When people ask, "What is consciousness", I think they're really asking how we have a sense of self, what is it, and how it fits into the larger understanding of the brain. — Philosophim

It is only a good word from the point of humans as social creatures who rely on folk acting the role of “consciously self-regulating selves”. We require people to take responsibility for all their actions at all times as if they were being attentive and thoughtful. That is how we civilise them. By insisting they have to be exactly that kind of biological “self”.

But then neurobiology tells us this is indeed a social fiction. Nature designs us to not think but just act as much as possible. It is a mistake to try to be “fully conscious and self regulating” even when walking down a flight of stairs.

It takes about 200 milliseconds to plan physical actions at the automatic or subconscious level of skilled habit. The brain just emits learnt routines “thoughtlessly”. To be in deliberative or attentive control takes about 500 milliseconds. And it suppresses sharp awareness for other things during the time it does its thing - the phenomenon known as the attentional blink.

So it is putting on the blinkers to operate step by step rather than letting behaviour flow. Performance on a tennis court or descending a staircase becomes dangerously choppy when we try to live up to the social ideal of being on “full conscious control” of our behaviour. It can’t actually be done.

Society finds consciousness to be useful propaganda. We have to make ourselves as much like the kind of selves that society needs so as to function as a superorganism - an integrated collective of selves. The Catholic Church really refined this cultural technology with its guilt tripping approach to restraint on every impulse, it’s policing of every thoughtless omission.

But neurobiology can strip things back to how selfhood really works in the natural world without the linguistic bondage of a social order. It can jettison the religious baggage of Cartesian duality - the idea that the self is a little witness sitting on our shoulder, responsible for every choice we might will into existence.

The brain does as much as it can in the fifth of a second timeframe of practiced skill, leaving the half second of lumbering attentive follow-up to only what deserves that extra level of scrutiny and regulation.

The business of living as a self in the world can set the bar on how “consciously regulated” we need to be, rather than a human social institution that wants to reinforce its Cartesian ideal.

Also, I've heard that psychedelics reduce brain activity but increase awareness. If true, would that suggest that consciousness and brain activity are two different phenomena. — Art48

Any idea what "increased awareness" means?

How would an unconscious unaware mind be triggered by an outside source? By definition, the mind is unconscious and unaware, so how would it be aware and conscious of any trigger? It would have to become conscious of it's own accord. Or just always conscious.

When asleep and a loud sound occurs, if we don't awaken the sound is interpreted by the brain into some kind of dream occurrence. But this is not the deep sleep discussed here.

How would an unconscious unaware mind be triggered by an outside source? By definition, the mind is unconscious and unaware, so how would it be aware and conscious of any trigger? It would have to become conscious of it's own accord. Or just always conscious. — RogueAI

I don't know whether you understand minds as functions of brains. However, in case your question wasn't rhetorical, Neurophysiology of Sleep and Wakefulness: Basic Science and Clinical Implications:

The reciprocal inhibitory exchange between the major ascending monoaminergic arousal groups and the sleep-inducing VLPO acts as a feedback loop; when monoamine nuclei discharge intensively during wakefulness, they inhibit the VLPO, and when VLPO fire rapidly during sleep, block the discharge of the monoamine cell groups [98]. This relationship is described as a bistable, “flip-flop” circuit, in which the two halves of the circuit strongly inhibit each other to produce two stable discharge patterns – on or off (Fig. ​33). Intermediate states that might be partially “on and off” are resisted. This model helps clarify why sleep-wake transitions are relatively abrupt and mammals spend only about 1% to 2% of the day in a transitional state [99]. Hence, changes between sleep and arousal occur infrequently and rapidly. As will be described below, the neural circuitry forming the sleep switch contrasts with homeostatic and circadian inputs, which are continuously and slowly modified [98].

I don't know whether you understand minds as functions of brains. — wonderer1

How do minds emerge from brains? Why aren't all brain processes associated with consciousness?

How do minds emerge from brains? — RogueAI

It's too early in the history of neuroscience to be able to explain how minds emerge from the most complex physical systems we know of.

Why aren't all brain processes associated with consciousness?

Because the brain automates all sorts of things in the body that aren't under direct conscious control, and if those elements of the brain weren't doing what they do, and were instead involved with consciousness, we would die.

It's too early in the history of neuroscience to be able to explain how minds emerge from the most complex physical systems we know of. — wonderer1

Do minds emerge from other things? Machines, maybe?

Why aren't all brain processes associated with consciousness?

Because the brain automates all sorts of things in the body that aren't under direct conscious control, and if those elements of the brain weren't doing what they do, and were instead involved with consciousness, we would die. — wonderer1

Imagine consciously squeezing our heart every second. :D Hey, Magneto had his heart literally ripped out of his body. He consciously kept his blood circulating with his power.

Do minds emerge from other things? Machines, maybe? — RogueAI

Well it's a big universe, so I can't claim to know. I don't think minds have emerged from machines other than brains here on earth.

But how can you verify that you feel nothing under anesthesia? — sime

That is an interesting question. Having had to return from it several times, I cannot verify a 'nothing' but the experience is unique. Something like, 'I left and am here again'.

Sleeping and dreaming is often an oppressive tour in the opposite direction. A cruel dossier of what one particularly sucks at.

I don't think minds have emerged from machines other than brains here on earth. — wonderer1

How do you know? Some of the Ai's perform at human level. If an Ai passes the Turing Test, will it be conscious?

I don't think minds have emerged from machines other than brains here on earth.
— wonderer1

How do you know? Some of the Ai's perform at human level. If an Ai passes the Turing Test, will it be conscious? — RogueAI

I didn't say that I know. The reason I consider it highly implausible is that we don't know enough about how consciousness emerges in a brain to have much hope of building a machine in which consciousness emerges. Furthermore, I don't consider it technologically feasible to build such a machine before neuromorphic hardware is in widespread use.

Some machines have performed at or above human levels in some limited domains, but that has been going on for a long time. That in itself doesn't lead to any good reason to think that consciousness has emerged in machines other than brains.

Your last question is poorly phrased. Passing a Turing test won't cause an AI to be conscious, and who conducts a Turing test and how that person interacted with the machine would make a difference in what conclusions would be reasonable, based on how the AI responded. In any case the Turing test wasn't seen by Turing as a test for consciousness, but as a test for thinking. I would say that modern AI's can reasonably said to think, regardless of whether they would pass the Turing test I would pose.

This model helps clarify why sleep-wake transitions are relatively abrupt and mammals spend only about 1% to 2% of the day in a transitional state.

A simpler account is that the brain switches on sleep by cutting the brain off from the flow of incoming sensation at the level of the brainstem and thalamus. The brain ceases getting “real” input and so - being a reality predicting machine - generates its own hallucinations.

In a sensory deprivation tank, we are likewise taken over by waking hallucinations.

But in sleep, the brain also needs to switch off the output at the brainstem level so we can’t act in response to our hallucinations. This is why we have sleep paralysis when in vivid dreaming sleep.

In deep sleep, we are allowed to move around more as now there is a generalised dissociation of brain activity due to a lack of thalamic integration. Even in deep sleep, we are sort of conscious. We have a woozy ruminating commentary to ourselves, that is really a disconnected word salad. And it all comes and goes without memory. But when waking from deep sleep - with some training - we can learn to notice and fix what it was like to be in that vague and rambling state of minimal arousal, minimal coherence.

So sleep is itself divided into two types. Deep slow wave sleep is speculated to be a restorative sleep phase where flushing pulses of lymphatic drainage help clear the brain of the day’s metabolic waste and aid consolidation of new pathways.

Then REM dreaming sleep is a way to get the brain roused and ready to go if needed, but still keep it off-line in blocking both incoming sensation and outgoing action.

The brainstem then has authority to throw the switch from sleep to waking if something noisy or untoward is happening. A startle response is a very simple neural reflex that doesn’t require high intelligence to initiate.

Again, all this complexity of activity gets swept under the rug of “consciousness” and its equally unhelpful antithesis of “unconsciousness”. But the neuroscience is in. It ain’t a great mystery.

I didn't say that I know. The reason I consider it highly implausible is that we don't know enough about how consciousness emerges in a brain to have much hope of building a machine in which consciousness emerges. — wonderer1

I see. You said to me "I don't know whether you understand minds as functions of brains.". Yet you're saying now that "we don't know how consciousness emerges in a brain to have much hope of building a machine in which consciousness emerges." I got the impression from you were pretty sure about minds and brains. Now it sounds like you're not so sure.

Some machines have performed at or above human levels in some limited domains, but that has been going on for a long time. That in itself doesn't lead to any good reason to think that consciousness has emerged in machines other than brains.

Your last question is poorly phrased. Passing a Turing test won't cause an AI to be conscious, and who conducts a Turing test and how that person interacted with the machine would make a difference in what conclusions would be reasonable, based on how the AI responded. In any case the Turing test wasn't seen by Turing as a test for consciousness, but as a test for thinking. I would say that modern AI's can reasonably said to think, regardless of whether they would pass the Turing test I would pose.

I never said that passing a Turing test would cause consciousness. I want you to think about what it would mean for a machine to be conscious. Soon, we will have AGI's that perform as well as us in all manner of activities. Soon after that, there will be ai's that surpass us. What does neuroscience say about how we should treat them? Should we assume they're conscious, even if we don't know?

I see. You said "I don't know whether you understand minds as functions of brains.". Yet you're saying now that "we don't know how consciousness emerges in a brain to have much hope of building a machine in which consciousness emerges." I got the impression from you were pretty sure about minds and brains. Now it sounds like you're not so sure. — RogueAI

Ok. I'm quite confident that minds emerge from brains, but that is a different matter than knowing all of the details of how minds emerge from brains that would be required to build a machine in which conscious could merge.

Similarly I'm quite confident that the property of being able to display a TV show, that my TV has, emerges from the electronic design and software in the TV, despite not knowing all I would need to know to design an equivalent TV.

Does that clear things up?

What does neuroscience say about how we should treat them? Should we assume they're conscious, even if we don't know? — RogueAI

Neuroscience is about answering is questions, not ought questions.

What does neuroscience say about how we should treat them? Should we assume they're conscious, even if we don't know? — RogueAI

We don’t need neuroscience to answer that. If we can't tell they're not, then what is the downside of treating them as though they are?

Ok. I'm quite confident that minds emerge from brains, but that is a different matter than knowing all of the details of how minds emerge from brains that would be required to build a machine in which conscious could merge. — wonderer1

Well then, let me ask you about brains. When did consciousness first arrive on the scene? Was coccocephalus wildi conscious? Were the dinosaurs? Is an ant conscious? A bee? A shark? Are mollusks conscious? What's the minimum number of neurons required for consciousness?

We don’t need neuroscience to answer that. If we can't tell they're not, then what is the downside of treating them as though they are? — Patterner

No downside. There's no downside to forbidding people not to abuse their cars or toasters. It just seems kind of odd to treat something as conscious when we have no idea whether it really is conscious or not.

Well then, let me ask you about brains. When did consciousness first arrive on the scene? Was coccocephalus wildi conscious? Were the dinosaurs? Is an ant conscious? A bee? A shark? Are mollusks conscious? What's the minimum number of neurons required for consciousness? — RogueAI

While I've considered it worthwhile to respond to your trolling up till now, because people who are serious thinkers seem likely to be reading along. I'm not seeing a point to continuing. So thanks for the discussion.

We don’t need neuroscience to answer that. If we can't tell they're not, then what is the downside of treating them as though they are?
— Patterner

No downside. There's no downside to forbidding people not to abuse their cars or toasters. It just seems kind of odd to treat something as conscious when we have no idea whether it really is conscious or not. — RogueAI

I thought the conversation was about machines that pass every test we give them looking for consciousness. We could always refuse to believe they are, thinking we'll eventually come up with a test that will trip them up, and treat them like toasters or cars, despite what we think is their faux grief and horror.

Or, we could treat them as though they are what we have no legitimate reason to think they are not.

What's the upside and downside of the options?

What's the upside and downside of the options? — Patterner

The upside is that we're not making a horrendous mistake and mistreating something that's conscious. There is no downside. But as I said before, this applies to toasters and cars and my computer as well as AGI's. How far do you want to extend this courtesy to machines?

But as I said before, this applies to toasters and cars and my computer as well as AGI's. How far do you want to extend this courtesy to machines? — RogueAI

Let's give your toaster and car whatever tests of consciousness we can think of. I'll give them the benefit of the doubt until they fail a test.

Let's give your toaster and car whatever tests of consciousness we can think of. I'll give them the benefit of the doubt until they fail a test. — Patterner

What tests do you propose we give an AGI that we suspect is conscious? Ask it?

What tests do you propose we give an AGI that we suspect is conscious? Ask it? — RogueAI

I think that would be one of the tests. Let me know what your toaster's response is. I'm very excited!!

10 print "I am conscious"

OK, now what? Do we assume a Commodore 64 is conscious because it says it is and there's no downside?

delete

While I've considered it worthwhile to respond to your trolling up till now, because people who are serious thinkers seem likely to be reading along. I'm not seeing a point to continuing. So thanks for the discussion. — wonderer1

I'm trolling because I asked you questions about brains and consciousness? You better develop a thicker skin if you want to be taken seriously here.

10 print "I am conscious"

OK, now what? Do we assume a Commodore 64 is conscious because it says it is and there's no downside? — RogueAI

Fascinating! How did your toaster respond? Audibly? Did it burn the words onto a slice of bread?

Fascinating! How did your toaster respond? Audibly? Did it burn the words onto a slice of bread? — Patterner

A panpsychist would say it's all conscious. I don't agree with it, but it's not a stupid position. They're not morons. I was being facetious with the toaster, but not with today's Ai. Are you sure ChatGPT isn't conscious?