I have the impression that you are trying to paint Jabberwock as a bigot, which seems the sort of thing you deplore about woke cancel culture. — wonderer1

No. The sort of thing I hate about woke cancel culture is the assumption that everyone on the less popular side of a political position must be acting out of stupidity, or malice (the same assumption you've just made). That differences of opinion can no longer be the result of differences in value, or differences in analysis - but rather some nefarious objective to undermine The Truth™ which everyone apparently knows.

That is exactly the pattern being repeated here. Intelligent, well-informed people have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict, but we can't just discuss the merits of each approach, those differing from the mainstream have to uniformed, biased, Putin-supporters, they must be informed of what is "in reality..." the case, or educated about "the facts...". It's a lame attempt to disguise ideological commitments (which we could talk about) behind the pretence that The Facts™ just so happen to lead directly to the conclusion they favour, and no ideology need enter into it.

It's bollocks. The Facts are literally everything that's ever happened, and selecting two of those things and claiming that they (rather than ideological preferences) lead to some conclusion about strategy is disingenuous at best.

's argument is absurd - as if producing two facts is sufficient to argue a complex case of geopolitical strategy in which many experts in the field disagree. It deserved nothing more than it got in response. If anyone wants to actually try and make the case that Putin could not be deposed by popular uprising, but very likely would be by losing a war, then that would be an interesting case to read, but...

1. Putin's rule has been practically unchallenged by peaceful protests for twenty years.
2. The events of the Ukrainian war have weakened Putin's regime. — Jabberwock

... isn't one. It's an argument that Putin has not yet been deposed by popular uprising, and might be weakening by losing a war.

But the argument above is not sufficient to hold ground as support for the position that alternatives to war are not viable. Supporting that position requires the stronger argument made above, and the facts very clearly do not support that stronger argument, only the weaker one.

This should not be difficult stuff, and were this a discussion about some uncontroversial matter, no-one of reasonable intelligence would have the slightest trouble telling the difference.

Perhaps, an attempt to make this more clear. The conflict between the idealist and the realist is not an equal one, it's asymmetric in terms of evidence. This is because the idealist argument is "we all want the world to be like X and actions a, b, and c can get us there", but the realist argument is not "we all want the world to be like ~X and actions d, e, and f can get us there", it is ""we too want the world to be like X but actions a, b, and c unfortunately cannot get us there, nothing can - we have to accept the lesser {not quite}X".

That's how these arguments are set.

Those arguing for continued war are not arguing "Yeah, war! Let's have more of that!" They are arguing that we unfortunately, reluctantly must have war, it's our only option. They'd love nothing better than a world without war, but their hands are tied and reality is such that it cannot be avoided.

Those arguing for non-war options are not arguing the opposite (that they'd love to have a war, but unfortunately our hands are tied and we just cannot). They are arguing that there is a way, that we can resolve conflicts without war, that we can oppose tyranny without having to first move it about the globe by way of border wars.

So the evidence required for each of these positions is different.

The first argument needs to show that war cannot be avoided, in other words, it needs to prove a negative - that no other way works.

The second argument has no such burden, we don't need to prove that war cannot work because no one wants war anyway. War is what we reluctantly accept when all other options are closed. so we don't have to prove a negative, we only have to disprove the opposition's attempts to do so. We only have to show that they've not sufficiently made their case that war is the only option.

What's happening here is an attempt to perversely change this around. To assume we want war and require those opposing it to prove that it won't work. That's a pretty inhumane position to have arrived at.

Intelligent, well-informed people have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict, but we can't just discuss the merits of each approach, those differing from the mainstream have to uniformed, biased, — Isaac

Or racist xenophobes.

Or racist xenophobes. — unenlightened

Yes. Or racist xenophobes. I expect they have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict too, but I've no interest in arguing with those. Likewise the terminally stupid, the uncaring, the insane... There are lots of categories of people who might have an opinion about how to resolve this conflict against whom I've no wish to argue, whose opinions I've no wish to hear.

We used to exclude those types of people from debate on the grounds of a lack of qualification, or of not meeting the basic requirements of civil society.

Now it seems, the measure of exclusion is likelihood of disagreeing on the very topic supposedly being discussed.

And that's progressive, apparently.

It would be absurd to argue that no-one is racist, or a xenophobe, or biased, or ill-informed... This is not about the possibility of any alternative opinion being one of those things. It's about the reasonableness of the criteria used to to judge that.

Jeffry Sachs is clearly not ill-informed. It would be ridiculous to suggest he is. He's clearly not malicious (he's spent his academic career fighting poverty). so it's unreasonable to suggest he is.

Your hypothetical Ukrainian espousing the idea that modern Russians have somehow inherited the evils of their forebears is xenophobic. It's literally the definition of the word - imputing on a nation some inherited 'characteristic', simply by virtue of origin. And Ukraine (alongside many of the nations in that region) is notorious for the strength of it's right-wing nationalism, particularly in the armed forces.

To put the implication that Jeffrey Sachs et al. are uninformed and uncaring on a par with the suggestion that an hypothetical Ukrainian repeating xenophobic tropes is, in fact, a xenophobe is nonsense.

The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. Of course they're not. It's an argument about what we ought take as reasonable grounds to take an opinion seriously.

I've no interest in arguing with those. Likewise the terminally stupid, the uncaring, the insane... There are lots of categories of people who might have an opinion about how to resolve this conflict against whom I've no wish to argue, whose opinions I've no wish to hear. — Isaac

But you sure like calling them out, o fair-minded one!

But you sure like calling them out, o fair-minded one! — unenlightened

Yes. That's right.

The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. Of course they're not. It's an argument about what we ought take as reasonable grounds to take an opinion seriously. — Isaac

The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. — Isaac

What argument?The rest of us call it ad hominem fallacy.

What argument?The rest of us call it ad hominem fallacy. — unenlightened

Is it ad hominem to take a medical professor's opinion about vaccine safety more seriously in discussion than the 16 year-old Proud Boy?

Of course not.

We take into consideration matters like qualification, basic social ethics, and intelligence (a minimum threshold of). These are not ad hominem, they're just reasonable entry requirements for discussion. Here, speaking English is one, for example.

I wasn't expecting that I'd have to actually repeat the arguments as to why one might not want to include racists and xenophobes in a discussion about how to settle international conflict.

If you want the full argument it was made in 1721...

Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired — Jonathan Swift

I have to admit that I have seen no reasonable evidence in this thread of any poster being terminally stupid, uncaring or insane. If I had, I would certainly have reported it to the moderators. And the same if I had seen evidence of racism and xenophobia. In fact I have a particular sensitivity on the latter issue that some here will be aware of, being part of a mixed race family.

And here is the inconsistency I see in your posting: you are very free with these negative labels, but there is no good reason ever to address them to your interlocutors on the boards, rather you should point them out to the mods so that they can be remove the people we don't want to waste time talking to and the sensible fair-minded decent people can discuss freely.

But instead, you use these sorts of epithets on a regular basis in an attempt to undermine people you do continue to engage with. And then bang on hypocritically about respect.

I have to admit that I have seen no reasonable evidence in this thread of any poster being terminally stupid, uncaring or insane. — unenlightened

No. Neither have I. Which is why I...

do continue to engage with [them] — unenlightened

I have no reason to invoke the mods. The only person I've accused of anything except error is your completely hypothetical Ukrainian who isn't (I assume) under the mods' jurisdiction.

you use these sorts of epithets on a regular basis in an attempt to undermine people — unenlightened

Do I?

And yet...

the inconsistency I see in your posting: you are very free with these negative labels, but there is no good reason ever to address them to your interlocutors on the boards, rather you should point them out to the mods so that they can be remove the people we don't want to waste time talking to and the sensible fair-minded decent people can discuss freely. — unenlightened

...I've had no moderation requests. And here you are, engaging. If my gross application of such epithets is so egregious and persistent, then why are you still engaging rather than taking your own advice?

Those arguing for continued war are not arguing "Yeah, war! Let's have more of that!" They are arguing that we unfortunately, reluctantly must have war, it's our only option. They'd love nothing better than a world without war, but their hands are tied and reality is such that it cannot be avoided.

Those arguing for non-war options are not arguing the opposite (that they'd love to have a war, but unfortunately our hands are tied and we just cannot). They are arguing that there is a way, that we can resolve conflicts without war, that we can oppose tyranny without having to first move it about the globe by way of border wars.

So the evidence required for each of these positions is different.

The first argument needs to show that war cannot be avoided, in other words, it needs to prove a negative - that no other way works.

The second argument has no such burden, we don't need to prove that war cannot work because no one wants war anyway. War is what we reluctantly accept when all other options are closed. so we don't have to prove a negative, we only have to disprove the opposition's attempts to do so. We only have to show that they've not sufficiently made their case that war is the only option. — Isaac

No, that is not true, it is as ahistorical as most of your other claims. The simplest example is the one I have already given you: the liberation wars. People do not start liberation wars when 'all other options are closed' - obviously there is always the option to remain under the oppression - but when the war is considered to be a better alternative. Nobody finds that blameworthy - few beside the most staunch pacifists claim that they should choose the oppresion over the war. Your position seems to be to avoid war at all cost, including oppression. I understand it, but you are a in a tiny minority of people who support this. Thus it is simply incorrect to assume that all who discuss the subject here share that position, which you do above.

But even if that was true, which it is not, the conlusion is still false. For both sides the burden of proof is exactly the same – to show that the expected results of the proposed course of action are more likely than not. Without that it does not matter at all whether the solution would be preferred by both sides, because if it is not likely to happen, it makes no difference.

If an idealist proposes that we reach global disarmament by destroying all our weapons and waiting as all others do exactly the same, it is not the realist's burden to show that it is not possible in principle (because it is) or that it is not the preferred course of action, but only that such a course of action is very unlikely to produce the expected result and quite likely to produce other quite adverse effects (like being attacked by those who held onto their weapons).

So no, 'the slighest chance' of good results is not sufficient to propose a course of action, if there is a quite big chance that the results might not be that good.

Supporting that position requires the stronger argument made above, and the facts very clearly do not support that stronger argument, only the weaker one. — Isaac

Oh, so we can discuss facts after all. So please, do present the facts that show that the peaceful deposition of Putin by way of popular protest is likely. That is all I ask. Because so far your track record is somewhat unimpressive: you have argued for an alternative between 'peaceful protests and military invasion', but that alternative is false and ahistorical. On the other hand, examining whether more regimes fell down by violence or by peaceful opposition shows that the first is definitely more likely. You had no answer to that.

You also have claimed that Ukraine in recent years went from autocracy to democracy quickly and by way of popular protests - that is also an ahistorical claim, which shows a rather significant lack of knowledge of the history of the country we are here discussing. You have given as a support democracy metrics, which, it turned out, were quite different than what you have claimed.

I gave you two facts, but I can give quite a few more. For some of them one has to go back to the times of tzars, when, at the time where Western civic societies were being established, Russians were still under absolutistic rule. The period of relative freedoms after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the Ditcatorship of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's verchushka. After that were fifty years of the authoritarian party's rule, with a very short period of relative relaxation under Yeltsin; then Putin came and strengthened the rule again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of democracy and very little of grass-root civil activity. This is aggravated by the rampant corruption, which necessarily weakens all the state institutions. It should also be noted that the geographical setup also plays a role – many remote regions are unsustainable without external help, so they were and are heavily dependent on the center. For example, independent Yakutia (Sakha) might sound nice to some, but is rather unrealistic - in spite of vast resources it would be unable to develop without significant external support. That forces heavily centralized structure of the government. This makes the greatest difference between Russia and current regions/republics and some former republics – for Baltics, for example, the oppression was clearly foreign - they did not need Moscow for anything, they could perfectly manage on their own (which they did). For remote regions it is quite different. This is somewhat related to another fact that hinders a popular uprising - significant differences in the standards of living. Those whose voice would be better heard and influential, Muscovites, have it much better than the rest of the country and they are quite aware of that - they have a lot to lose. On the other hand protests in remote areas would be simply unheard. Popular uprising needs unity, which would be difficult to reach.

This does not mean that Russians are unable to reach democracy, I sincerely hope that they do, but that process would be rather long and necessarily full of upheavals. It cannot be seriously considered as a solution for a conflict that is happening right now.

This is just a sample of facts, I can give you quite a few more. However, the issue I see is that you tend not to engage with facts, you simply ignore them. You do not seem to be even interested in the history of the region. You somehow believe that it is sufficient to claim 'But it could happen!'. That is not a position based on factually supported assessment of likely course of events, that is wishful thinking. Yet you demand that such position, in which you specifically reject the burden of proof, be given exactly the same merit as other views.

So yes, please, do present your detailed account of your assessment based on facts from the situation and history of the region, particularly Russia, that peaceful deposition of the regime leading to democratic changes that would prevent Russia from encroaching on Ukrainian freedom is likely in relatively short term. I will treat that position with the respect it deserves.

Nobody finds that blameworthy - few beside the most staunch pacifists claim that they should choose the oppresion over the war. — Jabberwock

And pacifists usually have some sort of otherworldly faith. The nasty, belligerent pacifist doesn't exist.

I'll save cluttering the thread with arguments written elsewhere. The arguments against historicism are discussed here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14472/why-should-we-talk-about-the-history-of-ideas

You've presented a series of facts which, alone, do not demonstrate anything but your interpretation of what actually happened in one instance. What actually happened in one instance is neither a delimiter nor predictive of what will/could happen in another instance. It would be like me claiming that tall people are likely to hit you on the grounds that a tall person once hit me.

Historical facts are always already interpreted. They don't stand on their own.

For example...

that Ukraine in recent years went from autocracy to democracy quickly and by way of popular protests - that is also an ahistorical claim — Jabberwock

Measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective. When Ukraine (or Russia) started being an autocracy and when it stopped are not raw historical facts (which would be things like election methods, political arrest rates, etc). You've already interpreted historical facts in line with your preferred narrative and are attempting to pass off the interpretation as fact.

We're not dealing with facts, we're dealing with your preferred story, based on facts. I can't argue against it because it's a perfectly valid story. Nor have I any need to to support my argument.

You, however, to support an argument that war is necessary, have to show that alternatives are impossible (or highly improbable). That can't be shown by simply pointing to one plausible interpretation of events. An argument that war is necessary has to show that other interpretations are all implausible. You have to show that it is impossible to be of the opinion that Ukraine turned from a state similar to Russia's current one, to their current one in a few years. You haven't shown that, you've shown that it is possible to interpret events in such a way as to suggest not. But no one is arguing that is is not possible to do that. I'm arguing it is not necessary to do that. Do you understand the difference?

Nothing you've presented even addresses the argument that it is not necessary to interpret historical events in such a way as to support the notion that war is necessary to bring about freedom. You've shown it's plausible to think the opposite, not that it's implausible to think anything else.

You've presented a series of facts which, alone, do not demonstrate anything but your interpretation of what actually happened in one instance. What actually happened in one instance is neither a delimiter nor predictive of what will/could happen in another instance. It would be like me claiming that tall people are likely to hit you on the grounds that a tall person once hit me. — Isaac

No, I did not present my views based on one instance. I have quoted many events from the history that support the view I propose. Unlike you.

Measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective. When Ukraine (or Russia) started being an autocracy and when it stopped are not raw historical facts (which would be things like election methods, political arrest rates, etc). You've already interpreted historical facts in line with your preferred narrative and are attempting to pass off the interpretation as fact. — Isaac

It was you yourself that proposed democracy indices as a measure of democracy. I understand your dismay that you did so without actually checking them and it turned out they actually do not support your view, but it is silly now to discredit them.

But sure, it is one interpretation of events, be free to present those events that support your interpretation. Till now you have flatly refused to do that.

We're not dealing with facts, we're dealing with your preferred story, based on facts. I can't argue against it because it's a perfectly valid story. — Isaac

And I am not asking for it, I am asking you to argue for your preferred story, based on facts. I suspect, based on the discussion so far, that the reason you refuse to do so is that you do not know any.

Nor have I any need to to support my argument.

Yes, you do. You demand from your government that it takes a specific course of action instead of the course of action it is taking. To argue for that you have to present an argument that the specific course of action you propose is more likely to have the preferred result than the course taken by them. It is not enough to claim that it is just possible that the preferred result might occur.

You, however, to support an argument that war is necessary, have to show that alternatives are impossible (or highly improbable). That can't be shown by simply pointing to one plausible interpretation of events. An argument that war is necessary has to show that other interpretations are all implausible. You have to show that it is impossible to be of the opinion that Ukraine turned from a state similar to Russia's current one, to their current one in a few years. You haven't shown that, you've shown that it is possible to interpreted events in such a way as to suggest not. But no one is arguing that is is not possible to do that. I'm arguing it is not necessary to do that. Do you understand the difference? — Isaac

No, all I have to do is support an argument that war is more likely to produce the preferred results than other courses of action and I did just that. We have to act based on what we consider to be likely, not possible. Until you actually present an argument (based on facts) that peaceful revolt in Russia is likely, then that is the only assessment of likelihood we have.

Nothing you've presented even addresses the argument that it is possible to interpret historical events in such a way as to support the notion that alternatives to ground war can bring about freedom. You've shown it's plausible to think the opposite, not that it's implausible to think anything else. — Isaac

I have already explained which historical events support my argument that peaceful revolution in Russia at this time is unlikely. Sure, it is possible to interpret historical events otherwise, but it is possible to interpret historical events in ANY way. It is possible to interpret historical events in such a way that supports the notion that the Moon landing did not happen. Would you demand that this position was treated equally as the one that says that it did? There are people arguing on the Internet that the ancient Rome did not exist. Does that position deserve the exact same merit as the opposite one?

I argue against your view, because it is not a perfectly valid story. I argue against it, because it is an invalid one, for which I gave my reasons. Saying 'Oh, I can argue that Ukraine's transition was fast and recent, because I can interpret the facts that way!' has the exact same weight as 'Oh, I can argue that the Moon landing did not happen because I can interpret the facts that way!' Actually, it has less weight, because the Moon landing conspiracists at least share their interpretations of the facts that led them to that conclusion, which you refuse to do.

The bottom line is that we have a reason to believe that the taken course of action is likely to produce the effects we expect (as you wrote yourself, it is a perfectly valid story). On the other hand, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that the course of action you propose is likely to produce the desired effects, beside your claim that your interpretation of events (which you refuse to share) tells you so.

I would let the readers decide how that should inform our demands concerning the course of action.

I did not present my views based on one instance. I have quoted many events from the history that support the view I propose. — Jabberwock

I was referring to your potted history of the USSR. The number of 'instances' you divide this into was not the relvan6part of that paragraph. The relevant part was that it is interpreted.

Unlike you. — Jabberwock

Are you seriously claiming that there exists not a single case of tyranny being overthrown by non-military? Because if not, then my case is already made. If we both agree that such cases exist then that is my argument. It is possible, therefore we ought strive for it. That case is undermined only by two counterarguments; a) it is not even possible, or b) we ought not strive for it. You've argued neither.

It was you yourself that proposed democracy indices as a measure of democracy. — Jabberwock

I proposed no such thing. I proposed "measures of human development", please respond to what I've written, not what you'd like me to have written.

An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119.

Till now you have flatly refused to do that. — Jabberwock

O will do so if you claim that there are no instances at all in history, or that it is impossible. Otherwise we already agree on the facts of my case. We disagree about the conclusion.

You demand from your government that it takes a specific course of action instead of the course of action it is taking. To argue for that you have to present an argument that the specific course of action you propose is more likely to have the preferred result than the course taken by them. — Jabberwock

all I have to do is support an argument that war is more likely to produce the preferred results than other courses of action — Jabberwock

I presume we'd all rather avoid war. Therefore I only have to argue that it is possible to do so.

If I wanted to kill Putin, dropping 10 nuclear bombs on Moscow would be sure to do it. So is all I need to do to prove that increased likelihood of achieving the outcome? Of course not. We want to kill Putin, but we want to do so in the least harmful way (in terms of collateral damage). If you prefer we could set the outcome to be 'freedom for the people of Ukraine with minimum loss of freedom to others'. But under that metric, war has a high(ish) chance of securing freedom, but with massive losses, supporting revolution has a lower chance of securing freedom, but with minimal losses. So which wins?

Probability of success is not a sufficient metric, unless your 'preferred results' is wide enough to include avoiding undesirable collateral effects, in which case, you haven't made your case because you've only included 'freedom for Ukraine' as your result. I sincerely hope my government have more concerns than the freedom of Ukrainians.

I have already explained which historical events support my argument that peaceful revolution in Russia at this time is unlikely. — Jabberwock

No, they don't. Look, I'll try and give an example from your post above...

"... at the time where Western decadent societies were being established, Russians were still under equally despotic rule (monarchs and bourgeois factory owners are identical). The period of relative chaos after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the paternal care of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's dedicated verchushka. After that were fifty years of the steady party's rule, with a very short period of descent into capitalism under Yeltsin; then Putin came and fortunately strengthened the rule for the people again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of decadence and are one of the few countries to overthrow the rule of bourgeois oligarchs, so they can do it again."

... I've not changed any of the facts at all. Just written it from a different perspective. You've not 'explained' anything. You've just told me what your preferred frame is.

I argue against it, because it is an invalid one, for which I gave my reasons. — Jabberwock

You've not given a single reason why my story is invalid. Presenting an alternative one isn't an argument that mine is invalid. You have to show that I can't think what I think (and remain coherent), not merely that there's an alternative which is also coherent.

Saying 'Oh, I can argue that Ukraine's transition was fast and recent, because I can interpret the facts that way!' has the exact same weight as 'Oh, I can argue that the Moon landing did not happen because I can interpret the facts that way!' — Jabberwock

No, it doesn't because I can show how it is virtually impossible to believe the moon landings were fake and remain coherent - the number of people who would need to be involved is inconsistent with the number of people who have been shown to be involved with any other conspiracy. It's not complicated. As I've shown above, you giving your preferred account of Russian history is not the same category of fact at all. It's really, really simple - do experts actually think the moon landings were faked? No. Do experts actually think war will be worse for Ukraine than occupation? Yes. That's literally all you need to do to determine which positions are off the 'crazy' end and which are to be taken seriously.

we have a reason to believe that the taken course of action is likely to produce the effects we expect (as you wrote yourself, it is a perfectly valid story). On the other hand, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that the course of action you propose is likely to produce the desired effects, beside your claim that your interpretation of events (which you refuse to share) tells you so. — Jabberwock

It's not that simple if one course of action is going to lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, we don't simple compare on likelihood of success, unless success includes the minimisation of collateral effects, in which case you haven't made your argument at all since you've not included that metric.

Encourage more war - "Putin is weakening and could be overthrown any minute, just a few more bombs and we'll be there."

Encourage political action instead of war - "Putin is strong, it would take many decades to overthrow him" — Isaac

↓ observations moreso than narrative (e.g. to proceed from)

Warring — the Kremlin invades + bombs Ukraine

Response — multinational political and defense action

^{(the "bombs" part includes food export by the way, "warring" party can make peace break out anytime, without much fear of invasion at that; the "response" part isn't exclusive-either-or like so, also repeated UN and Ukraine terms)}

Yes, Ukraine has been wrestling to shed the regressing shadow of the dominant neighbor for a bit. Some progress has been made, and more pending (barring PTSD).

Incidentally, there are some peripherals related to varying extents, e.g. Sweden, Armenia-Azerbaijan, North Korea, Germany, Poland.

↑ much already brought up earlier

Nothing further regarding this earlier comment?

I was referring to your potted history of the USSR. The number of 'instances' you divide this into was not the relvan6part of that paragraph. The relevant part was that it is interpreted. — Isaac

I was referring to the facts concerning overthrowing various regimes and how it affects the likelihood of assessment of success in this case.

Are you seriously claiming that there exists not a single case of tyranny being overthrown by non-military? Because if not, then my case is already made. If we both agree that such cases exist then that is my argument. It is possible, therefore we ought strive for it. That case is undermined only by two counterarguments; a) it is not even possible, or b) we ought not strive for it. You've argued neither. — Isaac

No, your case is not already made, because you are supposed to argue that what the course of action you propose is likely to provide the desired effects. Arguing that it is merely possible is not enough.

I proposed no such thing. I proposed "measures of human development", please respond to what I've written, not what you'd like me to have written.

An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119. — Isaac

If we are tracking transition from autocracy to democracy, then we should consider indices that do just that.

O will do so if you claim that there are no instances at all in history, or that it is impossible. Otherwise we already agree on the facts of my case. We disagree about the conclusion. — Isaac

Sure, I agree that is possible, I just argue that we have no reason to believe it is likely. If you are happy with that conclusion, the discussion is settled.

I presume we'd all rather avoid war. Therefore I only have to argue that it is possible to do so. — Isaac

No, you have to argue that your proposed course of action is likely to achieve that goal. I think all would agree that it would be great if we could summon aliens by singing hippie songs so that they brought us global peace with no victims at all. It is impossible to argue that this effect is NOT possible. Yet this idea is useless as the proposed course of action.

If I wanted to kill Putin, dropping 10 nuclear bombs on Moscow would be sure to do it. So is all I need to do to prove that increased likelihood of achieving the outcome? Of course not. We want to kill Putin, but we want to do so in the least harmful way (in terms of collateral damage). If you prefer we could set the outcome to be 'freedom for the people of Ukraine with minimum loss of freedom to others'. But under that metric, war has a high(ish) chance of securing freedom, but with massive losses, supporting revolution has a lower chance of securing freedom, but with minimal losses. So which wins? — Isaac

The former, because the chance of achieving the latter is low due to the circumstances I have described.

Probability of success is not a sufficient metric, unless your 'preferred results' is wide enough to include avoiding undesirable collateral effects, in which case, you haven't made your case because you've only included 'freedom for Ukraine' as your result. I sincerely hope my government have more concerns than the freedom of Ukrainians.

It is not the only metric, but it is the most important one. Great effects could be achieved by taking very risky actions, but we do not do them precisely for the reason that they would most likely fail. Yes, the predicted outcomes offset the probabilities, but only to a small degree.

No, they don't. Look, I'll try and give an example from your post above...

"... at the time where Western decadent societies were being established, Russians were still under equally despotic rule (monarchs and bourgeois factory owners are identical). The period of relative chaos after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the paternal care of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's dedicated verchushka. After that were fifty years of the steady party's rule, with a very short period of descent into capitalism under Yeltsin; then Putin came and fortunately strengthened the rule for the people again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of decadence and are one of the few countries to overthrow the rule of bourgeois oligarchs, so they can do it again."

... I've not changed any of the facts at all. Just written it from a different perspective. You've not 'explained' anything. You've just told me what your preferred frame is. — Isaac

It is not hard to notice that this interpretation is as coherent as the perspective that the Moon landing is fake. I understand that you are desperate to show that all perspectives are equal, but the simple truth is they are not.

You've not given a single reason why my story is invalid. Presenting an alternative one isn't an argument that mine is invalid. You have to show that I can't think what I think (and remain coherent), not merely that there's an alternative which is also coherent. — Isaac

Your story is invalid because it does not cohere with the generally accepted view of historical processes. Sure, you might argue that those in turn are invalid, but that requires in turn even more arguments.

No, it doesn't because I can show how it is virtually impossible to believe the moon landings were fake and remain coherent - the number of people who would need to be involved is inconsistent with the number of people who have been shown to be involved with any other conspiracy. It's not complicated. As I've shown above, you giving your preferred account of Russian history is not the same category of fact at all. It's really, really simple - do experts actually think the moon landings were faked? No. Do experts actually think war will be worse for Ukraine than occupation? Yes. That's literally all you need to do to determine which positions are off the 'crazy' end and which are to be taken seriously. — Isaac

But that is not the argument you are making. Do experts believe that quick and peaceful revolution in Russia leading to its democractization is likely? If you know them, just present their arguments. Because so far you have claimed you are exempt from making the argument at all.

It's not that simple if one course of action is going to lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, we don't simple compare on likelihood of success, unless success includes the minimisation of collateral effects, in which case you haven't made your argument at all since you've not included that metric. — Isaac

But so far we have nothing to compare, because you have failed to present the argument (I mercifully refrain to consider the 'decadence frame' as one).

you are supposed to argue that what the course of action you propose is likely to provide the desired effects. — Jabberwock

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny?

If we are tracking transition from autocracy to democracy — Jabberwock

We're not. We're talking about freedom. Freedom is a lot more than just democracy.

you have to argue that your proposed course of action is likely to achieve that goal. — Jabberwock

What goal? 'Avoid war'? Are you seriously arguing that 'continue war' is more likely to avoid war than 'stop war'?

The former, because the chance of achieving the latter is low — Jabberwock

So ignoring completely all collateral damage? I suppose the Iraq war was OK by you too then?

the predicted outcomes offset the probabilities, but only to a small degree. — Jabberwock

Really? How small. Smaller than 10?

I understand that you are desperate to show that all perspectives are equal, but the simple truth is they are not. — Jabberwock

Your story is invalid because it does not cohere with the generally accepted view of historical processes. — Jabberwock

Ah! The Generally Accepted View™. Owned by the same company as The Facts™ if I recall correctly.

Is there a citation you could share for The Generally Accepted View™, it would sure resolve decades of disagreement between Marxist historians and Western scholars.

Do experts believe that quick and peaceful revolution in Russia leading to its democractization is likely? — Jabberwock

Who said quick? Measuring against the current death rate in the war and the Russian occupation of Crimea, they've got decades and would still come out on top. Are you arguing that not a single expert in the world thinks Russia could improve a few points (all Ukraine has done) in the next decade or so?

so far we have nothing to compare, because you have failed to present the argument — Jabberwock

Done so already, but again...

According to the Human Freedom Index, Ukraine, just before the Maidan Revolution ranked 134. Russia, at last measure ranked 119.

It is therefore possible for a country to (through non-military action) bring itself to the level of freedom Ukraine now enjoys from the level of freedom Russia now suffers in the space of eight years.

Eight years is also the time over which Russia has occupied Crimea with some few hundred deaths and similar restrictions of freedom currently active in Ukraine (and imposed by Ukraine in Donbas before this latest invasion)

Therefore it is plausible to believe that a country can get from Russia-now to Ukraine-now (in terms of freedom) in the space of eight years, suffering only the death and humanitarian toll seen in Russian-occupied Crimea.

These are all historical facts (the human freedom measures, the deaths and humanitarian situation in occupied Crimea). They can be used to support a narrative - one of popular struggle against oppression, anti-war.

We're comparing two options here, It's no good just dismissing one because it's unlikely. What matters is whether it's more likely than the other. — Isaac

For both sides the burden of proof is exactly the same – to show that the expected results of the proposed course of action are more likely than not. Without that it does not matter at all whether the solution would be preferred by both sides, because if it is not likely to happen, it makes no difference. — Jabberwock

It's not about possibility and necessity. It's about "more likely".

It's not about possibility and necessity. It's about "more likely". — neomac

Depends on the framing. As I said above...

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac

...if you want to put it in terms of likelihood.

Sure, if your sole concern is the ability of Ukrainians to vote in an unimpeded election then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal.

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac

No, 'greater than zero' is not enough, you have to provide argument that your proposed course of action is likely to succeed. If you had a plan that would provide us with global peace without any violence, but the chance of success was 1%, and the 99% was that the world would be plunged into tyranny, then nobody would pursue that course of action, even though the goal was so lofty.

We're not. We're talking about freedom. Freedom is a lot more than just democracy. — Isaac

in this case it is a distinction without a difference. Neither Ukraine was authoritarian a few years ago, nor did it undergo any fast processes over the last few years.

What goal? 'Avoid war'? Are you seriously arguing that 'continue war' is more likely to avoid war than 'stop war'? — Isaac

No, I am arguing that you have failed to provide an argument that your proposed course of action would likely bring the result of avoiding war. If that goal is unlikely to be achieved, we should pursue other goals - those which we are likely to achieve.

So ignoring completely all collateral damage? I suppose the Iraq war was OK by you too then? — Isaac

No, because it failed to provide any positive results and was not likely to provide them from the start.

Ah! The Generally Accepted View™. Owned by the same company as The Facts™ if I recall correctly.

Is there a citation you could share for The Generally Accepted View™, it would sure resolve decades of disagreement between Marxist historians and Western scholars. — Isaac

If you enjoy the company of Moon-landing denialists, it is your choice, but do not demand that your views be treated as a reasonable alternative.

Who said quick? Measuring against the current death rate in the war and the Russian occupation of Crimea, they've got decades and would still come out on top. Are you arguing that not a single expert in the world thinks Russia could improve a few points (all Ukraine has done) in the next decade or so? — Isaac

Oh, so the alternative is now thousands of deaths or decades of oppression. Think of the children, you said? If so, then it is even more understandable why Ukrainians would prefer the former. And again you are saying what is possible, not what is likely.

Done so already, but again...

According to the Human Freedom Index, Ukraine, just before the Maidan Revolution ranked 134. Russia, at last measure ranked 119.

It is therefore possible for a country to (through non-military action) bring itself to the level of freedom Ukraine now enjoys from the level of freedom Russia now suffers in the space of eight years.

Eight years is also the time over which Russia has occupied Crimea with some few hundred deaths and similar restrictions of freedom currently active in Ukraine (and imposed by Ukraine in Donbas before this latest invasion)

Therefore it is plausible to believe that a country can get from Russia-now to Ukraine-now (in terms of freedom) in the space of eight years, suffering only the death and humanitarian toll seen in Russian-occupied Crimea. — Isaac

Sure, it is possible! If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.

But Russia does not have any of that. On the other hand, it has strict control of information (last somewhat independent press outlets were closed last year, it has massive blocking of Internet sites, Roskomnadzor, etc.), tight control of any social activities (organizations, foundations, etc.), stiff penalties for any form of protest, politically controlled judicial system. Could all those differences (beside those already mentioned by me before) affect the expected outcome? I say they would. Your argument just ignores all those differences and claims that we should expect a similar outcome, because they had a similar SINGLE metrics eight years ago (even if many other were different). And you demand to be treated seriously.

These are all historical facts (the human freedom measures, the deaths and humanitarian situation in occupied Crimea). They can be used to support a narrative - one of popular struggle against oppression, anti-war. — Isaac

No, they are not, you have specifically excluded 'human freedom measures' from 'facts' - 'measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective'. You cannot have it both ways.

you have argued for an alternative between 'peaceful protests and military invasion', but that alternative is false and ahistorical — Jabberwock

That alternative sounds foolish after so candidly claiming:

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility. — Isaac

ANY government (ESPECIALLY AS AUTHORITARIAN AS RUSSIA !) can VERY EASILY claim foreign interference for any fucking peaceful protest (see the protests in Iran for more than 20 years).

Depends on the framing. As I said above...

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac


...if you want to put it in terms of likelihood. — Isaac

Dude, focus. The point is not if I want to put it in terms of likelihood. But that you wanted to put it as well (framing or not framing). So if you talk about "more likely" events, others can do the same and challenge you accordingly. Framing interlocutors' views as a matter of possibility or impossibility constitutes a strawman argument. Repeatedly soliciting interlocutors to frame their arguments as a matter of taking position for or against possibilities is intellectually cringe.

Sure, if your sole concern is the ability of Ukrainians to vote in an unimpeded election then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal. — Isaac

If your sole concern is "freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead", then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal?!

No, 'greater than zero' is not enough — Jabberwock

Of course it is, if your only other choice has zero chance of success, then you take the one that has slightly above zero. Your plan has zero chance of achieving the 'desired effect'.

If you had a plan that would provide us with global peace without any violence, but the chance of success was 1%, and the 99% was that the world would be plunged into tyranny, then nobody would pursue that course of action, even though the goal was so lofty. — Jabberwock

They would if the alternative had 0% chance of success and 100% chance that the world would be plunged into tyranny. Again, if you want to talk about probabilities, then you're comparing options and their consequences.

in this case it is a distinction without a difference. Neither Ukraine was authoritarian a few years ago, nor did it undergo any fast processes over the last few years. — Jabberwock

I've cited the data. It ranked lower than Russia in the Human Freedom Index. It now ranks higher. It made progress from lower to higher in eight years. That's all that's needed to show Russia can do the same.

No, I am arguing that you have failed to provide an argument that your proposed course of action would likely bring the result of avoiding war. — Jabberwock

Nor have you. In fact your proposed course of action 100% guarantees war. So neither of our options are distinguished by a guarantee to avoid war. I'm suggesting war could be avoided by not resisting (militarily) when tyrants attempt to occupy territory but instead focus on removing the tyrant from power so that it doesn't matter much which country owns what. You're suggesting we use war to contain tyrants in the country they're in and by losing said war, weaken their rule. As far as 'avoiding war', your strategy literally cites it as a tool, so it will 100% not avoid war. My strategy might avoid war. In that one simple metric 'avoiding war', it's clear that even if my strategy had only 0.000001% chance of working it's better than yours which has 0% chance of avoiding war seeing as it involves war.

This is, of course, a good reason not to use stupidly simplistic metrics like 'avoid war' or 'secure voting rights', but rather take a more holistic approach which tries to maximise human well-being throughout the reach of our consequences.

No, because it failed to provide any positive results — Jabberwock

It removed a dictator. How's that not positive? Again, pick a naively simplistic metric and you can make anything sound like a success. That's why intelligent people avoid naively simplistic metrics of success. Even our governments have more goals in mind than simply 'free the Ukrainians' when they determine policy, they balance that goal against others to come up with a strategy which meets most.

Oh, so the alternative is now thousands of deaths or decades of oppression. Think of the children, you said? If so, then it is even more understandable why Ukrainians would prefer the former. — Jabberwock

Oppression only works because most people prefer it to death. If most people preferred death to oppression then they would all resist it until dead and the oppressor would have no population left to oppress. If an oppressor puts a gun to your head and says "jump", you jump, because you prefer that to just saying "no" and getting shot. It's an absolute fact of human nature that we marginally prefer oppression to death because there's a chance of getting out of oppression. Crimea has been under Russian oppression for eight years. Why has the entire population not simply killed themselves to escape the oppression? Because they'd prefer to live, and hope.

It's not as if the Ukrainians have these two stark choices. Ukraine outside of Russia is hardly a bed of roses and with crippling debt and a destroyed economy, it'll be much worse. The human rights record of Ukrainian-occupied Donbas is practically identical to that of Russian-occupied Crimea. You might have bought into the propagandist fantasy that Ukraine was some beacon of democratic light before the invasion, but the evidence shows otherwise.

The choice faced (in the frame you've used above) is thousands more dead vs slightly worse levels of freedom).

If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.

But Russia does not have any of that. — Jabberwock

The Human Freedom Index includes measures of

Rule of law
Security and safety
Movement
Religion
Association, assembly, and civil society
Expression and information
Relationships
Size of government
Legal system and property rights
Sound money
Freedom to trade internationally
Regulation — https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2021

... as do most indices. Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan. The factors you cite are already taken account of. Ukraine came from a situation where it was worse than Russia in all of those measures put together, to one where it was better than Russia, in eight years.

No, they are not, you have specifically excluded 'human freedom measures' from 'facts' - 'measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective'. — Jabberwock

I haven't excluded the measures, I've said that the categorisation is subjective. A measure of autonomy is objective (how many parties are on the ballot paper - for example), it is then subjective to say that fewer than two = 'autocracy'. An objective measure of democracy might be how many non-state-owned press outlets there are, a subjective judgement would be that more than five = 'democracy'. It is to avoid this very kind of subjective judgement that the indices of human freedom rank countries according the scores rather than simply divide them into two arbitrary camps. This really should be basic stuff. Objective - 'the probability is 72.5%'; subjective 'the probability is high'. Objective - 'there are six people in that car'; subjective - 'there are too many people in that car'. The human freedom indices are simply measures of factors usually associated with freedom (a subjective element), but the numbers are objective (if you trust their sources), categorising those numbers is subjective ('autocracy'/'democracy') ranking them isn't (119 is smaller than 134, that's not an opinion).

Of course it is, if your only other choice has zero chance of success, then you take the one that has slightly above zero. Your plan has zero chance of achieving the 'desired effect'. — Isaac

Not if the expected likely consequences are worse than if you did not take that action.

They would if the alternative had 0% chance of success and 100% chance that the world would be plunged into tyranny. Again, if you want to talk about probabilities, then you're comparing options and their consequences. — Isaac

But if the alternative did not strive for global peace, but also did not likely plunge the world into tyranny, they would not. Yes, I completely agree - we should compare options and their consequences. The issue is that you refuse to compare the consequences, e.g. you refuse to consider the consequences of making concessions toward force.

I've cited the data. It ranked lower than Russia in the Human Freedom Index. It now ranks higher. It made progress from lower to higher in eight years. That's all that's needed to show Russia can do the same. — Isaac

No, it did not.

Nor have you. In fact your proposed course of action 100% guarantees war. So neither of our options are distinguished by a guarantee to avoid war. I'm suggesting war could be avoided by not resisting (militarily) when tyrants attempt to occupy territory but instead focus on removing the tyrant from power so that it doesn't matter much which country owns what. You're suggesting we use war to contain tyrants in the country they're in and by losing said war, weaken their rule. As far as 'avoiding war', your strategy literally cites it as a tool, so it will 100% not avoid war. My strategy might avoid war. In that one simple metric 'avoiding war', it's clear that even if my strategy had only 0.000001% chance of working it's better than yours which has 0% chance of avoiding war seeing as it involves war.

This is, of course, a good reason not to use stupidly simplistic metrics like 'avoid war' or 'secure voting rights', but rather take a more holistic approach which tries to maximise human well-being throughout the reach of our consequences. — Isaac

Yes, I completely agree! We should abandon the discussion of consequences based on a single metric, like the body count, and consider the overall consequences.

Oppression only works because most people prefer it to death. If most people preferred death to oppression then they would all resist it until dead and the oppressor would have no population left to oppress. If an oppressor puts a gun to your head and says "jump", you jump, because you prefer that to just saying "no" and getting shot. It's an absolute fact of human nature that we marginally prefer oppression to death because there's a chance of getting out of oppression. Crimea has been under Russian oppression for eight years. Why has the entire population not simply killed themselves to escape the oppression? Because they'd prefer to live, and hope. — Isaac

Sure, that is why Ukrainian would not choose to fight, if it meant that they would all die. On the other hand, there are quite a few examples from history where people preferred the risk of death (i.e. that some of them die), if it meant that it would remove the oppression. On the other hand, if people believed that oppression is better than risk of death, like you do, then there would be no armed rebellions at all. As you are unable to delineate the boundaries of concessions, we can assume that in all provided cases of liberation wars and revolutions you would argue for leaving the oppression as the better option (because your only metrics is the death count). As I wrote, I understand it, but you would be at odds with all those people who decided themselves they prefer to fight.

Of course, if I mischaracterise your views, please correct me - tell me when the armed fight with oppression would be preferable. Just do not hide behind 'This is not my view, but I will not tell you what it is'.

It's not as if the Ukrainians have these two stark choices. Ukraine outside of Russia is hardly a bed of roses and with crippling debt and a destroyed economy, it'll be much worse. The human rights record of Ukrainian-occupied Donbas is practically identical to that of Russian-occupied Crimea. You might have bought into the propagandist fantasy that Ukraine was some beacon of democratic light before the invasion, but the evidence shows otherwise.

The choice faced (in the frame you've used above) is thousands more dead vs slightly worse levels of freedom). — Isaac

Ukraine outside of Russia is not a bed of roses, but it is better than Russia. I have already discussed some prominent differences. And your evidence does not show what you say it shows.

And now again we come to the part when you refuse to consider the consequences of your proposed actions, which makes the discussion difficult. You propose one concession and happily pronounce that it would avoid war. However, the obvious consequence of that would be that quite shortly we would be in the exact same situation, with the exact same choices. If you want to discuss the consequences, let us do that.

... as do most indices. Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan. The factors you cite are already taken account of. Ukraine came from a situation where it was worse than Russia in all of those measures put together, to one where it was better than Russia, in eight years. — Isaac

Was it? Let us examine the evidence, the single source you so cherish?

2013 (BEFORE Maidan): Ukraine: total score 7.06, Russia: total score: 6.35. Oh, so just one year before Maidan Ukraine WAS NOT WORSE by the single metrics you provided as evidence. And it was not worse for all the years up to 2008, the first scored year. As it seems to be a habit in our discussion, the evidence actually proves that you are wrong.

But let us examine the source you respect so much. What so terrible happened in 2014 that Ukraine somehow slipped into being an authoritarian regime? Let us examine the data for 2014:

Rule of law: Ukraine scores better
Movement: Ukraine scores better
Religion: Ukraine scores better
Association, assembly, civil society: Ukraine scores better (by a wide margin)
Expression and information: Ukraine scores much better
Relationships: the same (both countries have top score)

And that leaves us with a single point where Ukraine does score worse:
Security and safety

This comprises of two subitems:
Homicide: Ukraine scores better by a wide margin
Disappearances, conflicts, terrorism: yes, here Ukraine scores much worse than Russia and much worse than the year before

So what has happened? Two things: Maidan happened and a rebellion organized by Russia happened. Yes, that might affect the perception of security in the country, could it not?

So now it is quite clear: you have hand-picked a SINGLE DATA POINT in a SINGLE YEAR, where Ukraine has trailed in the metrics behind Russia and which is Russia's fault as evidence that Ukraine was worse as far as freedom was concerned a few years ago. But according to the same source it is completely false: in the years before and after according to your own source Ukraine has been in all aspects of freedom since 2008, i.e. the first year the source gives the data for.

But wait a minute... You wrote: 'An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119'. But the very source you have provided says something else: Ukraine 114 (score 6.57), Russia 123 (score 6.24).

Did you really think I would not look at the data?

in your place I would take this as an opportunity to admit that you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about and bow out of the discussion. But of course, we can have a few more.

(119 is smaller than 134, that's not an opinion) — Isaac

It was neither 119 nor 134. That's not an opinion.

But wait a minute... You wrote: 'An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119'. But the very source you have provided says something else: Ukraine 114 (score 6.57), Russia 123 (score 6.24).

Did you really think I would not look at the data? — Jabberwock

Gods! It's like talking to five year olds.

I'll try and go through this one more time, really slowly.

I'm showing how a country can rise up from where Russia is now in terms of human freedom, to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. To do that I'm showing that Ukraine has gone from below where Russia is now, to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years (the length of time for which Russia has occupied Crimea).

I know this is really complicated, but stay with me.

I've picked the time period of eight years because it is a time period over which we know the death and damage from occupation by Russia, right? Any other time period would be questionable because you might say that Russia would do more damage over that timeframe. It's a means of establishing a measure of damage by Russia from occupation that we don't have to speculate on.

Eight years ago from now is 2015. I assume you can keep up with the basic maths.

So I'm comparing Ukraine in 2015 to Russia now.

Ukraine in 2015 was ranked 134 (score 5.84) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2021-01/human-freedom-index-2018.csv

Russia in 2022 (latest published report) was ranked 119 (score 6.01) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf

When you've had a crack at understanding that, maybe try a little more respect for your interlocutors.

Not if the expected likely consequences are worse than if you did not take that action. — Jabberwock

we should compare options and their consequences — Jabberwock

We should abandon the discussion of consequences based on a single metric, like the body count, and consider the overall consequences. — Jabberwock

So explain to me why you previously wanted to completely ignore the consequences of continued war on Yemen, or future generations, or those at risk from escalation?

if people believed that oppression is better than risk of death, like you do, then there would be no armed rebellions at all. As you are unable to delineate the boundaries of concessions, we can assume that in all provided cases of liberation wars and revolutions you would argue for leaving the oppression as the better option (because your only metrics is the death count). — Jabberwock

If you want to continue to argue against an imaginary opponent, start a blog. If not, read what I've actually written and respond to that.

tell me when the armed fight with oppression would be preferable. — Jabberwock

When the likely gains outweigh the likely harms - including collateral damage. That is rarely an international land war. It is often a national rebellion (even an armed one).

If you want to discuss the consequences, let us do that. — Jabberwock

That's what I've been attempting to do, but you refuse to consider anyone who isn't Ukrainian.

Eight years ago from now is 2015. I assume you can keep up with the basic maths.

So I'm comparing Ukraine in 2015 to Russia now. — Isaac

Ukraine score in 2015: 6.34



Russia now: 6.01



Can YOU keep up with the basic math? Or do you prefer to keep digging?

Ukraine score in 2015: 6.34 — Jabberwock

You know those bits in blue? They're links so you can check the actual data I'm using. You know, rather than pick your own data...

As if the difference between 6.34 and 6.01 somehow was even relevant to the argument on a scale of 1-10.

Yes, I know those bits in blue, those are the exact links I have used to get the data I have so nicely presented. Those data say things completely different from what you said. Ukraine was not worse than Russia since 1991, its civic freedoms, while still quite imperfect, were on the higher level than Russia's at least since 2000, so were its freedoms of information, gathering, etc.

And now, visibly embarassed, you try to save the argument saying that .33 is irrelevant to the argument... If that is so, then so would be the difference of .38 between Ukraine in 2015 and now - but the whole point of using that datapoint was to show 'evidence' for the remarkable growth that Ukraine has made in a few years? Time and again, your own evidence disproves what you claim.

Not to mention that the score from 2020 for Russia is not that relevant either, given the changes that have occurred since. I could give you a long list of those, but I will not. Do you know why? Because you are not interested in facts. I have given you plenty of facts from the history of both countries and from the currect situation. Sure, I suppose it could be done better, I am not a historian. But I should not even bother, because you do not engage with facts. You ridicule them, because you have no facts on your side. You have based your whole argument on a handpicked data point and it turned out you are not even that good with handpicking data. That is exactly the level of Moon landing discussion, and yet you are indignant that it is not treated as a legitimate alternative view. It simply is not. You try to discuss things you have no idea about.

Given that your whole argument based on a single datapoint has crumbled, we are back to what I wrote - we have no reason to believe that the peaceful rebellion you propose in Russia will likely occur. I fully expect you to pull out another single random fact and just run with it, like you did above, with complete ignorance of the actual, quite complex situation in the region. I think nobody will blame me if I choose not to bother, I believe I have already contributed to this discussion quite enough.

Yes, I know those bits in blue, those are the exact links I have used to get the data I have so nicely presented. — Jabberwock

It's quite simple (though you seem to be having trouble with (4))

1. Open the CSV linked.
2. Go to line 316 - '2015 Ukraine'.
3. Read off column G 'hf-rank'.
4. Avoid then picking your own data from somewhere other than the link provided to show something different.