as if there is an existing definition, or even an existing (mutually agreed) phenomenon that we are trying to "capture". We can agree what a rainbow is, both in the dictionary and in the world. So there can be an argument about the correct definition - and there isn't one, because there are criteria.

In my book, Nagel is trying to persuade us that there is a phenomenon to be captured, one that everybody can recognize. But he also knows that there isn't universal agreement about that. It's a pity he doesn't actually engage with the issue.

That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all. — Patterner

It's not that simple. If you try to list every event, both the ones that are relevant to what the car does and the ones that are incidental, like comfortable seats or a sun roof and the ones that are irrelevant - side issues - like (in years gone by - the pollution it creates, you would, I suggest never come to the end.

Make a complete list of all the events going on in the desk that is supporting your computer.

If we did the same for a brain, a much more gargantuan task, — Patterner

The brain is important, but not the whole story. It is probably true that the brain has a dominant role in the processing of information. But our minds do much more than that. The brain depends on the entire nervous system, all the sense organs (supplying information) and all the muscles (enabling action) to function. Our hormones regulate all sorts of things, including our emotions. I don't think we will come even close to explaining the mind unless we include our entire body in our explanations.

If one considers how we can answer similar questions about what a computer does and compare that to the questions we are asking about the brain, it becomes clear that we are barely in the foot-hills of the project, and in no position to blandly assume that we know what will happen. We don't even know which events in the brain are relevant and which are not. We don't even know what all the chemistry of the brain is never mind what parts of it are relevant and which incidental.

We haven't yet mentioned emergent properties. One of the essential functions of the car is that it moves itself. What part of the car is the one that moves it? The wheels? The engine? The body? None of them, on their own. All of them, in their systematic relations. And here's the paradox of analysis, that what you are trying to analyze, in a sense, inevitably disappears when you take it to pieces.

Consider the rainbow. Or ask how a clock tells the time. These are systems. One can analyze them, but one will not find one-to-one correspondence between one level of analysis and the next.

If one considers the conceptual revolution that we required for us to understand the simplest physical object works, it seems to me arrogant to assume that this project will not also involve conceptual revolutions that we cannot imagine. When one considers how much our idea of matter has had to change in the process of understanding that, why would one think that understanding the mind will not involve similarly radical new concepts?

Philosophy often gets ahead of itself and tries to answer questions that it does not have the conceptual equipment to answer. Qualia is an example.

I'm sorry if this is too much, but it seems right to show what is involved in this issue.

It's really hard to know how to proceed with this. I'll do my best. — Ludwig V

:lol: I appreciate your efforts.

Do you think the definition is correct?
— Patterner

It depends what you mean by correct. It's not as if there is an existing definition, or even an existing (mutually agreed) phenomenon that we are trying to "capture". We can agree what a rainbow is, both in the dictionary and in the world. So there can be an argument about the correct definition - and there isn't one, because there are criteria. — Ludwig V

I’m asking your opinion. Do you think qualia are non-physical things?

In my book, Nagel is trying to persuade us that there is a phenomenon to be captured, one that everybody can recognize. But he also knows that there isn't universal agreement about that. It's a pity he doesn't actually engage with the issue. — Ludwig V

Such a discussion with him would be great. However, I don’t see anything wrong with anyone writing about topics on which there is not universal agreement, even controversial topics, from their pov. Brian Greene can write a book whose starting point is that String Theory is fact, and the pope can write one whose starting point is that Catholicism is fact. The target audience for every book isn’t necessarily every human.

That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all.
— Patterner

It's not that simple. If you try to list every event, both the ones that are relevant to what the car does and the ones that are incidental, like comfortable seats or a sun roof and the ones that are irrelevant - side issues - like (in years gone by - the pollution it creates, you would, I suggest never come to the end. — Ludwig V

No, not simple. But I don’t think we should only think about and discuss things that are simple.

Make a complete list of all the events going on in the desk that is supporting your computer. — Ludwig V

I hadn’t explicitly said it, but I’m comparing two things - cars and brains - that do things. Things whose functions/purposes are in what they do. We might say my desk supports my computer, and “supports” is a verb, so the desk’s purpose is an action. But there’s an obvious difference between that action and a car’s or brain’s.

I'm sorry if this is too much, but it seems right to show what is involved in this issue. — Ludwig V

No, there is nothing simple about it. It may be the most mysterious and complex thing in the universe. IMO, it’s also the most important and fascinating, and worth discussing and trying to understand. How many topics here are simple and universally agreed upon?

I’m asking your opinion. Do you think qualia are non-physical things? — Patterner

I can't give a straight answer to that, because the question presupposes that qualia exist, which I'm not sure about, especially since I'm not clear what category of existence is attributed to them. It seems to me very unlikely, if and insofar as they exist, that they can possibly be physical objects. But the term was invented in order to justify the philosophical theory known as dualism, which I do not accept.

I don’t see anything wrong with anyone writing about topics on which there is not universal agreement, even controversial topics, from their pov. — Patterner

You misunderstand me. I wasn't objecting to Nagel writing about his ideas. I was just disagreeing with them.

But there’s an obvious difference between that action and a car’s or brain’s. — Patterner

Certainly. I was suggsting that if we can't expect to give a complete description of something as simple as a computer (or a rock) on a desk, we can't expect to give a complete description of an autonomous system like a car or a brain.

"In Nagel’s words, there is something that it is like to be a bat. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Philosophy is a strange business. I'm about to complain that an ordinary expression that I understand as well as anyone else is incomprehensible. But seriously, what, exactly does "something it is like to be a bat" mean? Nagel makes another empty gesture when he says he means the subjective experience of a bat, which he believes cannot be described. So he knows that there is no answer to the question what it is like to be a bat. He provokes you to try to answer and prevents you from answering at the same time. That's the point of the question. The only sensible option is to refuse his trap and refuse to answer the question.

"these (sc. qualia) are taken to be intrinsic features of visual experiences that ... are accessible to introspection, ...." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

Introspection is a very strange concept. It is supposed to be readily available to anybody, because it is an essential feature of human consciousness and yet there is endless disagreement about what it amounts to. Yet here, it is presented as if it were completely unproblematic. There is one argument, for example, that introspection is not knowledge, which I think is not exactly right, but is an important part of the concept. If that's right, the entire debate is deflated.

"It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

That doesn't mean that there is some magical thing that the subject of an experience knows that no-one else can know. It just means that knowing is not the same as experiencing.

There is a thesis that I think has at least an important part of the truth here. It is sometimes called the transparency thesis. "According to this thesis, experience is ... transparent in the sense that we “see” right through it to the object of that experience, analogously to the way that we see through a pane of glass to whatever is on the other side of it. Gilbert Harman introduced such considerations into the contemporary debate about qualia in a now-famous passage: “When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences.” (Harman 1990, 667) As Harman went on to argue, the same is true for all of us: When we look at a tree and then introspect our visual experience, all we can find to attend to are features of the presented tree. Our experience is thus transparent; when we attend to it, we can do so only by attending to what the experience represents. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

That makes sense to me and doesn't need any reference to qualia. It may not be quite complete, but it settles a wide range of cases.

Something is an illusion only if there is consciousness to be fooled by it. The stick in the water is not an illusion to the stick, or the water, or the stick and the water. It's not an illusion to a camera that captures the image. It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know.

If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? The idea that consciousness is, itself, an illusion, but an illusion that perceives itself as real, is like picking yourself up by your own bootstraps. — Patterner

Stuff like this makes my head hurt

Mine too. That's why I object to it so much.

Wittgenstein says somewhere that the philosophical solution he is looking for is the one that enables him to stop doing philosophy when he wants to.

I can't give a straight answer to that, because the question presupposes that qualia exist, which I'm not sure about, especially since I'm not clear what category of existence is attributed to them. It seems to me very unlikely, if and insofar as they exist, that they can possibly be physical objects. But the term was invented in order to justify the philosophical theory known as dualism, which I do not accept. — Ludwig V

What do you think the things dualists invented the term for actually are? I mean, you see blue, and taste sugar, and feel pain. What category of existence do you attribute to them?

"In Nagel’s words, there is something that it is like to be a bat. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Philosophy is a strange business. I'm about to complain that an ordinary expression that I understand as well as anyone else is incomprehensible. But seriously, what, exactly does "something it is like to be a bat" mean? Nagel makes another empty gesture when he says he means the subjective experience of a bat, which he believes cannot be described. So he knows that there is no answer to the question what it is like to be a bat. He provokes you to try to answer and prevents you from answering at the same time. That's the point of the question. The only sensible option is to refuse his trap and refuse to answer the question. — Ludwig V

I don’t think that’s what Nagel is up to. Yes, he chose something we cannot imagine. But that’s the point. (I realize you’ve likely known of Nagel and this paper far longer than I have. I’m not trying to explain it to you. I’m just stating my understanding of it, to see how close we are to being on the same page.) I think he could have done it by addressing people who are entirely color blind. But it would have been strange to make his point only to the relatively small number of such people who read his paper. Totally color blind people surely believe those of us who see in color have subjective experience. (As we believe bats do.) But they cannot experience color. (As we cannot experience how a bat experiences the world through echolocation.) And I would not expect any amount of studying and understanding the physical processes to give them the experience of color. (Or us echolocation.) Yet, we experience colors.

And bats experience echolocation. They aren’t just flying machines we made that navigate via echolocation. There is something it is like for a bat to be a bat, because a bat has subjective experiences. As opposed to a rock. There is nothing it is like for a rock to be a rock, because a rock does not have subjective experiences.

Certainly. I was suggsting that if we can't expect to give a complete description of something as simple as a computer (or a rock) on a desk, we can't expect to give a complete description of an autonomous system like a car or a brain. — Ludwig V

True. But the principle still applies. If we see a hugely complex set of events, whereby photons hit retina, which causes a signal to go up the optic nerve, on and on, we come to understand how we perceive different frequencies of the spectrum, associate different frequencies with different things, and perform different actions at different times. We’ve created machines that do the same. But we do not expect those physical events in our machines that bring about these end results to also bring about the subjective experiences of seeing colors and of having awareness of it all. Although the medium is different, I don’t see why we would expect the events within us to perform this double duty.

"these (sc. qualia) are taken to be intrinsic features of visual experiences that ... are accessible to introspection, ...." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

Introspection is a very strange concept. It is supposed to be readily available to anybody, because it is an essential feature of human consciousness and yet there is endless disagreement about what it amounts to. Yet here, it is presented as if it were completely unproblematic. — Ludwig V

I sure don’t think it’s unproblematic. But yes, we can all be introspective. I think the endless disagreement is what comes of trying to learn about something that cannot be studied with the scientific methods that we are so used to and which has been so successful in other areas.

There is one argument, for example, that introspection is not knowledge, which I think is not exactly right, but is an important part of the concept. If that's right, the entire debate is deflated. — Ludwig V

I don’t know that argument, or how it deflates the debate. Actually, not sure exactly what debate you mean.

"It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

That doesn't mean that there is some magical thing that the subject of an experience knows that no-one else can know. It just means that knowing is not the same as experiencing. — Ludwig V

I don’t think anything “magical” is going on, either. I think something we don’t understand is going on. That thing being experiencing various things through our consciousness. In many situations, experiencing gives us something that we cannot get through any other method. Something is added by experience.

There is a thesis that I think has at least an important part of the truth here. It is sometimes called the transparency thesis. "According to this thesis, experience is ... transparent in the sense that we “see” right through it to the object of that experience, analogously to the way that we see through a pane of glass to whatever is on the other side of it. Gilbert Harman introduced such considerations into the contemporary debate about qualia in a now-famous passage: “When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences.” (Harman 1990, 667) As Harman went on to argue, the same is true for all of us: When we look at a tree and then introspect our visual experience, all we can find to attend to are features of the presented tree. Our experience is thus transparent; when we attend to it, we can do so only by attending to what the experience represents. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

That makes sense to me and doesn't need any reference to qualia. It may not be quite complete, but it settles a wide range of cases. — Ludwig V

Thank you. I’ve never heard of this. I’ll have to see if I can wrap my head around it.

What do you think the things dualists invented the term for actually are? I mean, you see blue, and taste sugar, and feel pain. What category of existence do you attribute to them? — Patterner

Well, you've identified/described three experiences quite clearly. You used a sentence, which consists of a subject, a verb and an object. So it looks as if an experience is a relationship, or (especially in the case of seeing, an activity). There are three different kinds of object, a colour, a substance and a sensation. What more do you want me to say?

Totally color blind people surely believe those of us who see in color have subjective experience. — Patterner

I'm not sure about total colour blindness, or about what colour-blind people believe. If they don't know that colour-blindness exists, they likely believe that everybody sees the same way they do. But I'm not denying that there's such a thing as subjective experience - that's true by definition. The question is whether a subjective experience is an object in its own right. That's why I prefer to stick to the verb "experience" rather than its associated grammatical form, the noun "experience".

I don’t know that argument, or how it deflates the debate. Actually, not sure exactly what debate you mean. — Patterner

The best way to explain is to give you a link - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/ section 2.3.3.

If you think that our knowledge of our own minds is just like our knowledge of tables and chairs, you will think that subjective experiences are a premiss for an argument, that they are true or false. If our "knowledge" of our own minds isn't like our knowledge of tables and chairs, then the problem disappears. I should confess that this is not a simple either/or.

I think something we don’t understand is going on....Something is added by experience. — Patterner

I agree with that. But I don't think it is helpful to jump to conclusions, which Nagel does. The issue is what is added by experience, or, to put it in a more neutral way, what the difference is between knowing and experiencing.

A first step is to observe that knowing that p adopts a third-person (hopefully objective) point of view; experiencing is a first-person point of view. There's a big difference between knowing that someone is in pain and being that someone.

(Don't forget that what you know actually affects how you experience things. If you know that the earth goes round the sun and not the other way round, you see the sunrise differently. When you do a bungee jump, your knowledge that you are securely fastened make a big difference to how you experience the fall.)

We’ve created machines that do the same. — Patterner

If a machine did do the same, it would be conscious and consequently not a machine. But they don't, so they're not. That's a bit unfair, but condenses another complicate topic about what the difference is and how one might create a conscious.

Well, you've identified/described three experiences quite clearly. You used a sentence, which consists of a subject, a verb and an object. So it looks as if an experience is a relationship, or (especially in the case of seeing, an activity). There are three different kinds of object, a colour, a substance and a sensation. What more do you want me to say? — Ludwig V

I don’t know. You said, “ I'm not clear what category of existence is attributed to them.” I wondered if you had any particular leanings. I don’t know all the options. I don’t know how much agreement there is on what the choices are. I’m looking it up, and it seems as complicated as most things.

I'm not sure about total colour blindness, or about what colour-blind people believe. If they don't know that colour-blindness exists, they likely believe that everybody sees the same way they do. But I'm not denying that there's such a thing as subjective experience - that's true by definition. The question is whether a subjective experience is an object in its own right. That's why I prefer to stick to the verb "experience" rather than its associated grammatical form, the noun "experience". — Ludwig V

I suspect color blind people are aware that the majority of people see in ways they do not.

If you think that our knowledge of our own minds is just like our knowledge of tables and chairs, you will think that subjective experiences are a premiss for an argument, that they are true or false. If our "knowledge" of our own minds isn't like our knowledge of tables and chairs, then the problem disappears. I should confess that this is not a simple either/or. — Ludwig V

I see. Sure, that makes sense. At the moment, the only solid stance I’ll take about subjective experiences is that they exist.

If a machine did do the same, it would be conscious and consequently not a machine. But they don't, so they're not. That's a bit unfair, but condenses another complicate topic about what the difference is and how one might create a conscious. — Ludwig V

Not sure what you mean. We have machines that perceive different frequencies of the visible spectrum, and perform different actions in response to different frequencies.

Are you saying a machine that was given consciousness would no longer be a machine?

I agree with that. But I don't think it is helpful to jump to conclusions, which Nagel does. — Ludwig V

Which conclusion do you mean? I try to read him, but can’t usually get far.

As far as I can tell Nagel never argued for anything in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, all he did was articulate an assumption. It seems to me the text is liked because many people shared with him that assumption but struggled with putting it into words, however for those who do not buy in the text is really quite useless.



I would like to make things simple for you and just boil this down to a question: why do you believe in qualia? I don't want to speak for Ludwig V but personally I am perfectly comfortable in my skeptical position, I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind.

I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind. — goremand

Do you mean that I'm using tricks of the mind to express my doubts? I believe that I'm exposing the tricks that make plausible the idea that we have an immersive experience playing in mind and especially the suggestion that everything we experience is an illusion. But I do not intend to malign anyone, so my argument would not claim to prove that the tricks are known or believed to be tricks; proponents of this idea are as taken in by these deceptive arguments as much as anyone else. They are tricks of language or perhaps I should call them misleading features of the grammar of language.

I'm comfortable for myself, but some people think that they have to refuse to acknowledge that there is a difficult philosophical problem here. That seems most unhelpful, to me.

It seems to me the text is liked because many people shared with him that assumption but struggled with putting it into words, — goremand

You may well be right. Don't get me wrong. It is a brilliant piece of philosophy, demonstrating that it is perfectly all right to be wrong, so long as you are wrong in interesting ways. I suppose it's just a marginal note to say that the article might well lead to some people who have never worried about the issue getting worried about it, or that, since philosophy thrives on puzzles, some people might buy in because they love a puzzle.

The defence is that resolving the puzzle can clarify what might be called knots in our thinking.

However, I think I should temper and depersonalize my language about this.

I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind. — goremand

I seem to remember that you doubt that phenomenal properties are real. Is that what you are referring to?

Which conclusion do you mean? I try to read him, but can’t usually get far. — Patterner

I realized after I wrote that sentence that I was going too far. It is true that Nagel aims to raise a question, not present a conclusion. But Nagel does propound his example as suggesting a problem and I think that problem is an illusion.

Are you saying a machine that was given consciousness would no longer be a machine? — Patterner

Yes and no. Perception is something that distinguishes consciousness beings from non-conscious (and unconscious) beings. If you say that a machine can perceive something, it is important to be clear in your own mind whether you are using "perceive" in a metaphorical way or whether you intend to attribute consciousness to it. When the EPOS machine says "Thank you", you don't believe that it is thanking you, do you?

At the moment, the only solid stance I’ll take about subjective experiences is that they exist. — Patterner

I wouldn't want to quarrel with that, so long as you don't get misled into clouds of philosophical problems by false analogies.

Let me try another example.

The word "appearance" gets used in two different ways. When I am waiting for a procession, (funeral, VIP, celebration) to pass by, we can say that eventually the parade appeared at the end of the street. Or that the parade made its appearance at the end of the street. These two ways of putting it mean the same thing, that the actual parade appeared, not something that looks like it or sounds like it. The appearance is an event, not an object in the sense that the cars and motor-cycles and people that make it up are objects. Right?

There's another sense of appearance which marks a distinction or contrast between appearance and reality. If we pay attention to the grammatical feature of language that an appearance is always an appearance of something, or perhaps more accurately, there is always an object that exists independently of any appearance of itself. Appearances may or may not coincide with the their objects. The stick appears to be bent or looks bent (or looks as if it is bent) is the best way to say this. This is the sense that gives trouble, especially when, as in the case of illusionism, there is no reality to distinguish appearance from - that's the philosophical move.

Experience is similar. By making a bungee jump, you have the experience of falling freely in perfect safety. But if you say it that way, you are heading for philosophical perplexity. However, if you say, by making a bungee jump, you can experience falling freely, there is less temptation to wonder what kind of object an experience is.

I would like to make things simple for you and just boil this down to a question: why do you believe in qualia? — goremand

What do you mean? Why do I think I see blue? And taste sweetness?

I don't want to speak for Ludwig V but personally I am perfectly comfortable in my skeptical position, I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind. — goremand

Not sure I am following you. Are you saying Ludwig V is a Jedi?

I don’t understand the difference between “you have the experience of falling freely” and “you can experience falling freely.”

What do you mean? Why do I think I see blue? And taste sweetness? — Patterner

If you take those to involve a qualitative element, then yes. Why believe that?

Like I told you I prefer functionalist definitions of taste and vision which do not involve qualia/phenomenal properties.

Not sure I am following you. Are you saying Ludwig V is a Jedi? — Patterner

No I am just saying that my doubt is straightforward, unlike that of an illusionist who needs to invoke something "extra" (illusions in this case) to justify their doubt.

Do you mean that I'm using tricks of the mind to express my doubts? — Ludwig V

No I'm sorry, this got misunderstood. When I said I wasn't speaking for you that is literally all I meant, that I wasn't speaking on your behalf and that you may or may not agree with what I am about to to say.

I don’t understand the difference between “you have the experience of falling freely” and “you can experience falling freely.” — Patterner

There is no difference of meaning, except that "you have the experience of falling freely" suggests that there is some kind of entity/thing that you in some sense have, whereas "you experience falling freely" does not suggest that.

No I'm sorry, this got misunderstood. — goremand

OK. But you made me think about how I express myself so there's no harm done.

What do you mean? Why do I think I see blue? And taste sweetness?
— Patterner

If you take those to involve a qualitative element, then yes. Why believe that?

Like I told you I prefer functionalist definitions of taste and vision which do not involve qualia/phenomenal properties. — goremand

If my hand is in a flame, I feel pain, and I pull my hand away. If there is no qualitative element/subjective experience/whatever term someone wants to use, then that’s all determined by the physical events/processes. If that’s the case, two questions.

1. If qualitative element/subjective experience doesn’t do anything, and everything works without it, why does it exist?

2. We can study and list all of the physical events/processes taking place in the brain and body. Maybe not literally, but in theory. And for any given cc of matter I suppose? Anyway, all of those things are the steps/building blocks of, in this example, taking my hand away from the fire. How are those physical events/processes also the steps/building blocks of the subjective experience of feeling pain and pulling my hand away from the flame? How do all of the physical events build these two different things? I would go further, and say three different things. They bring about the physical reaction of pulling my hand away from the thing damaging it, my subjective experience of it, and my awareness of it. After all, my subjective experience of the burning is not the same as my conversations about it in the future. I’m still aware of this burning from days gone by, even though I’m not currently experiencing it.

1. If qualitative element/subjective experience doesn’t do anything, and everything works without it, why does it exist? — Patterner

I don't believe that qualia/phenomenal properties do exist, so I obviously can't answer this question. I believe the position you're describing is called epiphenomenalism, but it's not one that I share. Did you mean to ask "why do many people believe it exists?"

And for any given cc of matter I suppose? Anyway, all of those things are the steps/building blocks of, in this example, taking my hand away from the fire. How are those physical events/processes also the steps/building blocks of the subjective experience of feeling pain and pulling my hand away from the flame? — Patterner

These are all *your* problems, as it is up to you to reconcile your belief in phenomenal properties with your belief in physical causation. I don't have these issues and that is a strength of my position.

As far as I can tell you haven't yet answered my original question, about why you believe in qualia. I think it's important you provide a direct answer, in particular I need to know if your belief is empirical (via the sense/introspection analogy) or dogmatic/a priori or perhaps a third option I haven't thought about.

Sorry for the late reply by the way.

My judgement of what caused these phenomena may be mistaken, in that I may think the postbox is red, but this would be an illusion, in that the postbox is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

In my view, the conception/meaning of wavelengths is entangled with everyday experience. If I ask you what you mean by wavelengths, you'll have to tell me about 'mere appearance.' In short, indirect realism that takes the scientific image as the hidden real seems to miss that this image is very much on the side of appearance and only his its meaning in context.

In my view, the conception/meaning of wavelengths is entangled with everyday experience. — plaque flag

That's a very good way of putting it.

In short, indirect realism that takes the scientific image as the hidden real seems to miss that this image is very much on the side of appearance and only his its meaning in context. — plaque flag

I think I agree with you, only I'm not sure what you mean by "this image" (which image exactly?).

It is certainly odd that people so often forget that the scientific version of colour is also the product of experience - that's what "empirical" means.

As far as I can tell you haven't yet answered my original question, about why you believe in qualia. — goremand

I did. We can explain things like perception, language, behavior, and memory in terms of things like neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms. Neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms explain it all without the need conscious experience, like blueness and pain. And they don’t explain blueness and pain. Blueness and pain are qualia. They are unnecessary subjective experience. and unexplained.

I think I agree with you, only I'm not sure what you mean by "this image" (which image exactly?). — Ludwig V

Ah, excellent question.

PSIM describes what Sellars sees as the major problem confronting philosophy today. This is the “clash” between “the ‘manifest’ image of man-in-the-world” and “the scientific image.” These two ‘images’ are idealizations of distinct conceptual frameworks in terms of which humans conceive of the world and their place in it. Sellars characterizes the manifest image as “the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world” (PSIM, in SPR: 6; in ISR: 374), but it is, more broadly, the framework in terms of which we ordinarily observe and explain our world. The fundamental objects of the manifest image are persons and things, with emphasis on persons, which puts normativity and reason at center stage. According to the manifest image, people think and they do things for reasons, and both of these “can occur only within a framework of conceptual thinking in terms of which [they] can be criticized, supported, refuted, in short, evaluated” (PSIM, in SPR: 6; in ISR: 374). In the manifest image persons are very different from mere things; things do not act rationally, in accordance with normative rules, but only in accord with laws or perhaps habits. How and why normative concepts and assessments apply to things is an important and contentious question within the framework.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/#PhilEnteImagHumaWorl

It is certainly odd that people so often forget that the scientific version of colour is also the product of experience - that's what "empirical" means. — Ludwig V

Yes. There's a default indirect realism that crumbles upon close investigation. I saw things like that myself once. It's probably because I was a science nerd and liked to think that tables were 'really' X. I probably absorbed it from nerdy teachers.

Anyway, Kant seemed to see that the others didn't go far enough. He put everything on the side of appearance but an unspeakable void. The really real shrunk to something infinitely distant, an absurd conclusion that suggests problems with the premises. Or that's how I grasp the situation at the moment.

Blueness and pain are qualia. They are unnecessary subjective experience. and unexplained. — Patterner

In my view, blueness and pain are actually just as caught up in the causal nexus and 'logical space' as everything else. Pain is used to explain behavior. Aspirin is used to explain the cessations of pain. As I see it, there's only one network of concepts whose meanings are radically interdependent.

I did. We can explain things like perception, language, behavior, and memory in terms of things like neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms. Neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms explain it all without the need conscious experience, like blueness and pain. And they don’t explain blueness and pain. Blueness and pain are qualia. They are unnecessary subjective experience. and unexplained. — Patterner

I don't really understand how this is an answer. Why do you believe in "conscious experience", blueness, pain etc.? Why believe there is anything "unneccessary" to explain in the first place?

Philosophy is a strange business. I'm about to complain that an ordinary expression that I understand as well as anyone else is incomprehensible. — Ludwig V

FWIW, Merleau-Ponty describes the philosopher as exactly the kind of person who finds the ordinary mysterious and full of complexities. The most basic concepts are perhaps the most elusive and difficult. The philosopher returns again and again to the beginning.