How do you know that?

We’ve looked. — NOS4A2

Among the many accounts of gravity on the table is that our gravity is bleeding into our universe from another bigger one. Some scientists noticed that the big bang has some of the characteristics of black hole, leading them to wonder if we're actually in one.

This is the way science works. We don't settle on a conclusion because it seems like the last resort, exclaiming, "We looked."

Do you find p-zombies convincing? I don’t even find them conceivable. I can’t even think about how such a being could be possible. — NOS4A2

This is metaphysical possibility, not physical possibility. An evil demon or a god could have done it. It's just a test for conceivability. Santa Claus is conceivable, though we would all struggle to explain how reindeer could act as an engine.

I am willing to change my mind upon further evidence, but there isn’t any. I can only observe and conceive of what it is that you are talking about, and all I can see and all I can conceive of is the biology. I try to find anything else upon which I can pin the phrase “phenomenological consciousness” and come up empty. If you can only pin it on nothing than nothing is what you are talking about. If p-zombies are missing nothing then they are not p-zombies.

Experiences are events, whether or not they are somehow illusory. As such they require an explanation. — hypericin

No 'Experience' is a word it's felicitous use in conversation is not empirical evidence, Scientists perfectly cogently used to use the word 'ether' too. turned it it referred to noting whatsoever.

our capacity to use such words as 'orange' to conceptually discretize continuities is subject to scientific explanation. — hypericin

It is, yes. It has nothing whatsoever to do with photons, It has to do with culture, that's why colour words are different in different languages, use different breaks and continuities - because it's just a word, and words don't magically identify empirical objects with scientific accuracy.

Suppose you lost your ability to experience sight (assuming you have it), even though you can still clearly respond to visual events. In what "world" would you look for an explanation of your plight? — hypericin

There already is a very good explanation for Blindsight. What is it you think the explanation is lacking?

I am willing to change my mind upon further evidence, but there isn’t any. I can only observe and conceive of what it is that you are talking about, and all I can see and all I can conceive of is the biology. — NOS4A2

I'm thinking you saw Pinocchio as a child and said, "This is inconceivable!"

I was struck by something Rorty said about truth. 'We don't need to define truth, we know how to use it.' I kind of feel the same about morality. I'm not generally big on definitions, actions are more interesting to me. Anyone can say any kind of guff about ethics and principles. But what is it that we do? — Tom Storm

But this is what leads to misunderstanding and confusion. That's what Plato showed in his dialogues. Different people all 'know how to use' the same word. But when you ask each of them what they mean when they use that word, they come up with different answers. This is clear evidence that there is misunderstanding when that word is being used, and knowledge of the subject is elusive.

Suffering bad. — Tom Storm

"Suffering is bad" is theory. It doesn't require a long statement to be a theory. In fact, it appears like the theories which people hold as being the most important (like 'God exists' for example), are the simplest, short and sweet.

No 'Experience' is a word it's felicitous use in conversation is not empirical evidence, — Isaac

Who exactly is arguing from its felicitous use as a word? Only you, for me.

There already is a very good explanation for Blindsight. what is it you think the explanation is lacking? — Isaac

I think it is just fine. It is a biological explanation for a change (loss) of phenomenal experience. The explanation is not floating off in some other world, as you would have it. .

I think you don’t have any evidence and are holding out for some odd reason.

I think you don’t have any evidence and are holding out for some odd reason — NOS4A2

I don't play dirty. I'm telling it straight. If you follow Chalmers' and Dennett's works, you'll find that both are pretty heavily preoccupied with who has the burden of proof.

The point of the p-zombie and other thought experiments is not about proving a difference between experience and biological function. They only prove that we can't assume they're the same. It's a subtle, but ultimately slam dunk point regarding the hard problem.

You have to face the fact that we don't know what causes phenomenal consciousness. You can insist that it's equivalent to biological function, but you'll need to provide evidence, ideally of a type that would be published in Nature. You can't just assume it. Do you see why?

Who exactly is arguing from its felicitous use as a word? Only you, for me. — hypericin

You are. Your only evidence Dir the existence of an entity/event in need of explanation is that we use the word 'experience'. Other than that, you can't point to it, you can't specify it, you can't identify it in any way other than saying the word.

I think it is just fine. It is a biological explanation for a change (loss) of phenomenal experience. — hypericin

Then you have your answer. The cause of phenomenological consciousness is the striate cortex, since you find lesions there to be an adequate explanation for blindsight.

I don’t see it—that’s the problem. I’m aware of the arguments. I’ve just never found them in any way convincing. But I’m hindered from the get-go. I have yet to understand what “phenomenal consciousness” is, I’m afraid, so I draw a blank upon hearing it. Nothing is caused, nothing arises, nothing emerges, that is worthy of the term. And that we can have two distinct accounts of one phenomenon does not suggest to me that there are two distinct phenomenon occurring in there.

Gotcha. Maybe someday down the road you'll return to it and it will all click into place, but not now. :up:

Other than that, you can't point to it, you can't specify it, you can't identify it in any way other than saying the word. — Isaac

But wait, I thought:

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences — Isaac

Have you reverted back to p-zombiehood? How exactly does your conscious mind (if it is) receive information about the world, if it doesn't experience? If there is no experience, what exactly are sufferers of blindsight complaining about?

The cause of phenomenological consciousness is the striate cortex, since you find lesions there to be an adequate explanation for blindsight. — Isaac

Again, the question is not what is responsible for consciousness. It's the brain, everyone knows it. The question is how the brain is responsible for consciousness.

But wait, I thought:

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences — Isaac — hypericin

Yes. I wouldn't want to deny a Bishop moves diagonally in chess either. Doesn't mean there's a scientific explanation lacking for why. Human cultures create facon de parler. It doesn't magically bring into being some entity. We're not gods.

How exactly does your conscious mind (if it is) receive information about the world, if it doesn't experience? — hypericin

Through dendrites.

Again, the question is not what is responsible for consciousness. It's the brain, everyone knows it. The question is how the brain is responsible for consciousness. — hypericin

Neuronal activity. But that doesn't seem to satisfy because you switch definition of 'consciousness'. People with blind sight are 'unaware' of the message from their retinas. They're unaware because to be aware we need the message to reach the working memory and the lesions in the striate cortex prevent that. Awareness just is messages in the working memory, nothing more. It's this form of awareness people with blind sight lack. There's a pretty full explanation of how.

Yes. I wouldn't want to deny a Bishop moves diagonally in chess either. Doesn't mean there's a scientific explanation lacking for why. — Isaac

Why waste our time demanding evidence for something you wouldn't deny?

Bishops move diagonally for historical reasons. History and science are both necessary for understanding the world. Bishops don't move diagonally "just because". If someone claimed that I would require a better explanation for that as well.

We're not gods. — Isaac

Exactly, unlike chess experience does not strike me as something we can whisk into being from nothingness. If we can, I want to know how.

Through dendrites. — Isaac

How is your conscious brain interface with something it is unconscious of? "The ball is red" is information, when confronted by a red ball does this proposition pop into your head unbidden?

But that doesn't seem to satisfy because you switch definition of 'consciousness'. — Isaac

Where have I done so?

I have yet to understand what “phenomenal consciousness” is, I’m afraid, so I draw a blank upon hearing it. — NOS4A2

I am puzzled by your puzzlement. Your life is different from mine. That comes from you being stuck with your set of experiences instead of mine. It does not take the invention of a 'ghost in the machine' to notice that is an inescapable fact.

It is also surprising to see you object to this quality of privacy after arguing in so many other places that all restrictions upon persons are a violation of their rights. I am not sure if you have thought this all through.

Something odd I've recently noticed is that I don't really understand why people say phenomenal consciousness is private, internal, and ineffable. I really believed Dennett was being disingenuous when he assigned those properties to it.

Now I'm starting to realize that many people actually do experience things that way. I think now that Dennett was being honest, so it's easier for me to believe now that NOS is being honest.

I think maybe all the people who say they don't know what phenomenal consciousness are telling the truth. They really don't.

I understand the folk psychology of “experiences”, but I don’t actually imagine I carry a “set of experiences” with me wherever I go, so I never need to appeal to them. All I have is my body. You have one too, I wager.

I object only to postulating something within us that isn’t there. I bestow rights upon what is there, not on what isn’t.

How do you experience it? I don't ask that as a trick question. I am not accusing anybody of misrepresenting their experiences.

The element of Chalmers' challenge that I don't see well represented in this thread is that he focused upon how the conflict of methods developed to establish facts beyond personal experience came to be used to explain that phenomena itself. Something deliberately built to avoid a problem was turned upon the potato deemed too hot to pass around. Observing that problem is different than insisting upon the existence of a being beyond what 'science' can establish.

I understand the folk psychology of “experiences”, but I don’t actually imagine I carry a “set of experiences” with me wherever I go, so I never need to appeal to them. — NOS4A2

You probably remember what you did and what has happened to you in the past. That 'set of experiences' is probably the closest you will get to what your body can report.

How do you experience it? I don't ask that as a trick question. I am not accusing anybody of misrepresenting their experiences. — Paine

I just meant that I don't grasp what it means to call experience internal. I'm not trying to be a pain in the ass when I say that. I just really don't.

Something deliberately built to avoid a problem was turned upon the potato deemed too hot to pass around. — Paine

Could you expand on that?

You probably remember what you did and what has happened to you in the past. That 'set of experiences' is probably the closest you will get to what your body can report.

Most of it I do not remember. Memories are fleeting.

I will give it a shot.

Science, as a practice, developed through a lot of discussion about separating causality from coincidence. Given that we are creatures who base much of our knowledge upon lining up what happened at the same time as evidence of a cause, it was only through suppressing this tendency that we became aware of systems that were not simply extensions of our assumptions. Establishing what is happening and building models for why it did was the beginning of looking for functions rather than accepting we have been shown what there is to know.

After some time of doing this, the method starts to consider what it dismissed at the beginning of its enterprise; The inclusion of observations made isolated from other people.

Memories are fleeting, as mortal as we are.

Something odd I've recently noticed is that I don't really understand why people say phenomenal consciousness is private, internal, and ineffable. I really believed Dennett was being disingenuous when he assigned those properties to it.

Now I'm starting to realize that many people actually do experience things that way. — frank

So do you experience them as public, external, effable?

Im confused how much all these disagreements are due to conceptual differences and how much are due to differences in ways of experiencing.

I believe experience is all three, for reasons that are more conceptual than experiential:

Private and internal: experiences are not public, a third party will never be able to access them, they are available to you and you alone, because experience cannot be experienced in the third person, only lived in the first person. Experience is your first person interface to the world. It is what it is like to be you, and no one else.

Ineffable: Experiences are incommunicable. The best you can do to describe them is to use other experience words. Red is like orange, feels hot, and so on. But ultimately any description must be circular. If my experience words map to your experience words in totally different ways, we will never find out. We can never know if humanity all experiences in the same way, if is it is divided into experiential groups, or if we all experience uniquely. This follows from the privacy of experience, which is absolute, there is no way out of it.

I doubt this will convince you. But this is my view, and it is quite hard for me to think outside of it. Especially the denialists, they are incomprehensible to me.

What fools these mortals be.

Why waste our time demanding evidence for something you wouldn't deny? — hypericin

I'm not. Not once have I 'demanded evidence' for phenomenal consciousness' If you can't follow a simple argument there's little point continuing. try reading what I've written rather than arguing against what you think I probably wrote. I'm sure you've got a nice stack of stock arguments against your imaginary standard reductionist scientism acolyte, but I'm not him, so if you want to argue against me you'll have to first try to understand what I'm saying.

Have you read the stuff on Anomalous Monism I posted earlier? Does the concept make any sense to you?

Science, as a practice, developed through a lot of discussion about separating causality from coincidence. Given that we are creatures who base much of our knowledge upon lining up what happened at the same time as evidence of a cause, it was only through suppressing this tendency that we became aware of systems that were not simply extensions of our assumptions. Establishing what is happening and building models for why it did was the beginning of looking for functions rather than accepting we have been shown what there is to know.

After some time of doing this, the method starts to consider what it dismissed at the beginning of its enterprise; The inclusion of observations made isolated from other people. — Paine

It's as if we started creating a documentary film, then forgot about the guy behind the camera. We wanted to remove personal bias from the account, and we ended up removing the person altogether.

Now we want to put the cameraman in the documentary?

So do you experience them as public, external, effable? — hypericin

Are you familiar with Meno's paradox? It basically concludes that communication is always a matter of pointing to facets of your audience's experience. You can't really communicate something that's outside their available data because communication is a matter of pointing. Explanation is a matter of channelling focus.

In short, communication requires a common experiential ground. There could be cases where experience varies significantly, as with people with aphantasia, but knowledge of that implies some commonality in order to communicate it.

So if experience is truly private, there's no way we could know that. See what I mean?

As for "internal". I just don't understand what it's supposed to be internal to. My skull?

doubt this will convince you. But this is my view, and it is quite hard for me to think outside of it. Especially the denialists, they are incomprehensible to me. — hypericin

And that's what's interesting to me. When we scrub the conversation of animosity and distrust, we come up on the ways that we differ in terms of conception.

It's as if we started creating a documentary film, then forgot about the guy behind the camera. We wanted to remove personal bias from the account, and we ended up removing the person altogether.

Now we want to put the cameraman in the documentary? — frank

Weird how those most dogmatic about the unquestionable 'truth' of sciences known full well to be biased are the same ones adamant about the bias in sciences not particularly known for such.

Those posting in this thread against the 'truth' capturing capabilities of neuroscience, arguing for 'bias' and 'blindspots' there, are the same cohort of people who argued with Covid and Ukraine that the medical establishment and intelligence establishment respectively represent unimpeachable truths without bias or blind spots. That to question them was conspiracy.

Replication rates in the woefully corrupt pharmaceutical industry are half what they are in neuroscience. Yet you'd want us to believe their grasp on 'truth' is unquestionable, yet that of neuroscience is riddled with bias and blindspots.

So does science have biases and blindspots or not? Are scientists biased by their fundamental metaphysical ideologies but miraculously unaffected by any other ideology (political, social, etc).

Your picture of the dogmatic, biased, blinded scientists when it comes to consciousness seems at odds with your faith in the unbiased, detached scientist of public health, or the dedicated non-political, intelligence officer.

Is it just neuroscientists who are so weak?

Science is ok. :up: