:snicker:

Do you know what you gave as your reference? Just look at what the ISW issue says:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2022!

It's been done the same month! The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! Just started. Quite good intel if you have good insight on the attacking formation in a couple of days.

How about something done perhaps with little more hindsight (from November 2022): RUSI: Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022

The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv. For this purpose, the Russians formed two groups of forces commanded from the Eastern Military District Command Post. One group was formed in the Gomel region of Belarus and used the tactical sign ‘V’ with orders to attack Kyiv along the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River. The second group was formed in the Bryansk region of Russia and used the tactical sign ‘O’ with orders to surround Kyiv from the left (eastern) bank.

And this wouldn't be the only reference. I could have several Finnish Military studies saying basically the same issues and other and going deeper in just what these groups of forces consisted. The operational objectives are quite clear and obvious now in hindsight.

And those who are curious just were the "Z" came from (continued RUSI article):

The Southern Military District Command Post commanded units with the tactical symbol ‘Z in a square’, ordered to attack from occupied Crimea to establish control over the North Crimean Water Canal, Energodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, surround Mariupol, take control of the bridges over the Dnipro and advance along the right bank to Voznesensk with the aim of seizing the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant.

The Southern MD has been seeing most of the fighting in the near history (Russo-Georgian war and earlier the Chechen wars), hence it seems to have been the best Russia MD as it gained it's primary objectives.

The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! — ssu

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on").


Anyway, your source provides nothing in the way of troop counts, so I'm not sure what you believe it proves.

Also, what losses are you talking about here?

If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. — ssu

Sources, or no bueno.

In the absence of a critical media that challenges the policies of the government, the average distracted citizen, in any given land, becomes a vessel of prescribed thoughts. Western perceptions of Russia, tainted by decades of motion pictures portraying Russians as routine villains, infect the collective consciousness. — yebiga

There's a fair amount of critique of the US, coming from the US, documentaries, movies, interviews, whatever. Some were posted in the thread.

The West is envious of Russia? — Jabberwock

Might be the other way around? Or is that politically incorrect to say?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/06/nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-ukraine-russia/ — neomac

For some reason, this doesn't really seem that surprising. (Ukrainian Floating Operatives.)

A diversion, most likely. — Tzeentch

How many troops did Putin need to take Crimea? — ssu

I'm experiencing déjà vu. :)

Zelensky asks for proof of invasion of Ukraine allegedly planned for February 16
^{— TASS · Feb 12, 2022}
Washington’s warnings that Russia is about to invade frustrate Ukrainians
^{— Matt Bradley, Veronika Melkozerova · NBC News · Feb 15, 2022}
EU 'did not believe' US warnings of Russian war
^{— John Silk · Deutsche Welle · Oct 11, 2022}

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on"). — Tzeentch

Wrong. Trying to misrepresent what I said is silly. I said "To assume that the fight of Hostomel/Antonov Airport and the whole fight for Kyiv". Notice the word and.

Besides @Tzeentch, it is you who is referring to a document given two days after the attack to claim how much there were troops of a battle that went at least to April, the next month.

Also, what losses are you talking about here? — Tzeentch

Oh right, you don't believe that Russia has experienced any meaningful losses.

Sources, or no bueno. — Tzeentch

Why don't you start with your own. Like try to give some credibility to your argument that how RUSI among military observers are wrong when they state "The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv."

Still no sources. I've already given you mine.

What tells about the pre-attack confidence of the Russians in their abilities (and their assumption on the weakness of the Ukrainians) is that when the Western intelligence sources gave out publicly a fairly correct estimate on what Russian plans were, Putin didn't change them, but went with the same plans anyway.

Who needs strategic surprise when the target is a weak state that is artificial?

I've already given you mine. — Tzeentch

How can a report done in February tell about facts that happened in April? :chin:

Just at first answer that.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. And they show just how wrong the Russians were right from the start:

For mechanised forces, the intent was often to rapidly occupy and thereafter isolate and screen key objectives. On the axis from Gomel to Kyiv, for example, the force was divided into a screening force that was to establish positions facing west to cut off Kyiv from western Ukraine, and units responsible for pushing into the city. Very little consideration appears to have been given to Ukrainian reserves or the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The assertion in Russian planning that Ukraine could generate only 40,000 additional troops appears to be premised on the anticipated speed of the operation rather than an appreciation of Ukraine’s capacity for mobilisation. This emphasis on speed led to units being ordered to advance in administrative column by road and to attempt to bypass any initial resistance. The assumption was that by D+10, Russian units would transition to stabilisation operations. The synchronisation matrix of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), for example, captured near Kyiv in March 2022, stated that by D+10 the force would ‘proceed to the blocking and destruction of individual scattered units of the Armed Forces and the remnants of nationalist resistance units’.

The reason why columns of armour were destroyed is that basically Russians were trying something similar to the US invasion of Iraq or more likely, their most successful military operation post WW2 operation, Operation Danube.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.

Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.

The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.

Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.

It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops. — Tzeentch

This is the number engaged on 26th of February, which does not comprise the whole northern force. As you seem to accept Wikipedia as credible, here is the article on the whole northern campaign:
[url=http://]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyiv_offensive_(2022)[/url]

It gives the number of the Russian troops involved in the northern campaign at 70 thousand (and defenders at less than 40 thousand, half of it irregulars, which seems a bit less than your 60). So your claim is basically that Russia has committed one third of its troops in Ukraine to a 'diversion'.

The 31 BTGs, roughly equivalent to 21,000 troops, comes from an ISW report, which in turn gets the figure directly from communications by the Ukrainian General Staff on the days of the invasion.

The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.

That of course doesn't add up.

If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.

One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.

We saw nothing of the sort.

Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.

Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.

The sources you quote list 31 BTGs ona single salient. I am talking about the total number of troops involved in the northern campaign. It is estimated that the Kiyv Convoy itself might have up to 15 thousand troops, that would leave 5 far all other salients, reserves, GLOC etc. That is simply absurd. The number of troops involved just in the battle of Chernihiv is estimated at 20 thousand.

As for the massive casualties - Russians were not massacred in the north, their offensive stalled mostly to unexpected resistance and catastrophic logistics. They expected a blitz and failed. They stood in a column for a week, a fine diversionary maneuver... The majority of the troops was not even close to the battle.

I have looked at other sources and indeed the number of thirty plus BTGs might refer to the northern campaign (without Kharkiv). Given that the initial number of Russian BTGs for the whole invasion is estimated at 80-110 BTGs (depending on the source), that is still one third of the force. Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion?

They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.

Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me. — Tzeentch

Ok, now you're just trolling.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ) a that two of the main groups attacking Kyiv were doing some kind of faint. Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states:

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch

Operation Danube didn't see more casualties and intense fighting, but did see large columns of tanks suddenly on the streets of the target Capital after a rapid drive from the border. Great military operation.



Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu

I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.

But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:

- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.

Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.

Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu

You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going. — Tzeentch

But obviously Russians DID try to commit more forces, that is why they moved their 60 km column. The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. In a hit-and-run operation such move would make even less sense.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting. — Tzeentch

In general, columns standing idly without fuel do not engage in intense fighting. They were lucky that Ukrainians were spread so thin that they could not move on them (and that their airforce was suppressed), otherwise they would all be massacred.

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table. — Tzeentch

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. It is even more absurd if you take the actual order of the battle – beside the 30 BTGs committed in the North there were 15 BTGs in the Kharkiv direction, 4 in Sumy and about 4 as a general reserve for the northern axis. That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive.

And again, the progress of the northern campaign has no indications of a successful hit-and-run attack, it has all indications of a failed effort.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US. — Tzeentch

So now you are claiming that the 'diversion' at Kiev was meant to reach an agreement where Russia would willingly give up what you claim were its aims in the war, i.e. the territorial gains. That would actually mean its defeat, right?

The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock

That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?

So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying. — Tzeentch

No, it does not, for the reasons I have already explained and which you are not even trying to engage. Do you believe that getting 15 thousand troops in a column, keeping them immobile for a few days and then withdrawing them was planned?

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they? — Tzeentch

They took some land, but the goals of the war were not achieved. It is a matter of interpretation how much success is that.

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022. — Tzeentch

I have tracked them as they happened. I was just pointing out that the source you have provided contradicts your previous claims.

They took some land, but the goals of the war were not achieved. It is a matter of interpretation how much success is that. — Jabberwock

I think the primary goal of the invasion was safeguarding a land bridge to Crimea. However, neither me nor you know what the actual Russian goals are/were.

Western media have tried hard to spread a narrative that the Russians were essentially hoping to take over all of Ukraine. Of course, given such a narrative it is easy to frame the Russian operations as a massive failure.

However, scholars such as Mearsheimer underline that given the 190,000 troops that participated in the initial invasion, the Russian goals must have been limited. Mearsheimer doesn't rule out the possibility that the operations in the north were meant to threaten (and not capture) either.

Seymour Hersh in one of his interviews states directly Kiev was a feint, and the number of Ukrainian defenders in and around Kiev he puts on 60,000. With that, we arrive at a whopping 180,000 troops necessary to reach a bare minimum of a 3:1 advantage with which the Russian could go on the offensive.

Instead, we see 21,000.

There is literally no way these numbers could be interpreted to support your view.

We could halve the number of Ukrainian defenders to 30,000, and double the Russian troops to 40,000, and we wouldn't come close to numbers with which the Russians could realistically take Kiev.

I was just pointing out that the source you have provided contradicts your previous claims. — Jabberwock

It's perfectly possible for a military operation to have multiple purposes, so I'm not sure where you're getting this idea.

I think the primary goal of the invasion was safeguarding a land bridge to Crimea. However, neither me nor you know what the actual Russian goals are/were.

Western media have tried hard to spread a narrative that the Russians were essentially hoping to take over all of Ukraine. Of course, given such a narrative it is easy to frame the Russian operations as a massive failure. — Tzeentch

You were already given many clues what their aims might be: Putin's speech, claims of propagandists, the order of the battle etc. You just ignore them. They have committed 40 BTGs out of 100 for what you claim was their primary goal. Militarily that makes zero sense.

However, scholars such as Mearsheimer underline that given the 190,000 troops that participated in the initial invasion, the Russian goals must have been limited. Mearsheimer doesn't rule out the possibility that the operations in the north were meant to threaten (and not capture) either.

Seymour Hersh in one of his interviews states directly Kiev was a feint, and the number of Ukrainian defenders in and around Kiev he puts on 60,000. With that, we arrive at a whopping 180,000 troops necessary to reach a bare minimum of a 3:1 advantage with which the Russian could go on the offensive.

Instead, we see 21,000.

The numbers simply don't add up to support your view. — Tzeentch

Your numbers simply don't add up at all. One third of the BTGs were committed to the northern axis, so if it was 20 thousands (with 15 thousands in a single column!), that would make the total invasion force just 60 thousands. On the other hand, if the total force was 190 000 troops, then one third on the northern axis would be 60 thousands, which is about what Wikipedia claims. So which is it?

And I see you conveniently decided not to answer the question: how exactly forming a 60 km immobile column works as a feint? Was it planned or not?

It's perfectly possible for a military operation to have multiple purposes, so I'm not sure where you're getting this idea. — Tzeentch

Your source claimed that Russians were ready to give up the land bridge to Crimea which you claim was the primary goal of the invasion. That basically means that your source claims that Russians were ready to surrender their primary goals. Why would they need 'threatening Kiev' for that?

Ukrainian counteroffensive has officially begun.

You were already given many clues what their aims might be: Putin's speech, claims of propagandists, the order of the battle etc. You just ignore them. — Jabberwock

That's rather ironic, considering the Russian order of battle included no more than 190,000 troops, making the notion that the Russians had large territorial goals something that can be dismissed outright.

One third of the BTGs were committed to the northern axis, [...] — Jabberwock

We don't know that. That's an assumption that you seem to keep hinging on, so you're questioning your own assumption here, and not mine.

how exactly forming a 60 km immobile column works as a feint? Was it planned or not? — Jabberwock

How should I know?

The question is irrelevant as to what the Russian goals might've been. Columns will be found during any large-scale military operation. Mistakes will be made and losses will be incurred regardless of the Russian goals. That's inherent to military operations.

Your source claimed that Russians were ready to give up the land bridge to Crimea which you claim was the primary goal of the invasion. That basically means that your source claims that Russians were ready to surrender their primary goals. — Jabberwock

If you take half a second to think about what you just wrote, you'll understand why this isn't contradictory at all.

Why would they need 'threatening Kiev' for that? — Jabberwock

To negotiate you need bargaining chips. Kind of obvious.

That's rather ironic, considering the Russian order of battle included no more than 190,000 troops, making the notion that the Russians had large territorial goals something that can be dismissed outright. — Tzeentch

Nobody claims that they had large territorial goals - they were supposed to take the capital and major cities - every move they made confirms that. They counted on the lack of resistance and political inertia of the Ukrainian government, exactly as it was in Crimea.

We don't know that. That's an assumption that you seem to keep hinging on, so you're questioning your own assumption here, and not mine. — Tzeentch

Let me see:

31 BTGs. — Tzeentch

The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give — Tzeentch

But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. — Tzeentch

You have given the number at least three times. I suppose that if you knew how many BTGs there were in total, you would rather not.

Wikipedia estimates the total number at about 80:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_battle_for_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

Guardian estimated it as 93:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-ukraine-crisis-putin-troops-visual-guide-explainer

The biggest figure I could find is 117 from some Polish analytic group:

https://defence24.com/armed-forces/land-forces/russia-losing-22-battalion-tactical-groups-is-btg-a-myth-or-is-it-truly-effective-in-combat-analysis

So yes, I would say I have a pretty good support for my claim - three quotes from you that the northern axis had 30 BTGs and three independent sources claiming the total was about 100. Your math is totally off.

The question is irrelevant as to what the Russian goals might've been. Columns will be found during any large-scale military operation. Mistakes will be made and losses will be incurred regardless of the Russian goals. That's inherent to military operations. — Tzeentch

No, you do not find 60 km columns stalled without fuel and resources for days in the enemy territory during any large-scale military operation. And in those which that happened, they were not part of a successful operation, but rather a major disaster. And the question is essential, because so obviously it was a mess-up of such embarassing proportions that it negates any claim of a successfully executed feint. You do not feint an attack by endangering 15 thousand troops... The column was obviously going somewhere – it was supposed to support the blitz and mop up the remaining forces. Except the blitz did not happen, as the campaign stalled. You just choose to ignore the reality of what has actually happened.

If you take half a second to think about what you just wrote, you'll understand why this isn't contradictory at all. — Tzeentch

Lol.

To negotiate you need bargaining chips. Kind of obvious. — Tzeentch

You do not need bargaining chips to negotiate your defeat.

You have given the number at least three times. — Jabberwock

Sure. The 21,000 (31 BTGs) figure is pretty solid.

The 190,000 as an upper limit for how many soldiers the Russians field is too.

Those are the numbers I've used.


Your math with how many BTGs the Russians supposedly fielded and what percentage the 31 BTGs participating in the invasion is part of your argument, and not mine. So I'm not sure why you're trying to accuse me of inconsistencies in an argument you are making.

This is strawmanning at its worst.

You just choose to ignore the reality of what has actually happened. — Jabberwock

Taking Kiev with the numbers the Russians fielded was unfeasible, no matter how you twist the numbers. That's the reality you're ignoring.

All you have is 21,000 troops marching on Kiev.

You do not need bargaining chips to negotiate your defeat. — Jabberwock

This is why I told you to look up information about the peace negotiations.

The Russians were bargaining to keep Ukraine out of NATO, and under those circumstances the land bridge to Crimea could be given up.

There's nothing inconsistent about that.

Sure. The 21,000 (31 BTGs) figure is pretty solid.

The 190,000 as an upper limit for how many soldiers the Russians field is too.

Those are the numbers I've used.


Your math with how many BTGs the Russians supposedly fielded and what percentage the 31 BTGs participating in the invasion is part of your argument, and not mine. So I'm not sure why you're trying to accuse me of inconsistencies in an argument you are making.

This is strawmanning at its worst. — Tzeentch

If 31 BTGs = 21 000 is pretty solid, then 1 BTG = is about 670 is also pretty solid. We can learn that, if we use division on those very numbers:
21000/31= 677,41

(The link is supposedly quite reliable).

If 1 BTG is 670 is solid (I round up to avoid fractioning of soldiers), then 100 BTGs (the estimated number of BTGs based on three sources) = 67000 is pretty solid, we know it from the same, reliable source:
100 * 670 = 67000

If your numbers are solid, as you say, then Russians put out in the whole of Ukraine as many people as you say were defenders of Kiev. That would not be even absurd, but simply insane.

On the other hand, if 190000 is your claimed upper limit, then:
190000/100=1900
so one BTG would be 1900 people, not 670. That means that your number is not 'pretty solid', it is completely wrong.

Similarly, if:
1 BTG = 670 people (YOUR CLAIM)
190000 total troops (YOUR CLAIM)
190000 / 670 = 283 - that is how many BTGs Russia should have in the beginning of the invasion according to your 'solid numbers'. I have given three sources which show that was not the case. If you believe that my sources are wrong, give three that claim Russians had nearly 300 BTGs in the Ukraine in the beginning of the conflict.

Of course, I might be wrong, feel free to correct my calculations.

This is why I told you to look up information about the peace negotiations.

The Russians were bargaining to keep Ukraine out of NATO, and under those circumstances the land bridge to Crimea could be given up.
There's nothing inconsistent about that. — Tzeentch

Your claim was that the bridge of Crimea was the primary goal of Russia in the war. Now you also claim that in the negotiations Russians would accept Ukraine out of NATO, but it would lose the bridge. Therefore, it would NOT reach your stated primary goal of the war, which is exactly what I wrote. I believe there is a name for not achieving your primary goals in a war and it is not 'victory'.

Perhaps not all Russian soldiers were deployed in BTGs.

Anyway, the 190,000 figure is provided by Mearsheimer as the upper limit of troops the Russians deployed at the start of the invasion. I don't think that number is actually being seriously disputed, and I take Mearsheimer quite seriously.

I think it's more llkely there's something lacking in your logic, and not in his.

Your claim was that the bridge of Crimea was the primary goal of Russia in the war. Now you also claim that in the negotiations Russians would accept Ukraine out of NATO, but it would lose the bridge. — Jabberwock

The land bridge with Crimea was Russia's primary goal if negotiations failed. There, are you happy now?

Perhaps not all Russian soldiers were deployed in BTGs. — Tzeentch

:) Yes, that is a quite reasonable conclusion for BTGs, given that their logistics is pretty basic and they need to rely in their tasks on other forces, such as aviation, heavy artillery, deep support etc., i.e. they are not self-sustaining by any degree. But wait, your whole claim for the 21000 attacking Kiev was supported by the calculation based on that inaccurate assumption... So, again, simple mathematical puzzle: if the indisputed Mearsheimer says it was 190000 troops, other sources say that this force included about 100 BTGs, then what part of the 190000 troops were in the north, if 31 BTGs were involved?

The land bridge with Crimea was Russia's primary goal if negotiations failed. There, are you happy now? — Tzeentch

So we agree that before the negotiations failed (and even started), i.e. before the beginning of the war, their goals were different. If the goals were different, then the invasion force would seek to achieve a goal different than just grabbing the land bridge. Well, yes, we told you so.

And sure, you can 'win' the war, if you change your goals to those which you have already achieved.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-russia-shelling-civilians-fleeing-dam-collapse-rcna88324

Evil.

But wait, your whole claim for the 21000 attacking Kiev was supported by the calculation based on that inaccurate assumption. — Jabberwock

Ehm, no.

This was in reply to your claim that 190,000 troops would translate into 283 BTGs.

The confusion lies primarily with you.

If the goals were different, then the invasion force would seek to achieve a goal different than just grabbing the land bridge. — Jabberwock

Taking the land bridge would obviously still be of vital importance, because the negotiations failing was a clear possibility from the start.