"X state of affairs could have happened in the future, but it did not take place" — schopenhauer1

I flip a coin and it comes up tails. If I said "It could have been heads," that would be a true statement. Is that what you mean?

I am writing a lot today. :) Valid conditionals are based off of known facts. For example, if I heat up ice past a certain temperature, it will melt. So I take an ice cube out of the freezer, put it back and say, "If I had left this cube outside of the freezer, it would have melted."

All of this relies on knowledge of unchanging laws. If tomorrow ice did not melt at room temperature, then of course our conditionals would change. But what is required for valid conditionals, repeatable known rules and consistent outcomes, does not change.

Sometimes conditionals are also confused for possibilities. In the case of T Clark's example, we say its possible that the coin could have landed at either heads or tails. But the reality is it landed on tails, so that was always going to be the outcome of that flip. If we say, "If I flipped it in X way, then it would land on heads", we have a conditional.

Conditionals rely on known laws and outcomes. When the law happens, the outcome happens everytime. Possibilities rely on known outcomes, but do not know which outcome could come out based on the information we have in front of us. We could flip a coin, but since we don't know all of the forces involved, its possible it lands on either heads or tails.

Sometimes conditionals are also confused for possibilities. In the case of T Clark's example, we say its possible that the coin could have landed at either heads or tails. But the reality is it landed on tails, so that was always going to be the outcome of that flip. If we say, "If I flipped it in X way, then it would land on heads", we have a conditional.

Conditionals rely on known laws and outcomes. When the law happens, the outcome happens everytime. Possibilities rely on known outcomes, but do not know which outcome could come out based on the information we have in front of us. We could flip a coin, but since we don't know all of the forces involved, its possible it lands on either heads or tails. — Philosophim

Nice definitions. But are these possible worlds in some way real? X is X. X could be X1 or X2. Is X1 or X2 a thing? What are these possibilities? Also, X could be X1 or X2, or even X3, but then they have likelihoods of being one or the other. But also there is a sense of necessity involved here. It is necessarily true perhaps, that X could not be Y in any possibility.

Nice definitions. But are these possible worlds in some way real? X is X. X could be X1 or X2. Is X1 or X2 a thing? What are these possibilities? Also, X could be X1 or X2, or even X3, but then they have likelihoods of being one or the other. But also there is a sense of necessity involved here. It is necessarily true perhaps, that X could not be Y in any possibility. — schopenhauer1

I think a lot of confusion arises because we don't use distinct vocabulary between conditionals, probabilities, possibilities, and plausabilities. Could you clarify what you mean by X is X but it could also be X2? Its a little too abstract for me to understand why X could be X or X2.

I think a lot of confusion arises because we don't use distinct vocabulary between conditionals, probabilities, possibilities, and plausabilities. Could you clarify what you mean by X is X but it could also be X2? Its a little too abstract for me to understand why X could be X or X2. — Philosophim

The tree is in X position now, but could be in X1 position or X2 position in the future, depending on conditions (conditional state of affairs I guess). What is X1 or X2 without defining it tautologically (that they are conditionals, or just explaining that in a longer definition).

The tree is in X position now, but could be in X1 position or X2 position in the future, depending on conditions (conditional state of affairs I guess). What is X1 or X2 without defining it tautologically (that they are conditionals, or just explaining that in a longer definition). — schopenhauer1

X1 and X2 without definitions or context mean nothing. I could very simply say the conditional that if the tree and ground do not move or affected by outside forces, they'll stay in X spot.

Or I could say if the three is dug up, and moved, it will be in X2 in 1 hour. Variables always represent some value, Conditionals are a set of known rules that always generate an outcome. Are you asking what the probability of each conditional happening is? Are you asking if its possible for X and X2 to happen?

Are you asking what the probability of each conditional happening is? Are you asking if its possible for X and X2 to happen? — Philosophim

So some might say that a future event is in some sense not "real" until it actually takes place. Some might argue that these possibilities somehow, ontologically exist. Even if they don't ontologically exist, are they in some sense real in a different way, or simply how we use language?

Even if they don't ontologically exist, are they in some sense real in a different way, or simply how we use language? — schopenhauer1

Sounds like its how we use language. An intuition I've always followed is, "If language doesn't match up to what you know about reality, the problem is likely with language".

Language does not dictate reality. Language is a tool we use that when effective, matches reality. There is no guarantee that we are using language effectively, but reality is always guaranteed to override our ineffective language.

Here's a few snippets of vocabulary that could help:

Probability: We know several outcomes could occur with some initial premises. Its a 50% probability that the coin lands heads or tails (We're using generalities here, yes it could land on its side.)

Possibility: There is an outcome we have known at least one time, therefore we believe it could happen again. Someone has flipped a coin and it landed heads up. So its possible for a coin to land heads up.

Plausibility: There is an outcome that we believe could occur within the bounds of current knowledge, but has not been actually observed to occur. Its plausible that when I flip a coin, the laws of physics suddenly change and it never lands.

All of these definitions are observations about reality. They are not reality itself. All of these are inductions about the future based on our current deductions, and nothing more.

If something does not exist in the future, but could exist in the future on certain known conditions, does that future state of affairs have any ethical worth to consider? Let us say a human exists in future point Y, but does not exist now in actual point X. Does future point Y have any ethical consideration since they don't exist unless conditionally at future point Y?

If something does not exist in the future, but could exist in the future on certain known conditions, does that future state of affairs have any ethical worth to consider? Let us say a human exists in future point Y, but does not exist now in actual point X. Does future point Y have any ethical consideration since they don't exist yet in future point Y? — schopenhauer1

I think we're still a little abstract. I like to give a concrete example of any abstract I use so its clear to others.

Lets say I'm pregnant and I want to get drunk. There's a high probability or certainty it will cause fetal alcohol syndrome, impairing my child's brain in the future. I can choose to drink and enjoy myself, or emotionally suffer until the desire blows over so that my child doesn't receive brain damage.

I think its pretty clear that this is an ethical consideration. Schopoenhauer1, it sounds like you're trying to say something without saying something. Give your idea fully. What are you looking for here? Its a lot easier to get to the point instead of holding out on it until some abstracts have been established.

I think we're still a little abstract. I like to give a concrete example of any abstract I use so its clear to others.

Lets say I'm pregnant and I want to get drunk. There's a high probability or certainty it will cause fetal alcohol syndrome, impairing my child's brain in the future. I can choose to drink and enjoy myself, or emotionally suffer until the desire blows over so that my child doesn't receive brain damage.

I think its pretty clear that this is an ethical consideration. Schopoenhauer1, it sounds like you're trying to say something without saying something. Give your idea fully. What are you looking for here? Its a lot easier to get to the point instead of holding out on it until some abstracts have been established. — Philosophim

At what point does a future person come into ethical consideration? Some have argued that because a person does not exist yet, that "that person" is an invalid category because it is en potential and not actual.

At what point does a future person come into ethical consideration? Some have argued that because a person does not exist yet, that "that person" is an invalid category because it is en potential and not actual. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand. I just gave an example of a human that is about to be born. Give me an example of what you're thinking and your opinion on it. Don't worry about what others think.

I don't understand. I just gave an example of a human that is about to be born. Give me an example of what you're thinking and your opinion on it. Don't worry about what others think. — Philosophim

X amount of indefinite harm will occur for a future person who is not born yet. Some have argued that one is not "preventing harm" for anyone, as they don't exist yet. Is this just rhetorical hedging in order to hold a certain ethical belief, or do they have some ontological validity in the idea that the potential person is not actual and therefore nothing is being prevented to any actual thing.

X amount of indefinite harm will occur for a future person who is not born yet. Some have argued that one is not "preventing harm" for anyone, as they don't exist yet. Is this just rhetorical hedging in order to hold a certain ethical belief, or do they have some ontological validity in the idea that the potential person is not actual and therefore nothing is being prevented to any actual thing. — schopenhauer1

I still don't understand what you mean in relation to conditionals. Get rid of all the fancy vocabulary. Don't worry about what "some" other people are saying. I want to hear what you think. Don't use X or X2. Remove all abstracts. Use an example like I did with the pregnant woman tempted by alcohol.

You seem so nervous to say what you want to say! Do not worry about being wrong so much that you lose your ability to be right! Worrying about being smart is one of the traps that inhibits true discussion. I've seen many "dumb" examples cut through to the heart of an issue faster than any abstract could. As it currently stands, I'm unable to clearly understand what you're trying to discuss.

I think its pretty clear that this is an ethical consideration. Schopoenhauer1, it sounds like you're trying to say something without saying something. Give your idea fully. What are you looking for here? Its a lot easier to get to the point instead of holding out on it until some abstracts have been established. — Philosophim

This is the kind of thinking I am talking about:

It isn't. In one case, one's actions are affecting a real person. In the other, nobody is being left in a more desirable or less desirable state as a result of what we have done. And if the prevention of harms can be good without a person being there, the prevention of happiness is also bad, even if there is no experience of hankering for the positives. — Existential Hope

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/820995

I hope it wouldn't be too presumptuous of me to put my two cents here by mentioning that this is only a part of my argument against anti-natalism. The other half revolves around the issue with disregarding the good just because there isn't a deprivation, but the absence of suffering is apparently better, even if there is no fulfilment.

I hope it wouldn't be too presumptuous of me to put my two cents here by mentioning that this is only a part of my argument against anti-natalism. — Existential Hope

Not at all. I took a look over the thread and decided that I did not have the full context of the conversation between you two. It did not seem right for me to weigh in on your particular comments.

I mean, if the issue is, "If we have control over outcomes in the future, do we have a moral obligation to ensure the most moral outcome happens within our capacity and resources?" Sure. Not sure who would disagree with this. All moral actions are about the future. They're about whether we do an action now to obtain or a avoid a certain consequence.

As for having a kid, you don't have full control over the outcomes. If you have a kid, you do your best to raise them right. But they still might suffer, die, etc. You can't consider things outside of your control as moral considerations. If you want to have a kid and will work to give them the best life and outcome you possibly can within your emotional and financial means, do so. If you can't be bothered, don't have a kid.

It would be foolish of me to presume that I can put forth an unbiased viewpoint, but I think that the central issue is having a partial understanding ethics. I find it troublesome when people act as if life is a bubble of unadulterated joy that should never be questioned. Entitled parents act in this manner and this is verily reprehensible. Yet, I also fail to see much substantial value in making everything about risks, harms, and impositions. Opportunities, benefits, and benedictions are also of interest.

Not at all. I took a look over the thread and decided that I did not have the full context of the conversation between you two. It did not seem right for me to weigh in on your particular comments.

I mean, if the issue is, "If we have control over outcomes in the future, do we have a moral obligation to ensure the most moral outcome happens within our capacity and resources?" Sure. Not sure who would disagree with this. All moral actions are about the future. They're about whether we do an action now to obtain or a avoid a certain consequence.

As for having a kid, you don't have full control over the outcomes. If you have a kid, you do your best to raise them right. But they still might suffer, die, etc. You can't consider things outside of your control as moral considerations. If you want to have a kid and will work to give them the best life and outcome you possibly can within your emotional and financial means, do so. If you can't be bothered, don't have a kid. — Philosophim

Indeed, good points about the future and basically is my point to Existential Hope. What I might contend here with (I am not sure really where you stand), is the application of "having kids" (the debate over antinatalism). That is to say, having kids is a future event (something Existential Hope can't seem to get over as disqualifying as moral and you rightly point out, almost all ethical considerations are considering hypothetical future scenarios). However, having kids is also an event that brings about varying (and often great) harms and suffering for a future person. Thus, if one sees preventing harms as the moral sticking point and NOT benefits-giving (as this is supererogatory not obligatory like preventing known harms is), then indeed it would be wrong to bring about a future person who would suffer, and it would not be wrong to "prevent" a future person who would also have benefits.

Yet, I also fail to see much substantial value in making everything about risks, harms, and impositions. Opportunities, benefits, and benedictions are also of interest. — Existential Hope

However, having kids is also an event that brings about varying (and often great) harms and suffering for a future person. Thus, if one sees preventing harms as the moral sticking point and NOT benefits-giving (as this is supererogatory not obligatory like preventing known harms is), then indeed it would be wrong to bring about a future person who would suffer, and it would not be wrong to "prevent" a future person who would also have benefits. — schopenhauer1

So existential is considering both the positive and negative as the moral points, while shopenhauer1 is only considering the negative as the moral obligation points to consider. Does that sound about right?

It might just be a conceptualization difference. "Positive" and "Negative" are really relative terms. schopenhauer, couldn't the view point that you're noting is really about making life less negative overall? Which doesn't that translate into the relative idea that you're making life more positive overall? Someone being happy is a less negative experience then not feeling anything at all right? The point is I don't think its possible to compare negative without positive, as negative needs what is positive as a relative comparison. Vice versa naturally.

As for doing this comparison ourselves about having kids, that's extremely difficult. Should Steven Hawking never have been born if science had predicted he would have ALS in the womb and that's all we knew? Deciding to have or not have a kid based on known negatives of the kids life in the future runs parallel to abortion, and that debate is not likely to be settled anytime soon. That's why I think its more important that the person willing to have a child goes in with trying their best, while those who aren't interested should pass on having a kid.

schopenhauer, couldn't the view point that you're noting is really about making life less negative overall? Which doesn't that translate into the relative idea that you're making life more positive overall? Someone being happy is a less negative experience then not feeling anything at all right? — Philosophim

No not at all. The main point is that the negatives come with positives and that positives are not really a "gift" if they come with intendent burdens too. Life is never burden-free, so this is always wrong. The giving "benefits" is not even in the realm of moral consideration. It is supererogatory, but is not required, and certainly not required if one is giving very significant negatives along with it.

In other words, if you never cause happiness, you did nothing morally wrong. However, if you caused suffering, that does become morally significant. It is not symmetrical. Happiness causing and harm-creating are not commensurate.

Hence my thought experiment in the other thread went like this (and hopefully this gives you better context):

Here is a thought experiments for you:

If you had the ability to give the gift of the following to a friend:


Creating or experiencing art and music that inspires and moves you.
Accomplishing personal goals and achievements.
Falling in love and experiencing deep emotional connections.
Building meaningful relationships with family and friends.
Exploring new cultures and traveling to different parts of the world.
Embracing adventure and taking risks
Appreciating nature
Reading/writing good literature
Learning X thing and mastering Y ability
Experiencing technological innovations
Flow states
Games and hobbies

But then, in order to gift the above positives to a friend you also definitely had to give that person at least several of these things below:

Chronic illness - cancer, disease, mental illness, breakdowns, etc.
Acute illness- bed bugs, disease, mental illness, parasites, food poising etc.
Accidents and misadventures (everything from broken limbs and car accidents, to getting eaten by a lion)
Disasters
Betrayal
Loneliness
Anxiety
Trauma
Addiction
Financial hardships
Poverty
Loss
Practically unavoidable, unwanted and tedious situations
Abuse
Discomforts of great and small variety that adds up when combined (everything from mistreatment by others in small ways, to traffic jams, to stubbed toes, to uncomfortable situations, to embarrassment, etc.)

Would you feel comfortable and moral providing the group of positives if you knew you will 100% also be giving some variation of the group of negatives?

I think you would not feel comfortable nor think that this was moral. But procreation is not seen this way. And here lies the misguided and wrong-headed thinking regarding procreation. It's no different. — schopenhauer1

In other words, if you never cause happiness, you did nothing morally wrong. However, if you caused suffering, that does become morally significant. It is not symmetrical. Happiness causing and harm-creating are not commensurate. — schopenhauer1

Ok, I think I understand what you're saying here. You view positive and negative as "shift changes". So if someone were unhappy, it is not a moral imperative to shift them to neutral or happy. However, in your moral imperative its more important to not shift them down. So if they were happy, you shouldn't do anything that would put them to neutral or sad. So positive shifts are not moral imperatives, while avoiding negative shifts are.

Not to spoil your thought experiment, but I would think the only right thing to do would be to tell the friend what the gift entailed and let them decide. But this is probably how we can also save that thought experiment. Instead of a gift to others, why not shift the focus of the gift to oneself? It should keep the spirit of what you're trying to say.

I know that I would definitely take some of those detriments to obtain some of those positive goals in my life. It depends on what I value. I have sacrificed much in my life to obtain my personal goals and achievements. And I willingly knew it when I made those choices I did in my life. If I could save the lives of 100 good people by getting eaten by a lion, would I do it? Here in my comfortable home I would say, "Yes". Hopefully I would pass that test if it ever came to it in reality. ;)

My point is that in our own lives we must weight the costs for benefits in our lives. Nothing is free. Marriage is a loss of freedom. Children are a loss of financial independence for many people. It can add stress to your lives, poor health, etc. And yet if you asked many parents, they would do it all again in a heartbeat. So I would put that question to yourself. Are there things that are worth suffering through in life? Is avoiding suffering, the negative shift, the only goal, or is it simply the price we have to measure out for living?

Not to spoil your thought experiment, but I would think the only right thing to do would be to tell the friend what the gift entailed and let them decide. But this is probably how we can also save that thought experiment. Instead of a gift to others, why not shift the focus of the gift to oneself? It should keep the spirit of what you're trying to say. — Philosophim

No it wouldn't though. The thought experiment works only if there is a rough symmetry between the situation of procreation and the already-existent, That is to say, in both cases the recipient of the "gift" would not be able to consent or know what the harms were.

I know that I would definitely take some of those detriments to obtain some of those positive goals in my life. It depends on what I value. I have sacrificed much in my life to obtain my personal goals and achievements. And I willingly knew it when I made those choices I did in my life. If I could save the lives of 100 good people by getting eaten by a lion, would I do it? Here in my comfortable home I would say, "Yes". Hopefully I would pass that test if it ever came to it in reality. ;) — Philosophim

I am not a utilitarian, so these debates aren't as relevant. It would be about proximity and capacity in that case. Obligation to help someone in a dire situation looks different than purposefully causing the situation and then trying to help what you caused.

My point is that in our own lives we must weight the costs for benefits in our lives. Nothing is free. Marriage is a loss of freedom. Children are a loss of financial independence for many people. It can add stress to your lives, poor health, etc. And yet if you asked many parents, they would do it all again in a heartbeat. So I would put that question to yourself. Are there things that are worth suffering through in life? Is avoiding suffering, the negative shift, the only goal, or is it simply the price we have to measure out for living? — Philosophim

I'm going to have to give you a bit of a primer here because this is tangential and though "touching" in a sort of ho hum ethical way, the ethics cuts much deeper than this kind of preference-fulfillment you are discussing regarding one's own life. It changes when you cause the life of another:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism#:~:text=Antinatalism%20or%20anti%2Dnatalism%20is,humans%20should%20abstain%20from%20procreating.

https://iep.utm.edu/anti-natalism/

So existential is considering both the positive and negative as the moral points, while shopenhauer1 is only considering the negative as the moral obligation points to consider. Does that sound about right?

It might just be a conceptualization difference. "Positive" and "Negative" are really relative terms. schopenhauer, couldn't the view point that you're noting is really about making life less negative overall? Which doesn't that translate into the relative idea that you're making life more positive overall? Someone being happy is a less negative experience then not feeling anything at all right? The point is I don't think its possible to compare negative without positive, as negative needs what is positive as a relative comparison. Vice versa naturally.

As for doing this comparison ourselves about having kids, that's extremely difficult. Should Steven Hawking never have been born if science had predicted he would have ALS in the womb and that's all we knew? Deciding to have or not have a kid based on known negatives of the kids life in the future runs parallel to abortion, and that debate is not likely to be settled anytime soon. That's why I think its more important that the person willing to have a child goes in with trying their best, while those who aren't interested should pass on having a kid. — Philosophim

I think that this is probably accurate. I don't think Schopenhauer1 does not see any value in the positives, but it is obvious that they are supererogatory for him. For me, they matter just as much as the negatives do.

To me, actions that make life better or worse are the ones that have moral relevance. However, I am willing to grant that states of affairs that are devoid of a person can still be good or bad in an impersonal sense. What I take issue with is arguing that only the absence of suffering possesses the unique capacity for impersonal value. Although I don't believe that positive experiences must be preceded by negative ones, I do agree that the presence of negative experiences can lead to a greater appreciation for the good.

I respect your nuanced position on this knotty subject.

The thought experiment works only if there is a rough symmetry between the situation of procreation and the already-existent, That is to say, in both cases the person would not be able to consent or know what the harms were. — schopenhauer1

Ok, that's fair. I don't want to divert from the intent of the thought experiment. If it is your parallel for procreation, then we also don't know what the benefits are either right? Further, we don't even know what we're gifting them. Its a mystery box to all involved. Since no one knows the outcome, is it even worth considering as part of your decision?

the ethics cuts much deeper than this kind of preference-fulfillment you are discussing regarding one's own life. It changes when you cause the life of another: — schopenhauer1

Its not like if we don't give them the gift they'll be fine. They won't exist. So we can really only judge by those who have received that gift. We can't ask those who did not get it. We look at ourselves, our friends, and our family. Even our enemies. Then we decide, "Is the gift overall worth gambling on?" That is up to each individual and their own experiences. No one can tell you "Yes." No one can tell you "No".

If you find that yourself, and people you agree with around you would rather not have lived then suffer through their life, then sure, don't have kids. That gift is a curse to you and those around you. But, you can't reasonably tell other people that they must follow your decision. The rational conclusion is it is a decision for each individual, not that there is a blanket answer that is the same for everyone.

I respect your nuanced position on this knotty subject. — Existential Hope

Much appreciated, it can be a difficult subject.

Ok, that's fair. I don't want to divert from the intent of the thought experiment. If it is your parallel for procreation, then we also don't know what the benefits are either right? Further, we don't even know what we're gifting them. Its a mystery box to all involved. Since no one knows the outcome, is it even worth considering as part of your decision? — Philosophim

It's not worth considering, but it's worth mentioning. The very fact that the good comes with such unknown (and very objectionable negatives) should negate it from even be considered.

Its not like if we don't give them the gift they'll be fine. They won't exist. So we can really only judge by those who have received that gift. — Philosophim

You would really gamble on something with so much negatives and suffering attached to it? Stay far far away from me when handing out gifts! Your heuristic would be horrific!

"Is the gift overall worth gambling on?" That is up to each individual and their own experiences. No one can tell you "Yes." No one can tell you "No". — Philosophim

Sure they can give you their input on whether giving a gift of harm along with good is a good idea. They can't force you but they can inform you. Presumably the child is even closer than a friend, and I would never give a friend a gift like that just because it has some good stuff too, not even if other friends say they don't mind it. I would not presume that kind of negatives onto another because yet other people told me they don't mind it. That seems perverse in anything other than this special pleading situation.

But, you can't reasonably tell other people that they must follow your decision. The rational conclusion is it is a decision for each individual, not that there is a blanket answer that is the same for everyone. — Philosophim

It's not as clear-cut for most people as murder or theft, but it is certainly a moral decision that impacts someone else, and my point is that it should be raised as something to consider. I liken it to at least the level of vegetarian/veganism or perhaps abortion and topics such as these. They should be debated, but they should not be forced. However, it simply isn't the same kind of topic as picking your favorite flavor of ice cream, just some personal preference that no one should bother themselves with either morally or philosophically. Also, take a look at the Wiki link I sent you. First catch up on some of the relevant philosophical arguments.

Well schopenhauer1, if that is your conclusion, then take that with you in your life. I will take mine. Good conversation.

Why do you assume people that come here don't have any say in the matter? You're assuming in your anti-natalist view that souls (disembodied minds, if idealism is true) don't exist.