Something that is worthwhile to note is that in any city the Russians held and then left, mostly the pro-Russian population would immigrate to Russia.

According to this UNHCR data sheet (https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine), some 2 874 806 Ukrainians have refugee status in Russia. — boethius

Evidently the belief in the new Novorossiya isn't at the ground level the same as in the propaganda. This was happening already before February 24th of last year, actually. The People's Republics weren't the most pleasant, organized and secure places to live in.

Evidently the belief in the new Novorossiya isn't at the ground level the same as in the propaganda. This was happening already before February 24th of last year. — ssu

Because of the war in Donbas?

Well, I think the reaction of the people when Ukrainian forces Russian occupied cities like Kherson tells it all. But noted, there were (and are) those places in Donbas were the Russia and the idea of Novorossiya was (and is?) admired.

I've met quite a few Ukrainians who've moved to the US recently, but I've now met a Moldovan whose whole family is coming soon, he said. Would Putin invade there?

In reality, I think Putin enlarging the conflict would be illogical, thus unlikely.

I think Putin enlarging the conflict would be illogical, thus unlikely. — ssu

He hasn't been overly logical to this point, though.

The Ukraine War is perhaps not the War we think it is.

The rich, often obese, post-white, post-christian mega-mono-culture represents little more than 15% of the Earth's human population. During the last 300-400 years, the core of this 15% was Western European and more lately North American. They have enjoyed total hegemony over the rest of the world. They created and control all the worlds global institutions. Any country that has refused to bend the knee to its demands has been destroyed, humiliated, impoverished, bombed, bought and sold. This is the genealogy of the current mega-mono-culture that still dominates our world today.

When you live you entire life within a mono-culture you cannot help but to acquire ways of thinking, attitudes, beliefs, narratives that are unexamined. When that mono-culture enjoys unparalleled supremacy over successive generations its citizens will inevitably acquire an unconscious hubris. No matter how hard they may try to be impartial, how hard they try to consider counter-narratives, the language and ideas they inherited are already infected by its cultural-genealogy. To a western mind the range of political concepts such as justice, democracy, freedom, rights, capitalism... all arrive confined within very narrow narratives. As the formation of any nation-state by necessity requires a mythology for it to sustain its identity, it follows that each citizen is infected by that mythology.

So the Ukraine war is not about Russia invading or annexing land from a neighbour. This narrative can only be sustained by the presence of an unconscious genealogy of hubris. The ingrained blindness enables Western Media to entirely memory hole the Minsk agreements; frame all human-rights abuses as committed only by Russians; portray Zelensky is the heroic leader of the French Resistance and Putin as something inhuman.

In reality the war is about Russia refusing to bend the knee to the hegemon. We already know that when you refuse to bend the knee the mega-mono-culture is coming to destroy you by any means necessary. So the interesting question is really not the war on the ground but what is Russia's plan to avoid its own destruction?

The obvious Answer is that Russia is determined to win overwhelming support from 85% of earths nations that are not part of mega-mono-culture. The primary calculus for the Kremlin is that the conduct of the war in the Ukraine does not alienate potential allies and especially China. To defend yourself against the mega-mono-culture you need lots of resources and lots of allies to buttress yourself against the inevitable series of measures designed to destroy you. With 20% of the world's land mass, Russia has all the resources it needs. So all that Russia really needs is Allies and China.

How successful has Russia been in acquiring those allies? Well, the successive sanctions proposed by the mega-mono-culture have not acquired majority support in a series of UN votes, with the majority of countries abstaining and more recently a growing number openly coming out opposed to the proposals. We have also witnessed a growing number of countries receiving a good dressing down by the Mono-culture for being too friendly with Russia or insufficiently supportive of the Ukraine.

Given the strength of Russias economy and its continuing resilience against the mother-load of sanctions deployed, it is apparent that Russia has acquired sufficient allies to help mitigate the damage that was intended.

The Thucydides Trap
Thucydides Trap is a term popularized by American political scientist Graham T. Allison to describe a tendency towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power as a regional or international hegemon. This theory suggests that China is the emergent power and the United States led mono-culture is the waning power.

From this perspective, the newly developed special relationship between China and Russia is perhaps the most significant story of the last 14 months - or perhaps the last 300 years. The ostracisation and sanctions against Russia have forced Russia to seek out China. The economic advantages this offers to China can not be over stated.

China's industrial capacity is already larger than the USA and the EU combined. Now, thanks to the sanctions against Russia, China has special access to 20% of the worlds resources at below market price. In other words, No one can hope to compete with such an input price advantage together with the economies of scale China already enjoys. Little wonder both Japan and South Korea are increasingly trying to wiggle around the Russian Sanctions and have obtained various exemptions - they can see the writing on the wall.

This narrative only works if it’s going to something better. The rebel alliance banding together to defend various forms of authoritarianism isn’t that.

I have to agree with here, when I mention most of the world (especially most of the world's leaders) are closer ideologically to Putin than the West: that's not a good thing in my opinion, but necessary to understand the geopolitical situation and the chances of Putin's uno reverse "authoritarian rebel alliance" (love it).

Of course, I wouldn't say most Western leaders are anti-authoritarian either, but their brand of authoritarianism in the name of liberalism doesn't go down well in most of the world, who respond mostly with "why not just be authoritarian in the name of authoritarianism; what's with all the extra steps? And also we really hate gays. What's with the gay loving? You're gay, is that it, gay!"

The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge). — neomac


This does not in anyway even contradict the my statement:

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius


Everything you said doesn't comment on who's most responsible for the result of a policy. Sure, the most influent party does not control events, but they would still be most responsible. If all the nation-states together push for this policy (to do nothing about environmental catastrophe) the most influent party would still be the most responsible. — boethius

I didn’t mean to contradict your claim. I meant to question:
1 - the strength of your accusation: “the most responsible“ is wrt what the US could have done, not wrt what was desirable, they might be very much different. Since that statement doesn’t make any such discrimination, from that sentence we don’t know what more specific facts the US can be legitimately accused of.
2 - its possible implications (e.g. that we should oppose the US leadership). Maybe the US has made big mistakes, that doesn’t exclude that such big mistakes might not be enough good reason to justify opposing the US leadership by the Westerners. It depends on what the viable alternatives are, including other forms of compensation. Even at the national state level, there are no democratic regimes immune from corruption or bad policies, that doesn’t mean one is ready to give up on democracy and move to ISIS theocracy just to give it a try.

The idea that environmentalism is a US policy to begin with is truly remarkable, but we could continue that discussion in the climate change thread. — boethius

I didn’t claim it’s a “US policy” but one of the most direct and self-conscious products of the US-led world.

Who would? — neomac

The question is not who would, the question is "would you?"
You can answer no. Now, I'm pretty sure many members of the Nazi community in Ukraine would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians. — boethius

What bothers me in your questions is that they are done in a void of realistic assumptions about human motivations. Given the current war, I doubt that there are Ukrainian Nazis willing to fight to death and promote this attitude among Ukrainians by mere principles or ideological indoctrination. Fighting to death to most ordinary people as well as for indoctrinated people may likely be motivated by traumatising experiences of personal loss and collective memories of oppression and abuses, so these feelings are not rooted in any specific ideology. They are very personal like personal feuds with related sunk costs. For that reason I do not have the pretentiousness of either empathising with or dismissing such feelings. They are part of the human fabric, so instead of repressing them or being judgemental about them, it might be profitable to channel them toward greater goals (for Ukrainians, independent Ukraine from Russia, for the Westerners, contained Russian imperialism).
Said that, until the one in power to take presidential decisions is Zelensky, he has to respond for Ukrainian policies in this war, not the Nazi community. Zelensky must care about the Ukrainians’ views on the war at large, not about fringe movements. At least, this is what I must assume if I believe Ukraine is a sovereign state, which I do. In any case, I have no evidence supporting the claim that Zelensky or Ukrainians “would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians”.

Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)? — neomac

Deflection, deflection, deflection, as soon as it's "what cost is reasonable" it's somehow all of a sudden a ephemeral netherworld of philosophical speculation we can hardly even scratch the surface of. — boethius

If you talk about “reasonable cost” I would like to understand what the reasoning is, other than your/my gut feelings. If we are talking military, I guess that for a military resistance one needs to take into account really many factors among them the rate of Ukrainian vs Russian people that can be enough trained, equipped and deployed on the battlefield, and their morale. I don’t have the actual figures available to decision makers, nor the military expertise to do the math, nor an insider sense of their morale. I guess neither Russians nor Ukrainians would fight literally to the last man, but they keep their military calculations secret for obvious reasons (e.g. the rule of 1/3 defensive vs offensive doesn’t seem to support an offensive action on either side given the overall deployed manpower on the ground, but depending on given circumstances and other asymmetric advantages this ratio maybe less relevant). I can just guess that they will keep fighting until the ratio in manpower and equipment between opponents supports the idea that there are still decisive moves to be made on the weakest defensive points of the opposing side. Otherwise the war will likely stall, even if there is no declared truce or peace. There is no need to have an anti-American bias to acknowledge that the military situation for the Ukrainians is ugly and chances to regain territories manu miltari are not encouraging. There is no need to have an anti-Russian bias either to acknowledge that Ukrainians might keep fighting as the Afghans kept fighting against foreign occupation, the Palestinians keep fighting and the Kurds who never even had an acknowledged state for their own. For generations. Do you think Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds would be impressed by your “reasonable cost“ line of argument to fight their wars? It’s precisely the frightening idea that “reasonable cost“ for the Russians might be significantly higher than the Westerners could tolerate, that Russian morale is stronger than the Western morale what needs to be countered. That’s the blackmailing trap the Russians, pardon, I meant you, are “proposing” and “recommending” people to fall in. What the Ukrainians are teaching the Westerners, it’s precisely what “morale” it takes to fight for one’s freedom against genocidal authoritarian regimes like Russia.

However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods. — boethius

Why 30k ? Why not 3k? Or 300k? And why would it be relevant to anybody that you start feeling uncomfortable at 30k? If one starts feeling uncomfortable only at 60k or hundred times more, what are you going to do about it?

However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods.

In the real world, an attempt to remove Russia entirely from Ukraine by force I would expect would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and not succeed, and, even if it did, would not result in peace but the war would still be on. — boethius

Putting these 2 arguments together reinforces the Western concern that Putin is testing a military plan that can be replicated by himself and other potential emulators again: Putin will occupy territories with whatever excuse good for pro-Russian propaganda against neighbouring countries and then threat tactic nukes if there is a serious chance to suffer a decisive conventional military defeat.
That in turn may reinforce the Western motivation to support Ukraine to prevent Russia (and its possible emulators) from being encouraged to replicate the same strategy elsewhere. How? If an outright and full victory is not possible on the battlefield, nor by diplomatic means, then bogging down the Russian military involvement in Ukraine as long and as costly as possible to Russia without escalation measures may be an effective strategy. But that has its costs, obviously. Especially for the Ukrainians.

the main one being not joining NATO (which is only useful to join before the war ... not after the war) — boethius

.

But the threat of war won’t be over even after peace. For example, Russia may still want to get Odessa once it has restored its military capacity or start somewhere else encouraged by a too favourable peace deal. And find other economic and political ways to bully Ukraine, to corrupt its politicians or oligarchs.

The higher the cost paid, the more the stronger party requires compensation for the cost, not less. — "boethius

That might be true also for a weaker but indomitable party.

Your analysis made no sense and I'll ignore it, does not support your conclusion, and your conclusion is false anyways. — boethius

But I can’t ignore that all three accusations lack arguments to support them.

However, to start the analysis an idea of what amount of lives is worthwhile to spend to achieve what must be posited. — boethius

Sure, but that’s not on me to establish. Politicians and military leaders/experts are there to do the job.
At best I can reason over their arguments, and suspend/withdraw my reliance on them if I find their arguments enough questionable. I’ve read elsewhere many if not all of your arguments (like Ukraine won’t be able to regain its territories from 2014, or Russia might use tactical nukes if there is a risk it will lose territories, or the lack of the Western commitment to Ukrainian victory, the peace deal refused by the West). But again I’m more interested to discuss geopolitical and moral implications/assumptions than to discuss the actual status of the Ukrainian military and morale. For the latter I mostly limit myself to get input from more reliable sources.

I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. — neomac

Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what you are talking about. — boethius

Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what I was talking about.

However, if you're interested in assumptions, the assumption of commanding soldiers to fight in a war is that there is something that can be achieved militarily and the cost in lives is reasonable. The implication of war is people die. — boethius

The other assumption is that I’m not a commanding soldier. So I’ll let other people more credited and qualified than I am to express their competent views on military matters. The war has also geopolitical implications like the rise of the Ukrainian nation against their genocide by the Russians.

Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point. — neomac

You made the claim Finland joining NATO is some big geopolitical strategic loss to Russia, I pointed out it doesn't really change anything ... and now you say I should ask Russia about it? — boethius

Again I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand. You asked me “Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia?” as if invading Russia is the only strategic concern for Russia. That is questionable. The Ukrainian case is there to prove it.

The difference with Ukraine compared to Finland is that there is an important Naval base in Crimea, there are lot's of Russian speakers in Ukraine, Ukraine is a former soviet republic, and there is first and foremost an economic conflict over Ukraine (spheres of influence of the major powers).
Finland was never part of the Soviet Union, was squarely part of "the West" and never part of Russia's sphere of influence. There is no conflict between the West and Russia over Finland. — boethius

If that’s the case then invading Russia is not the most realistic security and strategic problem that Russian imperialism has to face. Notice that Putin never presented the Western security threat specifically as a threat to the naval base in Crimea (other points were e.g. denazification Ukraine, NATO neutrality, demilitarisation). Besides Russia has Russian minorities in other ex-soviet union countries and accused other neighbouring countries to have nazi regimes. So the problem is not just what Russia did, but what it might do next if the war ends the way Russia wishes. Russia is challenging the West world order so this war must be assessed in that perspective not just as some beef between Russians and Ukrainians over marginal territorial disputes.
That Finland joins NATO is a problem for Russia for at least 3 reasons:
1 - Reputation: Finland doesn’t fear to anger Russia and feels safer within NATO as other countries who joined NATO.
2 - Security: Russia is compelled to react because if NATO enlargement was a downplayed provocation prior to the war in Ukraine by the Westerners, now Finland joining NATO is an overt provocation to Russia. Since NATO border is widening and the NATO control over the Baltic Sea getting stronger Russia must deal with related security threats.
3 - Network: NATO has become more anti-Russian by having countries like Finland and maybe later Sweden within NATO (counterbalancing the weight of other US allies milder against Russia).

This conflict is the US wanting to expand it's imperial influence in Ukraine and diminish Russia's imperial influence, made the bold move of orchestrating a coup to replace a legitimate leader willing to compromise with Russia (i.e. not insane and in power because many Ukrainians did, maybe still do, support compromise with Russia over conflict and warfare).

There are two empires sorting out the question of who indeed does have more influence over what happens in Ukraine at the end of the day.

Neither empire has a moral case. — boethius

Talking about “a coup to replace a legitimate leader” is a way to dismiss a popular revolt against an illegitimate leader. If it was the case and Russia had by far the popular support of the Ukrainians, I doubt that Western coups would succeed. Besides Ukrainians have a long history of opposing the Russian rule and have suffered for that a great deal (way more than they are doing now in terms of body counts). Even the entanglement with Nazism (as it happened in Finland) was also due to historical grievances with Russia. There is nothing here that the US propaganda invented.
I don’t know what you take to be a “moral case”. And if no wars in human history are grounded in what you consider “a morale case“, then I would find your moral claim useless. As far as I can tell there are no wars that aren’t morally controversial so when we talk about the morality of war we should take into account that moral controversy management is part of the game, and as far as I am concerned, how differently is played in Western democracies vs non-Western-like authoritarian regimes. So if you prefer the former to the latter then you better ask yourself what “reasonable cost“ is worth to spend to keep it that way.

The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends. — neomac


That's because actual evidence exists in the present and only speculation exists about the future.
To conclude one speculation is better than another, turns out requires evidence in the present to support. — boethius

You look more pressed to conclude how the West failed practically on all relevant grounds (military, economically, politically, morally) against Russia, based on a very selective view of the evidences you claim to have. So speculations (like in your hypothetical scenarios) are framed accordingly: Russian wins whatever military strategy pursues (annexed territories consolidation, more land grabbing, tactic nukes, wartime economy, alliances with the Rest), the US loses whatever military strategy pursues (with less engagement Russia wins, with greater engagement escalation to nuclear war, with peace on Russian deal-breaker terms then Russia will result victorious). But if the US is losing whatever it does, you should be glad. The primary/entirely responsible for the human suffering and global environment unimaginable devastation for decades is digging its own grave, isn’t that worth millions of Ukrainian deaths over 8 billions world population and more if one considers the well being of future generations? Why isn’t THAT a reasonable cost?

Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend). — neomac

This seems accurate.

I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!). — neomac

This literally means:

“A proponent of US foreign policy” — neomac

If you are supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so, but "let them fight".

If you are starting to doubt if the lives this policy costs are worthwhile to spend, then "preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude the idea that Western intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death. — boethius

Oh if that’s enough to call me “a proponent of US foreign policy” then you are “a proponent of the Russian foreign policy” since opposition to “supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so” is what Russia propaganda does. Actually I’m tempted to say the same for all your arguments.
“Preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude either the idea that the Western LACK OF intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death like the Ukrainian genocide during the Soviet Union. Worse, it could lead the avg Western life close to the avg Ukrainian life more than the other way around.

Let us rise above our unconscious pre-suppositions and examine more closely the premise that the western mono-culture is less authoritarian than China and Russia i.e. Putin and Xi. After we strip away the platitudes and propaganda what remains is an argument based solely on a more rapid periodical rotation of political leaders.

If the last 3-7 years have proven anything, it is that all political parties throughout western democracies on any substantial matters are globally in lock-step. We saw this with the management of COVID, we saw it with the global financial crisis, the war on terror, we see it with refugee policies, trade agreements, climate change policies and we see it with the war in Ukraine. Diversity no longer applies to substantial policies.

Every single western democracy affords the same advantages to the largest global corporations and in the same way. Where any differences appear it is a matter of style, a rhetorical flourish that may descend into a public trolling fest for our entertainment but is essentially a vacuous form or performance art.

When we label governments or their leaders as authoritarian, we impute that the government or leader heavily restricts citizens rights, and the influence those citizens may have in the political decision making. If this is what we mean, then it is not apparent at all that western democracies are less authoritarian than either China or Russia. Opinion polls may have caused the UK to rotate 4 different prime ministers during the last 3 years but it has led to no substantive change in policy. On all substantive matters, war, economics, health policy et al the western public is not asked but told what to think. The platforms of descent, the politicians with differing views are marginalised.

The citizens of Western Democracies have been quietly disenfranchised. The world's largest corporations together with traditional media and social media now manage the political system. Those corporations manage campaigns and lobbyists to determine policy, and often enough the lobbyists - not the politicians - even write the legislation. The allied media then carefully script the narratives, monitor and adjust the messaging to manufacture sufficient public consent. If politics is meant to be a public debate, a battle of ideas to formulate policies that are for the greater good of the populace then Western Democracies have reached a post-democratic, post-political stage. Here, words like authoritarianism are useful for formulating powerful talking points for the publics consumption but in reality they have devolved into meaningless anachronisms.

It should be clear to us all, that economic prospects not political systems determine whether a government - of whatever constitutional form - tends towards repressing its citizens or deigning to endow them with freedoms. When economic prospects are buoyant those who are in power graciously indulge the public and allow them the appearance of agency. When threats re-appear on the horizon, the chimera of public power is revealed. What follows is always the control narrative, censorship, wars, and policies that serve to protect and sustain those in power. The once sacrosanct civil freedoms that flourished in good times instantly become disposable indulgences.

Because In Western Democracies, the last 50-70 years have been so uniquely prosperous, it is probably impossible for us to appreciate that what is now occurring is a dull reversion to the norm. We enjoyed something very special but we took it for granted and permitted it to become hopelessly corrupted.

Any thoughts on the rumored Ukrainian offensive?

It seems "rumors" of a Ukrainian offensive seem to pop up every once in a while, but is there any substance to this?

There's at least a chance that Ukraine has successfully held back an amount of troops, materiel and ammunition to be able to conduct an offensive. I don't think the chance is particularly high, and the chances of this being a form of propaganda/information warfare seems more likely to me.

But even if it's the latter, it would be interesting to think about what the target and goal is of the information campaign.

- Information warfare aimed at the Russians seems unlikely, however the Russians have dug in across pretty much the entire frontline. That fact alone seems to discredit a real threat of a Ukrainian offensive, however it does show the Russians took the initial possibility seriously.

- Propaganda aimed at the western public, to divert the image of a lost war?

- Propaganda aimed at the Ukrainian forces to keep some semblance of hope for victory?

- All of the above?

I would also be interested to hear if anyone here is convinced the Ukrainian offensive is a likely possibility.

, those leaked docs also suggest they were/are planning...something.

Do you have any links to the piece you're referring to?

https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/the-calm-before-the-storm-waiting-for-ukraines-offensive/

Koffman has been one of the figures creating the 'rumors' I mentioned in my post, so his positions are basically what is up for debate.

As of yet, no Ukrainian offensive.

Do you (continue to(?)) subscribe to Koffman's position?

I think there will be a Ukranian offensive. Do you think there won't be?

As I said in my post:

There's at least a chance that Ukraine has successfully held back an amount of troops, materiel and ammunition to be able to conduct an offensive.I don't think the chance is particularly high, and the chances of this being a form of propaganda/information warfare seems more likely to me. — Tzeentch

This is of course referring to the rumored 'spring offensive'. How the war develops further in the future we cannot know.

Some thoughts as to why an imminent Ukrainian offensive seems unlikely:
- the attrition rate at Bakhmut
- the closing window of opportunity while the Russians are occupied at Bakhmut
- the state of Ukrainian air power and air defense
- the lack of Ukrainian armor
- the Russians having dug in all across the frontline

I'm kind of curious what positives someone who believes in an imminent offensive would look at to think it is feasible.

I don't think we will see any meaningful change in how the war is progressing because from a military perspective it makes no sense to communicate an imminent attack. There's new personnel arriving and tanks and new recruits, so I think this is about morality. Creating an image for veterans who could possibly be tired to welcome the new recruits for a spring offensive and illicit unit cohesion. But the offensive will be minimally effective. Just a Russia has barely gained ground in the winter I suspect the same the other way around.

I predict there will be a significant Ukranian offensive, and it will make significant gains.

[...] from a military perspective it makes no sense to communicate an imminent attack. — Benkei

It could be part of a deception campaign. Military deception is a big part of Soviet doctrine, which is what the Ukrainian army mostly runs on. I'm sure the Americans advising the Ukrainians will also seek to leverage whatever advantage they can.

Given the circumstances it is not likely, but I'm inclined to give the idea at least some credit. The Russians seem to have taken it seriously enough to dig in across the entire frontline.

The main thing I'm wondering about is if posters like have some interesting information to share.

, so, Russia rolls into Ukraine at the Gremlin's orders, bombs blazing, grabbing land, Ukrainians defend with foreign aid, and the defense are labeled war-mongers? (From memory, admittedly needing an upgrade, Russia hasn't been attacked/invaded in this millennium, rather there's been some tiptoeing.) Let's try being a bit more specific and see where that leads, let's split "war-mongers" into "attack-mongers" and "defense-mongers". What does it look like with the added nuance? Doesn't have anything in particular to do with taboo.

, you still didn't proceed with your suggestion:

Then what? — above

, especially with the attention they've gotten, it seems like a bad idea. Anything they may do or are doing will be/remain more covert (for the time being at least). Multifront warfare might also be a bad move.

, don't have the articles in front of me, no. They were from back after the leaks, "now we have to reshuffle things", "back to the strategy drawing board", that sort of thing. I suppose it's anyone's guess, time will tell. Could launch some betting/bookmaking, and exchange some money (don't think Bookies or bet365 do that). ;) Commentary on photos and such:

Ukraine could launch its offensive against Russia any moment. Here’s what’s waiting
^{— Tim Lister · CNN · Apr 29, 2023}

Back shortly before the invasion:

Investors Bet Ukraine-Russia War Will Be Averted
^{— Anna Hirtenstein · The Wall Street Journal · Feb 11, 2022}

, for all we know, the onslaught in the east could be part diversion from digging in elsewhere. Ordinary strategy anyway, but it's anyone's guess.

Ukraine Says Russia Is Preparing to Evacuate Civilians From Occupied Areas of South
^{— Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Yurii Shyvala · The New York Times · Apr 8, 2023}
Ukraine Says Russian Troops Are Evacuating Civilians From Occupied Areas of South
^{— Jeffrey Gettleman, Olha Kotiuzhanska · The New York Times · Apr 23, 2023}
Wagner Group boss tells his mercenaries ‘not to take POWs’
^{— The Kyiv Independent · Apr 23, 2023}
Russian forces ‘forcibly evacuating’ civilians in Kherson, says Ukraine
^{— Peter Beaumont · The Guardian · Apr 24, 2023}
Wagner boss says his forces will not take any more prisoners in Ukraine
^{— Agence France Presse via Al Arabiya · Apr 24, 2023}

Various people think back:

Oral history: Leaders recall dismay, fury on first day of war in Ukraine
^{— Peter Finn, Tara McCarty, Susan Doyle et al · Washington Post · Feb 24, 2023}

As-is or a ruse or something? I guess we can only wait and see.

Prigozhin threatens to withdraw his mercenaries from Bakhmut if they lack ammunition
^{— New Voice of Ukraine via Yahoo · Apr 30, 2023}

Prigozhin threatened Shoigu to withdraw the militants from Bakhmut in case of lack of ammunition
^{— Larisa Golub · Apr 30, 2023}
(↑ translation via google)

(I could only find the original interview on Telegram.)

As far as Ukrainian strategy goes, it seems separating east and south (isolating the south) would be worthwhile, assuming it won't be reverted the next day. Then again, that may be what Russian strategists are expecting.

The 2020 documentary Kill Chain: The Cyber War on America's Elections (1½ h), featuring Harri Hursti, might be a worthwhile watch for the interested.
It's fairly tough on a number of parties, including Russia (so peripherally relevant here). Dis/mistrust vectors.
"Kill chain" refers to reconnaissance/observe/collect → target/analysis → weaponize → paralyze enemy → attack; Hursti thinks paralyzing is a crucial part, for example, to get whatever actors to panic.

The Kremlin’s forces have suffered more than 100,000 killed or wounded fighters since December alone, the United States now estimates — outlining Moscow's massive losses as its military leaders scramble to recruit more men and prepare for an impending counteroffensive.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-casualties-soldiers-killed-ukraine-counteroffensive-putin-war-rcna82380

If you're Ukraine, don't you think that if you hold out long enough, eventually the Russians will just get sick of it all?

Time is not on Ukraine's side. The Chechens thought they had won for a bit but were crushed eventually.

If the annexations stand, they become 'facts on the ground'.

↪boethius, so, Russia rolls into Ukraine at the Gremlin's orders, bombs blazing, grabbing land, Ukrainians defend with foreign aid, and the defense are labeled war-mongers? — jorndoe

What's war mongering is the assumption that supplying arms is somehow necessary to the exclusion of peace talks and diplomacy. That declaring things like Ukraine will negotiate only after Russia withdraws, which is just stupid, is some purist being "tough" on Russia etc.

Obviously, you negotiate to get what you want, not after you already get what you want.

A logic that excludes peace is, by definition, mongering for war.

Likewise, simply assuming Ukraine is entitled to arms supplies and it's all "Ukrainian agency" is just cowardly war mongering, such as stating "Ukrainians defend with foreign aid". Ukraine is not entitled to arms supplies, if they didn't manage to navigate their international relations to avoid a war and didn't manage to create with their own taxes and policies a conventional deterrent, that's their business and doesn't morally bind anyone to supporting their war effort; supplying arms is not some moral position (plenty of countries get invaded and the West doesn't supply arms because it's "the moral thing to do"), it is a policy position taken in the West's, particularly the US, (at least perceived) interest to have a prolonged giant war.

If that policy is not in the average Ukrainians interest compared to the Russian's initial offer of autonomous Donbas, neutrality, giving up claim to Crimea, but in the US' interest (that all of a sudden after decades of the US going on about their interest as the explanation of all their policies ... is somehow no longer the case?) then, again, it is war mongering because the US wants a war.

For, without not only the arms but promises that are obvious lies (such as giving Ukraine "whatever it needs" and "for as long as it takes") fighting a long war would not even be possible for Ukraine. Had the truth been told: that Ukraine will be supported insofar as it serves the US, at least perceived in the White House, interest (and enough to also justify twisting the arms of NATO members against the war), maybe that would have been pause for thought for Ukrainians, and even Zelensky.

Ukraine has no friends in this situation, only war mongerers who want war today. The day war in Ukraine is no longer fit for purpose, the narrative will change overnight to: "oh well".

If you disagree, you believe this war is some moral imperative based on absolute values, then all I hear is a lot of talking and not much fighting in your holy war.

I talk because I owe nothing to Ukraine, sworn no oath and have given no promises, and believe in peace and not war, and peace is achieved by talk. If you believe in war and not peace, then you should do war and not talk.

If you are back to being some impartial observer of things without skin in the game and a horse in the race, then observe there are war mongerers on each side, and for now they are the victors.

Some thoughts as to why an imminent Ukrainian offensive seems unlikely:
- the attrition rate at Bakhmut
- the closing window of opportunity while the Russians are occupied at Bakhmut
- the state of Ukrainian air power and air defense
- the lack of Ukrainian armor
- the Russians having dug in all across the frontline

I'm kind of curious what positives someone who believes in an imminent offensive would look at to think it is feasible. — Tzeentch

The narrative of a Ukrainian offensive is that NATO has trained and armed many brigades and this will be a game changer when they arrive at the front and start their assault.

Of course, that's hypothetically possible but seems highly implausible, mostly for the reasons you mention in addition to potentially electronic warfare and glide bombs being a game changer for Russia.

It's also difficult to come up with some way it's even feasible to not only train and equip an entirely new army, but do it with new systems, less people available, less capabilities (in particular AA systems as you note), degraded civilian infrastructure, and somehow be several factors, maybe an entire order of magnitude, more effective than last summer, which is what would be needed to achieve what last summer's offensive did not ... and against hardened lines and more Russian troops.

The only theory that makes a little bit of sense seems to be:

If you're Ukraine, don't you think that if you hold out long enough, eventually the Russians will just get sick of it all? — RogueAI

Which not only as points out is a theory that didn't work for the Chechens, but there's little reason for the Russians to simply get up and leave if losses were indeed a problem, they'd just stop offensive actions, as Ukraine would have the exact same (likely a lot more) problems in doing their own offensives and have zero advantages in a war that transforms into mostly just artillery firing back and forth (as they have significantly less artillery and other standoff munitions).

And that's if statements like a "estimated 100 000 killed or wounded" are even remotely true or just made up for propaganda purposes as they seem to be. For all we know, the estimate is simply assuming Russian losses are similar to Ukrainian losses and the pentagon knows Ukraine has 100 000 killed and wounded in this time frame, so let's just assume it's the same for the Russians.

However, these sorts of "rules of thumb" can be wildly wrong when there's differences in capabilities. Russians have more artillery and more types of artillery, electronic warfare (i.e. drone advantage), and now deployed glide bombs that Ukraine has no AA capabilities to stop, and so on, and their losses could be nothing like Ukrainian losses.

Not to say that's what this US estimate is based on, but it's an example of how you engineer what you want to hear in a bureaucratic setting. In itself, there's nothing wrong with coming up with an estimate based on some given assumptions, so an analyst given this task can carry it out without lying, then you can declare this estimate exists and just omit the part that there's no reason to believe it's true.

I was not agreeing with your analysis of the circumstances but only observing that Ukraine cannot afford to just wait out the present situation if it is to have a chance of stopping the Russians.

You have been saying that resistance is futile since 2/22. We will see.