The title is ambiguous by itself. You've interpreted it how you have, and now treat it as a claim to be challenged, but your interpretation of the title isn't my argument. I've defined morality as the ability to percieve right/wrong, fair/unfair, and this ability belongs to an individual. Only an individual can do this, so, I agree, it is inherently and irreducibly a personal condition.

The "personal" origin of morality wasn't in question. It's about whether morality purpoted to act only as a moral code for oneself is actually any different than otherwise, particularly in having an active social impact.

Ironically, those referenced in how I've used "personal" morality, are quite likely to think of morality as objective, and decidedly not personal in origin. They probably would've disagreed with you if you had made an OP with this very same name but using your argument.


One who saw coercion as immoral, and by coercion, I mean an unbiased interpretation, and refused to engage in it for the most part, could avoid it, although it'd be very unusual. I'm not arguing against that.

However, surely, your personal moral code involves standing up against injustice? It involves invoking consequences against others for their actions? How can your moral code just be to act morally and ignore the world around you, save for "leading by example"? How is that possible.

As I said then, the essence of morality as a kind of duty (Kant) which makes us better, is a much more satisfying concept and appeals to a great many people, versus this pessimistic and sad outlook. — Pantagruel

You find it pessimistic because you define morality as goodwill. The coercion in morality comes from the intolerance of evil, and a desire for justice. It not inherently bad. But, this thread is not about that anyway.

Well, at least not exclusively.

You find it pessimistic because you define morality as goodwill. The coercion in morality comes from the intolerance of evil, and a desire for justice. It not inherently bad. But, this thread is not about that anyway. — Judaka

The "disposition" to see morality as imposed versus chosen can be explained through the external versus internal perceived locus of causation (as cited), which is a psychological feature.

I agree, it is inherently and irreducibly a personal condition. — Judaka

YEA!! That means I interpreted the title correctly. Or at least, sympathetically. Morality is personal.

Objective moralists will indeed disagree with me, as you say. But an objective moralist is an ill-disguised behaviorist, which means he begins by barking up the wrong tree.

Anyway, problem solved, and…..thanks.

What those arguments tend to boil down to is that when many people believe a thing, it is moral. — Tzeentch

No this does not follow. All that follows is that it is moral in the opinion of many people not "it is moral".

I invited you to present an argument that 1. isn't moral relativism, and 2. makes a distinction between personal and collective (group) morality.

If I understand correctly that is your position, since you mentioned you weren't a moral relativist, but do make said distinction.

I'm a bit skeptical as to whether that can be formed into a coherent argument, which is what I (perhaps clumsily) have been trying to express to you.

As many do, you read my title "Morality is Coercive" and created an argument using your interpretation of it. What you've decided that title necessarily means I'm arguing for has nothing to do with me. Even learning that we're using the word morality very differently has had no notable effect. The context for reading me is that I'm arguing for how you've interpreted my thread title, and you're unwilling to question it. I imagine the belief you think I have is one I disagree with. If you'd like, try outlining what that view is, and probably we can agree it's wrong together.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach. — Judaka

This is the thrust of your thesis, correct? So, whatever your personal morality is, it is inherently just? So you are claiming that, regardless of any putative "objective" or "intersubjective" moral code, the implementation of that code is always a matter of personal discretion, ergo the only true morality is a personal morality?

One who saw coercion as immoral, and by coercion, I mean an unbiased interpretation, and refused to engage in it for the most part, could avoid it, although it'd be very unusual. I'm not arguing against that.

However, surely, your personal moral code involves standing up against injustice? It involves invoking consequences against others for their actions? How can your moral code just be to act morally and ignore the world around you, save for "leading by example"? How is that possible.

“Standing up against injustice”. Do you mean retribution? I do believe in retribution. One has to be just. What that has to do with social control, I’m not sure. You’re not encouraging or discouraging anything with retribution. You’re satisfying a desire for justice.

Frankly, it’s all a little weird for me to suspect that following one’s own conscience has the effect of encouraging and discouraging others, as if we’re training animals. It sounds to me more of an admission of guilt than a statement of fact.

If I understand correctly that is your position, since you mentioned you weren't a moral relativist, but do make said distinction. — Tzeentch

I don't identify as a moral relativist because it is much misunderstood (particularly by moral objectivists).

You appear to to take the view that moral relativism entails normative moral relativism - the view that
moral relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. This is an extreme form of moral relativism that is not endorsed by most philosophers.

Most moral relativists hold that it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality.

(Much of this is taken straight from the Wiki entry on Moral Relativism)

You appear to to take the view that moral relativism entails normative moral relativism - the view that moral relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. — ChrisH

What I said was that moral relativism makes morality meaningless. It turns morality into a buzzword that is used to make one's opinions sound more authoritative than they, by one's own confession, really are.

Most moral relativists hold that it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, ... — ChrisH

That's an open door, isn't it? If everything can be moral, then it is exceedingly easy to defend one's subjective values.

Frankly, it’s all a little weird for me to suspect that following one’s own conscience has the effect of encouraging and discouraging others, as if we’re training animals. It sounds to me more of an admission of guilt than a statement of fact. — NOS4A2

We are training animals. Evolution resulted in us having instinctive reactions to things, which result in us training each other.

That's an open door, isn't it? If everything can be moral, then it is exceedingly easy to defend one's subjective values. — Tzeentch

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others.

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others. — ChrisH

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? Morality is fundamentally performative in nature. The best defense of a moral position is the things that one has in fact chosen to do, consonant with that position.

Excuse me, but if one wants to persuade others, doesn't one have to believe their views are better than the other's? :chin:

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? — Pantagruel

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X.

Not sure what point you're making.

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X. — ChrisH

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? Or only incidental? Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature?

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? — Pantagruel

I think so (I include unspoken demonstrations of approval/disapproval in the general term 'moral discourse').

Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature? — Pantagruel

Not sure what you mean.

If all moral views are equally valid, the idea that one ranks their views above others already starts to raise some question marks.

But let's assume one answers in the affirmative.

The obvious follow-up question would be, by what metric?

This creates an interesting problem. Any appeals to objectivity are off the table as it would imply objectivism. I wonder if one could answer that question in a way that isn't circular.

Hmm, you've interpreted these terms "personal morality" and "social morality" in a different way that I had meant to have laid out. I took them as mutually exclusive ways of viewing morality. Personal morality as a code limited to oneself, and social morality where views are applied in social contexts, to influence others and the rules of the group. — Judaka

This happened last time we talked too - I misunderstood what you were trying to say in the OP. If I remember correctly, I classed social morality in as just another part of social control but you didn't see it that way. I see from comments in this thread that is still a disagreement between us.

If you want to piece-by-piece categorise your moral views, as either personal or social, or alternatively using a less binary view, that's a different approach. — Judaka

Are you saying my approach is less binary. I would have thought you saw it as moreso.

However, even here, it's hard to imagine that the personal remains personal within the context of morality. So long as your feelings are genuine, then your empathy and compassion will inenvitably manifests in attempts to influence or coerce others. After all, you wouldn't sit back and watch someone else be treated cruelly and unfairly, as though it had nothing to do with you, right? You would want to intervene, and tell the belligerent to cut it out. — Judaka

First off, I strongly disagree that "feelings of empathy and compassion will inevitably manifest in attempts to influence or coerce others." As I noted in my first post, If someone is being bad and hurting someone else, my motives would be to help the victim, not to punish the evildoer. That might involve attempts to influence or coerce, but there are many instances where it wouldn't, e.g. stopping at a car accident and giving aid to the injured.

You can argue that harm is always wrong, and then list exceptions. Or you can say harm is not inherently immoral, and then argue for the cases where it would be. I'm not sure there's much of a difference. Moral systems always involve these games... You won't condemn harm when it's done under conditions that you consider fair & reasonable, so, yes, it's necessary to judge the acts as unfair, wrong, unreasonable and so on. — Judaka

You've missed my point. I'm not taking about killing in self-defense or something like that. I'm saying it is not necessary to judge or be angry at someone who is doing something bad. All you need to do is protect the victims and potential victims. Protection of real and potential victims might also include physically stopping the wrongdoer and putting them in jail.

I'd like to hear how you've been defining personal/social morality, and whether you really need to debate with me, that your moral views do not contain attempts to influence anything beyond yourself. I'm sure you can see it false. — Judaka

Here's how I defined personal/social morality earlier in this discussion.

Personal morality is the path I follow when acting from my heart - empathy, fellow-feeling, friendship. I act in accordance with social morality out of fear or duty. — T Clark

Would it help if I clarified that I don't think my personal morality isn't influenced by social factors? Everything I do is influenced by my interactions with others and what I learn from them. I didn't think that's what you were talking about. It's not what I was.

Do I ever try to influence others. Sure. I don't see that as a reflection of my personal morality. It's more of a way of trying to live my life in social situations. How I go about doing that is a matter of personal and social morality, especially if it comes to coercion.

Moral discussions are often couched in terms of "fairness" or "goodness" or other general terms. However moral actions are demanded in very specific circumstances, which may never have been exactly anticipated or discussed. So when you are discussing morality in general terms, you may not be really facilitating moral actions. Which is why people can rationalize not doing the right thing so easily.

↪ChrisH If all moral views are equally valid, — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by this. Equally valid in what sense?

Assuming moral relativism, morality is a matter of opinion.

And even if one agrees or disagrees with a certain opinion, it doesn't make it any more or less valid as a moral view.

E.g. if people believe stoning someone to death for a minor crime is moral, it is. A moral relativist has no grounds to say that it isn't.

if people believe stoning someone to death for a minor crime is moral, it is. A moral relativist has no grounds to say that it isn't. — Tzeentch

That doesn't follow. What I think you mean to say is that they have no objective grounds.

From this it doesn't follow that there are no grounds for disagreement. Moral disputes are routinely couched in appeals to common human values.

Moral disputes are routinely couched in appeals to common human values. — ChrisH

Pointing towards something like common human values in my view implies objectivism.

Ok.

I always understood that objective moral truths, if they exist, do so without regard to anybody's personal values.

Common human values imply something unchanging, no?

And when those values are examined they are almost certainly tied to a belief about objective moral truth - a rational thought process which explains the value.

Further, why wouldn't the stoning of criminals for petty crimes be considered a common human value? It was common in history. We see similar practices today in certain parts of the world.

So apparently there's also a heirarchy that determines whether a certain value belongs in the 'common human value' category or not.

I suspect that stoning people does not belong in the 'common human value' category because it violates an underlying value, which is the hidden objective moral truth upon which one's idea of common human value is based.

It seems you're agreeing that moral positions are grounded on personal values and that those values are based on a hidden objective moral truth (but presumably only when those moral positions align with your own).

This looks as though you're assuming the truth of what's in question here.

I only asked that you attempt to bring clarity to our discussion... Your response should've helped me to understand what were arguing against instead, just makes it more ambiguous.

This is the thrust of your thesis, correct? So, whatever your personal morality is, it is inherently just? So you are claiming that, regardless of any putative "objective" or "intersubjective" moral code, the implementation of that code is always a matter of personal discretion, ergo the only true morality is a personal morality? — Pantagruel

What you've quoted is arguing that a moral code that one follows still exerts pressure on others to act morally, and on systems to be organised fairly and justly. It has nothing to do with most of what you've talked about.

The term "just" reflects agreement or approval in a moral context. For example, a "just" punishment is one that is correct. A "just" system should be fair and reasonable, and produces desirable outcomes.

The concept of justice could be omitted from morality without any meaningful change. Justice exists when things are done "right" and are "fair", it is the latter two that matter. What is "right" or "fair" sits between being subjective and objective, in a way that is difficult to define, I won't go too into that right now.

It's in a similar place with other things human percieve, such as beauty, brilliance, nobility, kindness, courage, and etc. They're not entirely objective, there's room for disagreement, but there's a limit, some views would pervert how we periceve these concepts too much for us to accept them.

I have no idea what "true" morality means, so I just clarified my views on the subject. If we're going to talk past each other, may as well be honest about it.

“Standing up against injustice”. Do you mean retribution? I do believe in retribution. One has to be just. What that has to do with social control, I’m not sure. You’re not encouraging or discouraging anything with retribution. You’re satisfying a desire for justice.

Frankly, it’s all a little weird for me to suspect that following one’s own conscience has the effect of encouraging and discouraging others, as if we’re training animals. It sounds to me more of an admission of guilt than a statement of fact. — NOS4A2

Really? You're not discouraging anything? "Listen, this is your life, do with it what you will, I would prefer you to act morally, If you want to do X thing, that's your choice, I can't force you not to. However, if you do X thing, there will be consequences for that. You'll reveal to all your low worth, I will lose respect for you, and I will make sure to punish you". How is that not discouraging? Why wouldn't people fear retribution and act to avoid it?

If the majority agree with the need for retribution, then of course, that would create an environment that discouraged those acts. Would it not? I am not condemning this, and you could easily just say that you have no problem with creating an environment that discouraged the acts you find immoral, it's not a trap.