When is something in evolution a difference in kind and not just a difference in degree? — schopenhauer1

For Deleuze, there is no difference in kind without a difference in degree, and vice versa, either with regard to biological or psychological phenomena. The challenge he presents is how to rethink natural structures and organizations starting from this basis.

Very obtuse.

We have very little innate modules and much of our way of surviving in the world is learned habits and deliberative reasoning based on heuristics that could be comprised of. beneficial or poor methods to obtain goals all of which are themselves constructed from preferences based on heiristics built over time. — schopenhauer1

This is a controversial issue that I've been reading and thinking about recently. I think your statement is wrong. I think our thinking is heavily influenced by innate modules. Not certain. Working on it. It's likely a combination of both. I know @apokrisis agrees with you.

At what point do you think that this general processing ability- whereby there is much plasticity in how we behave and thus plasticity in our ways of survival, makes this ability some thing that is a difference in kind not just a degree in evolutionary, biological, and psychological terms? — schopenhauer1

It's not that I don't think we have a powerful general processing ability, but I don't think you can ignore what is built in from the start. I don't think there's anything wrong with calling them instincts.

I'll answer this question with another question - Is it actually true that there is a discontinuity in cognitive ability between humans and other living things? I guess so, if you ignore all the extinct ancestors to our species. I was going to say more but I'm walking on thin intellectual ice now. I'll leave it at that.

It's not that I don't think we have a powerful general processing ability, but I don't think you can ignore what is built in from the start. I don't think there's anything wrong with calling them instincts. — T Clark

Can you define instinct? I am not being cheeky. This is immensely important yet elusive, even in zoology, biology, and certainly evolutionary psychology (if that is even amenable to strict scientific principles), I think this is not quite nailed down. An ape learning to use tools to pull termites and an otter in heat are two different things, so perhaps that points the way... Why is the otter trying to hump the other one three times per year? It can't help but try to hump the otter. It literally can't deliberate and think otherwise about it. That is the MO of the otter for those brief periods.

I'll answer this question with another question - Is it actually true that there is a discontinuity in cognitive ability between humans and other living things? — T Clark

I am posing the question and thus, clearly I am asking thee.

Can you define instinct? — schopenhauer1

This is from "What is an Instinct" by William James:

Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance. — William James - What is an Instinct

[Edited to remove confusing quote]

This is from "The Language Instinct" by Stephen Pinker:

Darwin concluded that language ability is “an instinctive tendency to acquire an art,” a design that is not peculiar to humans but seen in other species such as song-learning birds. — Stephen Pinker - The Language Instinct

I am posing the question and thus, clearly I am asking thee. — schopenhauer1

I'll modify the answer above so as not to be quite as wishy-washy:

I guess so Yes, if you ignore all the extinct ancestors to our species. If you don't ignore our most recent ancestors, I think the answer is "no," but I'm not sure.

I am not sure what you are saying. Yes, I've read the Language Instinct by Pinker. That is one theory. Even if it is, language indeed does seem a difference in kind. That very short snippet you posited doesn't get at the fact that Pinker thinks the language faculty is indeed quite unique to humans. Communication, through sound, movement, or otherwise, is not necessarily language. Perhaps dolphins and whales have a primitive language. But this isn't fully generative. It is language with the fully deliberative aspect of humans that make it perhaps unique in kind not just degree.

The instinct for language, as humans use it, seem to be a difference in kind. We learn through language, we think in language, we deliberate on various counterfactuals and past events. We can reflect on the reflection of a reflection seemingly infinitely.

I am not sure what you are saying. — schopenhauer1

I was only answering your question "What is an Instinct." I probably should have left out the Pinker quote. It seems to have confused things.

language indeed does seem a difference in kind. — schopenhauer1

As I noted, it was a mistake to include the Pinker quote.

That is one theory. — schopenhauer1

I noted in my response that the issue is controversial.

The instinct for language, as humans use it, seem to be a difference in kind. — schopenhauer1

Is I indicated in my response, that's only true if you ignore the most recent human ancestors. Which brings us back the question of when human cognitive ability evolved. I guess the answer is that there is continuity between animal and human cognition. It's a slope, not a jump.

I guess the answer is that there is continuity between animal and human cognition. It's a slope, not a jump. — T Clark

I’ll include our ancestors in it. Obviously that was involved, but even if it happened over 2 million years or in a day, I don’t think that informs degree or kind. I speak of the human that has all our faculties as we have them in modern humans. Is this a difference in kind? Deliberative, constantly iterative, many degrees of plasticity, self-reflective, language based creatures, as we are now.

I speak of the human that has all our faculties as we have them in modern humans. — schopenhauer1

Homo heidelbergensis lived until about 200,000 years ago, They are considered the immediate ancestor to homo sapiens. The earliest bones of h. sapiens have been dated to just about the same time.

There's probably no benefit for us to go on. We're defining the differences between animals and humans using different standards. It's a matter of perspective. I doubt either one of us is going to change our mind.

We're defining the differences between animals and humans using different standards. — T Clark

I do not believe we have been. Rather, you keep asking about our ancestors implying this has an impact on degree vs kind in modern humans. It is precisely the idea that we are different on our very general processing brain than animals who do not have:

Deliberative, constantly iterative, many degrees of plasticity, self-reflective, language based creatures, as we are now. — schopenhauer1

Further ones that:

we deliberate on various counterfactuals and past events. We can reflect on the reflection of a reflection seemingly infinitely. — schopenhauer1

Yes, perhaps we are degrees from ancestral humans but clearly I mean non-humanoid. But that’s the point. At what point is it a degree versus a kind. You seem to be backhandedly stumbling to an answer maybe. Are we really degrees away from a chimp or a dolphin or whatnot or is it rather that there is something wholly different with a brain that is almost completely general processing?

Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance.
— William James - What is an Instinct — T Clark

Darwin used the word instinct in a number of different ways—to refer to what impels a bird to breed; to a disposition, such as courage or obstinacy in a dog; to selectively bred patterns of behaviour such as the tumbling movements of tumbler pigeons; to feelings such as sympathy in people; and to stereotyped actions such as those employed by honeybees when constructing the cells of a honeycomb. It is regrettable that Darwin did not make the distinctions of the meaning of instinct more explicit, for he gave powerful precedent for the indiscriminate use of the word, the ambiguity of which has repeatedly clouded and confused the understanding of behaviour. — https://www.britannica.com/topic/instinct

Some people might make rather simplistic analogies: “X animal gets jealous and feels happy as do humans”. Degree not kind. Case closed. That might be more like saying a bat, a flying bird, and a flying insect must be a difference in degree because they all can fly or have wings.

So I can see the degree people using dolphins, apes, birds, and such and studies in communication and problem solving for their evidence. But is this really degree? At what point does something become wholly unique to that animals set of traits? General processing with very few innate components seems to be a defining trait. One of kind, not just a few degrees away.

When is something in evolution a difference in kind and not just a difference in degree? — schopenhauer1

To first address this question, without getting into the philosophy of biology in which problematics emerge regarding how a species should be demarcated, from a relative distance at least: the most rudimentary difference in kind among lifeforms occurs when speciation occurs. All members of a given species are the same kind of lifeform, and are differentiable from other species, these being different kinds of lifeforms - even if they all belong to the same genus. Whereas differences of degree that are devoid of differences in kind will, tmk, only be deemed to occur within a given species.

So appraised, Homo Sapiens are a unique kind of lifeform. But then so too are all other species of life out there. And all species evolve, sometimes speciating into new kinds, given a sufficient period of time and given that they don’t perish.

At what point do you think that this general processing ability- whereby there is much plasticity in how we behave and thus plasticity in our ways of survival, makes this ability some thing that is a difference in kind not just a degree in evolutionary, biological, and psychological terms? — schopenhauer1

This question is to my mind strictly philosophical rather than being a biological or evolutionary one.

For example, each individual organism is unique in certain respects, but this for most would be insufficient to declare that each individual organism is its own kind of lifeform. Similarly, should we declare the unique mathematical genius of a particular human, for instance, to be an intellect kind that is metaphysically divided from those of all other humans on account of its uniqueness? This rather than it being viewed by a difference in degree?

More generally, how can awareness, as an aspect of life, be deemed to not hold any continuity between different types, here meaning species, of lifeforms? With such an evolutionary continuity then also comes different degrees of magnitude of awareness and different degrees of quality of awareness. The ameba and the human then holding vast differences in their magnitude and quality of awareness despite there being a continuity between the two - such that the differences in their awareness could be deemed a matter of degree on a very extreme spectrum.

Philosophically, I strongly favor there being a continuity among the psyches of different species of life, including that of humans. But I don’t know how to convincingly make this point to somehow inclined to view humans via, for lack of a better analogy, a Biblical-like metaphysics wherein a supposed existential division of being occurs between soul-endowed humans and soul-devoid lesser lifeforms. (To me, either all life is endowed with an evolutionary continuity of soul/anima or else no life is endowed with soul - but I see neither evidence nor logical cohesion for there being a division between lifeforms with a soul and lifeforms devoid of soul.)

Biblical-like metaphysics wherein a supposed existential division of being occurs between soul-endowed humans and soul-devoid lesser lifeforms. (To me, either all life is endowed with an evolutionary continuity of soul/anima or else no life is endowed with soul - but I see neither evidence nor logical cohesion for there being a division between lifeforms with a soul and lifeforms devoid of soul.) — javra

False dichotomy. I’m not implying nor would I imply anything like that.

False dichotomy. I’m not implying nor would I imply anything like that. — schopenhauer1

I didn’t presume that you were. I did however, however mistakenly, presume that you were exploring the possibility of some type of metaphysical divide between humans and lesser animals - to which what you quoted of my post was supposed to be an analogy … since it does present one such form of a metaphysical divide. This notion of a metaphysical divide (however it might be envisioned) being something never found in what I take to be non-Abrahamic mindsets; for one example, such as in typical polytheistic systems wherein lesser lifeforms can be considered kindred spirits.

At any rate, while I don’t presume you filter the OP’s question via a theistic lens, it so far does seem to ask whether there occurs a metaphysical divide between lifeforms. Am I wrong in this?

I'm sure some evolutionary reasons. Our evolutionary path was that of flexibility over specific modules to handle situations. These in turn, were probably a kind of Red Queen scenario where each new advantage created its own problems which needed more ratcheting. So for example, it may have started out simply with walking upright continually, which freed up hands for tools. As with other primates, tool-use is not new. But the complete freedom from using hands for mobility and bipedalism created the opportunity for more exploration. This in turn favored higher rates of pre-frontal cortex formations for abstract and long-term planning. This created the situation where social pressures needed even more ratcheting for there to be awareness of intent and understanding social relations. The shift to some language-based thinking that could have been due to various mutations (FOXp2 gene for example), along with exaptations like the the mirror-neuron system (that is just one idea), might have helped in developing dedicated regions like Wernicke and Broca's region of the brain. This in turn ratcheted up things exponentially as symbolic thought combined with a general processing brain (not specified to certain tasks and responses), created the goal-directed, reason-producing, narrative creating human being we saw appear 500,000-150,000 years ago.

But though interesting, I am trying to showcase the burden that this kind of cognition carries. We are an animal that knows it does not have to, but does it anyways. A chimp forages and hunts in its environment but it almost certainly doesn't have to motivate itself. Sure depression is something that can be seen in animals, but it is not necessarily the same as a daily struggle for providing reasons. We know there are nasty, shitty, crappy, negative aspects that we don't want to encounter, and we must grapple with that and overcome that. If we didn't, we would literally die. — schopenhauer1

So appraised, Homo Sapiens are a unique kind of lifeform. But then so too are all other species of life out there. And all species evolve, sometimes speciating into new kinds, given a sufficient period of time and given that they don’t perish. — javra

Yes agreed. But do other animals have this cognitively general processing unit? This kind is different not in its specialization but in its GENERALIZATION. It is this I'd like to focus on. This is quite different. We didn't get better at a set of innate things (echo location, egg flipping, great scent, etc.). We don't just have a set way we get the things we need to survive. But it's not just that, it is the fact that we have infinitely iterative ways of surviving. But not only that, it is based on the fact that as deliberative, language-based animals, we can create virtual worlds of internal culture, and personal value that we weigh our actions against, creating yet more exponentially different ways of being. This brain vastly plastic and continually iterative and learning from its learning about learning about learning.

More generally, how can awareness, as an aspect of life, be deemed to not hold any continuity between different types, here meaning species, of lifeforms? With such an evolutionary continuity then also comes different degrees of magnitude of awareness and different degrees of quality of awareness. The ameba and the human then holding vast differences in their magnitude and quality of awareness despite there being a continuity between the two - such that the differences in their awareness could be deemed a matter of degree on a very extreme spectrum. — javra

Agreed here.

Yes agreed. But do other animals have this cognitively general processing unit? This kind is different not in its specialization but in its GENERALIZATION. It is this I'd like to focus on. This is quite different. We didn't get better at a set of innate things (echo location, egg flipping, great scent, etc.). We don't just have a set way we get the things we need to survive. But it's not just that, it is the fact that we have infinitely iterative ways of surviving. But not only that, it is based on the fact that as deliberative, language-based animals, we can create virtual worlds of internal culture, and personal value that we weigh our actions against, creating yet more exponentially different ways of being. This brain vastly plastic and continually iterative and learning from its learning about learning about learning. — schopenhauer1

We are the most generalist species that we know of by far. And clearly only humans communicate via the use of words. As to other animals having a lesser degree of generalized cognition ability than that which we have, chimpanzees immediately come to my mind. They exhibit an impressive amount of cultural variation in the wild. As one reference:

Abstract

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation1,2,3,4,5,6,7. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation. This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans8,9,10,11. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted. Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds12,13. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures14 but previously unrecognised in non-human species. — https://www.nature.com/articles/21415

Boldface mine.

Bonobos, or pygmy chimps, have tmk been studied a lot less in the wild, thought they exhibit a more developed cognition than chimps in captivity, as in learned symbolic communication (interestingly, they're also far more comfortable than chimps in walking upright - and, unlike chimps, they can also smile when feeling pleased). And we know far less about elephants and dolphins which could also hold cultural plasticity and, at least anecdotally, give evidence of advanced communication skills.

Just remembered what I take to be another interesting tidbit. Gorillas might know how to use plants for medicinal purposes, though more research is required to establish that such plant use is intentional and ailment specific. But, if so, such knowledge could to my mind only be described as culturally transmitted. As a highlight from the link:

The most common medical problems that affect mountain gorillas are respiratory infections, diarrhea, and intestinal parasites. The main disease challenges for the local human population are similar. Surveys have shown that traditional healers who live near the park use up to 183 different plants, of which 110 grow wild in Volcanoes National Park and the remaining 73 are cultivated by people in their gardens. Of the 110 medicinal plants found in the park, 55 are known to be consumed by gorillas.
...
Researchers discovered, by using chromatography, that similar plant species contained a number of organic properties known to have positive effects against bacteria and parasites that cause diarrhea and respiratory diseases. These findings led to more questions for researchers: "Do the gorillas treat themselves by seeking specific plants, or does their constant intake of a variety of plant material end up being a preventive measure?" — https://gorillafund.org/uncategorized/do-gorillas-use-plants-as-medicine/

We are going to split hairs at this point because in theory, I have no preference for degree or kind. But the degree gets to be exponential once we factor in not just variation in culture, but the virtual worlds I am talking about. That is to say, the indefinite ways that we can be self-referential. Not that I am saying these articles and quotes are anywhere near consensus, but it is just an example of the general idea:

In sum, our discussion points to the broad conclusion that all natural dependencies admissible in human language are Merge-generable, including certain types of nested, cross-serial, and transformational (such as filler-gap/movement) dependencies, and that non-Merge-generable dependencies of any type are extraneous to the human language faculty. There are only abstract hierarchical phrase structures in human language, generated all the way through via Merge. Here, we provided a novel set of neuroimaging data that confirm this general picture, thus corroborating the overarching hypothesis that human language at its core is a surprisingly simple system of unbounded Merge, and that Merge is the single generative engine underlying every aspect of linguistic computations. — Frontiers In Article

The significance of language lies in its capacity to express and communicate meaning, which includes our experiences, beliefs, intentions, and values. This capacity is founded on the ability to construe reality, i.e. to mentally represent it and make sense of it. Conception is not a passive reflection of the external world, but an active process that entails selective attention, highlighting of aspects, and organization into patterns. These patterns are abstracted from experience, both perceptual and introspective, and become structured in a cognitive grammar. Language is the vehicle for these structures, which are brought to bear on the interpretation of linguistic expressions. — Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World" by Ronald W. Langacker

Language is the key symbolic adaptation that has enabled humans to accumulate and transmit culture, including cooperative social practices, technology, ethical codes, and knowledge of the natural world. The development of language reflects a confluence of evolutionary and developmental events that led to the co-evolution of brains and communication systems, including the growth of cortical brain regions involved in auditory processing, vocal learning, and syntactic analysis. As a result, human communication exhibits unique properties, such as the ability to express an unlimited range of meanings, displace talk to other times and places, and create recursive structures of great complexity. These properties, which are absent in the communication systems of other animals, reflect distinctive features of the human brain and its relation to social and cultural processes. — The Symbolic Species- Terrence Deacon

The creative aspect of language use can be seen most easily in the ability to produce an unbounded number of new sentences, quite unlike any that have been previously encountered.

Language is a complex, uniquely human cognitive ability that allows us to communicate with one another, to express our thoughts and feelings, and to create an infinite variety of novel sentences. While other animals also have systems of communication, they are not able to acquire language in the way that humans do, and their communication systems are limited in their expressive power and flexibility."

We possess an elaborate and highly articulated system of knowledge of language, which is both tacit and explicit, and which reflects the experience of a lifetime. This knowledge, together with the highly articulated system of sensory-motor capacities, provides the basis for the production and comprehension of an unbounded variety of expressions, each with its own meaning, conveyed in a way that is sensitive to a potentially unlimited number of conditions. — Language and Mind by Noam Chomsky

The recursive mind has allowed us to transcend the limitations of our senses, and to inhabit a world of possibilities, independent of immediate circumstances. It has allowed us to engage in science, to imagine alternative scenarios, to predict the future, and to entertain multiple perspectives on a situation."
"Recursion is a process that allows us to generate an indefinitely large set of hierarchically structured objects or ideas, each of which can be analyzed in terms of smaller components that are themselves instances of the same kinds of objects or ideas."
"The recursive capacity is what allows us to create complex grammars, to generate infinite sentences, to use pronouns, and to talk about things that are not present. It is also what allows us to think about the future, to make plans, and to imagine hypothetical scenarios."
"The recursive mind is the key to our creativity, our sense of self, and our ability to navigate complex social environments. It is what allows us to create art, music, literature, and science, and to pass on our cultural heritage to future generations. — The Recursive Mind: The Origins of Human Language, Thought, and Civilization by Michael C. Corballis

All of these quotes point to the "virtual world" that I am trying to convey.

Interesting! Don't get me wrong. I respect the variety of ways animals live in the world, and actually admire them more than our own. It is because of these "kinds" of capacities that we have that I think humans aren't necessarily "special" - not in the religious sense you were conveying with some elite status, but rather with existential burdens of self-awareness and self-motivational ways of going about the world. We must constantly renew every day why we do anything. It is precisely when our brain "shuts off" that we seek the most value: "Flow states", "meditative states", "good night's sleep", "zoning out". We don't want to be in continual discursive thought, but we want to be taken away from it. Other animals are already there. We have to constantly "get there" or "get caught up in something" to get there. It is why we look at other animals, especially companion ones with such love and loyalty, and perhaps even envy. They embody simply being, and not constantly grappling with being.

We are going to split hairs at this point because in theory, I have no preference for degree or kind. But the degree gets to be exponential once we factor in not just variation in culture, but the virtual worlds I am talking about. — schopenhauer1

I'm myself fully onboard with this notion: an "exponential" difference of degree. So maybe we don't have any major differences on this point after all. Again, my own view is that there is yet an evolutionary continuity despite the reality of this drastic differentiation - such that there is not metaphysical divide between lifeforms - but, as it now seems, that's neither here nor there in relation to the OP.

It is because of these "kinds" of capacities that we have that I think humans aren't necessarily "special" - not in the religious sense you were conveying with some elite status, but rather with existential burdens of self-awareness and self-motivational ways of going about the world. — schopenhauer1

I think this to be obvious, so I'm in agreement. In parallel, with great ability comes the burden of greater responsibility.

It is precisely when our brain "shuts off" that we seek the most value: "Flow states", "meditative states", "good night's sleep", "zoning out". — schopenhauer1

Interesting perspective. I find that being in the zone, or in flow states, is antithetical to zoning out. Yes, the questioning, chattering aspects of mind vanish in both cases, but in the first we are effortlessly (so to speak) accomplishing our goals. Wheres with the second we don't progress anywhere. For me, in an ideal case, all pondering and analyzing is to facilitate a smooth practice of being in the zone and so having "flow". Which, for me at least, is when life become most purposeful, for lack of better terms.

Other animals are already there. We have to constantly "get there" or "get caught up in something" to get there. — schopenhauer1

Here again I'd describe this in terms of degrees. Lesser animals can certainly feel anxiety, trepidation, lack of flow - this in due measure to their intelligence. But they certainly are nowhere near as prone to such unpleasant states of being as we humans are.

Reminds me of train of thought wherein ego is considered a in some fundamental sense a vice, lesser animals have less ego in due measure with their intelligence, and we humans - although having greater egos due to our greater intelligence than all other known lifeforms - endeavor for states of being that are evermore more egoless while yet maintaining the wisdom, or gnosis, that our intelligence gives us opportunity to obtain. To momentarily bring spiritual notions back into the discussion, notions of Nirvana or Brahman come to mind as just such egoless state of being which would be the pinnacle state of awareness to experience ... that is yet different in supposed quality from the reduced egos of lesser lifeforms.

Would this roundabout mindset be something that resonates with you?

Interesting perspective. I find that being in the zone, or in flow states, is antithetical to zoning out. Yes, the questioning, chattering aspects of mind vanish in both cases, but in the first we are effortlessly (so to speak) accomplishing our goals. Wheres with the second we don't progress anywhere. For me, in an ideal case, all pondering and analyzing is to facilitate a smooth practice of being in the zone and so having "flow". Which, for me at least, is when life become most purposeful, for lack of better terms. — javra

I was just listing off the top of my head states whereby we want to be caught up in something. And yes they may be opposites, but opposites of a same category. You passively get caught up in X, and it feels like time has flown by. You actively engage in stimulating activity and time has flown by. One is passive and the other active, but it is not uncomfortable, tedious, or existentially burdensome. With animals, a Gorilla can sit munching on leaves for hours, or just sit. Not in angst or tedium, but just being there. Obviously similar to a whole host of other animals, all of them except us really.

Here again I'd describe this in terms of degrees. Lesser animals can certainly feel anxiety, trepidation, lack of flow - this in due measure to their intelligence. But they certainly are nowhere near as prone to such unpleasant states of being as we humans are. — javra

Ok, but this disruption is usually because their natural habitat is disturbed, not because of some natural angst. Although, I'll agree about general "unpleasant states". Sure, every animal that has a nervous system will "feel" some sort of unpleasantness, but not in the self-referential/aware human agnsty way. And I don't think being "bored" necessarily cuts it. I also don't believe this happens much in the wild anyways. Other animals have a niche that seems to be much more in balance with what it is their being in the world requires, reflecting whatever their evolutionary path took.

But I agree that if they are there, it's nowhere near human states.

Reminds me of train of thought wherein ego is considered a in some fundamental sense a vice, lesser animals have less ego in due measure with their intelligence, and we humans - although having greater egos due to our greater intelligence than all other known lifeforms - endeavor for states of being that are evermore more egoless while yet maintaining the wisdom, or gnosis, that our intelligence gives us opportunity to obtain. To momentarily bring spiritual notions back into the discussion, notions of Nirvana or Brahman come to mind as just such egoless state of being which would be the pinnacle state of awareness to experience ... that is yet different in supposed quality from the reduced egos of lesser lifeforms.

Would this roundabout mindset be something that resonates with you? — javra

Well actually, this perfectly encapsulates the "shutting off" or rather "grappling of being" that humans must deal with. You see, we are not "there" (whatever we are aiming for with Nirvana and meditative practices) so we have to get "there". But why aren't we "there"? I'm sure you can use some tricky language and say, we are "there" we just don't realize it, but it is just inverting the same thing. We "don't realize it". So we aren't there. So yeah, we have the burden of not being there. Other animals are there.

Well actually, this perfectly encapsulates the "shutting off" or rather "grappling of being" that humans must deal with. You see, we are not "there" (whatever we are aiming for with Nirvana and meditative practices) so we have to get "there". But why aren't we "there"? I'm sure you can use some tricky language and say, we are "there" we just don't realize it, but it is just inverting the same thing. We "don't realize it". So we aren't there. So yeah, we have the burden of not being there. Other animals are there. — schopenhauer1

No, I certainly don't believe we are there either. I should say, if there is such a "there" to begin with. And I think I see what you mean to convey in a roundabout way. But as to other animals already being there ... say, to add just one slant to things, that this "there" is (among other things) the zenith experience of beauty which in some way equates to the zenith of being in the zone; other animals have no cognizance of the beauty we humans can experience - with the experience of beauty being one possible instance of flow - much less of this experience's potential zenith. So, here, saying that other animals are already "there" would be a romanticized misnomer. There is a massive qualitative difference between a) what lesser animals experience by flow, b) what humans experience during moments of flow, and c) what this "there" of actualized, perfect, literally limitless flow could be.

Don't think this might change your perspective much, but I wanted to offer this alternative interpretation.

I'm never sure about intervening in an on-going debate. I hope that these comments are helpful.

I was very struck, when I read Darwin's Origin of Species, by the time and effort he put in to arguing that there was a continuity of differences in degree (varieties within a species) and differences of kind (different species). It is clearly a fundamental plank in the theory of evolution. It turns on the idea that differences of degree can accumulate and become differences of kind. So establishing which are the ancestors of a given species is very much a question of working out the small steps that link the two. Nonetheless, the hypothesis seems to be that all life has a common ancestor species.

As I remember it, he doesn't have a general account of where or how to draw the line. But breeding true seems to be an important consideration. Darwin recognizes that interbreeding between species is often possible, but points out that continuation of the new line of descent is often impaired.

We are all aware that the question what is due to DNA and what due to the environment, particularly due to learning from the environment, has been endlessly debated. It seems most likely to me that it is undecidable, at least so far as we know at present.

Another question that has been endlessly debated is what makes human beings unique. There have been many suggestions. In every case that I am aware of, it has always been found that other species have features similar or at least analogous to any human feature. This is what the theory of evolution would lead one to expect. For example, it is often claimed that human being are uniquely adaptable, and indeed they are very adaptable. But I'm not sure that this is unique to human beings. Rats come to mind as an example of a remarkably adaptable species.

I don't think this is a decidable issue, but rather a question of emphasis. But much depends here on what each of us is looking for. The debate would be greatly clarified if the consequences of any decision could be clarified.

The discussion of animal vs human ways of being in the world seems to me too polarized. Animals are subject to pressures from their environment, including each other. So are humans. There are many similarities between humans and animals and it seems to me most likely that there will be very similar ways of being available to both. I have been told that boredom is a uniquely human capacity, not shared by most animals; parrots are apparently an exception, but it may be that the distress behaviour displayed by caged animals is the result of boredom, so that is not at all clear.

There is a massive qualitative difference between a) what lesser animals experience by flow, b) what humans experience during moments of flow, and c) what this "there" of actualized, perfect, literally limitless flow could be.

Don't think this might change your perspective much, but I wanted to offer this alternative interpretation. — javra

I’m a philosophical pessimist and antinatalist as you probably know so several responses:

whatever great experiences we humans have, ALL the non flow/non beauty whatever is not worth it. As you acknowledged, we “have” to constantly “get there” or “catch it” (flow states/ beauty). And anyone who tries to market the idea that all moments are good ones are selling a crock of bullshit. And is probably selling fake self help books to make an extra buck and smoking too much wacky tobbacy.

I already said my piece regarding the having to get there and thus we are already in a state of lack because of the existential burden of constantly getting there as explained earlier. I think it’s a bit of a bias to think humans have some access to the best experiences simply because we are self aware. That’s just post facto justification for why living this constant burden is worth it. I just don’t agree.

The discussion of animal vs human ways of being in the world seems to me too polarized. Animals are subject to pressures from their environment, including each other. So are humans. There are many similarities between humans and animals and it seems to me most likely that there will be very similar ways of being available to both. I have been told that boredom is a uniquely human capacity, not shared by most animals; parrots are apparently an exception, but it may be that the distress behaviour displayed by caged animals is the result of boredom, so that is not at all clear. — Ludwig V

I just want to present to you the last few posts so we can maybe discuss off that because they all hit on these subjects.

Start with this post between me an javra and then read down: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/786471

At what point does something become wholly unique to that animals set of traits? General processing with very few innate components seems to be a defining trait. One of kind, not just a few degrees away. — schopenhauer1

Sorry, I didn't mean to ignore your responses. I just don't have any more to add. You and I just see things differently.

I had read all of those posts, as it happens. But perhaps I didn't engage with them in the way you expected.

There is a discussion there of "ways of being" in the world and hints of an evaluation of human ways of being. What I don't see is the place of ideas about evolution and similarity or difference between humans and animals has in that discussion. I ask that because I feel that each discussion can stand on its own feet; neither needs the other.

I'm also rather puzzled by your confidence in identifying language and what you call a general cognition processing unit as critical to that difference. It seems very speculative to me. It may be just a personality trait, but I like to keep my feet on the ground.