So, why speak about propositional knowledge at all then, why not speak about more or less justified propositional belief instead, thus dissolving all the attendant paradoxes, and saving us from going over and over this same old boring ground ad nauseum? — Janus

I think it is very hard to let the idea of knowledge go, because it carries a promise of certainty. Even if we did speak only about justified belief, we would still argue about what counts as justification. It is not an unimportant idea.

Sadly, every philosopher has to be convinced of everything for themselves. It's foundational that one cannot trust anyone on any subject. Perhaps it's overdone, but I don't think there is any cure that would not be worse than the disease.

What works, what is useful, what is pragmatic; or just that it's what we do? I'm not sure that the use of "pragmatic" isn't a bit too teleological, giving the impression of serving an 'ends' that isn't there. — Banno

At some point, there has to be a point when justifications come to an end and "it's just what we do" kicks in. I'm not dogmatic about where that point is, and I suspect that every generation will throw up people who can't resist asking questions and pushing beyond.

I agree with you that appeal to evolution should always be cautious and tentative. There are some dreadful cautionary tales. Fortunately, I'm not competent to go beyond gesturing in the direction of evolution without offering any specifics.

Do you want it to reflect current use in ordinary language? That is what dictionary definitions do, so the obvious thing would be to consult a good English dictionary — SophistiCat

:up:

So what is the perfect definition of knowledge? — Cidat

Is knowledge playing the role of an abstract hero here ? I think (?) you are looking into what kind of claims should be respected and trusted. As you say, we can't limit ourselves to infallible claims. In my view, it might be better to discuss the ideal philosopher or the truly rational person. I apologize if I'm way off on what you are ultimately getting at.

there has to be a point when justifications come to an end and "it's just what we do" kicks in. — Ludwig V

:up:

This makes sense, because it costs to doubt. Smooth operation is paused. I have to stop and make sure, 'waste time' questioning this or that, when I could be steaming ahead. Then there's the cost of feeding a complex nervous system, of calculating a massive model when a cheap model might be the better deal, all things considered.

Knowlege is experience, through which meanings are gained though fallible. Which can only be found fallible through another biological experience.

The JTB definition is at best a badly formulated account of knowledge, and at worst a useless account.

Whether we are dealing with the former or latter depends on the relationship between truth and justification, according to the user of the definition. Either, a justified proposition is always true (1), or it is not always true (2). In the latter case, justification may have the capacity, if sufficiently strong, to prove a proposition true (2a), or it may never have this capacity (2b). In the event of 2b, justification like plays the role of increasing the probability of a proposition being true; it's simply that this probability will never reach 1.

NB: In this section, I will simply assume justified propositions are beliefs.

_______________________

In the case of 2b, truth is an undecidable property, and thus makes knowledge a category of propositions of which we know no elements. In this case, knowledge becomes a pretty useless word; we can only speak of certain aspects of the elements of the set of knowledge, but we can not directly speak about any elements.

If one has this account of truth; a property that can never be certainly proven to apply to a proposition; then one is likely to speak of "probably true propositions"; and likely, one would adopt this set of propositions as one's set of knowledge. Thus, this account of truth calls for a different definition of knowledge; the JB definition. Likely, there'll also be some minimum threshold of justification required to for the status of being knowledge, so to call it the JB definition is a simplification.

In the case of 2a, an identity is, to some degree, drawn between proof of truth and justification. Put precisely, a proposition is proven true iff a proposition is sufficiently justified. Thus, such an account means knowledge could simply be defined as JB, though, there would need to be specified a threshold of justification. Note that TB would not necessarily be definition of knowledge under these kinds of epistemtic accounts, because unprovable truths may exist within some of them.

The possibility of 1 is drawing a complete identity between proof of truth and justification. Thus, the definition can be reduced to JB.

_________________________

Thus, in all cases, the criterion of being true within the JTB definition is either redundant, or, it makes the definition quite useless. Do not get me wrong, the concept of truth is important even for a radical skeptic; but most skeptics refer to facts and logic in their daily lives. By defining truth and knowledge in the way as proposed in response to 2b, one can continue to be skeptical about truth, and yet also retain the practicality of referring to knowledge.

Now, this critique has not even touched on the B of JTB. I find it somewhat problematic, given that it can pose a pointless obstacle in situations of non-skeptical accounts of truth. Let us say one's account says that the ZFC system is true. Now, let us say you go through the proof of the Banach-Tarski theorem, understanding everything. At the end of it however, you are not convinced (along with many others, hence the Banach-Tarski paradox). Now, you are in possession of a justified and true proposition, yet it is somehow not knowledge, just because it conflicts with your primitive, monkey-brained intuitions? Some may say my retort is a straw-man; to them, the purpose of the B is to include a phenomenological aspect of knowledge. However, the J is capable of doing that in a far less problematic way, granted one defines justification as something that is consciously applied to propositions.

If this feels reductive, one can always just define justified as the property of being consciously justified, and justifiable as the property of having the capacity to be justified. Thus, every justified proposition is justifiable, but not vice versa.

As you say, we can't limit ourselves to infallible claims. — green flag

That's right. And ordinary or natural language has a way of dealing with claims that are not true. We are expected to withdraw them, on pain of lying or misleading people. That applies to knowledge claims just as much as plain assertions.

Knowlege is experience, through which meanings are gained though fallible. — boagie

I think that the practice or skill of drawing conclusions from experience, which I call reason, plays a part. Don't you think?

Experience isn't a given, as it usually seems to be. There is a great deal of (unconscious) interpretation that has gone into processing the data before we are aware of it and more can be (consciously) done after we become aware of it

Thus, in all cases, the criterion of being true within the JTB definition is either redundant, or, it makes the definition quite useless. — Ø implies everything

I don't find much wrong with your analysis. Considered in the abstract, justification and truth are connected, so it seems that only one process is needed. But you are forgetting that in the third person, there are three people involved in the definition - subject, speaker and audience. If I say that she or he knows something, I need to know that it is true; but I also want to know that she or he is not guessing or basing the claim on some false or irrelevant evidence. This point gets obscured because we so often fall into thinking about "I know". Certainly justification and truth overlap in that case, which is why "I know" has little more than rhetorical impact.

"Know" as differentiated from "belief" has a very useful function, which "believe" cannot fulfil. It passes on information with an endorsement and a source, so there is some reason to trust it. "Believe" cannot do that, because (in the second or third person) it is compatible with the belief being false and so does not endorse it.

The most common definition is "Justified True Belief" — Cidat

Belief can depend on justification. Justification can depend on truth.

Example: I believe in moneys value (belief) . This is justified because others agree and behave in the same way (justification) . It is true because we all transact and buy things. (truth)

Justification can depend on belief, belief can depend on truth

Example: money can be used to buy things (justification) because people believe in its value (belief). They believe it because money bought stuff for them in the past (truth).

Truth can depend on justification. Justification can depend on belief.

Example: I bought an apple (truth) because money has been known to buy things (justification). It's value comes from the fact that everyone has agreed to believe so (belief).

Truth can depend on belief. Belief can depend on justification.

I bought an apple (truth) because everyone believes that is possible with the use money (belief), and that belief comes from the fact that it has been done before (justified).

No matter what dependency or inter-relationship there is between the three, the final result is the same.

However if we remove any of the three. The sequence fails.

@Ludwig V I don't see how the third person is relevant here.

We have three humans, H1, H2 and H3. P1 is the following proposition: "H2 knows P2."

P2 is the following proposition: "H3 knows P3". P3 is an arbitrary proposition.

Now, when does H1 know P1?

Well of course, that depends on your account of truth. If a proposition is (sufficiently) justified iff it is proven true iff it is knowledge, then:

(H1 knows P1) iff (H1 is justified in P1) iff (H1 is justified in thinking that H2 is justified in thinking P2) iff (H1 is justified in thinking that H2 is justified in thinking that H3 is justified in thinking P3).

At what point does the criterion of truth become necessary?

And what about the skeptical account of truth, where we may only approach in probabilistically and knowledge is defined as "sufficiently probable to be true", a property which we then call being justified?Well, then the same chain iffs is true.

This makes sense, because it costs to doubt. Smooth operation is paused. I have to stop and make sure, 'waste time' questioning this or that, when I could be steaming ahead. Then there's the cost of feeding a complex nervous system, of calculating a massive model when a cheap model might be the better deal, all things considered. — green flag

This would make sense if real people making real decisions argued about things like this, but it's only philosophers. Philosophers have lots of time to waste. Pausing smooth operation is what they, we, do.

Good points ! We are like wicked children, who question what they are told, because it feels good. But we are also anguished adults, truly troubled about whether X is right and whether Y could be true.

It passes on information with an endorsement and a source, so there is some reason to trust it. — Ludwig V

Right. Amplifying: I say that Sally knows P if

(1) Sally believes P
(2) Sally can justify her belief in P (according to current norms)
(3) I also believe P

I think we agree that this is an idealized definition. In other words, real life is messy and inconsistent. People use 'know' without much precision. So philosophers write a dictionary for the Utopia which will never arrive, which is probably good for their own thinking even in this world.

Good points ! We are like wicked children, who question what they are told, because it feels good. But we are also anguished adults, truly troubled about whether X is right and whether Y could be true. — green flag

Well, I am neither wicked nor anguished. I guess I'm just opinionated and stubborn.

Welcome to the forum.

Well, I am neither wicked nor anguished. I guess I'm just opinionated and stubborn. — T Clark

Oh, but I include 'opinionated and stubborn' under 'wicked.' (My point is that sometimes we just like to play with thoughts, while at other times it's no longer play but all too serious.)

Thanks for the welcome!

For any proposition P, "I know P, but P is not true" is a contradiction.

I don't see how the third person is relevant here. — Ø implies everything

I don't follow your iff sequences at all. Let me explain how the third person is relevant.

Let S be a person who knows something. Let p be the something that S knows. Let R be a person who wants to report to a third party that S knows that p. Let the third party be A.

S = subject (of S knows that p). p=proposition, known by S. R = person reporting that S knows that p. A = person to whom R is reporting (Audience)

"S knows that p" informs A that 1) p is true; 2) that S has the information and reason to believe it; and 3) that R accepts that both 1) and 2) are true.

OK?

I say that Sally knows P if

(1) Sally believes P
(2) Sally can justify her belief in P (according to current norms)
(3) I also believe P — green flag

I'm afraid that doesn't quite cut it, because if P is false, (1), (2), and (3) will still be true and hence it will still be true (on your definition) that Sally knows that P. Clause (3) has to be "P is true". It may make no difference at first sight, but this clause means that anyone who claims that Sally knows that P has to withdraw that claim if P turns out to be false.

At what point does the criterion of truth become necessary? — Ø implies everything

One can be justified in believing something even if it is false. The criterion of truth prevents that weakness from being passed on to knowledge.

I'm afraid that doesn't quite cut it, because if P is false, (1), (2), and (3) will still be true and hence it will still be true (on your definition) that Sally knows that P. — Ludwig V

Personally, I'm OK with that. I think it's too restrictive (possibly completely paralyzing, so that we couldn't honestly use the word) to require perfect certainty with the use of 'know.'

But let me reiterate that we are cowriting the dictionary of a utopia that will never arrive. The 'real' or 'more real' meaning of 'know' is a tangled mess to be empirically investigated.

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. Sadly, what we know does not always elicit belief. There are many examples of people committing to what they want to be true, rather than what they know to be true. If you can know a proposition p, and not believe p, then knowledge cannot be a species of belief. Additionally, belief can be suspended. Descartes tells us he was in his chamber when he was writing, showing he knew the facts of his situation, but chose to suspend belief in those facts. His suspension of belief in no way affected what he knew for a fact.

A much better definition is awareness of present intelligibility. To know something, it must be able to be known, aka intelligible. Objects typically make themselves present by acting on our senses. It frequently passes without notice that a sensed object modifying our neural state is (identically) our neural state being modified by the sensed object. In other words, our neural representation of an object is its action on us. It is by this action that the object makes itself present in us, awaiting our awareness. When we become aware of the neurally encoded information, we know it. Such awareness is knowledge as acquaintance.

As I explain in my recent article (discussed in a different thread) propositional knowledge derives from knowledge by acquaintance via abstraction and recombination.

Scientific knowledge is partly observational and so a case of sense based knowledge, or it is hypothetical, and so not knowledge as defined above. Still, "knowledge" is analogously predicated when we assert that well-confirmed theory as knowledge. (A is analogous to B if A is partly the same as, and partly different from B.) It is partly the same because it is founded in, and descriptive of, a broad range of sensory experience. It is partly different because it is not based on sufficient experience to preclude the need for further refinement or correction.

There are many examples of people committing to what they want to be true, rather than what they know to be true — Dfpolis

Let's have a few then...

our neural representation of an object is its action on us — Dfpolis

How does that work? Take me through the neurological processes you envisage bringing this about. Let's say you see a tree. We have some photons hitting the retina...what then?

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis

Hmm. That's a pretty broad notion of "will", there. I believe I'm a tad hungry, but I'm not willing myself to be hungry. Quite the opposite, since i need to drop a kilo or so.

Nor is an act of will involved in my committing to the proposition "I am hungry". It's more a recognition of a fact. I'm not saying "I choose the words "I am hungry" to set out how I am feeling", so much as a recognition that these are the right words here.

It appears to be contradictory to say "I know such-and-such, but I don't believe it". Of course, we might use such an expression, not to set out our state of mind, but to give voice to how startled we are that such-and-such is indeed the case. However saying we know something and yet do not believe it looks like a misuse of one term or the other - either we don't actually know it or we don't actually believe it.

When one suspends belief, as in the Descartes example you give, one does not thereby commit to the alternative being true. One might, for example simply be saying "yes, I know I'm in a nice warm room, but what if I weren't?"; or any of various other ideas usually associated with the philosophy of fictional writings. It's a long stretch to claim that since we might engage in a few modal musings, we don't believe what we say we know.

And Present ineligibility looks a but fraught. I know stuff that is not present to me... that Paris is in France, for example which is on the other side of the world from here.

Anyway, that might do for a bit. I'm not in agreement with you, shall we say.

Let's have a few then... — Isaac

Donald Trump in his claims that he had the largest crowd at his inauguration and that he won the 2020 election. Also, all who chose to believe him, knowing that there was no basis for doing so other than their own desire that it be so. People who know, but will not believe, that they have insufficient funds to buy what they want, and act on this commitment by buying it because they want it.

How does that work? Take me through the neurological processes you envisage bringing this about. Let's say you see a tree. We have some photons hitting the retina...what then? — Isaac

The object acts to scatter light into our eyes, activating its rods and cones. Some of these activate the optic nerves which convey the information through the ganglion axons to the optic chiasm where information from both eyes is combined. The signals then pass to the lateral geniculate thalami. Other neurons connect to primary visual cortex for processing, extracting features such as edges and colors. Thence, information is conveyed to the visual association cortex for integration with prior experience.

This complexity of visual precessing does not change the fact that without the action of the object, none of the consequent changes of neural state, which are our visual representation of the object, would exist. So, again, the action of the sensed object on our nervous system (as complex as it is) is identically our neural representation of the object.

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis

Hmm. That's a pretty broad notion of "will", there. I believe I'm a tad hungry, but I'm not willing myself to be hungry. Quite the opposite, since i need to drop a kilo or so. — Banno

To make a commitment is to will. In choosing, we are not merely more motivated toward one alternative than another, we commit to a line of action. We know there is a commitment when we act on the false belief as though it were true. We buy things we cannot afford or commit to the idea that a politician is really a moral person and so vote, when we know he or she is not.

Being hungry is not a commitment. It is a physiological state, and perhaps our awareness of that state. If will enters, it is only in choosing to attend to or ignore the neurally encoded information informing us of this state. Choosing how to respond to this information is the province of will.

Nor is an act of will involved in my committing to the proposition "I am hungry". It's more a recognition of a fact. — Banno

But, it is. I may pretend, to myself, that I am not hungry, even though I know that I am. Such a pretense is committing to, believing, the false proposition that I am not really hungry.

It appears to be contradictory to say "I know such-and-such, but I don't believe it". — Banno

As I have defined these acts, no contradiction is involved. Descartes knew he was in his chamber, but chose to suspend his belief in it. In watching a movie or play, we enter a state aptly described as "a willing suspension of disbelief."

I agree that people often use "know" and "believe" interchangeably. I have given technical definitions to distinguish my use of the terms in this discussion from their common use. Clearly, those to propose to define knowledge as "justified true belief," or "causally justified true belief" must mean something different by "knowledge" and "belief." If they did not, the definition would be circular. Such a definition assumes that there can be false beliefs that are not knowledge. There is no reason that knowledge and a commitment to a contradiction of knowledge cannot co-exist.

When one suspends belief, as in the Descartes example you give, one does not thereby commit to the alternative being true. — Banno

Agreed. But, if knowledge were a type of belief, we could not know without believing. Believing would be a necessary condition to have knowledge. That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing.

And Present ineligibility looks a but fraught. I know stuff that is not present to me... that Paris is in France, for example which is on the other side of the world from here. — Banno

If you think about it, this knowledge depends on a chain of action that can be traced back to the city acting on a subject's senses. If your knowledge is true, that sort of action is in you indirectly. If that action were not in you, at least indirectly, you might have an unjustified belief, but it would not be knowledge.

This means that we cannot always know that we know. This is not problematic, because we know we can be and have been deceived.

Your explanation is no different than mine, except for how you denote the three people involved. H1 = S, H2 = R, H3 = A. Additionally, my explanation is also denoting the propositions regarding S's and R's knowledge, which I denoted as P1 and P2, respectively. The proposition which you denoted as p was denoted as P3 in my comment. I think you'll get my iffs sequence upon rereading it now, given the mapping I've provided here.

One can be justified in believing something even if it is false. The criterion of truth prevents that weakness from being passed on to knowledge. — Ludwig V

This is the very notion I argued against with my first comment on this thread. You did not express any disagreement then, except for in the third person case, which I still do not see how you've shown makes truth a necessary condition.

If you read my first comment on this thread, you'll see how adding the criterion of truth introduces a different, more damaging weakness, in the event one has a skeptical account of truth.

If you read my first comment on this thread, you'll see how adding the criterion of truth introduces a different, more damaging weakness, in the event one has a skeptical account of truth. — Ø implies everything

But I don't have a sceptical account of truth!

Your first comment, if the software is working correctly, includes:-

Whether we are dealing with the former or latter depends on the relationship between truth and justification, according to the user of the definition. Either, a justified proposition is always true (1), or it is not always true (2). In the latter case, justification may have the capacity, if sufficiently strong, to prove a proposition true (2a), or it may never have this capacity (2b). In the event of 2b, justification like plays the role of increasing the probability of a proposition being true; it's simply that this probability will never reach 1. — Ø implies everything

I inferred from the first sentence that you were considering "I know.." as a speech act. It seems that I was wrong to conclude that. We both agree, I think, in the first-person statement, the truth condition is clearly redundant. "I know.." is cognitively identical to "I believe..". It's meaning, if any, is purely rhetorical. But if we abandon the truth condition, as you seem to want to do, "know" becomes indistinguishable from "believe".

In the case of third- and second - person uses, there is a point to the truth-condition. Without it, "know" again collapses into "believe", as I pointed out here: -

I'm afraid that doesn't quite cut it, because if P is false, (1), (2), and (3) will still be true and hence it will still be true (on your definition) that Sally knows that P. — Ludwig V

It is true that, in a sense, the most that I can convey is that I (the speaker) also believe that P. But the truth condition is also a commitment to abandon my claim if p should turn out to be false.

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis

There’s a great deal packed in to your first post. But your starting-point is

Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis

So I shall start with that. There are a couple of points from your second post at the end.

I’m not a fan of the concept of “the will”. I don’t understand what it means. It seems to be an attempt to sweep up into one category all the various beginnings of action. But our actions are very various and have many different beginnings. Moreover, while it seems reasonable to suppose there is a beginning to most beliefs, it isn’t clear to me that that all actions have the same beginning or that the beginning can be called an action of the same kind as cooking a meal or starting the car.

Coming to believe that p is often simply accepting or recognizing that p is true. Nothing more is needed. It is true that other considerations may affect that process, usually sub- or un- consciously. As you note, “Sadly, what we know does not always elicit belief. There are many examples of people committing to what they want to be true, rather than what they know to be true.” But you are taking a partial view here. There are also many examples of people accepting a situation that they very much do not want to be true.

Coming to believe something is very seldom like making a commitment, in the way that choosing one sandwich rather than another or accepting God into your life or getting married are commitments. We can, it is true, decide to believe p rather than q. But that is only an appropriate description if p and q have the same or similar weight of evidence. “Deciding to believe” would be a misdescription when I find out that p or notice that q.

Descartes is astonishingly casual in introducing his suspension of belief, and I’m not at all sure that I really understand it. Clearly, he did not suspend his belief that he was holding a pen and writing on paper. We have the evidence of the text he wrote.

However, it is true that sometimes people don’t accept the conclusion of what looks like a conclusive argument or conclusive experiences. It is a paradoxical situation. Perhaps we could say that the scintilla of doubt that there might be some mistake or get-out clause is relied to delay acceptance of the inevitable.

the consequent changes of neural state, which are our visual representation of the object, — Dfpolis

No brain state is our visual representation of the object. We can't see it, and if we did, we would not know what we are looking at.

That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing. — Dfpolis

Suspending belief isn't the same as ceasing belief. I'm required to suspend disbelief while hearing or reading or watching a fictional story. That doesn't mean I stop believing anything, any more than it means I start believing that the story is true. One interpretation of the phrase that has been suggested elsewhere, (but I'm afraid I've forgotten where) is that we are asked to consider "what if.." Alternatively, Banno suggests that Descartes' project consists of

modal musings, — Banno

Going from JTB to JB does not make knowledge into belief, by definition of JB as "justified belief", in which a belief is merely an emotional conviction, whereas "justified" (not "justifiable") is an emotional conviction that the belief is correctly supported. There are theists who exemplify the state of feeling that one's conviction is true, yet simultaneously not feeling that it is justified. That is, these theist have, in their own eyes and others', unjustified beliefs.

If you do not have a skeptical account of truth, that means (sufficient) justification is an undeniable proof of truth. Thus, if you know that John knows P, you also know P, because if P were false, then John does not know P, which means you do not know that John knows P, which contradicts the premise. This can be expanded to the case that involves three people, four people, etc.

If you disagree, could you formalize the event in which (sufficient) justification is certain, yet being (sufficiently) justified in knowing someone else is (sufficiently) justified in knowing P can somehow coexist with P being false?

I think knowledge could be defined as "Beliefs based on highly-tested perception" or "The best explanation for sensory evidence."

I’m not a fan of the concept of “the will”. I don’t understand what it means. It seems to be an attempt to sweep up into one category all the various beginnings of action. But our actions are very various and have many different beginnings. Moreover, while it seems reasonable to suppose there is a beginning to most beliefs, it isn’t clear to me that that all actions have the same beginning or that the beginning can be called an action of the same kind as cooking a meal or starting the car. — Ludwig V

Thank you for commenting.

I do not see will as the beginning of action. Physical action can be traced back to the Big Bang, and if multiverse theories are true, perhaps prior to that. More proximately human, humans are psychophysical organisms and have multiple, incommensurate needs. Some, like breathing, are normally dealt with automatically, others, like that for social relationships, require thought. Employing the strategy that AI researchers call "generate and test," we imagine several possible, but mutually incompatible, lines of action to meet our needs. These we subject to conscious reflection.

Because our needs are incommensurate (e.g., we cannot trade off between our need for oxygen and our need for calories or vitamin C), we cannot decide on the plan to be implemented based on the maximization of some utility (as utilitarians believe).

Metaphysical naturalists (who are not naturalists, but physicalists who seem to believe that intentional acts are un- or supernatural) would have us believe that this intentional issue is resolved by a purely physical process. I pointed out in my recent JCER paper (https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/1042/1035) that physical operations have physical, not intentional, effects. Committing to a line of action is an intentional act in Franz Brentano's sense, because we do not simply commit, we commit to something. So, commitments exhibit aboutness.

So, we are left with multiple possibilities and the need to actualize one in light of conscious reflection by an intentional act. Since we resolve such issues daily, we have the power to make such commitments. I am calling this power (which is not a thing) "will." It is different from our capacity to know (the "intellect") as we can know without committing.

Coming to believe that p is often simply accepting or recognizing that p is true. — Ludwig V

I distinguish accepting from recognizing. Acceptance is the result of a choice, in which not accepting is a possible result. In recognition, there is no alternative. There may be a prior choice to attend to or ignore information, but once we attend to it, we are aware of it, which is no different from recognizing it. So, if you say that believing is accepting, we agree. If you say it is recognizing, you are speaking of what I am calling "knowing."

But you are taking a partial view here. There are also many examples of people accepting a situation that they very much do not want to be true. — Ludwig V

Advancing evidence that supports a conclusion is not taking a partial view, unless one ignores evidence against the conclusion. I agree: many people align their beliefs with their knowledge, however painful they may find it.

“Deciding to believe” would be a misdescription when I find out that p or notice that q. — Ludwig V

Yes, because such acts describe knowing p or q. Suppose that I find out that the perihelion of Mercury precesses at a rate that is incompatible with Newtonian mechanics. I can decide to maintain a prior belief in Newtonian mechanics, or say it is inadequate. My commitment will affect my subsequent acts. Some may be private, in how I think about nature. Some may be public, in my teaching or work.

Descartes is astonishingly casual in introducing his suspension of belief, and I’m not at all sure that I really understand it. Clearly, he did not suspend his belief that he was holding a pen and writing on paper. We have the evidence of the text he wrote. — Ludwig V

My distinction between knowing and believing allows us to understand what he did. He knew he was in his chamber, writing, but chose to believe he might not be. The same applies to what you describe in your next paragraph.

No brain state is our visual representation of the object. We can't see it, and if we did, we would not know what we are looking at. — Ludwig V

I make this very point in my paper in discussing David M. Armstrong's proprioception theory of consciousness (p. 98). Still, I hope to be forgiven for using conventional language in order to simplfy the discussion. I cannot address every point in a single post, a single article, or even a single book.

My preferred language is to call the neural modification induced by the action of the object on our senses a "presentation." A re-presentation occurs when we recall the experience. It is "enhanced"/modified by the memory and recall process. Neither is a representation in the sense that a picture or a text is. They are instrumental signs, which must be recognized to be what they are before they can signify. Our neural encoding need not to recognized to be neural connections and/or activation rates before it can signify. Nor is its whole existence (all that it can and does do) to be a sign, as would be the case if it were a formal sign. So, it is sui generis.

Suspending belief isn't the same as ceasing belief. I'm required to suspend disbelief while hearing or reading or watching a fictional story. — Ludwig V

You are quite right. I overreached for another example.

Still, it shows that beliefs are commitments with behavioral consequences that bare knowledge does not have. It is because of the suspension of belief that we can respond emotionally to a story. Commitments have behavioral consequences knowledge does not have.

Thus, if you know that John knows P, you also know P, because if P were false, then John does not know P, which means you do not know that John knows P, which contradicts the premise. — Ø implies everything

But if I know that John knows that p, I do know that p is true. If p had been false, I wouldn't have known
that John knows that p. What's the problem?

Going from JTB to JB does not make knowledge into belief, by definition of JB as "justified belief", in which a belief is merely an emotional conviction, whereas "justified" (not "justifiable") is an emotional conviction that the belief is correctly supported. — Ø implies everything

Then either you are changing the definition of belief. The differential of belief and knowledge is normally thought to be that a belief is still a belief even if it is false. This is perfectly compatible with some beliefs being justified and some not. Emotion does not justify a belief unless the emotion is justified. If that is the case, the justification of the emotion also justifies the belief. You are also changing the definition of knowledge, by allowing that it might be false and still be knowledge. Your argument about John presupposes that if p is false, p is merely believed, not known.

There are theists who exemplify the state of feeling that one's conviction is true, yet simultaneously not feeling that it is justified. That is, these theist have, in their own eyes and others', unjustified beliefs. — Ø implies everything

I think you misunderstand "God exists". It is what is called a hinge proposition, like an axiom. Everything is interpreted in the light of this. Justification starts from that, and it would be inappropriate to try to justify it.

I am calling this power (which is not a thing) "will." — Dfpolis

I'm sorry if I led you to believe that I thought that "will" is a thing (object/state?). But my criticism was not about that. Your belief that all actions of whatever kind stem from a single power is a distortion through over-simplification. Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs.

My preferred language is to call the neural modification induced by the action of the object on our senses a "presentation." — Dfpolis

I find it hard to see why you want to call something a presentation when it is never presented to anyone or anything.

He knew he was in his chamber, writing, but chose to believe he might not be. — Dfpolis

If Descartes thought he might not be in his chamber writing, one might have expected him to be rather alarmed and to stop writing while he worked where he was and what he was doing. But he never stops believing that he is in his chamber writing.

Your belief that all actions of whatever kind stem from a single power is a distortion through over-simplification. Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs. — Ludwig V

I thought I dispensed with that misunderstanding. I pointed to multiple motivating factors from which action stems. Still, given multiple conceptual possibilities (lines of action), one needs to be actualized. That actualization is a specific kind of intentional act. Do you disagree? It would violate the principle of parsimony to posit multiple powers doing the same sort of actualization (committing to a line of action).

Also, since a power is not a thing, but a capability, either humans have the capability of actualizing one to the lines of action we contemplate, or we don't. If we don't, we could never pass from the contemplation of diverse plans to the implementation of one. So, we have the power I am calling "will."

Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs. — Ludwig V

I already said that.

I find it hard to see why you want to call something a presentation when it is never presented to anyone or anything. — Ludwig V

Because objects act on the senses to inform the nervous system, thereby presenting themselves for possible attention. When we choose to attend (focus awareness on) to them, we actualize their intelligibility, knowing them.

The actions by which they inform our senses are not the only ones they are capable of. As a result, our knowledge is partial, not exhaustive. Still, we know that they can act as they do act on us.

If Descartes thought he might not be in his chamber writing, one might have expected him to be rather alarmed and to stop writing while he worked where he was and what he was doing. But he never stops believing that he is in his chamber writing. — Ludwig V

Thinking he was not would be alarming. Thinking he might not be -- not so much.

He tells us he has doubts. Doubts question his commitment to the truth of what he continues to know and believe. If the doubts prevail, he will continue to perceive, and so know, that he is in his chamber, but he will no longer be committed to the truth of what he knows. So, there is a difference between knowing and believing as I have defined them.