Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac
He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever. — Tzeentch
You look confused. — neomac
Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch
Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac
Do you know what a strawman is?
... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac
Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not. — Tzeentch
Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac
It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.
A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.
Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.
Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac
Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?
Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing. — Tzeentch
To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac
You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.
Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.
Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio. It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost. Russia has NONE of those things. — Tzeentch
Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian sources, but nice try. — Tzeentch
Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac
Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. The some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter. — Tzeentch
If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know. And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective. — Tzeentch
The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.
Mearsheimer makes that point in detail. — Tzeentch
Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan). So far Russia tried but failed this objective. Along with the objective of demilitarization (or neutrality). Ukraine is getting more pro-Western and its chances of joining the West have arguably increased thanks to the war started by Putin.
The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated (due to the Russian intelligence failure).
Concerning Mearsheimer’s video, it’s too long. It would be easier if you specified at what point of that video Mearsheimer is offering arguments in support of your belief that "the territories they [the Russians] occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion". — neomac
Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch
Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course). — neomac
23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.
1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.
Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at all at the start of the war.
And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually confirm that. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine. — Tzeentch
In the first clip Mearsheimer’s is questioning the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. In the second clip Mearsheimer is questioning the alleged imperialistic ambitions of Putin. Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were.
Said that, I also remark that at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer is claiming that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports the idea that the Russian military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac
If you want only to prove that your view is plausible, then you need to show that you have sufficient evidence and that it is trustworthy. You're failing to do that because you're instead asking others to show their evidence or to show yours isn't trustworthy. This is an incorrect burden of proof for this type of claim. Other people lacking evidence is not evidence that your position is plausible, it's evidence that their position might not be.
If you want to prove that another's view is implausible, then you need to show that their position is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. You keep failing to do this because you revert instead to merely showing that there is evidence to contrary (sufficient to show your view is plausible, but insufficient to show another's view isn't).
If you want to prove that your view is more likely true than another's, then you need to have some metric of likelihood. Again, you keep failing to do this, merely pointing out that there exists evidence of alternative views, none of which has any bearing on likelihood.
You've written huge volumes of text, all of which add up to nothing more than that there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views. That's not an argument. That's the bare minimum threshold of entry into the debate. You then have to go on to argue either likelihood, or the implausibility (lack of evidence) for the alternative view. Otherwise, all you're doing is showing, at enormous length, that you qualify to be heard. Something which no-one is now contesting. — Isaac
When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac
Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported... — neomac
I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac
Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures). — neomac
according to British intelligence — neomac
even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. — neomac
As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here. — neomac
As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter. — neomac
If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did. — neomac
Second “burden of proof” is limited by the available information — neomac
Generically speaking, the platforms I reported from (and they were just a part of the sources I consulted) are well reputed, domain-specific, corroborate each other and do not contradict my wider background assumptions. — neomac
When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac
Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev? — Tzeentch
Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment? — Tzeentch
I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev. — Tzeentch
I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac
Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making. — Tzeentch
And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg. — Tzeentch
Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. — Tzeentch
Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022) — neomac
What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change. — neomac
Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac
The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long.
Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same. — neomac
Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac
The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.
Tzeentch keeps desperately trying to argue this, which just shows his total lack of understanding just how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. Prior to the February 2022 assault, there likely was a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine, hence that card was on the table before the conventional attack (but didn't go anywhere). And Russia had lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself.You keep focusing on the number of deployed ground troops as if my argument essentially hinges on that. But that’s not what I argued (nice strawman). Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac
When my service to the state is completed, I seriously plan to compete with our dear brother Yevgeny Prigozhin and create a private military company. I think it will all work out. — Ramzan Kadyrov
Almost a year after the beginning of the NWO, we were waiting in the Russian city of Kyiv for the president of the Russian Federation, and not the United States. — Notes of midshipman Ptichkin (Feb 20, 2023)
Lol! :rofl:Evidence. — Isaac
Family ties. Russia and Ukraine have strong familial bonds that go back centuries. Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is sometimes referred to as “the mother of Russian cities,” on par in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and St. Petersburg. It was in Kyiv in the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic peoples. And it was Christianity that served as the anchor for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians draw their lineage.
Russian diaspora. Approximately eight million ethnic Russians were living in Ukraine as of 2001, according to a census taken that year, mostly in the south and east. Moscow claimed a duty to protect these people as a pretext for its actions in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014.
Superpower image. After the Soviet collapse, many Russian politicians viewed the divorce with Ukraine as a mistake of history and a threat to Russia’s standing as a great power. Losing a permanent hold on Ukraine, and letting it fall into the Western orbit, would be seen by many as a major blow to Russia’s international prestige. In 2022, Putin cast the escalating war with Ukraine as a part of a broader struggle against Western powers he says are intent on destroying Russia.
Crimea. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 to strengthen the “brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.” However, since the fall of the union, many Russian nationalists in both Russia and Crimea longed for a return of the peninsula. The city of Sevastopol is home port for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the dominant maritime force in the region.
Trade. Russia was for a long time Ukraine’s largest trading partner, although this link withered dramatically in recent years. China eventually surpassed Russia in trade with Ukraine. Prior to its invasion of Crimea, Russia had hoped to pull Ukraine into its single market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which today includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Energy. Moscow relied on Ukrainian pipelines to pump its gas to customers in Central and Eastern Europe for decades, and it paid Kyiv billions of dollars per year in transit fees. The flow of Russian gas through Ukraine continued in early 2023 despite the hostilities between the two countries, but volumes were reduced and the pipelines remained in serious jeopardy.
Political sway. Russia was keen to preserve its political influence in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly after its preferred candidate for Ukrainian president in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, lost to a reformist competitor as part of the Orange Revolution popular movement. This shock to Russia’s interests in Ukraine came after a similar electoral defeat for the Kremlin in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose Revolution, and was followed by another—the Tulip Revolution—in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Yanukovych later became president of Ukraine, in 2010, amid voter discontent with the Orange government.
Ukraine remains vulnerable to subversive Russian influence deriving from cultural, structural, organisational and societal similarities, as well as from a deep connection between the business elites and populations of both countries. Since the Orange revolution, Russian-Ukrainian relations were increasingly shaped by conflicting political processes under way in both countries with Russia aiming to retain Ukraine within its sphere of influence by creating and strengthening anti-western platforms inside the country.
a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine — ssu
lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself. — ssu
This was a week into the war. You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim. — Tzeentch
If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev? I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country. — Tzeentch
Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac
Ahem. From the very same article...
The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long. — Tzeentch
So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine. I think it isn't because:
- The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
- There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
- Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency.
We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success. — Tzeentch
Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac
The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)
On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:
The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.
As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.
31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.
As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider. — Tzeentch
If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did. — neomac
No. If your claim is about likelihood, you need to provide some metric of likelihood (or prove that your record of 'what has been reported' is exhaustive). Without either, all you've shown is that it is plausible that Russia pursued regime change in the first phase of the war. You've not presented an argument regarding the claim that it was 'likely'. — Isaac
That is why we are making alternative sources of information available to you. If you ignore them, that's an issue of bias, not availability. — Isaac
Nonsense. You cite US government sources and those who cite them in turn, occasionally turning to Western mainstream media. None of these are "well reputed”. The US government have been shown time and time again to lie; with sources from military intelligence it is literally their job to lie (when it serves their country's interests). As to mainstream Western media, only recently has the Columbia Journalism Review written a damning report of press coverage regarding Russia, and here on the Ukraine war itself, The Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting group have written a considerable number of articles highlighting serious bias in press reporting (including specifically on Ukraine), not to mention the shocking level of blatant racism.
As I said. If you merely want to claim plausibility, it is sufficient that your sources meet a threshold of expertise (which military intelligence and sourced journalism would meet), but if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others, You've not even begun to make that argument. — Isaac
how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. — ssu
Evidence. — Isaac
At the beginning of Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and recruited ATO veterans attempted to overthrow the Ukrainian government and install pro-Russian rule in various cities for their further surrender to the Russian Army. The coup plan was ultimately cancelled following the detainment of its participants by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).
Coup plan
Planning began no later than the summer of 2021. According to a detained agent who was set to participate in the coup, Russia was to send an appeal to current Ukrainian authorities and call on them to surrender; in the event that Ukraine declined, pro-Russian agents would stage a coup. The attempt would begin by creating incidents in Kyiv and along Ukraine's border with Transnistria, creating a pretext for invasion. Once the invasion started, agents would begin seizing administrative buildings in various Ukrainian cities, followed by the installation of pro-Russian leadership in them and the surrender and transfer of Ukrainian cities to Russian troops. Mass riots with the use of fake blood, clashing with law enforcement officers, terrorist attacks and assassination of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky were to also take place to further destabilize the situation. After the coup, the Verkhovna Rada would be dissolved and replaced by a pro-Russian "People's Rada" playing the role of a puppet government on the occupied territory of Ukraine and the newly created people's republics in Western Ukraine. A pro-Russian president was also to be installed in Ukraine.
The plan was eventually cancelled once the organiser and key persons of the plot were detained by the SBU in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Odesa Oblasts. Prior to their arrests, the agents managed to conduct one successful operation to ensure the capture of Chernobyl.
I seriously don't consider you taking anything seriously. But I put the articles and links for others to look and make their mind, if they are interested on what Russia has actually done. You continue with your selected Mearsheimer quotes.You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances. — Isaac
As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources — neomac
CSIS — neomac
CSIS is funded largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others. — https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/
WilsonCenter — neomac
Approximately one-third of the center's operating funds come annually from an appropriation from the U.S. government, and the center itself is housed in a wing of the Ronald Reagan Building, a federal office building where the center enjoys a 30-year rent-free lease. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_International_Center_for_Scholars
RUSI — neomac
I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. — neomac
Also a considerable chunk of your 'evidence' comes directly from the US government or Ukrainian government sources. — Isaac
You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances. — Isaac
Trails of (independent) evidence paint a picture and also suggests modus operandi, fingerprints, tell-tale tracks. — jorndoe
The shamming, organized re-enculturation efforts, subversion (mentioned in the thread prior) are also parts thereof.
...
Grabbing Crimea and eastern "insurgence" (followed by "annexation") are fairly hands-on type pieces of evidence — jorndoe
If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. — neomac
Still Western source — neomac
If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac
OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians. — neomac
Through indiscriminate killing of civilians and leveling cities Russian armed forces might eventually prevail, but they will have a lot of trouble in the urban areas trying to root out these many fighters, but much of [the Ukrainian armed forces] will survive.
And they have no prospects of being able to occupy the country. Putin has said (again you can't believe him) but he said he has no intention of occupying. So you think [with] the destruction that already happened, if we support an insurgency, and I know we'll get to this in a minute, Russian casualties will be through the roof.
This will be... This could be an insurgency that is bigger than our Afghan one in the 1980's in terms of things we could provide them that would really hurt the Russians.
And then if he pulls out, If he installs a puppet government, that government's not going to last hours. I don't see how they could control the territory.
Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation? — neomac
I don't see how. Pretty much all of Russia's actions so far which cannot be denied (the war itself, the sham referenda, the annexing, the bombing, the inhumanity...) are indicators of a ruthless country invading a neighbour. No one is disputing that simple fact. The dispute is over the question of why they invaded, and (more importantly) how best to bring the invasion to an end. — Isaac
Hmm Gotta' wonder what Putin would do with all that in case the diplomats came through with something... — jorndoe
They intend to transform a local conflict into a phase of global confrontation. This is exactly how we understand it all and we will react accordingly, because in this case we are talking about the existence of our country. — Putin (Feb 21, 2023)
Minister Lavrov is a good illustration of the degradation of this system. In 18 years, he went from a professional and educated intellectual, whom many colleagues held in such high esteem, to a person who constantly broadcasts conflicting statements and threatens the world (that is, Russia too) with nuclear weapons!
Today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not about diplomacy. It is all about warmongering, lies and hatred. — Boris Bondarev's resignation letter
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