But wouldn't that reduce morality to subjectivity? — Noblosh

Yes, of course. That's what morality is.

It is just too subjective — TimeLine

It is subjective. I am not a moral absolutist. I see morality as personal - and hence subjective. In the eyes of a moral absolutist, that may seem too subjective. To me it does not.

As I now see Terrapin Station has just observed.

The mistake that some (not all) moral absolutists make is to hold on to the unexamined presupposition that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them. The presupposition is wrong, but it is very widely believed.

But wouldn't that reduce morality to subjectivity? — Noblosh

Yes, of course. That's what morality is. — Terrapin Station

Let me guess: says.. you! So, would you be so nice as to clarify that view for me?
Do you claim there's nothing in common between all versions of morality, subjective as they may be?
Nothing inherent to morality? No way to distinguish someone's morality from their preferences?
Would you agree, for example, that someone who doesn't stay true to their moral beliefs is immoral?

Let me guess: says.. you! So, would you be so nice as to clarify that view for me?
Do you claim there's nothing in common between all versions of morality, subjective as they may be?
Nothing inherent to morality? No way to distinguish someone's morality from their preferences?
Would you agree, for example, that someone who doesn't stay true to their moral beliefs is immoral? — Noblosh

Says me because that's what facts (states of affairs in the world) say.

Just to clarify here, all that noting that it's subjective is saying is that morality is a phenomenon that only occurs in the minds (which are specific aspects of functioning brains) of persons.

And right, there's no way to distinguish morality from preferences, because preferences--namely, about certain types of interpersonal behavior--are what morality is.

Someone "not staying true to their moral beliefs" is probably someone who has stated moral stances that aren't what they really feel. Maybe because they were kowtowing to social norms, for example.

Absolutism? Perhaps more moral anti-realism. :-} The problem here is the following statement:

What did I do wrong? Nothing. I behaved unethically, for ethical reasons. — Khashoggi

What is 'wrong'? And how does his reasoning that justified unethical behaviour to paradoxically be ethical relate to this interpretation of 'wrong'? You are saying that there is no such thing as 'wrong' considering your view that '(t)o me it does not.'

The mistake that some (not all) moral absolutists make is to hold on to the unexamined presupposition that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them. The presupposition is wrong, but it is very widely believed. — andrewk

If you think of introspection and your conscious awareness of phenomenal properties, what you understand of your inner experience is limited and reliance on such subjectivity when the quality itself is lacking and thus the transparency required therewith, how can you trust in these values when making an ethical decision, a decision likely to impact others?

You are saying that there is no such thing as 'wrong' — TimeLine

No, I am not. That is the classic moral absolutist mis-step, to conflate denial of absolute right and wrong with denial of personal morality. I believe there is no such thing as absolute, mind-independent, objective wrong. But I have a very strong personal sense of right and wrong, on the basis of which I strive to act.

Hence, in my analysis, whether Khashoggi acted wrongly is a matter that in the end only he can assess. The only way in which a judgement on my part of his actions makes sense is:

(1) if I am on a jury and am called upon to judge whether he has committed a crime. In this case all that matters is what the law says; and
(2) if I want to use his case as an example to encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour to others. In this case all that matters is my assessment of his behaviour according to my values, not those of anybody else.

how can you trust in these values when making an ethical decision, a decision likely to impact others — TimeLine

I do not understand the question, as 'trusting in my values' is a concept that does not mean anything to me.

For values to be trustworthy or non-trustworthy would require that there be a 'correct' set of values against which mine can be measured, and I do not believe there is such a thing.

I understand, of course, that many people believe there is such a thing, and I do not say they are wrong, just as they are in position to say with any justification that I am wrong.

The only way in which a judgement on my part of his actions makes sense is:

(1) if I am on a jury and am called upon to judge whether he has committed a crime. In this case all that matters is what the law says; and
(2) if I want to use his case as an example to encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour to others. In this case all that matters is my assessment of his behaviour according to my values, not those of anybody else. — andrewk

We do however make judgments of others in formulating policies, for instance. An industry should not imply child labour except under certain stringent conditions, say. In such cases we seek common ground with others about what we think would be wrong, surely?

And right, there's no way to distinguish morality from preferences, because preferences--namely, about certain types of interpersonal behavior--are what morality is.

Someone "not staying true to their moral beliefs" is probably someone who has stated moral stances that aren't what they really feel. Maybe because they were kowtowing to social norms, for example. — Terrapin Station

So are you saying that you're always acting according to your moral beliefs (or according to what you really feel or your personal preferences, if you will), for example? If you're not, I'd argue that you're sometimes acting immorally, would you agree? Accounting for subjectivity or not, I think we should be able to come to a definite consensus at least about what immorality is.

So are you saying that you're always acting according to your moral beliefs — Noblosh

No, I wouldn't say that.

For one, people often act in ways that are expected of them, ways that won't rock the boat, etc.rather than following their own views. People often just don't want hassles from others, they don't want to be ostracized, they don't want to be jailed, etc.

But also, people don't always know their own dispositions that well. You usually figure them out better when you're in situations that challenge superficial reactions--situations that post some moral dilemma for you, so that you have to really think about how you feel on a "gut level."

I'd argue that you're sometimes acting immorally, would you agree? — Noblosh

Defnitely in a situation where you're acting against your moral dispositions just to acquiesce to social norms, you'd feel that you're acting immorally, yeah, so I'd agree there.

I think we should be able to come to a definite consensus at least about what immorality is. — Noblosh

That should be easy at least in terms of what it is functionally--it's behavior that you feel its wrong, impermissible, etc.

Defnitely in a situation where you're acting against your moral dispositions just to acquiesce to social norms, you'd feel that you're acting immorally, yeah, so I'd agree there. — Terrapin Station

If I would know you well (enough), would I be able to know when you're acting immorally? Also, would all kinds of constraint that would prevent you from acting according to your moral dispositions be immoral?

I'm asking you these because I'm curious if you consider morality having any objective aspects. Maybe you're just saying that all ethics are subjective since we're choosing which to follow and which to dismiss.

If I would know you well (enough), would I be able to know when you're acting immorally? — Noblosh

You mean would you be able to know per my judgment whether I'm acting immorally? I'd say you'd have a very good idea of that if you knew me well enough, sure. (You wouldn't be able to know with certainty, though, as I might have changed my mind, for example.)

Also, would all kinds of constraint that would prevent you from acting according to your moral dispositions be immoral? — Noblosh

It just depends on how an individual judges those constraints. I wouldn't personally say that all constraints are immoral, unless they force behavior that I consider immoral--some wouldn't do that. They'd just not allow action.

I'm asking you these because I'm curious if you consider morality having any objective aspects. — Noblosh

No, not at all.

Maybe you're just saying that all ethics are subjective since we're choosing which to follow and which to dismiss. — Noblosh

Ethics/morality is only ethics/morality if someone makes a judgment about behavior. You can't just follow it.

Hence, in my analysis, whether Khashoggi acted wrongly is a matter that in the end only he can assess. — andrewk

This contradicts your basis of striving to act according to your personal morality whereby you believe that Khashoggi is the only one who can assess whether his actions are deemed immoral, which is thus an objective, mind-independent decision and your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' leads to counter-intuitive implications. You are denying your personal morality and so your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' on the basis of which you strive to act is false, as you are acting with inaction.

Watching someone get hurt and doing nothing does not save you from your moral responsibility. Inaction is immoral as it is still a decision you make not to act.

I understand the very importance of this subjective assessment, namely that only by ones own conscience can a person feel guilt or remorse and thus change their values to adhere to a strong personal sense of right and wrong as you do, but this itself manifests through empathy and reason alike, through a characterisation of 'wrong' and 'right' that is epistemic despite the realism of such properties. It is why a combination of first and second order ethics becomes necessary. The law is moral knowledge justified as part of this combined epistemic structure.

For values to be trustworthy or non-trustworthy would require that there be a 'correct' set of values against which mine can be measured, and I do not believe there is such a thing. — andrewk

But you do. You said it yourself, that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them.

What is belief?

This contradicts your basis of striving to act according to your personal morality whereby you believe that Khashoggi is the only one who can assess whether his actions are deemed immoral, which is thus an objective, mind-independent decision and your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' leads to counter-intuitive implications. You are denying your personal morality and so your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' on the basis of which you strive to act is false, as you are acting with inaction. — TimeLine

Contradicts how?
Denying how?
False why?
What inaction?

Nothing I have said implies that I would not take action to prevent harms committed by someone else. In fact I have said quite the opposite.

As is so often the case with moral absolutists, you are arguing against what you think moral relativists believe, rather than putting the effort in to carefully read what I've said and trying to understand what I actually believe.

But you do. You said it yourself, that 'believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them.' — TimeLine

Umm.

Here is the passage from which you took those words

The mistake that some (not all) moral absolutists make is to hold on to the unexamined presupposition that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them. The presupposition is wrong, but it is very widely believed. — andrewk

Can you spot the difference?

We do however make judgments of others in formulating policies, for instance. An industry should not imply child labour except under certain stringent conditions, say. In such cases we seek common ground with others about what we think would be wrong, surely? — mcdoodle

I agree. If we have a difference, perhaps it is one of emphasis.

I think of it as seeking common ground with others as to what constitutes a harm. That takes the form of a judgement about an act rather than a judgement of a person or their intent. If I can find enough others that agree with me that child labour is a harm, we can form an effective movement to agitate for change.

The lobbying may take the form of making loud, emotive verbal judgements of the employers of child labour, if the advice from the best spin doctors we can afford is that that tactic is what is most likely to succeed. But that would be purely pragmatic - and also unfortunate in my view (a 'necessary evil'), as I would prefer to lobby without having to say that certain people are bad. I would not believe the employers are bad. I would just wish that they ceased employing children, and do what I can to make that come about.

Nothing I have said implies that I would not take action to prevent harms committed by someone else. In fact I have said quite the opposite. — andrewk

On the contrary, you have. You said it yourself;

The only way in which a judgement on my part of his actions makes sense is:

(1) if I am on a jury and am called upon to judge whether he has committed a crime. In this case all that matters is what the law says; and
(2) if I want to use his case as an example to encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour to others. In this case all that matters is my assessment of his behaviour according to my values, not those of anybody else. — Andrewk

That is not action in part of your values, as you say you apparently have a very strong personal sense of right and wrong, on the basis of which I strive to act. That is merely compliance.

Is there validity in Khassoggi statement vis-a-vis his sale of arms or not? You haven't solidified your point and clearly your most recent post exemplifies nothing more than a rhetorical sting.

Here is the passage from which you took those words — andrewk

And? Answer the reasoning behind it, that you do measure your values because you believe in them. What is belief?

That is merely compliance. — TimeLine

It's merely compliance with what?

The law.

Okay--his (1) you mean. What about his (2)?

No, both. I take it that by his case it means (1), thus the result of the legal case against Khassoggi and andrewk - being a jury - assessment of his behaviour according to his values.

That statement you quote is about making a judgement of somebody after the actions have occurred. If the actions have already occurred, I cannot prevent them. You seem to be inferring from that that I would not seek to prevent further such actions, if I deemed them to be harmful.

That inference is incorrect.

It's the difference between
(a) stopping somebody from mugging an old person, and
(b) condemning the mugger.

I would do (a) (if I had the courage) but usually not (b).

The reason for your confusing the two might be that in both cases a judgement is made. But they are different judgements. The judgement in (a) is about harm. The judgement in (b) is about guilt.

In my moral framework it is essential to make judgements about harm, but not about guilt.

That statement you quote is about making a judgement of somebody after the actions have occurred. If the actions have already occurred, I cannot prevent them. You seem to be inferring from that that I would not seek to prevent further such actions, if I deemed them to be harmful. — andrewk

What exactly do you mean by prevention? It may be after it has occurred but the sale of lethal weaponry clearly has greater ramifications than merely Khassoggi alone and therefore if one is unable to show the harm of his indirect actions, one is unable to see the greater ramifications. Two words: Lockheed Martin. And exactly how can you seek to prevent further actions if you do not view his actions as wrong? It is harmful and thus your choice of action is inaction.

The reason for your confusing the two might be that in both cases a judgement is required. But they are different judgements. The judgement in 1 is about harm. The judgement in 2 is about guilt — andrewk

That is the purpose of the law and by setting a precedence prevent other Khassoggi's - your judgement in (1) enables the judgement in (2) and so, you are also (2).

(a) stopping somebody from mugging an old person, and
(b) condemning the person for having done the mugging.

I would do (a) (if I had the courage) but usually not (b). — andrewk

So you would do prevention but not punishment? Is that what you're saying?

What exactly do you mean by prevention? — TimeLine

Saying to the would-be mugger: 'Hey you, stop that', and then (courage permitting) physically restraining them while asking bystanders to call the police if they don't stop.

As for arms dealers: you tell me what power I have over them and I'll tell you in what circumstances I'd use it.

The rest of your post appears to be about judgements under the law. This discussion is about moral, not legal judgements.

Yes. I see punishment of law-breakers as the job of the state, not of individuals, else we descend into Philippines-style vigilantism.

So you don't see filing a lawsuit against someone as a kind of condemning? Legality or not, seems to me we're concerning with the guilt of the person we're making a lawsuit against.

That's a constructive direction to take it, because it leads to an important distinction, which is between damages lawsuits and injunctions. I see the latter as frequently useful, but the former as only rarely so.

Injunctions can be useful because they request that the court make an order for somebody to perform or not perform a non-financial action - for instance to not publish something. The purpose of the injunction is to prevent a harm, so there is no need for assignation of guilt, merely for a court order requiring or forbidding the action.

Damages suits, on the other hand, usually involve the assignation of blame. I am very anti-blame, and do not like damages actions. I find it hard to imagine myself ever taking out a damages action against somebody. Bad things happen all the time, and the search for somebody to blame rarely helps us cope with them. If I lost my wealth and livelihood and a successful damages action was the only way I could provide for my family, I might do so. But that would purely be a mercenary tactic, not a moral judgement on the party I was suing (regardless of how much my barrister, as hired sophist, would present it as such).

I am not saying that damages suits never have any benefit, but I feel that the vast majority of them cause social harm. Defensive medicine is the classic example of the harm done by such actions - where the doctor makes decisions that minimise the risk of being sued, rather than what is best for the patient. Children's playgrounds with all the fun toys removed is another example.

As for arms dealers: you tell me what power I have over them and I'll tell you in what circumstances I'd use it. — andrewk

How is this related to the meta-ethical problem at hand? No one is discussing your powerlessness in fighting injustice but ascertaining your position on Khassoggi. You have been unable to answer anything; what is 'wrong', what is 'belief' viz., your values, and how 'prevention' is related to the subject of your moral position? The answer to that is because you have no answer because your position is baseless.

I don't have a position on Khashoggi. I know almost nothing about him, so I'm afraid I can't help with your inquiries about him.

I can answer some of your other questions though.

what is 'wrong', — TimeLine

I call that potential action 'wrong' which would violate my ethical framework if I were to do it. I try to use the term publicly only in relation to my own actions, not those of others, as I see moral judgements of others as usually unhelpful.

what is 'belief' — TimeLine

I call 'belief' any proposition that is sufficiently plausible to me that I am prepared to act in accordance with it.

how 'prevention' is related to the subject of your moral position? — TimeLine

My moral framework will lead me to decide to take certain actions. Some of those actions may involve imposing my will on others, including preventing them from doing things - eg preventing the mugger from completing their mugging. Such interventions will be prompted by the perception that I am in a position to be able to prevent harm from occurring.

your values — TimeLine

My primary value is compassion. Beauty is another. I sometimes muse over the extent to which they overlap.

Does that clear up the confusion?

Alright, so you say:

I call 'belief' any proposition that is sufficiently plausible to me that I am prepared to act in accordance with it. — andrewk

You also say:

I call that potential action 'wrong' which would violate my ethical framework if I were to do it. — andrewk

How do you measure this 'ethical framework' with your beliefs and whether your values that enable you to act against what you consider 'wrong' as being aligned 'correctly'? Are you saying that you have direct access to your judgements and experiences that enables an introspective glance of indisputable accuracy, that there is no sociological or epistemological basis to this ethical framework in which you have formed? Since you muse quite regularly on the concept of Beauty, how does this conceptualisation form?

How do you measure this 'ethical framework' with your beliefs and whether your values that enable you to act against what you consider 'wrong' as being aligned 'correctly'? — TimeLine

I'm afraid I don't understand that question.

Are you saying that you have direct access to your judgements and experiences — TimeLine

I wasn't saying that. But I do have that direct access.

that there is no sociological or epistemological basis to this ethical framework in which you have formed? — TimeLine

No I am not saying that.

Since you muse quite regularly on the concept of Beauty, how does this conceptualisation form? — TimeLine

I'm afraid I don't understand that question.

Are you saying that you have direct access to your judgements and experiences
— TimeLine
I wasn't saying that. But I do have that direct access. — andrewk

I wasn't saying that you were saying that. I was asking whether you have direct access to your judgements and experiences that enables an introspective glance of indisputable accuracy. Your behaviour is rather unbecoming. :-}

Since you muse quite regularly on the concept of Beauty, how does this conceptualisation form?
— TimeLine
I'm afraid I don't understand that question. — andrewk

You said that beauty - along with compassion - is a primary value that you hold. How do you believe your conception of beauty is formed?

How do you measure this 'ethical framework' with your beliefs and whether your values that enable you to act against what you consider 'wrong' as being aligned 'correctly'?
— TimeLine
I'm afraid I don't understand that question. — andrewk

Explain how you form this 'ethical framework' and why you believe it is correct? Since you think that 'wrong' is what would violate this framework, in order to ascertain what you mean by 'wrong' I would need to understand the validity of your ethical framework.