In case it helps anyone, here's some more context for my interpretation of H:

Language is not merely a tool which man possesses alongside many others; language first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings. Only where there is language, is there world, that is, the constantly changing cycle of decision and work, of action and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and turmoil, decay and confusion.
...
The one as that which forms everyday being-with-one-another...constitutes what we call the public in the strict sense of the word. It implies that the world is always already primarily given as the common world. It is not the case on the one hand there are first individual subjects which at any given time have their own world; and that the task would then arise of putting together, by virtue of some sort of arrangement, the various particular worlds of individuals and of agreeing how one would have a common world. This is how philosophers imagine these things when they ask about the constitution of the inter-subjective world. We say instead that the first thing that is given is the common world -- the one.

Then this is about the gossip we are thrown into, the gossip we mostly are. We are Poloniusbots with the potential to switch into Hamletbot mode if we can hear our superficiality. Polonius must realize that he's mostly a bot, suffer the terror of never having been, of having been lived by an anyone who was no one at all, a mere echo of what one says what one says. I claim that if you don't feel how thrown you are then you can't understand what's crucial in Heidegger.

What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.” “Publicness ” does not get to "the heart of the matter," because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness.”

Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer. Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of being of Dasein, and also constitutes its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over inner worldly beings. “ “ Ontologically, this means that when Da-sein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself.”

Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [urspriinglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].

One is a bot.

Dasein is time.
— plaque flag

Does he say that? Why not Being and Dasein? I would have to read it in context before saying more. — Fooloso4

Sorta-kinda. What he actually says is that Being is time. Being is disclosed to Dasein in its way of understanding.

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics)

1 The world is everything that is the case.

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.

1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2 The world divides into facts.

1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1921 (completed 1918)

I think 'Witty's facts' (sinpliciter) are synonymous with actual relations. Anti-cartesian/platonic ontology (à la Spinoza ... Epicurus ... Laozi ...)

So what additional, clarifying insight does the cryptic "In-der-Welt-sein" offer? :chin:




https://www.wittgensteinproject.org/w/index.php?title=Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus_(English)

Sorta-kinda. — Joshs

Nossir, exactly. "Dasein is time, time is temporal."

This is on page 20E of the McNeill translation of the [Marsburg] lecture The Concept of Time, which is affectionately known as the urB&T. I'm sure it's in the Dilthey draft too (same name, confusingly), and I'll give the location if I bump into it. Please note that, for Bard knows what reason, there are three valuable Heidegger texts titled The Concept of Time. (This is perversely fitting somehow, given the importance of the concept.)

Kojeve fuses Heidegger and Hegel and has quite a party with man as time as the concept existing empirically. He helped me see how Hegelian Heidegger is. Softwhere is my jam, friends. I'm on this.

What he actually says is that Being is time. Being is disclosed to Dasein in its way of understanding. — Joshs

I'm not saying you can't find this in one of the texts. Nor do I disagree. I will say that his earlier stuff was more experimental. There's not just 'one' readymade Heidegger, in other words.

So what additional, clarifying insight does the cryptic "In-der-Welt-sein" offer? — 180 Proof

I don't think (?) early Witt discussed the 'transparency' of the tool in the hand, the way that tools exist. Nor did he make worldhood explicit. If you chunk both early and late W, then maybe you have something comparable to early H, but I still think there's good stuff that'd be left out.

Yes, of course. Yes, you would. — plaque flag

Yes, of course he said Dasein is time? Where?

Yes, I would ask for a reference so I could read it in context? Guilty as charged!

See above.

To appreciate and study time, one must genuinely ask: Am I time ?

This is from the Dilthey draft, page 60.

Am I softwhere ?

Yes, I just noticed that. Before discussing the lecture let's back up a little. The question arose as to whether he was using temporal terms metaphorically. You cited the statement: Dasein is time as an example.

From a quick preliminary reading of the lecture: He is not talking about what man is but how he is. Time is dasein's way of being.

The lecture ends:

What is time? became the question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable.

How we are to be is being questionable. Dasein's way of being is open to possibilities. In the lecture he insists on the indeterminacy of the past and the certainty of the future as death. The indeterminacy of the past means we must return to the past, for it is the way to the future.

And what do Heidi's "tool ... transparency" and "explicit worldhood" insights clarify philosophically? Maybe these insights are anthropologically or psycho-cognitively interesting ... but I think they are philosophically trivial (i.e. redundant with respect to e.g. (early) pragmatism).

And what do Heidi's "tool ... transparency" and "explicit worldhood" insights clarify philosophically? Maybe these insights are anthropologically or psycho-cognitively interesting ... but I think they are philosophically trivial (i.e. redundant with respect to e.g. (early) pragmatism). — 180 Proof

It depends on what you want to count as philosophy, I guess. To me it's almost tautological to call philosophy 'hermeneutical fundamental ontology.' Philosophy unfolds, makes explicit, appropriates the hermeneutic situation...

It depends on what you want to count as philosophy, I guess. — plaque flag

:roll:

from Kiesel ( in case it's helpful) about early H:

In fact, it was in this semester which inaugurated his phenomenological decade that he first discovered his root metaphor of the 'way' to describe his very kinetic sense of philosophy. Philosophy is not theory, outstrips any theory or conceptual system it may develop, because it can only approximate and never really comprehend the immediate experience it wishes to articulate. That which is nearest to us in experience is farthest removed from our comprehension. Philosophy in its 'poverty of thought' is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only 'formal indications' which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life's possibilities of understanding and articulation. In short, philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression than a science. That phenomenology is more a preconceptual, provisory comportment than a conceptual science, that the formally indicating 'concepts' are first intended to serve life rather than science, becomes transparent only after the turn...
...
Philosophy is 'philosophizing', being 'on the way to language,' ways ---not works.
...
Life is sufficient to Itself, Ekhart already said. The trick is to get to this level and stay with it, thereby reaping the harvest of its self-expression. For factic life also gives itself in the deformation of the objectification, which must first be dismantled in order to get to its initial moment of articulation.

Not saying I agree with that very early approach, but it's fascinating. I love Brandom, who explicates carefully and systematically. But I want my philosophy to be alive and get at 'factic life.' It's not a toy for the shelf. It's the deepening of a sober joy, an endless pursuit of greater wakefulness. It's also a kind of worldrevealing poetry. Paintings and phenomenology teach us how to see.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Being and Time) — Joshs

@plaque flag

Earlier I asked for an explanation. I followed up with some questions intended to focus on what is at issue and what is not.

Heidegger is talking about time as it relates to Dasein and the disclosure of Being. The disclosure takes place in or through time but this is not the same as what happens day by day or in what is recorded in history books. It is not about objects in the world or what happens to me or someone else in their past.

Having been refers to the history of Being. To what was disclosed, what was hidden, and what was forgotten. Heidegger returns to the first disclosure of Being through Greek philosophy in order to think what was left unthought. Having been is not earlier than the present in for far as it is still present in order for Dasein to think what was left unthought.

Sorta-kinda.
— Joshs

Nossir, exactly. "Dasein is time, time is temporal." — plaque flag

We must be careful in attributing exactitude to Heidegger’s discussion of time at this preliminary point in his career, and in the specific context of your quote. The introduction to Concept of Time notes that in Chapter 3, “Heidegger warns against the 'misunderstanding' that would summarize his view as: 'Dasein is in each case time'. Heidegger was always far more nuanced than many of his critics acknowledge. The review article is best understood as 'preliminary notice' of his own research, as Heidegger states in the Introduction to this work. As such it is an important way station, not a fixed doctrine.”

Given that this is the first draft of Being and Time, let’s see what Heidegger says about Dasein and time in his magnum opus. Heidegger begins Being and Time saying his aim is to answer the question of the meaning of being in general. Alas, by the end of BT, he leaves us with only questions and a promise for answers in a division III which was never produced.

He does define Dasein's kind of being as the ontological difference , the in-between , happening , occurrence , the ‘as' structure , projection.

“ Something like "being" has been disclosed in the understanding of being that belongs to existing Da-sein as a way in which it understands.”

“The ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of being is temporality itself.”(Basic Problems, 1927)

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics)

But he leaves us with the following questions:

“The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Da-sein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?

he leaves us with only questions and a promise for answers in a division III which was never produced. — Joshs

Why?

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics) — Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being?

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being? — Fooloso4

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit.

Would someone with little or no background in Heidegger understand this? What does the truth have to do with this?

We must be careful in attributing exactitude to Heidegger’s discussion of time at this preliminary point in his career — Joshs

Sure. But for me anyway there's no Moment when the real Heidegger please stands up.

Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? — Joshs

Do we [as time] do so ?

he introduction to Concept of Time notes that in Chapter 3, “Heidegger warns against the 'misunderstanding' that would summarize his view as: 'Dasein is in each case time'. — Joshs

IMV, this is like Hegel warning against thinking that pithy summaries (substance is subject!) can mean anything to today's busy consumer without them having to wrestle with the matters themselves. Dasein is in each case time is part of what he says, but it's just mumbo-jumbo and gossip to those who aren't serious.

Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philosophy, is nothing else but the view that truth consists in a proposition, which is a fixed and final result, or again which is directly known. To questions like, “When was Caesar born?”. “How many feet make a furlong?”, etc., a straight answer ought to be given; just as it is absolutely true that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of a so-called truth of that sort is different from the nature of philosophical truth.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm


One does not carry away a pocket full of Heidegger's theorems. Philosophy as fundamental ontology (a tautology) is a lifestyle or identity even which is endlessly on-the-way. I'd call it an ascending hermeneutic spiral, for one incorporates more and more in something that a jazz 'improvisation.' Riffs are repeated but also recontextualized, occasionally inspiring new riffs. So the music gets richer. The Onebot expands its metacognitive and affective vocabulary, finds deeper connections within what it already/only halfknows, ...

Would someone with little or no background in Heidegger understand this? — Fooloso4

This is the problem with rich, difficult thinkers. Background is everything. Imagine a rich kid in a poor neighborhood, trying to make sense of things, or the reverse. It's not this or that sign but an entire world of inter-refering significations. As Dreyfus might put, there are assumptions too deep for tears, which aren't even articulate, so that 'assumptions' is a metaphor for something 'stupider' like a competence.

This is the problem ... — plaque flag

The problem is hiding behind jargon and frictive words that produce heat without light.

Background is everything. — plaque flag

The background can be sketched, as simply and clearly as possible. Thinking and speaking simply and clearly is very difficult. Hiding behind words is easy but lacks probity. The most insidious part is that one's lack of understanding never reaches the surface.

Is it your view that H is deliberately using difficult language for obfuscatory purposes or that he just happens to use difficult wording because that's how he thought? It certainly seems to make it hard for others to get a read of him.

I give Heidegger a pass. He has earned it. I am talking about the unwillingness or inability of some members here to attempt to clarify and explain things. The problem is when one attempts to do so the gaps in understanding as well as misunderstandings become clear.

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs

Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese.

Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese. — fdrake

:up:

Always a fair request, no matter the dense philosopher...

H promotes "misunderstanding" both with the obscurant sophistry of his texts and rare, explicit statements such as

Those in the crossing must in the end know what is mistaken by all urging for intelligibility: that every thinking of being, all philosophy, can never be confirmed by ‘facts,’ i.e., by beings. Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. — Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Notes 1936-1938

Note N's prescient criticism sixty-something years before:

Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water. — The Gay Science, 173

(Emphases are mine.)

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/637153

Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. — 180 Proof

There's a charitable reading of this. New metaphors confuse and offend. To test dead metaphors with a hammer is to do violence to common sense. One is outraged that another would dare question The Obvious.

Philosophy that does not challenge common sense (that does not make itself conveniently intelligible for today's busy consumer ) is indeed no longer philosophy.

Does this imply that the obscure is necessarily profound ? Of course not.

The profound is obscure but the other direction don't always work out.

Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water. — The Gay Science, 173

This is a beautiful quote, and I will grant you that Being and Time contains many needlessly tangled passages. Yet there are long stretches that I find very direct and clear. I don't know why he did that. I wish he hadn't.

I can't comment on the later Heidegger. I will reiterate that his style is direct and clear in the lectures that led up to the writing of Being and Time.