Cute. New one on me.

I felt the thread needed more visual illusions.

how can you so boldly assert that others are in the same position — plaque flag

It's a way of speaking. I'm sure you have met it many times in discussions.
I could never claim or believe that everyone else is "in the same position". That would be just absurd.
Whatever one states in a philosophic discussion is an opinion.
It is very obvious that no one can speak for everyone.
As for what you describe as "boldly", it's just certaintly. And certainty is also subjective.

The shadow’s wrong.

Wait a sec ! I wasn't calling a foul. I was asking epistemologically. I was pointing out what I thought was an incoherence in your position. We are just 'playing poker' here. It's all in the pursuit of being less wrong. No personal bad feels intended.

The shadow’s wrong. — Mww

It's more of a reflection than a shadow. Did you notice that it reverses direction depending on how you look at it? Sometimes looking at the feet or below the picture will make it change direction. If you're on a cell phone try turning the cell phone a few degrees to the left or right. That'll do it.

Cool. I was hoping someone would mention looking at the shadow to switch the rotation. Doesn’t happen all the time, but often enough. Could just blink, too, like that hollow cube that switches orientation.

Might be me, but reflection or shadow, I can’t get it to mesh with the movement.

Fun anyway, so, thanks for that.

And phenomenological direct (naive) realism says something exactly like this. They don’t just say that we respond to external world objects. They say that external world objects are as they are seen, e.g. that the colour property in the experience is the colour property of the apple. — Michael

I think you are maybe loading your own presuppositions on to the position. Here is a minimal versino : We can directly perceive ordinary objects. To me the point here is that we are not behind a screen. We don't see an image of the apple. We just see the apple. Note that direct realism does not forbid being mistaken. 'I thought that shadow was a possum for a moment !' The point is that one is talking about the world, always our world, in our language. And our language is 'made of' our norms for applying concepts. The 'We' is tacit in the use of that old tribal sign 'I.'

What tempts people to talk as if they see only images ? I suspect the scientific image is being taken as a deeper truer reality than the lifeworld it depends on in order to make sense in the first place. Once this mistake is made, people say things like 'color isn't real.' The internal image (the hidden states of the ghost) becomes not only the given but all that is given in an orgy of methodological solipsism which takes the norms of rational concept use for granted, as if planted in this solipsist by a friendly god.

For the direct realist, the self is not a submarine captain peering through a periscope. It is a member of a community with norms for evaluating and making claims. 'Red' gets its meaning from the inferential relationships between assertions, just as a bishop gets its meaning in the context of trying to checkmate the opposing king. I say zoom out and do not ignore that norms of rationality that every philosopher depends on as philosopher. Don't think of individual concepts as magic labels. Put them in sentences. Put sentences into sets of sentences that a person uses to tell a coherent story. This is after all what we are already doing.

The 'We' is tacit in the use of that old tribal sign 'I.' — plaque flag

And vice versa.

And vice versa. — frank

Not so sure. 'I' seems to be the sign for a 'virtual' bearer of social responsibility, a 'player' on the 'stage,' which is associated with a particular living body. It exists within the tradition at the root perhaps (any exceptions?) all traditions, that of the unified voice, the ego, the individual.A body learns to be an 'I' [singular]. One ghost per machine.

Not so sure. 'I' seems to be the sign for a 'virtual' bearer of social responsibility, a 'player' on the 'stage,' which is associated with a particular living body. It exists within the tradition at the root perhaps (any exceptions?) all traditions, that of the unified voice, the ego, the individual.A body learns to be an 'I' [singular]. One ghost per machine. — plaque flag

I sense some hatred of the ego here. What's that related to?

I sense some hatred of the ego here. What's that related to? — frank

I'm sorry, doctor, but that's not it. I think our softwhere is as adversarial as it is cooperative, possibly because we evolved at the level of the tribe (which had other tribes to worry about.) I don't stress the we for sentimental reasons. I started like most with the default 'screen' metaphor of Hume, Locke, Kant, ... but I kept thinking and reading and slowly grasped the deep confusion in such positions, which was made especially explicit in the early 20th century. For the most part I paraphrase well known results, though I reach for fresh metaphors, trying to pass on unexploited representatives from the same blurry equivalence class.

I do understand of course that claims about the we are attributed to the I that makes them. This is as common as any discussion about the rules of a situation.

Only the little story about the Real being beneath the real-- that's what's being doubted. — Moliere

Do you doubt that what appears real to us, what can appear real to us, is not (or at least not necessarily or not the whole of) what is real per se? Of course the latter is not something we could ever discover, but is just a logical distinction between what appears to us and what is independently of us. I'd say it is of importance, because it reminds us that life is, fundamentally, a mystery. So I don't count it as a "little story" but as a realization that is central to human life.

'See' does not have this dual meaning where it's also describing a self-report about mental states. — Isaac

Yes it does: introspection is understood to be 'seeing into' the body/mind in order to notice what bodily feelings or thoughts seem to be present. It's commonplace and most everyone knows how to do it.

What’s the actual physics of this? What mechanical process counts as “estimating external states”? — Michael

It's the modelling assumption of the aggregated function of our nervous system, so I suppose the 'physics' would be action potentials, ion channels and the electromagnetic forces of neurotransmitters at synapse vesicles?

I would say that “estimating external states” is itself just the firing of certain neurons. — Michael

Plus neurotransmitters, but yes.

So what all perception reduces to is an external stimulus influencing sense receptors which in turn trigger the firing of certain neurons and then sometimes a bodily response. That is perception at its most fundamental. — Michael

Seems so. When we talk about the biology of it. I don't believe that much of what we speak about correctly reduces to biology. Much of what we say is functional rather than representative, so many things we talk about have no proper reference in empirical science. If you want to bring science into something like perception, however, it's a mistake to do so piecemeal. If we're talking about the science of perception, then this description is, I believe, the most persuasive model and is certainly the leading one right now.

But given the mostly deterministic nature of such physical processes (I say mostly because at the quantum scale it is stochastic) it doesn’t make much sense to describe the firing of certain neurons or its response as being correct or incorrect. One can only say that it’s adaptive or maladaptive. — Michael

I don't agree. The terms we use are obviously all loaded with the meanings from where we've borrowed them (we don't have terminology specifically designed to describe this kind of predictive network). Adaptive and maladaptive are loaded too, they suggest a teleology to evolution which is certainly not present in the nervous system. When we make a choice and it turns out well for us, we call it 'correct', I'm just seconding that term for the actions of the nervous system in predicting appropriate responses. I'm not wedded to the terminology though. Technically, I tend to refer to is as reducing surprise (since 'surprise' here has a technical meaning in the Bayes optimisation equations used to describe the function of these systems), but any term would do.

But with this it really makes no sense to talk about seeing the world “as it is”. There’s just neurons firing in a useful way, and it’s not a given that there’s just one useful way for neurons to fire in any given situation. — Michael

Absolutely. Again, it's a modelling assumption, but an important one and one which is supported by the theoretical framework...

Simply put, for an system to have some self identity requires it oppose entropic forces (Newton's third law). Since opposing entropic forces requires information about the direction and momentum of such a force a system needs to be able to detect those properties in order to sustain itself against entropy. Since we do sustain ourselves against entropy, it follows that we must actually be detecting the direction and momentum of otherwise entropic forces (or, Newton's laws are wrong).

As such it's a good working assumption (based on what we know of physics and systems dynamics) that any system such as ours will need to be at least moderately successful at actually identifying the state of external nodes since it is their actual state against which gradient our internal probability distributions must climb to maintain their highly improbable state of being self-consistent.

I was pointing out what I thought was an incoherence in your position. — plaque flag

No problem. No offence taken.
But ... what exactly is the inchoherence in my position?

We are just 'playing poker' here. — plaque flag

Well, if you feel like betting on your positions and beliefs ...
But keep in mind that there are no winners here. You can only bet with yourself. :smile:

do understand of course that claims about the we are attributed to the I that makes them. This is as common as any discussion about the rules of a situation. — plaque flag

No, it's that "we" means a group of individuals. Yes, the ego is an idea. It's a kind of construction. Monotheistic divinity reinforces the primacy of the ego. The burning bush told Moses that its name was "I am.". Genesis 3:13.

However you come to realize that the ego is a kind of fixture of the mind, it's startling, yes. Where does it leave you though? For me, the landing place is Schopenhauer.

I might be more in the direct realist camp, so I'll try to answer this — plaque flag

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with everything you wrote in your post. It is interesting that you used Kant, in today's terms an Indirect Realist, to support your case.

Kant discussed "Existence", in that there are things-in-themselves, "Humility", in that we know nothing of things-in-themselves and "Affectation", in that things -in-themselves causally affect us. Kant's concept of a thing-in-itself is not that of a Direct Realist.

We need not assume in the first place that we are trapped behind a wall of sensations. This methodological solipsism is unjustified, in my view. Concepts are public. They exists within a system of norms for their application. This is why bots can talk sensibly about pain and color. — plaque flag

Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy in para 293 of Philosophical Investigations may be used as an argument against Direct Realism. The Direct Realist would argue that if two people are looking at the same object in the world, as both will be perceiving the same object in the world immediately and directly, their private mental images must be the same, meaning that each will know the others private sensations. However, this wouldn't agree with Wittgenstein's para 272 that each of us has private experiences not known by others.

Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy also explains how a public language is possible, even though our private experiences are unknown to others. In a public language, our private experiences, as with the beetle, drop out of consideration.

I assume that both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree:
1) All our information about things external to our senses comes through our senses.
2) We directly perceive things this side of our senses, such as apples, trees, mountains, etc.
3) Science tells us that the properties of things the other side of our senses, such as wavelength, are different to the properties this side of our senses, such as the electrical signal that travels up the optic nerve to the brain.
4) Even though we each have private experiences, we can talk about these private experiences using a public language, allowing us to live in social communities.

The Indirect Realist would argue that the world outside our senses is different to the world we perceive this side of our senses. The Direct Realist would argue that not only is the world outside our senses the same as the world we perceive this side of our senses but also that we directly know the world outside our senses.

The question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible to know that the world outside our senses is the same as the world we perceive this side of our senses, when science tells us that what is on the other side of our senses is different to what is this side of our senses.

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with everything you wrote in your post. It is interesting that you used Kant, in today's terms an Indirect Realist, to support your case. — RussellA

Is it really so strange ? Philosophy can even be framed as a series of creative misreadings or violent appropriations of influences.

Kant discussed "Existence", in that there are things-in-themselves, "Humility", in that we know nothing of things-in-themselves and "Affectation", in that things -in-themselves causally affect us. Kant's concept of a thing-in-itself is not that of a Direct Realist. — RussellA

That sounds right enough, and I think that description of our situation doesn't work. So Hegel fixed Kant and offered a sophisticated kind of direct realism. I suggest Brandom's appropriation of Hegel as a version of the software for today's busy consumer.

The Direct Realist would argue that if two people are looking at the same object in the world, as both will be perceiving the same object in the world immediately and directly, their private mental images must be the same, meaning that each will know the others private sensations. — RussellA

No, sir, no. That's how someone trapped in exactly the metaphorics being criticized is almost forced to misunderstand direct realism.

Abandon all hope ye who enter here take private mental images seriously ! That way madness endless confusion lies.

My direct realism rejects as step one this idea of the private mental image. The self exists in a social space of reasons. It is a discursive convention. It is not a screen or an imp behind a screen in the pineal gland.

The question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible to know that the world outside our senses is the same as the world we perceive this side of our senses, when science tells us that what is on the other side of our senses is different to what is this side of our senses. — RussellA

Here's where, in my opinion, the confusion lies. The scientific image only makes sense within an encompassing lifeworld including a space of reasons. Atoms are no more real than tables. Entities in the scientific image are only intelligible in terms of medium size dry goods and epistemological norms. Clearly atoms don't work as the postulated infinitely hidden Really Real. There is no need to decide that color is unreal because it is correlated with wavelengths, etc. Science is amazing, but scientistic metaphysics is not so great. And one can make this point as an atheist who just likes coherent and careful descriptions of our situation. It's not religious sentimentality, as others (if not you) might think.

No, it's that "we" means a group of individuals. Yes, the ego is an idea. It's a kind of construction. Monotheistic divinity reinforces the primacy of the ego. The burning bush told Moses that its name was "I am.". Genesis 3:13. — frank

:up:
Yes. So the fun is the making explicit of what this ego is. I agree that monotheism is relevant here. I'd say that we should also think in terms of goteam tribal identification. Think of the brutal joy and terror of war where men lose their individuality, jumping on a grenades for their boys. Schopenhauer is, as you say, relevant just here. He saw virtue in terms of piercing the illusion of individuality. I tend to naturalize my Schopenhauer and think of Darwin. We've evolved to readily die for our children. We can also die for flags as symbols of the chosen or elevated people (incarnations of Freedom or Rationality, etc.)

Presumably more intelligent and creative (and aggressive?) groups dominate other groups in the long run, which would seem to require a relatively more intense but still controlled expression of individuality. We might think of this as a deep bench when it comes to deciders. Adversarial discussions are like war simulations, safer than finding out the hard way that an idea sucks. This is seemingly analogous in evolutionary terms to a species 'investing' in the feeding of a larger brain. Because the tribe as a whole needs a coherent policy, individual candidate deciders need coherent policies. This is one possible explanation for coherence norms. I can disagree with you, but I can't (as a self) disagree with myself. In fact we end up doing so, so the self is like an infinite task of becoming more coherent.

However you come to realize that the ego is a kind of fixture of the mind, it's startling, yes. — frank

:up:

I agree. It's an exciting idea. I do think the shock wears off and one becomes interested in researching the consequences of this dropped assumption. If the self is a function of language, then we look into this curious 'house of being.' We can see around Cartesian assumptions of the self as that which is most inexorably given, along with its menagerie of Private Images and Ineffable Pains, etc.

Sure. You can't really dispense with the self though. Unless you want to become a homeless lunatic living under a bridge babbling and being hit in the head by rocks thrown by kids.

Sure. You can't really dispense with the self though. Unless you want to become a homeless lunatic living under a bridge babbling and being hit in the head by rocks thrown by kids. — frank

:up:

Of course. And I'm an ambitious fucker. I'm trying to drop some fresh memes. I'm not preaching against the softwhere but making it a theme within which to show off and gather prestige coins.

Presumably more intelligent and creative (and aggressive?) groups dominate other groups in the long run, which would seem to require a relatively more intense but still controlled expression of individuality — plaque flag

The Jews have the oldest known living culture. Opinions vary about what their secret might be.

Of course. And I'm an ambitious fucker. I'm trying to drop some memes. I'm not preaching against the softwhere but making it a theme within which to show off and gather prestige coins. — plaque flag

Why?