For me it is simply not believable that fossils for example or even ancient artefacts ( and my point has been there is no different *problem* with the former than there is with the latter) had no genuine origins of their own but are "projected by present experience". I can see no good reason at all to believe that, because I can see no genuine problem with the notion that they origiinated independently of our experiences.

Okay? I don't care what you believe or what is believable to you.

Awareness does not dependent on being thought about or recalled in memory. Life does not need to think about how it had an experience to have one. And it is most definitely a conscious experience. I don't need to think about how the stove was hot for it to be hot. I just feel that in the moment. Our lives are full of moments of awareness we never think about, experiences which never in our memory. We do not have to think: "I am thinking..." to have a thought. It most certainly a conscious experience. Our analysis has already taken that has given by we are talking about conscious experiences.

To be aware of what we are thinking in any moment is a different experience than that (now former) moment. The "timeless" of experience is defined by how the moment of any experience is not the moment we are thinking about it. It applies to any experience, including experiences when we think about what we are thinking of. Let's say I experience a hot stove. Then I might think about how I experienced a hot stove. Then I might think about how I was thinking about a time when I experience a hot stove just a moment ago. And so and so on. In the moment, even experience is timeless. I don't place any of my experiences in time until I've passed into a different state of experience.

When TGW says people don't get the Schop quote, he is right. It's not merely trying to, as many people think, say that anything is dependent on experience, but rather trying to deal with the distinction of "timeless" of any experience or state of the world (the presence of a tree, for example, says nothing about time) in a world where overstate is placed within time. How can everything of time but "timeless" in this way? How can things be given on their own ("timeless") when all are other things (states of existence) are necessarily given with them (causality, everything connected in time)? That's the supposed paradox.

I can see no good reason at all to believe that, because I can see no genuine problem with the notion that they originated independently of our experiences. — John

They haven't "originally" occurred independent of our experiences at any time though. They are part of causal system all bound-up together. Ancestral events prior to us cannot be given without our experiences.

If we talk about past events, we have left behind discussion of any single moment. No moment has a "beginning." We can't say any moment the world "originated" at a time. We can say that some moment occurred at one time rather than another, but then we have left behind any discussion of a moment. We are talking about time and causality, all events bound-up together in necessary relation: there is no independence.

So should I take this to indicate that you do believe what I have said I find unbelievable, and that you cannot provide any good reasons why I should join you in believing it, or that you simply can' t be bothered providing such reasons?

Awareness does not dependent on being thought about or recalled in memory. And it is most definitely a conscious experience. I don't need to think about how the stove was hot for it to be hot. I just feel that in the moment. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree. I said consciousness does, not awareness. I mean it's a matter of terminology; I prefer to reserve the term 'consciousness' for reflective awareness.

I don't agree that the mere sensing of the heat of the stove is a conscious experience; it is certainly an example of awareness, though, however basic. When you say "I feel it in the moment" you are projecting your conscious awareness of a past experience back into a purported 'moment in which it occurred'. In that sense I agree with TGW that the experience (the basic awareness) is not attended by any experience of 'being in a precise moment'. A sense of having been in a moment of experience, though, may appear reflectively almost immediately after the sensation of the heat though. I believe this reflexiveness can occur prelinguistically; which means it can occur to, not only humans, but to (some) animals as well.

They haven't "originally" occurred independent of our experiences at any time though. They are part of causal system all bound-up together. Ancestral events prior to us cannot be given without our experiences. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I do not see any reason to think that "ancestral" events, just like any other events we do not experience, cannot coherently be said to occur, or to have occurred, independently of our experiences.

All events, and not just ancestral events, cannot be given (to us) without our experiences; that is a mere truism.

This is philosophy, we don't care about random opinions. It's not my job to assume your random opinion as the default and then try to move you out of it. You believe this or that, or can't believe this or that, no one cares. You don't have any reason for believing or any way to defend it.

If you want to claim that some counter- intuitive standpoint is the more plausible and cannot offer any good reason to support your contention then no one will take you seriously; that's what it comes down to. I've presented my reasons for thinking that Meillasoux' argument fails, that the so-called "problem" with ancestrality is a faux problem. I'm happy to be corrected if you're up to the task.This is philosophy, no one cares about your random opinions; put up or shut up.

You are missing that, in that instance, the statue is named. You began by pointing at a statue. The object you were thinking of has been there all along. Similarity, Brassier begins by talking about Saturn. What object someone is pointing at is always, assuming a coherent claim about the world is made, given in talking about some state of the world (statue, Saturn, etc.,etc.). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Hi Willow,

I apologize for the long delay. Brassier's example of people pointing at Saturn, while not knowing what it is, is supposed to problematize the idea that "Saturn's existence -- that it is -- is a function of what it is -- that Saturn [the concept] is indissociable from Saturn..." (Concept and Object, p.62)

It could be argued that for an object (e.g. Saturn) to exist, or not, doesn't depend on our ever having acquired, uncovered, or created the concept under which it falls. This concept (e.g. the concept of a planet) is the referent of some word that expresses our conception of what it is, on my Wiggins/neo-Fregean account. Saturn itself is the referent of its proper name (or of some definite description, or some deictic act of reference such as pointing), and any such act of reference in thought or speech is enabled by our having some grasp of the concept.

What is more difficult to conceive, and this was my main objection, is that there might be anything out there that answers to the description "the object pointed at by people who didn't know what it is". This could be sensibly said if what was meant was "the object pointed at by people who still only had at that time an indistinct conception of what it is". But that can't be what Brassier meant since he wants to divorce the idea of the object's existing by itself from the concept of what it is.

Another way to convey the point of my 'lump-of-bonze / statue' example is that someone who didn't have possessions of any one of those two concepts (or any other relevant concept of a definite sort of material object under which the object pointed at falls) and who nevertheless pointed her finger in direction of the statue (thereby also pointing it in direction of the lump of bronze, and countless other things) would not thereby make *any* deictic act of reference since she wouldn't have any normative standard on the basis of which to determine if any part of the "object" is indeed a part of it (rather than, say, something extraneous accidentally attached to it, or touching it) or under what conditions the object could be said to have been destroyed and/or ceased to exist.

So, the alleged possibility of an act of "pointing" to Saturn by people who don't know what Saturn is at all seems to fall short from showing that Saturn's existence -- that it is -- can be separated from the concept of what it is.

Hi csalisbuty,

Thanks for raising up the problem of ancestrality. I wasn't acquainted with it -- at least not under this guise. I gave it some thought and still need to give it some more. Incidentally, I had likened your 'lol-planet' concept to Goodman's 'grue' concept. Maybe a closer analogue would be Dennett's lost sock center!

I don't think the mere appeal to prehistory suffices, though, which is all these criticisms ever amount to.

The past, if you like, is like a rule of thumb: it's a schema for extending the way something can be manipulated 'backward.' It's projected by experience, not something that was 'really there' as if before it. — The Great Whatever

There can be an appeal to the historical imagination, whether or not one believes one is talking about something that was 'really there'. On Meillassoux's and my historical account, using our historical imaginations, certain events pre-dated the presence of homo sapiens on our local planet. That schema seems fine to me and makes no realist assumptions. If it's not ok, all sorts of archeological, paleontological and similar discourse has to have new caveats placed on every page. That's where I'm defending his right to a point of view, and claiming that this is a disagreement with the Schopenhauer turn of phrase.

What Meillassoux goes on to fret about, as I understand him, is that in a certain scientific schema, we 'know' beyond reasonable doubt - indeed we can 'know absolutely' - that certain events happened in certain time-scales before homo sapiens, via radiocarbon dating, and that because of this, all we think we know about contingency and necessity has to be rethought. For myself, that's where I don't follow him. But if others feel they've understood him better than me, I'd be glad of their tuppenny worth.

In the moment, even experience is timeless. I don't place any of my experiences in time until I've passed into a different state of experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Some of my momentary experiences are plans for future action, and some are memories of past action, each understood to be going to happen, or to have happened, in a certain time-scale. How can one say that such experiences aren't placed in time?

before homo sapiens, via radiocarbon — mcdoodle

I hope you don't mind an inconsequential quibble, but radiocarbon dating relies on carbon-14, which has a rather short half-live (5,730 years), and isn't reliable past 62,000 years. A variety of other isotopes enable radiometric dating all the way back (with ever coarser resolutions) to several billion years in the past.

I've presented my reasons for thinking that Meillasoux' argument fails, that the so-called "problem" with ancestrality is a faux problem. — John

I'm a bit confused John but it may just be because I've misunderstood your stance. You think there *is* some in-itself, no? You think the correlationist is wrong, yes? Because Meillassoux's ancestrality is meant to be a problem for the correlationist. If you're unmoved by correlationist's account then you needn't bother with ancestrality at all. But then you also have no reason to read Meillassoux. He's making an argument *against* the correlationist but (attempting) to do so from within, by granting most of their points. You keep talking as if Meillassoux, with the ancestrality problem, is trying to provide a positive ontological thesis which you disagree with. But the point is rather to make the correlationist a little uneasy about the sophisticated account they reflexively roll out. If youre not moved by - or acquainted with - that account, then there's not even a faux-problem for you to find - there's just confusing shadowboxing.

That you appear to be arguing the failure of the ancestrality thought experiment against TGW makes things even more muddled. He doesn't think it works either.

If you (1) find the correlationist's account to be hopelessly confused and (2) think that M's argument 'fails' then my question to you is: fails to do what?

I'll explicitly explain why I think schop's account is problematic later this evening. I want to do so carefully and precisely. As I hope I've demonstrated, I "get" the paradox of trying to think an "in-itself" outside of experience.

What Meillassoux goes on to fret about, as I understand him, is that in a certain scientific schema, we 'know' beyond reasonable doubt - indeed we can 'know absolutely' - that certain events happened in certain time-scales before homo sapiens, via radiocarbon dating, and that because of this, all we think we know about contingency and necessity has to be rethought. For myself, that's where I don't follow him. — mcdoodle

The ancestrality problem has no direct bearing on M's discussion of necessity and contingency. Ancestrality is only a relatively short portion of the book. Its meant to be a visceral shock to the correlationist view which segues into a close consideration of correlationism's inner logic (which logic M endorses, but believes that, if considered closely, implies a dissolution of the correlationist circle). Thats where necessity and contingency come in. In fact, the central argument book could function without ancestrality altogether really.

I hope you don't mind an inconsequential quibble, but radiocarbon dating relies on carbon-14, which has a rather short half-live (5,730 years), and isn't reliable past 62,000 years. A variety of other isotopes enable radiometric dating all the way back (with ever coarser resolutions) to several billion years in the past. — Pierre-Normand

Quibble accepted :)

I can see where it might seem confusing. What I take issue with is that if I was one that if I accepted the notion that unexperienced objects in general are a problem for the realist ( which I don't) then I would not see any reason to think that "ancestral objects" should present any extra difficulty for the realist or for the correlationist than the rest of the objects that are not experienced. That is all I have been wanting to discover; why Meillasoux thinks that ancestral objects could present any extra, or significantly different problem, one way or the other, to any position. The whole idea just seems to me to be a red herring.

My understanding of TGW's position, such as it is, is that he does think the notion of unexperienced objects is incoherent and is thus a problem for realists. On that account he probably doesn't think that ancestrality is an extra problem. I haven't been disagreeing with him on the basis that I think he accepts ancestrality at all.

My challenge to him was to provide an actual argument as to why we should think that ancestral objects, or for that matter any objects which are said to have originated in the past, (which really applies to every object that is not present that you can presently think about) actually had no real existence in the past at all, that the only existence they had is an existence projected back by us from present experience.

Idk. I've done my best to show why unexperienced objects *are* a problem and you responded with a stew of 'Wittgensteinian silence' & 'i guess its a matter of taste'. If thats where we're at I don't see much point in laboriously explaining a sophisticated way of dealing with unexperienced objects constructed by those who aren't willing to prudently turn away from such paradoxes; and to do all that just to then show you how to undermine that very account. It seems like a waste of time. You've pinpointed why the correlationist is wrong from the outset (we know very well the difference between in-itself and for-itself, just look at how we talk), so you've no real need to wander down the maze they've built around their initial, mistaken, insight. After Finitude simply wasn't written for you.

I think, provided what you've said so far, the best way for you to approach After Finitude is like so: 'Some people are silly enough to think that the very idea of the in-itself is fundamentally compromised. They went through a lot of trouble to do away with that idea by finding new ways to talk about things like e.g. scientific discourse There exists a writer silly enough to take these people and their ideas seriously enough to argue against them on their own terms. This kind of thing is not worth my limited time. There are other, actually lucid philosophers to read.'

That's all fine csalisbury, I am very familiar with all the common arguments as to why the very idea of 'unexperienced objects' constitutes a problem. I understand that there is a divided philosophical landscape over this issue, and many of the divisions are complex; I acknowledge that, and I also acknowledge that the answer is not be found in any simplistic return to naive realism or naive idealism or naive anti-realism.

The fact that there is such a divided landscape with obviously highly intelligent protagonists and very sophisticated arguments on both sides convinces me that there is no demonstrable 'fact of the matter' as to whether unexperienced objects *really are* a problem (not to mention the unexperienced ancestrality of objects :P), and that's why I think of it as a matter of taste. I am certainly not recommending that debate or inquiry should be curtailed, though; no doubt there are still some more interesting things to be said about the issue.

I was just concerned that I might be missing something about a very specific point, but if there is nothing to miss there, then my concerns are laid to rest.

Sorry tgw some unexpected life events swallowed all my time
I'll post soon as I can.
And sorry@John those same life events were stressing me out big time and mad me a little testy. I think youre a good poster and I apologize for being a dick.

Hey no problem csalisbury I never thought you were being a dick. We all get testy at times...and understandably so since life's no fucking picnic! ;)