Belarus' Lukashenko asks for Russian security guarantees
^{— DW et al · Apr 10, 2023}

Because everyone is just standing in line to attack Belarus. :D
What's the play here?


Column: Putin’s war on Ukraine is in the sinister tradition of the Russian war machine
^{— Jonah Goldberg · Los Angeles Times · Apr 11, 2023}

Because everyone is just standing in line to attack Belarus. :D
What's the play here? — jorndoe

Most of what politicians say is for their domestic audience.

Belarus has been supporting Russia, so naturally the question arises of what Russia will do for Belarus.

Even if Lukashenko is a dictator, he still has to worry about PR and if he gets formal security commitments from Russia it makes him look like a more competent statesman (which is the image he wants).

And Russia's troops are already there, it looks good to have allies for the Russian audience, and signing these sorts of papers cost nothing, so it's an easy PR win. Maybe not so significant in the grand scheme of things, but at least easy.

No one was standing in line to invade Finland either and Finland is not about to open up a second front with Russia to help Ukraine, but Finland joining NATO played well with domestic audiences in the West.

Of course, one can argue in both cases that who knows what will happen in the future, but that's not what actually drives these sorts of processes. If long term thinking was relevant, we wouldn't have things like climate change.

To continue my military analysis, which, to remind everyone, so far been pretty accurate: such as

1. Predicting Ukraine would not be able to compete on the battlefield without armour (the whole javelins and other shoulder launch missile will defeat euphoria was has proven to be completely delusional for the reasons I expounded on),

2. That Russian morale would not just randomly collapse leading to being routed out of Ukraine, based on the idea Russians have internalised Western beliefs and feelings about the war (why would they?)

3. Most importantly, Western policy is to drip feed weapons into Ukraine enough to prop up the Ukrainian military but remotely not enough to threaten Russian defeat in Ukraine, much less on Russian soil.

4. The Russian military and high command is not incompetent and will just randomly lose due to bad decision making.

5. Ukraine does not have the force capabilities to cut the land bridge (which is the critical strategic step, and offences elsewhere, such as Kherson and Kharkiv, only mattered if they led to cutting the land bridge, which they didn't). And the reason to predict Ukraine doesn't have the force capabilities is the simple symmetry between Russian and Ukrainian problems on the battlefield ... just a lot worse because Ukraine lacks entirely whole categories of capabilities. I.e. the only reasonable prediction would be that Ukrainian offences result in the exact same stall as Russian offensives did.

As well as other predictions such as sanctions wouldn't collapse the Russian economy (even islands can withstand far worse sanctions).

All predictions vehemently argued against by US policy proponents, on this forum and elsewhere, to justify the US policy position at various times. For, at the start of the war, no one wanted to escalate into a full scale war we have now where tanks and planes and so on need to be poured into Ukraine, so it was essential to believe that Javelins and other man portable arms (and the "pluckiness" @Isaac definitely found the right word for) could somehow defeat Russia in military terms ... and since that wasn't really believable that it doesn't matter because sanctions will collapse the Russian government, and if that didn't happen then morale will be so low of these Russian soldiers doing something the West disapproves of and is wagging their fingers about that they'll just give-up on mass.

All entirely delusional beliefs at the time, and it's good to remind ourselves of why they were necessary: negotiated peace was the only rational option for flesh and blood Ukrainians (not some heroic mythological amorphous mass of willpower, without any distinguishing personalities having any worth or consideration, ready and willing to sacrifice themselves for a Western WWII nostalgic trip down heroes lane), and Russias offer of giving up claim to Crimea and independent Donbas was obviously far, far better option that a long and total war in Ukraine. No one really disputed that, which is why the only way to make the policy rational was with the idea victory would be easy.

Now that a diplomatic resolution is no longer even an idea (which people should remember that it was at the start of the war and for months, even the most ardent pro-US talking heads would discuss the idea of a negotiated resolution and the different talks that happened at various points), we are in the classic scenario (since a while) of the costs being so high for each side that neither can compromise.

A entire year after supplying tanks would have made a major difference (at the start of the war obviously) the West has finally supplied some tanks. My prediction on this is too little too late. If hundreds of Western tanks, with well tankers having trained in the West since the start of the war, joined the Ukrainian offensives last the summer, maybe that would have been a big difference, actually cut the land bridge for example.

Tanks supplied now, at best, will maintain Ukrainian lines (in the sense of keeping the slow pace of defeat, hopefully to a crawl). Certainly, far from irrelevant, but 100% inline with drip feed theory: prop up the Ukrainian military so they don't lose outright but don't supply or do anything that may actually seriously threaten the Russians.

In other words, Western tanks at best are keeping Ukrainian force capability from attritting further, but there's zero reason to believe such equipment now actually increases Ukrainian strength compared to last summer. At best, I would argue, Ukrainians have a similar force than they had last summer ... and I would argue this at-best scenario is unlikely and what is likely is the attrition is starting to have an impact (not only in terms of casualties, equipment and ammunition, but there's starting to be reports of Ukrainian drone operators saying Russians are starting to perfect their anti-drone processes).

Compare this to the Russian side of having called up hundreds of thousands of troops that were not in theatre last year, build out significant defensive structures along the entire line in multiple layers, that weren't there last year, and all the learning of capabilities (that the Ukrainians don't have at all) such as anti-drone electronic and other capabilities, their standoff strike capabilities (ballistic and cruise missiles and glide bombs) as well as artillery tactics.

I.e. in terms of learning there is only even potential parity in capabilities Ukraine also has in similar quantity, such as infantry, but in capabilities Ukraine basically lacks entirely they do no learning at all and in areas where they have far less quantity (or then running out of ammunition) the learning they have done is not as significant.

Which is why the "Russians are incompetent" theory was so essential, as even if Russian capabilities weren't optimally deployed at the start of the war (which for sure was not optimal, which is a difficult standard to achieve, though obviously by now neither incompetently deployed), the more the war continues the more Russians would learn to deploy those capabilities effectively. People had this idea that if Russians fell into an Javelin based ambush or something similar once ... they would just continue to do that forever.

What we have seen instead of not-learning-from-damage, again entirely predictably, is the Russians learning from damage (whether they are "mistakes" given the context and information at the time or just the nature of fighting a war that sometimes your enemy wins here and there, doesn't matter in terms of learning to avoid damage in the future), such as consolidating their lines rather than expose weak points to being overrun by surprise attack or then special forces penetration of sparsely defended areas etc., moving to standoff strikes rather than expose planes and helicopters to shoulder fired missiles and other AA systems, and basically just attritting the Ukrainians with a massive artillery advantage.

Currently the direction isn't good with the slow fall of Bahkmut and from my interpretation of the West's actions is scrambling to try to at least arrest Russian advances, that an actual stalemate is the best case scenario for NATO (that the Western media keeps on repeating it's already a stalemate because this is Western policy, to just have a stalemate); however, what's currently happening is not a stalemate and it's anyone's guess how long Ukraine can maintain slowly losing before a complete collapse of command structure.

The world has never had a long war of this kind (WWI and WWII are really totally different situations, and there are few parallels with any of the post-WWII US wars or even Chechnya, which is arguably closest) so I would argue there are no historical parallels to base on in terms of evaluating military end-points. Frozen conflict is what happened in places like Korea, but the Korean war was a very different political and military scenario and totally different terrain.

However, generally speaking, when a small proxy force is propped up to fight a larger force, the larger force either leaves, the proxy force loses, or there's a negotiated peace (favouring the larger force). There are few, if any, examples of the proxy force simply winning in direct military terms, and in the case of the larger force leaving (Soviets in Afghanistan or US in Vietnam ... or US in Afghanistan) usually terrain and logistics favour guerrilla and insurgency tactics and the value of the land to the larger power is relatively low, quickly becoming a pride thing rather than making any military sense to continue fighting, none of which is the case in Ukraine.

That made me laugh.

It seems it will have little impact on the war maybe now Russians have confidence and confirmation to retreat.

They won’t though.

Putin if he doesn’t feel the noose tightening round his neck will at least change it for a looser fitting noose for now.

A naive (and very sketchy) outline for peace plan

1) Ceasefire
2) Russian military leaves all contested territories - to be replaced by UN Supervised International force
3) UN supervised elections within some period of time - let's say 5 years - inhabitants can choose whether they want to be part of Ukraine or part of Russia (maybe offer option of being independent)

Yes, yes - a million and one details to be worked out. Who will administer the contested territories, is there any hope of reparations, etc, etc, etc.

Of course this is currently unacceptable to both sides.

Have at it.

Most importantly, Western policy is to drip feed weapons into Ukraine enough to prop up the Ukrainian military but remotely not enough to threaten Russian defeat in Ukraine, much less on Russian soil. — boethius

This is something I have to degree with. The objective seems to prevent Russia from gaining an all out victory, but Ukraine not having the ability to defeat the Russians. And likely after this year, it will be far harder for Ukraine to succeed as Russia will likely get it's wartime manufacturing running.

This war is simply a conventional war and the Western military industry isn't geared up or willing to commit to a war. It's been optimized to fight basically "colonial wars" with very costly weapon systems with low production quantities. Not to increase production on a huge scale. The only huge commitments we have seen are investments in the energy sector to replace the Russian exports. There actually for example Germany could act rather quickly.

For, at the start of the war, no one wanted to escalate into a full scale war we have now where tanks and planes and so on need to be poured into Ukraine, so it was essential to believe that Javelins and other man portable arms (and the "pluckiness" Isaac definitely found the right word for) could somehow defeat Russia in military terms ... — boethius

Actually, nobody in the West believed that Ukraine could defend itself as well it has. Likely outcome that was seen was that Ukraine has to fight with insurgency, hence that it's not capable of stopping Russian attacks towards the capital.

There are few, if any, examples of the proxy force simply winning in direct military terms, and in the case of the larger force leaving (Soviets in Afghanistan or US in Vietnam ... or US in Afghanistan) usually terrain and logistics favour guerrilla and insurgency tactics and the value of the land to the larger power is relatively low, quickly becoming a pride thing rather than making any military sense to continue fighting, none of which is the case in Ukraine. — boethius

The fact is that Soviet Union lost the Afghan war, just as the US lost Vietnam and Afghanistan. That they withdrew (with Soviet Union in a less humiliating way than the US from Afghanistan) doesn't change the reality. Neither Moscow or Washington DC were in peril.

If you would consider the Arab-Israeli conflict also a proxy war, there's the example of winning in direct military terms. But then both sides could be argued as being proxies.

What do you think is the biggest barrier to such a solution that we (the Western electorate) could actually do anything about?

In other words, if you wanted to bring about your preferred solution, what would personally do to help (whom would you petition, what political or social action would you take)?

Or do you consider the electorate just as helpless pawns who can do more than watch as the powers play it all out?

It seems it will have little impact on the war maybe now Russians have confidence and confirmation to retreat. — invicta

The summary from the BBC is possibly the dumbest true statements I have ever read in my entire life.

It seems it will have little impact on the war maybe now Russians have confidence and confirmation to retreat. — invicta

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Putin if he doesn’t feel the noose tightening round his neck will at least change it for a looser fitting noose for now. — invicta

Think about where this sentiment comes from, because there is zero evidence Putin is under any domestic pressure or then oligarch pressure at all. Since the start of the war, Putin's popularity has increased, and pretty much all his notable critics within Russia are criticise him for not winning the war hard enough, not mobilising soon and big enough, not using nuclear weapons already etc.

Throughout this whole conflict Western media has developed a representation of the average Russian as some sort of mythological reflection of our own feelings about the war, basically to the point of assuming Russians think Russia is the enemy because we think Russia is the enemy. This is really far from any reality we have any evidence for.

Putin would be in danger if there was some total collapse of the Russian military in Ukraine. This was maybe-sort-of-possible had the West organised some sort of heavy weapons surprise (and a lot more heavy weapons than they have given even up to now) in Ukraine (also taking advantage of the initial impact of sanctions pressure / disruption to society) last year, but the weapons drip feed policy ensured there was zero chance of that, because that's not the goal.

This is something I have to degree with. The objective seems to prevent Russia from gaining an all out victory, but Ukraine not having the ability to defeat the Russians. — ssu

Yes we agree on this point.

I think in basic military terms it's certainly possible, as even if lines collapse in Donbas, Ukraine has lot's of fall back positions including a giant river.

Russia would need another go at Kiev for a chance at all out victory, which certainly doesn't feel likely but who knows.

The only problem with this theory is exactly what you mention next:

And likely after this year, it will be far harder for Ukraine to succeed as Russia will likely get it's wartime manufacturing running.

This war is simply a conventional war and the Western military industry isn't geared up or willing to commit to a war. It's been optimized to fight basically "colonial wars" with very costly weapon systems with low production quantities. Not to increase production on a huge scale. The only huge commitments we have seen are investments in the energy sector to replace the Russian exports. There actually for example Germany could act rather quickly. — ssu

While it seems clear the goal is to prop up Ukraine and never negotiate, the commitment to that long term seems low, as ramping up production of munitions doesn't happen and sooner the better and simply maintaining the status quo on the front requires constant supply of munitions.

There's report now of batteries simply running out of shells and having no resupply for days, and very little when it comes in. One counter narrative is the shells are being saved for the big counter offensive, which I guess is possible but is still not a good position to be in.

It seems to just be taken for granted by Western powers that they can't produce all that many shells.

This whole running low of ammunition is honestly a confusing part of the situation. It doesn't seem possible as an oversight, and that it's industrially impossible for the entire West to produce more shells seems implausible, and if it's a deliberate decision then it's difficult to make sense of. If it's policy, then my best guess is that it was calculated that Ukraine simply cannot sustain their operation beyond a certain date (in terms of casualties and all sorts of other supplies such as AA missiles) and there was therefore no use in increasing production of shells. Or then maybe it's all a ruse.

The fact is that Soviet Union lost the Afghan war, just as the US lost Vietnam and Afghanistan. That they withdrew (with Soviet Union in a less humiliating way than the US from Afghanistan) doesn't change the reality. Neither Moscow or Washington DC were in peril. — ssu

Yes, I agree these are not good parallels for the reasons you state. Empires withdraw when their reasons for the invasion in the first place was expecting an easy time and picking low-hanging fruit, but even then can easily be literally decades later.

The biggest long conventional war was the Iraq-Iran war, but neither side was significantly more powerful than the other.

If you would consider the Arab-Israeli conflict also a proxy war, there's the example of winning in direct military terms. But then both sides could be argued as being proxies. — ssu

I think what's more dissimilar as a parallel is that the Arab countries were not large industrial nations and entered into a trench-attrition phase of warfare. Maybe it is a somewhat a parallel of the first phase of the Ukraine war, in stopping the encirclement of Kiev, that a smaller force can put up a fierce defence.

In addition to there being no close parallel, there's also the drones and missiles. The Western media seems to assume that it's essentially WWI style stalemate, because there are trenches, but I'm not sure that's a good assumption is my basic point with this reflection. It could be, but I also think it's also entirely plausible that Ukraine reaches a point of exhaustion and things start to unravel quickly; the main argument for this would be that Russia works out effective use of all it's capabilities and Ukrainians simply can't deal with it at some point. It is the learning curves on different capabilities that may simply arrive at some overwhelming synergy; especially if Ukraine also runs out / low on shells and AA missiles.

I’d be curious to know what the effects on Russia overall are focusing on what is becoming the raison d’etre for Russia @boethius

A country whose sole focus of resource is war at the expense of everything else alienates other reasons such as commerce which now isolated from most western partners gives them a huge disadvantage which ultimately affects war strategy if winning territory is their end goal.

If Russia entered this war purely for the egotistic fantasy of reuniting the former soviet bloc then that kinda of error can prove fatal to future leaders who wish to maintain such a status quo.

Ukraine as we know is not as oil/gas rich as to be of strategic value in this sense but the reasons for the war was the imminent perceived threat of NATO expansion in that area right or wrong.

If NATO membership ends this war here and now it’s worth consideration although that raises questions of the ceded territories such as crimea.

In brief:

Pro-Russia, Pro-Ukraine Invasion Propaganda Channel Run by Former U.S. Navy NCO
^{— Tony Spitz · Veuer · Apr 17, 2023 · 1m:18s}

It was one of Sarah Bils' (aka "Donbass Devushka") social media accounts that disseminated the classified documents leaked by Jack Teixeira. Insider reported that the documents posted by Bils were doctored versions of the ones initially posted on Discord.

Here's a different story than those often posted here. It's a bit old, but does have a kind of internal narrative coherence:

What really happened in Ukraine
^{— Niclas Fogwall · Sep 2015}

Coincidentally, some of the numbers have been posted in the thread. Anyway, there are some patterns here. One of the photos can be found here as well.

In retrospect, how did Fogwall's story fare?

Less straightforward:

The Putin Myth
^{— Kathryn Stoner · Journal of Democracy · Apr 2023}

I think in basic military terms it's certainly possible, as even if lines collapse in Donbas, Ukraine has lot's of fall back positions including a giant river. — boethius

One possible outcome is that the border will be at the Dniepr river. This basically would mean a Russian victory as then they have obtained from this a secure landbridge to Crimea. This also would be quite devastating for Ukraine: there would be the possibility that the war could erupt again, hence nobody would invest in the country afterwards.

Russia would need another go at Kiev for a chance at all out victory, which certainly doesn't feel likely but who knows. — boethius

At least what is certain that they wouldn't try it as they did last year.

If it's policy, then my best guess is that it was calculated that Ukraine simply cannot sustain their operation beyond a certain date (in terms of casualties and all sorts of other supplies such as AA missiles) and there was therefore no use in increasing production of shells. — boethius

Lack of equipment or ammo means just one thing: no large operations, but the WW1 trench stalemate continues.

This has been evident from the fact that the Russian push has basically been centered around Bakhmut. It's actually resembling more the Iran-Iraq war in the case that there also both countries didn't have the ability for large scale maneuver warfare all the time. The last time we saw similar maneuver warfare was in the Gulf War, but then the US (and it's allies) just had all the stuff and the manpower built up for the Cold War still at hand to use.

This whole running low of ammunition is honestly a confusing part of the situation. It doesn't seem possible as an oversight, and that it's industrially impossible for the entire West to produce more shells seems implausible, and if it's a deliberate decision then it's difficult to make sense of. — boethius

The military-industrial complex has adapted to World where the focus has been fighting terrorists or dirt poor insurgents in the mountains and making very expensive, limited production weapon systems and materiel. These intended for quick limited wars. Nobody has had the idea of building up huge stockpiles of ammo for a long, big conventional war. And once when you have downsized, it's not easy increase production, especially when your country isn't at war. Best example of this is Germany: the Bundeschancellor promised huge increases in military spending, but the German military industrial complex, even if it does make nice high end products, simply cannot change instantly.

Nice read. An analysis that is both rational and not corrupted by the typical cartoon narratives that immerse all our collective sources of information.

But why stop short of following your own rational arguments to their logical conclusion?

Not only was this war against Russia never ever winnable but...

The only conceivable path to some kind of victory for the USA was a vague hope that the combination of kinetic war and economic sanctions might cause a coup in Moscow and a coup that by chance was compliant to western demands.

This theoretical possibility was always a reckless gamble. And yet, this calculus was the singular rational idea underpinning the western strategy in this war. But by May/June of 2022 it was clear that there was not going to be any coup that might favour western interests. The Russian public was not only not in revolt but had displayed a distinctly anti-western fervour - so that even if a coup did occur it would likely be something hardline and more militaristic.

Thus, for the US/NATO to persist with this post-June of 2022 reveals something fundamentally dysfunctional had infected the western political class and its populace:

A ten-year-old understands that it makes no sense to continue with Economic and Financial sanctions against a country that has less than 2% of the world's population but over 20% of the world's commodities. A twelve-year-old could tell you that 1.5 billion people must be relying on those commodities and that the demand for those commodities are not satiated because of a press release in Brussels. A fourteen-year-old might plot out how this would cause inflation everywhere - except in Russia.

Yet this is sadly only a tip of the iceberg. There is really no end to the incompetence and miscalculations. It is evident that the US and EU combined did not anticipate that they could be overwhelmed by Russian Military Production Capacity. We've sent to the Ukraine 16 different varieties of tanks, artillery, etcetera all requiring as many different types ammunition and spare parts. A sixteen-year-old is likely to understand why this is a recipe for disaster.

Fortunately we have not been demoralised by any of these setbacks, US/NATO leadership is champing to expand the war. It figures, If you are going to lose a war and lose your empire you don't want to lose to a mid-range power, you want to give the rightful challenger the opportunity. If you lose a war against China, who possess more industrial capacity than the EU and USA combined, the leading trade powerhouse in the world - well then - that would be at least an honourable loss.

Now whether the war does expand to China or whether it remains contained in the Ukraine and Russia is really academic. If the NEO-CON dream came true and somehow the Ukraine military did actually threaten to defeat Russia does anyone doubt China would be sending military aid to Russia. And if that occurred, the entire Western World placed on a total war footing could not conceivably compete with the production levels required.

If you can handle it, take a cursory visit to anyone of the many telegram channels covering this war in the Ukraine, then imagine how anyone could believe that the privileged western world has the stomach for this kind of fight. Aside from an excess of reserve commodities, the one thing the Russians excel at, throughout their history, is the level of suffering they will endure.

What this all amounts to is that the US empire and some 500 years of Euro hegemony is history. A new multipolar world has arrived. China, India and Eurasia are again assuming a status reflective of its size, and rightful historical importance in the world. The advantages gifted to the early adopters of mass industrialisation have all but evaporated.

Understandably, the US empire and its vassal states - the beneficiaries of those advantages - are not prepared to quietly relinquish the privileges they have acquired. The increasing levels of nonsense that we are experiencing in the world: the war in Ukraine, the rolling Financial Crisis, Assange, Snowden, the emergence of Trump, Brexit, Biden, PC, Identity polltics, Black lives mater, cancel culture, refugee crisis, the transgender trope, the War on Terror trope, Climate Change hysteria and even Covid - all of this is a direct manifestations of refusing to accept this fundamental power re-alignment.

Those on top of the food chain - whether that's the MIC, or what ever the deep-state is, our political class or our billionaires - they naturally don't want to accept a multi-polar world where the power they now enjoy is certain to diminish or possibly worse. So they continue to invent and create any and every chaos that might serve to distract and preserve their current status.

At some point, we will collectively accept reality, wake up and wonder WTF we were thinking. Or the prevailing irrationality, the troll storm we currently enjoy will escalate and the current simulation climaxes in a glorious symphony of mushroom clouds.

While it seems clear the goal is to prop up Ukraine and never negotiate, the commitment to that long term seems low, as ramping up production of munitions doesn't happen and sooner the better and simply maintaining the status quo on the front requires constant supply of munitions.

There's report now of batteries simply running out of shells and having no resupply for days, and very little when it comes in. One counter narrative is the shells are being saved for the big counter offensive, which I guess is possible but is still not a good position to be in.

It seems to just be taken for granted by Western powers that they can't produce all that many shells.

This whole running low of ammunition is honestly a confusing part of the situation. It doesn't seem possible as an oversight, and that it's industrially impossible for the entire West to produce more shells seems implausible, and if it's a deliberate decision then it's difficult to make sense of. If it's policy, then my best guess is that it was calculated that Ukraine simply cannot sustain their operation beyond a certain date (in terms of casualties and all sorts of other supplies such as AA missiles) and there was therefore no use in increasing production of shells. Or then maybe it's all a ruse. — boethius

My guess is that the situation is a lot more dire than western sources are letting on, and that even copious amounts of ammunition would not make any significant difference on the battlefield.

A lot of folks seem to believe the Ukrainian forces have "ground the Russians to a halt", but I think that's wrong.

I think the Russians have for the most part stopped pushing for territory, and are now consolidating what they have taken.

This was likely their plan from the start, since the threat of a Ukrainian insurgency was ever-present, and taking too much territory that they couldn't effectively control and pacify would be a guarantee for such an insurgency to materialize. A while back I shared a CSIS panel discussion in which the panelists outright stated that is what they (the Americans) could and would do. The person from the panel who claimed this apparently played a major role in the American-led insurgency against the Russians in Afghanistan.

When/if the Russians will at some point in the future seek to take more territory from Ukraine probably depends on multiple factors, the most important of which is whether the West can be made to acknowledge Russian security concerns vis-à-vis Ukraine.

If the West refuses, either because the US strongarms the EU, or because the EU remains ignorant, likely more Russian aggression will follow. Though even then it remains to be seen whether their aim is to take all of Ukraine, or only those areas which are strategically relevant - it's even possible that what they hold now is all they intend to take.

Note that the US doesn't care about instability in Eastern Europe - it in fact believes it to be instrumental to their goals among which are unity and remilitarization of Europe. Ironically, Europe seems to be the key to peace.

My guess is that the situation is a lot more dire than western sources are letting on, and that even copious amounts of ammunition would not make any significant difference on the battlefield.

A lot of folks seem to believe the Ukrainian forces have "ground the Russians to a halt", but I think that's wrong. — Tzeentch

I agree. The narrative has moved from "Ukraine is winning" to "stalemate" as a transition to "Ukraine is losing".

However, even if copious amounts of ammunition now won't make that much of a difference, ammunition production has long lead times, so you would have had to have worked out this point in the war at the start of the war in order to decide not to ramp up ammunition production because it doesn't matter. The decision was made over a year ago, not today. And there's basically no military scenario where less ammunition is as good or better than more ammunition.

So credit to pentagon analysts who worked out Ukrainian sustainment is simply impossible beyond a certain point and so just no reason to produce more ammunition.

However, this contradicts the apparent policy to prop up Ukraine as long as possible without ever negotiating. Indeed, even if you did plan to negotiate you'd want more ammunition to increase your leverage, both in terms of terrain held at the ceasefire as well as the credible potential to be able to keep fighting. "We've run out of ammunition so now we want to negotiate," is not a good negotiation position.

So, there's no obvious answer to this "run low on ammunition policy", but certainly it was thought out, not some accident, at least by Pentagon top brass who obviously understand things like "rounds down range" is important to keep doing insofar as the war continues.

I've thought of a few possibilities, however:

1. It's part of the drip feed arms calibration to send equipment but then kneecap ammunition. If you don't want the Ukrainians to have any chance at all of defeating the Russians in Ukraine you control the ammunition they have and ensure they simply never have enough ammunition to sustain an offensive all the way to the Azov sea to cut off Crimea (which, to remind everyone, Russia would likely result to nuclear weapons if that were to occur; at the least, pentagon planners would make their decision based on that assumption). In return for this favour, perhaps Russia keeps an apparent stalemate that looks nice in the Western news (for example not open up another front on the rest of the thousand kilometres of border, which is all technically "the front"). Evidence for this is that obviously the policy is to drip feed arms, so the answer to "why not more ammunition?" may simply be the same as "why not tanks and fighter jets from day one?"

2. The decision to continue fighting is purely political for short term PR reasons and makes no military sense, pentagon top brass are simply undermining the White house's policy, by "forgetting" to produce more ammunition. The white house is full of myopic idiots led by someone with Alzheimer's, focused on the news cycle who don't understand anything about war fighting so we'll just go ahead and bake in a Ukrainian defeat from the get-go, ensure they can't do something too stupid by taking away the means. Evidence for this would be pentagon top brass literally stating Ukraine achieved all it could reasonably achieve militarily and it would be good to negotiate.

The pentagon does just do its own thing every once in a while, like the time it had its jihadist equipped and trained forces fight the CIA's jihadist equipped and trained forces in Syria.

3. Every war planning scenario in which Russia does not collapse internally results in Ukraine simply being unable to sustain the war effort under attrition conditions, and for "reasons" playing this out is a better option than negotiation. For example, it may simply have been a bet on Russian internal collapse, and if that doesn't happen then unfortunately it's just going to be tough watching the Ukrainian military get totally destroyed and Ukrainian society fall apart. However, I very much doubt pentagon war planners actually want to bet on Russian internal collapse, and managing the ammunition is a war planners thing. So this sort of turns into scenario 2 in that maybe the white house was willing to bet Ukraine on an internal Russian collapse, but the pentagon didn't really support this strategy whole heartedly.

4. Shit happens. Nothing is ever organised 100% efficiently. Can't exclude this option entirely when it comes to military affairs. The argument against this is just that "how much ammunition do we need if the war goes to X date" is a pretty simple calculation to make. It's difficult to believe it's just an oversight, and given the lead times required if you calculate you'll need to produce more of anything at all in a war you want to get that capacity online as soon as possible so it's there when you need it.

This was likely their plan from the start, since the threat of a Ukrainian insurgency was ever-present, and taking too much territory that they couldn't effectively control and pacify would be a guarantee for such an insurgency to materialize. — Tzeentch

I agree that there was never a plan to occupy more territory than the Russian speaking regions they currently have, but I'd also agree with @ssu that plan A was a negotiated resolution with Kiev. The purpose of encircling Kiev to bring the war to the capital and put the diplomatic pressure for a negotiation, and if not, then it occupies the large majority of Ukrainian forces (i.e. is also a giant fixing operation, as the capital is always the priority) while the Southern regions are occupied and pacified.

If the West refuses, either because the US strongarms the EU, or because the EU remains ignorant, likely more Russian aggression will follow. Though even then it remains to be seen whether their aim is to take all of Ukraine, or only those areas which are strategically relevant - it's even possible that what they hold now is all they intend to take. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

Note that the US doesn't care about instability in Eastern Europe - it in fact believes it to be instrumental to their goals among which are unity and remilitarization of Europe. Ironically, Europe seems to be the key to peace. — Tzeentch

Also agreed, but the only problem in this logic is that if the goal is to prop-up Ukraine indefinitely you wouldn't plan on running into a ammunition problem. So could also just be that there's not really a clear overall plan. The support to Ukraine is delivered primarily through NATO, so maybe the US can't just show up and declare their purpose of keeping Eastern Europe unstable indefinitely; so lot's of different plans and ideas happen simultaneously, which, in the end, keep planning incoherent and things unstable.

However, this contradicts the apparent policy to prop up Ukraine as long as possible without ever negotiating. — boethius

Well, the people in the Pentagon aren't dummies either. My guess is by now they have fully realized Russia's plans to take it as slowly as it needs to in order to avoid an insurgency. Perhaps the Pentagon even understood this before the war fully got underway. If we can conceive of these ideas, so can they.

If they knew Russia was going for a 'bite-sized chunks' approach, then they don't have to do much in order for Ukraine to hold out for a long time, since it's already baked into the Russian strategy. I imagine the pacification of the occupied areas may take months, perhaps even years.

Additionally, for all we know the Russians may not desire any more land beyond what they have occupied now, at which point any further support for Ukraine would be pointless.


So I think the view I've shared fits very neatly into this picture of the Pentagon not seemingly overly fussed about supporting Ukraine, even in terms of bare necessities like ammunition.

The western strategy so far seems more preoccupied with public opinion and appearances than it is with the actual situation on the battlefield.

I agree that there was never a plan to occupy more territory than the Russian speaking regions they currently have, but I'd also agree with ssu that plan A was a negotiated resolution with Kiev. The purpose of encircling Kiev to bring the war to the capital and put the diplomatic pressure for a negotiation, and if not, then it occupies the large majority of Ukrainian forces (i.e. is also a giant fixing operation, as the capital is always the priority) while the Southern regions are occupied and pacified. — boethius

I don't want to toot my own horn, but the advance on Kiev having been a dual-purpose operation is a theory I've been sharing here for close to a year now. (And I still believe it is true, so we're in agreement there).

I'm glad more people are starting to see it that way, since initially it was met with a lot of skepticism.

It was game over as soon as Russia was in a position to annex the contested territories because NATO won't go to war against Russia for Ukraine, which would be the only conceivable way to reclaim them. It's not a movie. The bad guys win sometimes. The challenge now is for the West to engineer a situation where this doesn't look like an abject loss. I stick to my idea that a reduced Ukraine gaining NATO membership is this compromise. Russia gets its land bridge and NATO gets to fully hem it in. Ukraine gets to sacrifice just its arms and its legs rather than its head too. Sad, but...

Well, the people in the Pentagon aren't dummies either. My guess is by now they have fully realized Russia's plans to take it as slowly as it needs to in order to avoid an insurgency. Perhaps the Pentagon even understood this before the war fully got underway. If we can conceive of these ideas, so can they. — Tzeentch

Yes, maybe we're overthinking their overthinking, but ammunition is just so basic to war fighting that it's difficult to believe it's just been overlooked.

If they knew Russia was going for a 'bite-sized chunks' approach, then they don't have to do much in order for Ukraine to hold out for a long time, since it's already baked into the Russian strategy. I imagine the pacification of the occupied areas may take months, perhaps even years. — Tzeentch

In military terms I completely agree, but running out of ammunition has the political risk of collapse of the Zelensky regime with someone willing to negotiate with Russia.

So, maybe if that happens it's fine, just one way to exit, throw Zelensky under the bus, blame the Ukrainians for not being "plucky" enough to pull a victory out of a hat in dire circumstances.

Likewise, if the only meaningful policy priority was simply to separate Europe from Russian resources, commit Europe to American LNG, then that's obviously happened both with blowing up Nord Stream as well as getting the Europeans to put out a warrant for Putin's arrest. It would take decades for a Russian-European rapprochement to happen, Europe "got over" the transition from Russian resources, so maybe the war is just on zombie mode until it ends one way or another, no reason to escalate further with Russia as mission accomplished.

I don't want to toot my own horn, but the advance on Kiev having been a dual-purpose operation is a theory I've been sharing here for close to a year now. (And I still believe it is true, so we're in agreement there). — Tzeentch

Yes, it's pretty obvious that taking the land bridge was plan B for Ukraine not capitulating or negotiating, but lot's of people had this position since the first weeks of the war when Ukraine didn't capitulate. @Isaac and myself, and @ssu also agreed Russian generals had such a backup plan (but debate remained on how likely they thought they would need it as well as the FSB and Kremlin's evaluation, which honestly I'm sure how likely they thought Ukrainian capitulation and, more importantly, if they would have not invaded if they thought the current situation would happen; odds don't really matter if you're committed anyways).

Nice read. An analysis that is both rational and not corrupted by the typical cartoon narratives that immerse all our collective sources of information. — yebiga

Thanks.

It's also nice that essentially pure propaganda positions without any evidence at all (like Russia will lose due to their own incompetence, or sanctions will collapse Russian society any day now) have largely exited the debate, even in the Western media.

But why stop short of following your own rational arguments to their logical conclusion?

Not only was this war against Russia never ever winnable but...

The only conceivable path to some kind of victory for the USA was a vague hope that the combination of kinetic war and economic sanctions might cause a coup in Moscow and a coup that by chance was compliant to western demands.

This theoretical possibility was always a reckless gamble. And yet, this calculus was the singular rational idea underpinning the western strategy in this war. But by May/June of 2022 it was clear that there was not going to be any coup that might favour western interests. The Russian public was not only not in revolt but had displayed a distinctly anti-western fervour - so that even if a coup did occur it would likely be something hardline and more militaristic. — yebiga

It's not clear to me if war planners in NATO thought this was ever likely.

Also, NATO doesn't escalate enough the kinetic war part of such a strategy; whole reason for my musings on the ammunition shortage is that it does not fit the apparent objective.

It could be the white house thought this was possible and did the sanctions part, but the pentagon never really followed through on the kinetic part (otherwise there would not be an ammunition shortage and you wouldn't suddenly discover by surprise you could send tanks this whole time).

For, there is always the context of nuclear weapons, and too much escalation would likely lead to their use, which the US would not have a good response for.

As I've mentioned, the core geopolitical reason for the conflict is the status of the USD in world trade.

The war creates a fractured multi-polar world rather than a fluid multi-polar world. The reason the US would want to manage a transition to a fractured multi-polar world is to reduce the risk of being replaced of sidelined to zero.

Without war the US would be facing the real risk of becoming irrelevant in the globalised trade system it created and underwriting the stability required for the USD as "a service to the world" to be replaced entirely the time be replaced militarily as well.

The war significantly weakens the West and accelerates multi-polarity, but at the same time keeps the US as the top dog in the Western system.

Macron seems to have figured that out recently and is like "merde alors" all of a sudden.

Sanctions on Russia are also a form of market protectionism, tightening the US grip on Europe while also making a new market for US gas. The US guessed, correctly, that European leaders would be too weak and clueless to do anything about it and they would prefer the fantasy film version of reality that this is somehow World War Two ... 2 with a happy Western ending at the end.

It was game over as soon as Russia was in a position to annex the contested territories because NATO won't go to war against Russia for Ukraine, which would be the only conceivable way to reclaim them. It's not a movie. The bad guys win sometimes. The challenge now is for the West to engineer a situation where this doesn't look like an abject loss. I stick to my idea that a reduced Ukraine gaining NATO membership is this compromise. Russia gets its land bridge and NATO gets to fully hem it in. Ukraine gets to sacrifice just its arms and its legs rather than its head too. Sad, but... — Baden

Indeed, it's not a movie.

This would be a good outcome for the West, but I doubt is possible.

The time to leverage the capacity to fight irrationally to the death is before fighting irrationally to the death, not afterwards.

Negotiation is of course still possible but Ukraine would need to offer deep concessions. The problem of the path of fighting irrationally to the death is it quickly locks the policy in as the sacrifice quickly becomes too great to compromise.

It's basically war diplomacy 101 that you leverage the cost of further fighting as soon as possible, even if you would lose and it's not "rational", it is still a cost the opposing side will need to pay and so motivates a compromise. But the key word is compromise.

However, if you want to lock in sanctions and make them irreversible, transition the EU to US gas, fracture the global financial system to keep the USD relevant, prevent the Euro becoming a peer currency competitor, then you need to make sure Ukraine keeps fighting even if there is no logic (for them) whatsoever to do so, and just accept some temporary negative PR when Ukraine starts to break down ... which, sadly, is easily managed in this day and age; it's not like anyone remembers the Afghans. They can just take the L and we all forget about it.

I see a way for Ukraine to still emerge victorious but having to concede territory only short term and momentarily and in so doing joins NATO aka US army branch in Europe. This is the only way and they must be brought to reason to do so and that is the collective will of the Ukrainian people to do this.

What I think is important for Europeans and Ukrainians to consider, is that the more adversarial our stance towards Russia becomes, the greater their territorial ambitions will become.

A lot of the political situation we see in Eastern Europe today is a result of a past mutual understanding between NATO and Russia. This included Ukraine's independence, and for example political anomalies like Kaliningrad and Transnistria.

If these mutual understandings disintegrate further, these situations will become new hotbeds for conflict.

I'm quite convinced that Russia will seek to connect to Transnistria if some form of agreement cannot be reached in Ukraine.

A future invasion of Lithuania to connect to Kaliningrad is also not unthinkable.

I doubt the Russians would voluntarily initiate such hostilities, but if relations with the West become highly adversarial they will likely feel like they have no other options, which is essentially what happened in Ukraine.

The idea that if we just push hard enough the Russians will back down is in my opinion a foolish and very dangerous misunderstanding.

I see a way for Ukraine to still emerge victorious but having to concede territory only short term and momentarily and in so doing joins NATO aka US army branch in Europe. — invicta

The problem is NATO doesn't let Ukraine in ... which they could have done any day since 2008, or even 1991.

No one in NATO actually wants some insane escalation with Russia that results in the use of nuclear weapons, so we don't see that escalation.

For the past year the total fantasy has been peddled that somehow NATO can "avoid escalation" (which they don't really hesitate to say to explain policies like no-tanks-for-you!) but also Ukraine will win.

But what is the definition of escalation at the end of the day?

Ukraine winning.

That's what would cause Russia to behave differently, such as deploy nuclear weapons, so if you're trying to avoid those actions then you're trying to avoid what would cause those actions and so, in this case, trying to avoid Ukraine winning.

Ukraine winning is not and has not ever been the policy, at least in military terms.

I'd be willing to believe that some neocons actually believed sanctions may collapse the Russian government, or society as a whole, and actually wanted that, but it doesn't seem to me that the war planners managing the war part made any real effort to help with that, otherwise there wouldn't be an ammunition problem.

This is the only way and they must be brought to reason to do so and that is the collective will of the Ukrainian people to do this. — invicta

It also requires NATO's will to invest further on behalf of Ukraine rather than insofar as it serves US interests, which is not a controversial explanation of US foreign policy ... in literally the history of US foreign policy until now.

What I think is important for Europeans and Ukrainians to consider, is that the more adversarial our stance towards Russia becomes, the greater their territorial ambitions will become. — Tzeentch

Totally agreed.

Though I highly doubt any direct conflict with NATO, as long as NATO is a thing, but conquering all of Ukraine is certainly something being considered.

In terms of further into the future, Russia's concerns I would guess are more being invaded, for their resources as climate change starts to collapse global supply chains, and so the current war is good strategic positioning, mainly securing the Azov sea and preventing any buildup East of the Dnieper, as well as "war hardening" the Russian economy and society and war materials production.

That is if the Russian war planners are looking into the future, it would be preparing Russia as a target of resource wars, not waging their own.

We are heading, fairly rapidly, to a global scenario of planetary scale crop failures and large parts of the globe currently inhabited no longer being inhabitable, hundreds of millions of climate refugees (at any one time, a few billion deaths overall), the break down of the global trading system and general chaos.

At best.

The current war is a terrible move if you believe the US led Western model of business as usual is "where it's at", but if you can read the writing on the wall then everything that has happened within Russia are things you would want to do if you had carte blanche to "brace for impact". Of course, it would be politically impossible to do those things without having a war.

To what extent Russian war planners consider the obvious future I don't know, but the Kremlin obviously does know about climate change as they keep investing in Arctic infrastructure far ahead of time. Additionally, they don't even need to do their own analysis, the pentagon and various other European militaries regularly come out with the hard facts of what climate change means in terms of defence implications, so all Russian war planners have to do is read Western war planners thoughts about the matter; which, presumably, they do at least read.

The problem is NATO doesn't let Ukraine in ... which they could have done any day since 2008, or even 1991. — boethius

This sounds like speculation, NATO’s stance is flexible especially during this conflict. As the Russians are clearly playing dirty then NATO expansion in this front seems the only logical step at this point.

From a trade perspective a Ukraine that will bounce back and flourish once more in farming and other agricultural industries is not just better for the whole of Europe but beyond and could prove to be fertile in other areas too.

From a military POV the Russian move that occurred will set Russian back decades as they will be unable to modernise technologically and so militarily for years to come but only relying on its nuclear deterrent as defence.

This sounds like speculation at this point, NATO’s stance is flexible especially during this conflict. As the Russians are clearly playing dirty then NATO expansion in this front seems the only logical step at this point. — invicta

Noting that NATO has not let Ukraine join for decades is not speculation.

Speculation would be the idea that NATO would let Ukraine in all of a sudden to punish the Russians ... after winning and Ukraine loses?

Think it through, if the goal was protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, NATO would have just let Ukraine in anytime since 2008 or then the US and UK just act unilaterally and send in their troops to protect Ukraine from invasion.

That doesn't happen because that's not the goal.

Your arms dealer is like your meth dealer: maybe you need the meth to keep going but he's not your friend.

From a trade perspective a Ukraine that will bounce back and flourish once more in farming and other agricultural industries is not just better for the whole of Europe but beyond and could prove to be fertile in other areas too. — invicta

Agreed. Definitely peace is far better for everyone than war.

From a military POV the Russian move that occurred will set Russian back decades as they will be unable to modernise technologically and so militarily for years to come but only relying on its nuclear deterrent as defence. — invicta

This is highly debatable.

First, China can supply most engineering services and products the West can, and second Russia has comparable technology and capabilities to the West in key areas: missiles (in particular AA missiles where Russia seems to exceed Western capabilities), submarines (maybe the US' are better, but Russia still has a bunch), and, most importantly, nuclear weapons.

Historically, fighting a war, even a costly one, and winning results in a far stronger military and arms industry than at the start of the war. Even the disastrous American civil war (where the US didn't even "win" anything) is credited as placing the US on the path of military super power, which then gets boosted by being on the winning side of WWI and WWII.

Indeed, the common adage among war planners is that a military that doesn't fight any wars gets lazy and soft and "battle tested" is where you want to be with your equipment, training and doctrines.

If I had the choice I would rather fight the Russians at the start of this war than now. Maybe things will just fall apart randomly any day now as has been continuously predicted by Western media since day one, but that's not the historical pattern. Indeed, the largest army ever assembled was the Soviets at the end of WWII and that was after sustaining some 20-30 million killed, mostly soldiers.

Indeed, the benefits of war experience is so high that Germany is able to make a second world war after losing the first! That's how powerful these effects are.

Noting that NATO has not let Ukraine join for decades is not speculation. — boethius

You can’t speculate about the future can you ? I’m not denying the historical rejection of Ukraine’s NATO membership.

This all changed in relation to the agreement that was brokered by Russia-US regarding Ukraine nuclear status which guaranteed Ukraine its territorial integrity which the Russians eventually dishonoured by various land grabs since then.

Membership application now becomes useless hindsight and the future looks bright for Ukraine despite territorial losses.

NATO or No Europe and US will support and supply as long as the Ukrainians are willing to fight for their land and go toe to toe with this foxlike enemy that Putin really is.

Despite the cunning of this old fox it will eventually tire and die

I think the most significant player on the scene now is neither the US nor Russia. It's China. Russia is now dependent on China. The way Xi behaved when he visited Russia broadcast his domination of the whole region.

Biden comes from an era when the US was glaringly alone at the top. We're transitioning to a new era where China is ascendent while the US continues to recede from the world stage. Russia will settle into a position in China's domain. That's the path Putin has set his country on. There's not much he can do now to turn that around.

I’m talking about future plans of course and I’m not denying the historical rejection of Ukraine’s NATO membership. — invicta

In which case it's not speculation but basic inference that the policy is not to let Ukraine in.

What you're proposing is an entirely speculative scenario where that policy changes. Now, definitely just because it's speculation doesn't mean it won't happen, you can argue the why and how, but the position that the future will resemble the past is not speculative, it's the default epistemological position; it's the idea that it won't, that the sun will not in fact rise tomorrow or Ukraine will in fact join NATO, which requires the burden of evidence.

Without strong evidence and arguments that the policy will change, the reasonable position is to assume that it won't change.

NATO or No Europe and US will support and supply as long as the Ukrainians are willing to fight for their land and go to toe with this foxlike enemy that Putin really is. — invicta

The problem is there may simply be a limit to what Ukraine is able to do on the battle field.

Russia not only has a much larger population, but as importantly, has more capabilities: more artillery, more planes, more bombs, more missiles, more types of drones, more electronic warfare suites.

Along with conventional attritional fighting (which does not favour Ukraine), there is a learning race going on between Russia learning to adapt to Ukraine capabilities and tactics and vice-versa, as well as each side learning to deploy their capabilities effectively and perfecting their tactics.

For a bunch of mathematical reasons, having more capabilities (things you can do that your opponent is simply unable to) is a massive advantage in this learning competition. At some point, the Russians may learn to adapt to Ukrainians tactics and capabilities (which are limited in configurations, due to having less of them, meaning Ukraine may not be able to adapt to the adaptation) while learning to efficiently deploy their own capabilities and tactics. At some point, the Russians may find a configuration of tactics and capabilities that Ukraine simply is unable to adapt to.

Running out of ammunition, such as artillery shells and AA missiles, greatly accelerates this process.

Maybe Ukraine has some big surprise in store, has secretly trained a large army with hundreds of tanks and aircraft and thousands of missiles that NATO has assembled in secret, but if that's not the case, it seems to me at least, the war has reached this learning inflection point where Ukraine cannot deal with Russian advances and cannot carry out their own counter-offensives.

At least all the reports I read of the different kinds of missile strikes, the overwhelming artillery advantage, glide bombs and increased effective use of electronic warfare, it's really difficult to imagine how Ukraine is able to deal with it in a sustainable way.

I think the most significant player on the scene now is neither the US nor Russia. It's China. Russia is now dependent on China. The way Xi behaved when he visited Russia broadcast his domination of the whole region. — frank

Yes, totally agreed the Russian war effort is completely dependent on economic support from Xi.

Xi launching the "exercise" to surround Taiwan is also further critical support, teasing a two front war.

Indeed, one question I posed to the pro-US policy side to this debate is whether this was a US proxy war against Russia, using Ukraine ... or a Chinese proxy war against the US, using Russia.