Here are the two problems with the view espoused by @Mark S.

1. Regardless of how sophisticated it might be, no description of what we do can imply what we should do.

2. That an act is cooperative is not sufficient to ensure that it is moral. Folk can cooperate to act immorally.

The lesson I take from Foot is the intractability of moral issues. There are no simple solutions here, no algorithms or methods with universal applicability. While cross-cultural descriptions of moral norms might be interesting, perhaps allowing us to understand something of human diversity, and games-theoretical problem solving may be of some nerdish assistance, they do not form anything like the whole of morality; indeed, they hardly even begin to address the issues.

Look instead to Rawls, or Hanna Arendt, or even Peter Singer for more comprehensive accounts.

As a layperson, I can well imagine the ambition to discover some kind of secular and universal formula for morality. It reminds me of the alchemist's quest to turn base metal into gold.

If coherence and simplicity are values, and if we cannot deny with out falling into total self-refuting subjectivism that they are objective (notwithstanding their "softness," the lack of well-defined "criteria," and so forth), then the classic argument against the objectivity of ethical values is totally undercut.” — Joshs

Interesting. I can't see how we would begin to assert notions of 'the good' or virtue, except through connecting these to values we have arrived at through some kind of intersubjective process. And there will always be those who don't 'see it' or agree or find curious exemptions.

As a layperson, I can well imagine the ambition to discover some kind of secular and universal formula for morality. It reminds me of the alchemist's quest to turn base metal into gold. — Tom Storm

:up:

I can well imagine the ambition to discover some kind of secular and universal formula for morality. — Tom Storm

Here's were Arendt's "banality of evil" is pertinent. One might well anticipate a future Eichmann justifying himself in the terms used in the OP: "I was only cooperating using the cross-cultural universals within descriptively moral norms and judgments..."

Apparently Hilary Putnam also makes this ‘error’. Putnam makes the argument that if the basis of our valuative, ethical judgements is an evolutionary adaptation shared by other animals then it is as though we are computers programmed by a fool ( selection pressure) operating subject to the constraints imposed by a moron (nature). — Joshs

I have not studied Hilary Putnam, but nothing (with one exception) I have written contradicts his quotes here. The science of morality reveals what the underlying principles of past and present cultural moral norms ‘are’. These principles reveal what is objectively universal to cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments – which non-philosophers would say summarizes their moral values. That looks like agreement to me that at least these values are objective.

However, there is nothing in the Putnam quote about imperative oughts. The objectivity of moral values does not necessarily imply that everyone somehow ought to follow these values regardless of their needs and preferences.

The objectivity of moral values does imply a conditional ought:

If your goal can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to act consistently with those objective moral values that sustainably maintain cooperation, then you ought (instrumental) to act consistently with those objective moral values.

So, I don’t see the quotes as relevant to Banno’s bizarre belief, despite all evidence to the contrary, that I am somehow naively claiming a source of imperative oughts from science.

Just FYI, where I disagree with Putnam is his reported assumption that the source of our ethical judgments is a fool – referring to selection pressure. This is an obsolete, inaccurate perspective that remains the source of much misunderstanding among moral philosophers, particularly when making evolution-based moral debunking arguments.

Selection pressure is part of the mechanism that encoded cooperation strategies in our moral sense and cultural moral norms and is not the source of what was encoded. The ultimate source of what was encoded – cooperation strategies – (and the source of our moral values) is in a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe. The encoding mechanism for morality is a fool. What was encoded is not.

↪Mark S So, oddly, you are now saying that it is not the case that we ought cooperate?

I'm not too keen on the term, but that looks rather mote-and-bailly. Somehow this tells us
about right and wrong
— Mark S
without telling us what to do? You commence your argument in the bailey of right and wrong, but when challenged retreat to the motte of supposed "objective science". — Banno

Despite your incoherence here, I will respond that I have made no retreat from bailey to motte - check your spelling.

Where I start from and where I end is that science can provide useful instrumental (conditional) oughts for achieving shared goals. One form is:

"If your goal can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to act consistently with those objective moral values that sustainably maintain cooperation, then you ought (instrumental) to act consistently with those objective moral values."

This is culturally useful moral guidance. No imperative oughts are required, which is a good thing. It is a good thing because we have no evidence they can exist.

Why are you so fixated on imperative oughts when our best evidence is that their pursuit is a waste of time? You must know that your intuitions on the subject are an illusion. In contrast, conditional oughts are quite real and culturally useful for refining cultural moral norms that can encourage human flourishing.

Here are the two problems with the view espoused by Mark S.

1. Regardless of how sophisticated it might be, no description of what we do can imply what we should do. — Banno

I do not claim anything so silly.

2. That an act is cooperative is not sufficient to ensure that it is moral. Folk can cooperate to act immorally. — Banno

This is, of course, true. If you read what I have written, you will know that nothing I have written contradicts this.

The “Two problems” you describe do not exist.

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

If you could find an example of cooperation that does not exploit others being immoral, then you would have an interesting criticism. As is, you have nothing.

As far as I know, Phillipa Foot was unaware of game theory’s explanatory power for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. So it is no surprise that she didn’t talk about the cultural value of conditional moral oughts based in science.

Peter Singer’s wonderful 1981 book The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress is consistent with the above two moral principles. Singer intuitively recognized that moral progress was made by expanding the circle of moral concern (the circle of people who were not to be exploited). Singer’s moral progress through history is the history of moving from merely descriptively moral behaviors (the first principle) that may exploit others to universally moral behaviors that do not exploit others (the second principle).

John Rawls’ justice as fairness explicitly advocates expanding the circle of moral concern to everyone. This is consistent with the second principle since exploitation is unfair.

By revealing the underlying principles of our moral norms and moral sense, the science of morality reveals the underlying foundations of much of moral philosophy.

Ah, so your account, @Mark S, does not tell us what we should do?

...and yet "...science can provide useful instrumental (conditional) oughts for achieving shared goals"? Despite nine threads on the same topic, perhaps your account is not as clearly expressed as you think?

If your goal can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to act consistently with those objective moral values that sustainably maintain cooperation, then you ought (instrumental) to act consistently with those objective moral values. — Mark S

Let's look at the logic here. Is this it...

If P can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to P, then you ought to P.

The clause on cooperation doesn't appear to do anything here. Your argument looks to be that if you want to do something then you ought do it. But not only is it, as Mick pointed out, that you can't always get what you want, sometimes you ought not get what you want.

Sure, if you have the urge to pee you probably ought, but in the appropriate place and so as not to inconvenience others. Of course we might well let folk do as they want, unless there is good reason not too; and that, what is to count as "good reason", is what ethics is about.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies — Mark S

I put it to you that rather, cooperation strategies may be part of achieving our goals. You've got it the wrong way around.

Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. — Mark S

What is claimed here... needs unpacking. "Universal moral behaviours" is a problematic term, and obviously, contrary to what is implied, folk can cooperate in order to exploit others. Your "Universal moral behaviours" are presumably those found by anthropological examination of what people do; and you agree, at least sometimes, that a description of what we do does not tell us what we ought do. Your term "Universal moral behaviours" carries the insinuation that these merely observed behaviours bring moral weight. But any such moral weight must be argued for separately. I don't see where you have done this.

As for the relation between cooperation and justice, take a look at “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas” by Ursula K LeGuin (thanks, @unenlightened), and consider those who cooperate in the plight of the child.

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole.

I'm confused by this discussion. And Mark I can't seem to understand what you are arguing for - which may be my fault.

Mark does your approach tell us what we ought to do by identifying universal moral behaviors?

What are universal moral behaviors - are they the same as oughts?

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. — Mark S

These sentences confuse me - admittedly I am not a philosopher.

What does ' are parts of cooperation strategies' mean? Which parts? What constitutes the rest of these parts?

Is a universally moral behavior an ought?

What qualifies as a cooperation strategy?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole. — Banno

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality?

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality? — Tom Storm

Not a question that can have a back-of-an-envelope answer. Not least because it's not clear what that question might be asking... but with my being of the analytic persuasion, that sort of vacillation is to be expected...

I'm disincline to talk of foundations or answers in this regard; it seems absurd to expect moral issues to be addressable by what one might loosely call an "algorithmic" method; one in which we can set out, beforehand, rules or methods that will give us the right thing to do.

Hence I am somewhat sceptical of both deontology and consequentialism.

But despite such considerations, we are obliged to make decisions of a moral sort, and so must muddle on as best we can. So one tries to do the best one can, and perhaps to do better on each new occasion than on the last, and so some consideration of the development of the various virtues has a place. A heuristic, not an algorithmic, approach, if you will.

As you said,

I can well imagine the ambition to discover some kind of secular and universal formula for morality — Tom Storm

We might agree that such ambition ought best be avoided, and perhaps confronted when it is encountered. Hence these posts.

All of which might be taken as condescending twaddle, but you asked.

I’m ok with that answer. Thanks.

So, what does science say we should do about the Trolley Car problem?

Ah, so your account, Mark S, does not tell us what we should do?

...and yet "...science can provide useful instrumental (conditional) oughts for achieving shared goals"? Despite nine threads on the same topic, perhaps your account is not as clearly expressed as you think? — Banno

As a matter of logic, science does not tell us what we imperatively ought to do.

Is science then culturally useless? No, of course not. Claiming science is, therefore, useless would be silly.

Your contempt for the relevance of science of morality for resolving moral disputes and understanding the foundations of moral philosophy is equally silly.

The science of morality is culturally useful because it explains that:

1) Cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.
2) A subset of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others are universal to all strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma – the same dilemma that must be solved by all highly cooperative specie from the beginning of time to the end of time. To enable highly cooperative societies, all intelligent species must create morality made up of strategies that solve that dilemma. .
3) Morality as cooperation strategies is uniquely harmonious with our moral sense, and therefore has self-motivating components, because these cooperation strategies are what created our moral sense.
4) Our moral intuitions are parts of cooperation strategies.


1), 2), and 3) provide an objective basis for resolving many disputes about moral norms and reveals what is universal for all moral systems – systems that solve the cooperation exploitation dilemma. In summary, 1), 2), and 3) provide an objective basis for a universal moral system.

And before you start going off again about imperative oughts, no it is not a system that comes with innate imperative oughts. However, a group could decide that this is the system they will advocate and enforce based on the expectation it will best achieve their shared goals. Is that a good enough moral system for a well-functioning society? Of course! And as a bonus, it fits our moral sense like a key in a well-oiled lock because this key, morality as cooperation strategies, is what shaped this lock, our moral sense.

Why do you think we should throw out what science tells us about morality just because it does not come with magic oughts? Pursuing a source of imperative oughts is, to me, the intellectual equivalent of spending your life searching for magical unicorns who fart rainbows. Others disagree. That's fine. But please don't spread the falsehood that looking for imperative oughts is the only approach to designing and refining moral systems.

Returning to the list of what science explains, 4) explains the foundations of moral philosophy based on “well-considered moral intuitions”. What foundations does moral philosophy have except our moral intuitions and rational thought?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole. — Banno

I have never claimed there was not more to morality than what science can tell us. I have emphasized there was more to morality than science can tell us multiple times. Again, you make false accusations based on your straw man version of what the science of morality provides.

Max Planck once said, “Science advances one funeral at a time”. Perhaps the same is true for moral philosophy. Some people are incapable of changing old ideas when presented with new evidence.

↪Banno ↪Mark S I'm confused by this discussion. And Mark I can't seem to understand what you are arguing for - which may be my fault.

Mark does your approach tell us what we ought to do by identifying universal moral behaviors?

What are universal moral behaviors - are they the same as oughts?

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.
— Mark S

These sentences confuse me - admittedly I am not a philosopher.

What does ' are parts of cooperation strategies' mean? Which parts? What constitutes the rest of these parts?

Is a universally moral behavior an ought?

What qualifies as a cooperation strategy?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole.
— Banno

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality? — Tom Storm

Tom, here I'll answer the questions you addressed to me.

I'll separately answer your excellent question to Banno, "What do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality?" and invite you to compare my and Banno's answers and consider which answer you expect to be the most useful in your life.

Answering the questions you asked me:

Descriptively moral behaviors are described as moral in at least one society but perhaps no other. I could also have expressed this as:

“Past and present cultural moral norms (no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange) are virtually all explained as parts of cooperation strategies.”

Parts of cooperation strategies include moral norms and moral intuitions that advocate or motivate 1) initiating cooperation, 2) punishing moral norm violators, 3) markers of membership in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups, 4) detection of free-riders and other exploiters.

Examples of each include 1) versions of the Golden Rule and advocacy of loyalty and self-sacrifice for the group, 2) moral norms about punishments plus righteous indignation to motivate the punishment of others and guilt and shame to punish our own violations, 3) sex and food taboos plus clothing and behavior rules, and 4) “He who will not work will not eat” and moral gossip about who is and is not a reliable person to cooperate with.

Cooperation strategies are developed in game theory as means to overcome the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. The main ones are reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and kin altruism. You might do a google search. There are a lot of them, with some more relevant to morality than others.

Moral norms in general are oughts (what we feel we have an imperative obligation to do). But, as I have explained, that feeling of imperative oughts is an illusion encoded in our moral sense by our evolutionary history because it increased cooperation.

Is what is universal to morality (cooperation strategies that do not exploit others) an ought? That depends on what you mean by "ought". Is it a “magic ought” (Banno's apparently favorite kind) - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences? No.

However, that does not prevent it from being a culturally useful, culture and even species-independent, moral reference. All it takes to become a moral ought is for a group to decide to advocate and enforce it as a moral ought.

Groups could decide as a preference that they will advocate and enforce it as what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. This preference could be based on it being most likely to achieve group goals. And experience shows that this advocacy and enforcement should work well. This cultural advocacy and enforcement is the main source of the oughtness (bindingness) of moral norms that enable our civilizations to continue to exist.

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality? — Tom Storm

The most reasonable foundation for morality is what morality is and always has been - the rules we live by to maintain cooperative societies.

Moral rules such as the “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” make more sense once you understand them as parts of cooperation strategies – they all advocate initiating indirect reciprocity.

For example, “Do not lie” as a cultural moral norm is the reciprocity equivalent of “Don’t steal from anyone else and everyone else will commit to not stealing from you and society will punish anyone who does steal from you.”

Also, as parts of cooperation strategies, all of the above moral norms are understood as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) not moral absolutes. When the Golden Rule fails, such as when “tastes differ”, and following it would cause cooperation problems rather than solve them, you have good moral reasons for not following the Golden Rule. The same is true for “Do not kill”. If following it causes cooperation problems, as when dealing with criminals and in time of war, there is no moral reason it should be followed.

And applying the above moral foundation in your own life comes with a bonus – increased durable happiness, the feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative company of family and friends. These durable feelings of pleasure in the cooperative company of family and friends exist because our ancestors who experienced them were more motivated to stay and participate in cooperative groups. Understanding why and when we experience these pleasures encourages the moral behaviors that trigger them. This really works to both increase durable happiness and motivation for moral behavior.

It is intellectually and psychologically rewarding to think "How can I cooperate with this person?" and then feel the durable happiness that cooperation triggers. There will be exceptions when attempts at cooperation are rebuffed, but on average, it works well.

The above describes a useful foundation for morality. Compare it to what Banno could supply.

Not a question that can have a back-of-an-envelope answer. — Banno

For non-philosophers, Banno’s muddled answer is not remotely competitive. Some might describe it as dead useless.

The most reasonable foundation for morality is what morality is and always has been - the rules we live by to maintain cooperative societies.

Moral rules such as the “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” make more sense once you understand them as parts of cooperation strategies – they all advocate initiating indirect reciprocity.

For example, “Do not lie” as a cultural moral norm is the reciprocity equivalent of “Don’t steal from anyone else and everyone else will commit to not stealing from you and society will punish anyone who does steal from you.”

Also, as parts of cooperation strategies, all of the above moral norms are understood as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) not moral absolutes. When the Golden Rule fails, such as when “tastes differ”, and following it would cause cooperation problems rather than solve them, you have good moral reasons for not following the Golden Rule. The same is true for “Do not kill”. If following it causes cooperation problems, as when dealing with criminals and in time of war, there is no moral reason it should be followed. — Mark S

Thanks Mark, yes, this much makes sense and is clear to me.

Does this lead us into a space that there is nothing intrinsically good or bad and that almost anything might be allowable under the right circumstances?

Moral norms in general are oughts (what we feel we have an imperative obligation to do). But, as I have explained, that feeling of imperative oughts is an illusion encoded in our moral sense by our evolutionary history because it increased cooperation. — Mark S

Do you think this is a controversial statement? I see where you are coming from but many people who do not share your values could find this problematic.

Not wanting to harm children (for instance) is no doubt hard wired in us as one of these 'evolutionary illusions'. But does this suggest that harming children might be permissible in certain contexts?

Not a question that can have a back-of-an-envelope answer.
— Banno

For non-philosophers, Banno’s muddled answer is not remotely competitive. Some might describe it as dead useless. — Mark S

I've found @Banno helpful on many subjects. He certainly reminds me that philosophy is not easy and to be wary of easy answers. He alerted me to virtue ethics when I first arrive here. Philosophy seems to be about continually refining the questions we are asking, which may matter as much as, if not more so, than the putative answers.

However, that does not prevent it from being a culturally useful, culture and even species-independent, moral reference. All it takes to become a moral ought is for a group to decide to advocate and enforce it as a moral ought. — Mark S

This process is what we call intersubjective agreement - these often become reified over time (as you suggest). I suspect this process isn't just how morality develops, but is also behind many of our ideas of knowledge. I recall a quote from some postmodernist - the truth is a subjectivity we all share.

Final question and forgive me if this seems obtuse - how to do you discern between good and bad cooperation?

I'll respond to your other points later. But your last one is an easy question.

Final question and forgive me if this seems obtuse - how to do you discern between good and bad cooperation? — Tom Storm

My central point has been that moral norms for bad cooperation are bad because they exploit others such as "women must be submissive to men" and "homosexuality is evil". It is bad cooperation because it acts opposite to the function of morality - solving cooperation/exploitation problems. Bad cooperation creates cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Harming children would usually be included under exploitation as bad behavior. For example, harming children to benefit others.

But if harming children is merely a side effect of having no moral regard for children, we can agree that is evil, but the reasons for being evil might better be found in traditional moral philosophy. Science tells us important things about morality but cannot tell us everything about morality.

My central point has been that moral norms for bad cooperation are bad because they exploit others such as "women must be submissive to men" and "homosexuality is evil". It is bad cooperation because it acts opposite to the function of morality - solving cooperation/exploitation problems. Bad cooperation creates cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Harming children would usually be included under exploitation as bad behavior. For example, harming children to benefit others.

But if harming children is merely a side effect of having no moral regard for children, we can agree that is evil, but the reasons for being evil might better be found in traditional moral philosophy. Science tells us important things about morality but cannot tell us everything about morality. — Mark S

Does that satisfy you or does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology.
For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”.

There is something to be said for the idea that compassion towards other sentient beings is a natural condition for humans, because we have the reflective capacities to be able to vividly imagine pain and suffering. Of course, this natural capacity for empathy and compassion can be distorted by culture, life experience, and is arguably not universally innate as there are genetic disorders that affect every aspect of human capacity and functioning.

So, perhaps for most people harming children is anathema simply on account of how they naturally feel about it.

For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”. — Joshs

It could well be seen to have a scientistic flavor.

does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology. — Joshs

I can see this interpretation. Yes, it's the ye olde search for foundational morality .

What's your essential perspective on moral 'foundations'?

Claiming science is, therefore, useless would be silly. — Mark S

Of course, I've done no such thing. What I have done is simply point to the is/ought distinction, and warned against taking what humans have done as evidence for what they ought do.

And before you start going off again about imperative oughts... — Mark S

This gave me a laugh. "imperative oughts" is not a term I would use, except in response to your use of it.

Deontology, after Kant, distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is couched in an implication, as "If you want B, you ought do A". A categorical imperative is not so couched; it sets out a duty, as in "everyone ought do B".

I gather you use "imperative oughts" to mean what most English speakers would call "duty", or something close.

You seem to think I'm advocating deontology; I'm not. Perhaps that's baggage you've brought in from elsewhere.

If anyone is "going off about imperative oughts", it's you.

I'm not anti-science. But I do advocate clarity.

What might be of use in what you have cited is the notion that cooperation serves as a strategy for survival. That's not new. You add the notion that "cultural norms" - morality - is (all of it) mere cooperation strategies. That's not firm science, and even if it where, it does not follow that we ought cooperate. What might follow is that cooperation sometimes enhances survival. That's a pretty weak hypothetical imperative: If we would survive, we ought sometimes cooperate.

Sure.

But within the corpus of ethical and moral reasoning, that's pretty superficial.

Anyway, that should stir the pot and piss you off enough for now. There might be an argument buried here to the effect that cooperation leads to reciprocity and hence to justice. Now that might be interesting. But The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas might have a say here.

Of course, that we desire to cooperate with each other does not imply that we ought cooperate...

It's not easy...

Does that satisfy you or does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology.
For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”. — Joshs

It is highly satisfying.

"Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are common parts of traditional moralism. Now I can explain why people thought they were moral but since they contradict morality's function of solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma, I know they are immoral.

Our genetic evolution prompts us to desire to cooperate and triggers psychological rewards when we cooperate because our predecessors who did not tended to die out.

Ought we cooperate? I will better achieve my goals by cooperating with people who reciprocate that cooperation. Whether you cooperate or not depends on your goals and your interest, or lack thereof, in achieving your goals by moral means.

This is not complicated. If you want complications and endless arguments, join the search for imperative oughts (categorical imperatives in Kant's terms).

The way I see it, we ought to cooperate if we want to enjoy happy lives, but not with anything that goes against a balanced sense of compassion and fairness. The laws in most societies which are not autocratically, theocratically or kleptocratically corrupted reflect what are the general human sentiments regarding what is acceptable and what is not. The most significant moral issues are regarding exploitation, theft, violence, rape and murder. and those things are almost universally condemned. Other issues such as age of sexual consent, acceptance of homosexuality and so on seem to get worked out sensibly in the absence of dogmatic religious interference.

The question then devolves to 'ought we want to live happy lives" and that question just seems silly since happiness is universally preferred over unhappiness.

The question then devolves to 'ought we want to live happy lives" and that question just seems silly since happiness is universally preferred over unhappiness. — Janus

That's right and ultimately we need to settle on an axiom like this as a starting point.

This is not very imaginative but for the most part - it's better to be alive than dead, it's better to be well than sick, its better to flourish than suffer. How do we build principles that assist in achieving this for all? Even the notion of 'for all' is an axiom, since we know of people who think that the circle of moral concern should only encompass the types of peeps they recognize as citizens.

How do we build principles that assist in achieving this for all? Even the notion of 'for all' is an axiom, since we know of people who think that the circle of moral concern should only encompass the types of peeps they recognize as citizens. — Tom Storm

:up: Yes, that is the conundrum. Perhaps part of the problem is the incapacity of people to viscerally care for more than some relatively small number of others. I think it's worth remembering that for the greatest part of human history (including here prehistory) people lived in relatively small communities, and now many of us live in vast metropolises; perhaps we haven't adapted fully to that condition yet.

This is not complicated. If you want complications and endless arguments, join the search for imperative oughts (categorical imperatives in Kant's terms). — Mark S

Would travelling back in time (assume it's possible) to kill baby Hitler be the moral thing to do? What about using data the Nazi's collected experimenting on people? What about diverting a runaway trolley car full of children by pushing one child in front of it? What about aborting a baby one minute for non-health reasons?

I think it's worth remembering that for the greatest part of human history (including here prehistory) people lived in relatively small communities, and now many of us live in vast metropolises; perhaps we haven't adapted fully to that condition yet. — Janus

Indeed. I came to this conclusion myself. Pluralism and balancing competing values and beliefs within a culture is a massive challenge - especially where those beliefs are irreconcilable. I wonder what the conditions need to be for cooperation to be possible? Does it require a sufficiently generous understanding of the word and shared values, including a commitment to reason. Does cooperation rely on cooperation and does this make is circular? :razz:

Would travelling back in time (assume it's possible) to kill baby Hitler be the moral thing to do? What about using data the Nazi's collected experimenting on people? What about diverting a runaway trolley car full of children by pushing one child in front of it? What about aborting a baby one minute for non-health reasons? — RogueAI

Remember the limitations of the primary conclusions about cultural moral norms and our moral sense:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

There is no reason to expect them to answer all moral questions that we can think of.
For example, they are largely silent on the goals of acting morally (cooperating). They might or might not be able to answer these particular questions.

The most significant moral issues are regarding exploitation, theft, violence, rape and murder. and those things are almost universally condemned. Other issues such as age of sexual consent, acceptance of homosexuality and so on seem to get worked out sensibly in the absence of dogmatic religious interference.

The question then devolves to 'ought we want to live happy lives" and that question just seems silly since happiness is universally preferred over unhappiness. — Janus

:up: