flogging dead horses is also not productive. — Wayfarer

I think it might be because many of the issues are conceptual and not empirical. — bert1

I think it's because many of the issues are so personal. Our experiences are what is most who we are.

Whatever you're going on about, it has nothing to do with the hard problem.

Thank you for the considered response. It does strike me that all this is being done by - as you put it - swapping words. I'm not sure those words are having the same power on me as they are having on you.

In relation to the mind body problem it seems to be a problem for idealists but not naturalists. A problem in as much as 'physicalism' seems to be its target. The ontology held seems to generate the type of argument and its resolution. Which may partly be your point.

I observe the cup on the table and there before me in the appearance is the reality. — Constance

But you are only able to say this from the perspective you have chosen. For many philosophers there remains a Kantian distinction between appearance and reality as it is in itself. Can we just make this go away simply by using different words or concepts? How is this different to saying that we can solve the problem of the origin of life just by saying God created it? It's only solved if God is 1) real and 2) God created life.

If I say from now on I am a monist, that very act does not do away with the hard question even if it satisfies me, right?

But maybe I've missed something in your response?

This from "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.

Chalmers;https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf"]The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. that unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
" — T Clark

There is one fundamental premise that really should preside over the entire inquiry: all one has ever experienced, every can experience, and hence ever know, is phenomena. It reminds me of an issue I came across regarding Freud and the unconscious: The unconscious was considered to be a metaphysical concept entirely, and I thought, no, for there is an evidential basis for it. But the response was quick, pointing out that it was not that the unconscious had never been directly experienced, but rather that it was impossible for it to every be experienced, encountered, and this is why it belonged to metaphysics. Not just unknown but impossible to know. Why? Because the moment it comes to mind to consider at all, it is conscious, and references to the unconscious are only references to conscious events, which in turn were the same. The unconscious cannot be even conceived as a concept. It is nonsense.

Here, anything that can ever be conceived, even in the most compelling argument imaginable, simply cannot be anything but a phenomenological event, for to conceive at all is inherently phenomenological. Nonsense to think otherwise. Consciousness is inherently phenomenological.

There is no way out of this, for the moment the effort is made, one is already IN the problem; unless, that is, Husserl was right, and that it is possible to achieve an awareness of the intuited landscape of all things that is pure and absolute. This, then, is not a matter for science as we know it. It lies with the "science" of phenomenology. Which leads me to reaffirm that philosophy is going to end up one place, and it is here, in phenomenology. There is quite literally no where else to go.

But you are only able to say this from the perspective you have chosen. For many philosophers there remains a Kantian distinction between appearance and reality as it is in itself. Can we just make this go away simply by using different words or concepts? How is this different to saying that we can solve the problem of the origin of life just by saying God created it? It's only solved if God is 1) real and 2) God created life.

If I say from now on I am a monist, that very act does not do away with the hard question even if it satisfies me, right?

But maybe I've missed something in your response? — Tom Storm

I can put something out there, but you won't like it. One has to understand that there is a whole other philosophical world that continues in Germany and France that is not popular in Anglo-American philosophy. I read this, often enough with genuine understanding I would say, but it is an acquired ability. Joshs seems pretty solid on this.

It is not a matter of just rearranging words. One has to argue. What is that Kantian distinction really about? Always one must go to the things that are given to see what there is that can provide justification. Kant had to talk about noumena; why? Either it is nonsense, or there is something in the witnessable, phenomenological (empirical) world that insists. This is where we have to look: what is it in the world we know that intimates noumena? What is there in the presence of things that is the threshold for metaphysics? How does one talk about such a threshold? One cannot say it, for it is an absence, and yet it is an absence that is in the presence of the world.

Of course, this sounds confusing, but metaphysics is not just nothing at all, like an empty set. This absence is intimated in the world, so it is part of the structure of our existence, and so, it is not outside of our identifiable existence as Kant would have it, but in it, saturating it, if you will, and it is staring you right in the face in everything you encounter. In the analysis of what it is to experience the world, it is clear that the language used to "say" what the world is is radically distinct from the existence that is being talked about. The cup is smooth to the touch, and warm, and resists being lifted, and so on, but all this language I use to describe the cup takes the actual givenness of sensation up IN a language setting. I call it a cup, but the calling does not, if you will, totalize what is there in the language possibilities because there is something that is not language in the "there" of it. It is an impossible other-than-language, and because language and propositional knowledge is what knowing is about, the understanding encounters in the familiar day to dayness of our lives something utterly transcendental. The cup is both clearly defined as long as I can keep it contained within familiar language, and, utterly impossible, because it is there, radically unknowable, for to know is to be able to say. Wittgenstein put it simply: It is not how things are that is mystical; but THAT is exists.

This is a hard idea to simply throw out there and expect to be well received. Nor do phenomenologists all agree with this. Heidegger held that language and existence were of a piece, and our existence is language, and I think this is right; but I argue (have read it argued, too) that IN this matrix of language-in-the-world, a transcendental affirmation is possible, and this affirmation occurs in-the-midst-of everyday affairs.

But the effort is worth it, reading phenomenology, that is. In this issue, the hard problem of consciousness, phenomenology is not just an alternative view; it is necessary and inevitable.

God is another issue, a metaethical issue. I hold that the impossible, the mystical Wittgenstein mentioned, is, as Witt agrees, is really about value, or meta-value.

There is one fundamental premise that really should preside over the entire inquiry: all one has ever experienced, every can experience, and hence ever know, is phenomena. — Constance

This is something I've struggled with a bit. I know you can't talk about noumena. As Lao Tzu says, the Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. But I'm not sure you can't experience it.

It reminds me of an issue I came across regarding Freud and the unconscious: The unconscious was considered to be a metaphysical concept entirely, and I thought, no, for there is an evidential basis for it. But the response was quick, pointing out that it was not that the unconscious had never been directly experienced, but rather that it was impossible for it to every be experienced, encountered, and this is why it belonged to metaphysics. — Constance

This surprises me. Did Freud consider the unconscious to be a metaphysical concept? Seems unlikely. Not everything I am not aware of is metaphysical.

Here, anything that can ever be conceived, even in the most compelling argument imaginable, simply cannot be anything but a phenomenological event, for to conceive at all is inherently phenomenological. Nonsense to think otherwise. Consciousness is inherently phenomenological. — Constance

As I noted, I suspect this isn't true, but I'm not sure.

This, then, is not a matter for science as we know it. It lies with the "science" of phenomenology. Which leads me to reaffirm that philosophy is going to end up one place, and it is here, in phenomenology. There is quite literally no where else to go. — Constance

I've read a little about phenomenology and I don't get it. Wikipedia says

Phenomenology (from Greek φαινόμενον, phainómenon "that which appears" and λόγος, lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. — Wikipedia

But when I go to read about it, it is just a bunch of jargon and convoluted language. As if I need someone to tell me how to understand something I am intimately familiar with.

It is not a matter of just rearranging words. One has to argue. What is that Kantian distinction really about? Always one must go to the things that are given to see what there is that can provide justification. Kant had to talk about noumena; why? Either it is nonsense, or there is something in the witnessable, phenomenological (empirical) world that insists. This is where we have to look: what is it in the world we know that intimates noumena? What is there in the presence of things that is the threshold for metaphysics? How does one talk about such a threshold? One cannot say it, for it is an absence, and yet it is an absence that is in the presence of the world. — Constance

This lays out the question pretty well, although in different language than I would use. One thing I disagree with is equating the world of experience with the empirical world. As I noted in my previous post, I think it's possible to directly experience noumena, the Tao. It's just not possible to speak about it. When I start talking, then it becomes phenomena. Then I can measure it, name it, and conceptualize it.

This absence is intimated in the world, so it is part of the structure of our existence, and so, it is not outside of our identifiable existence as Kant would have it, but in it, saturating it, if you will, and it is staring you right in the face in everything you encounter. In the analysis of what it is to experience the world, it is clear that the language used to "say" what the world is is radically distinct from the existence that is being talked about. The cup is smooth to the touch, and warm, and resists being lifted, and so on, but all this language I use to describe the cup takes the actual givenness of sensation up IN a language setting. I call it a cup, but the calling does not, if you will, totalize what is there in the language possibilities because there is something that is not language in the "there" of it. It is an impossible other-than-language, and because language and propositional knowledge is what knowing is about, the understanding encounters in the familiar day to dayness of our lives something utterly transcendental. — Constance

This sounds as if you're agreeing with at least some of what I'm saying.

the hard problem of consciousness, phenomenology is not just an alternative view; it is necessary and inevitable. — Constance

You already know I disagree with this.

I can put something out there, but you won't like it. — Constance

Perhaps. Again, thank you.

One has to understand that there is a whole other philosophical world that continues in Germany and France that is not popular in Anglo-American philosophy. — Constance

I'm aware of the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dan Zahavi and the alleged split in traditions. Good thing is, I am from neither.

Kant had to talk about noumena; why? Either it is nonsense, or there is something in the witnessable, phenomenological (empirical) world that insists. — Constance

I wouldn't presume to disagree with Kant and I have no commitments to naive realism - other than that's the world we 'appear' to play in.

What is there in the presence of things that is the threshold for metaphysics? How does one talk about such a threshold? One cannot say it, for it is an absence, and yet it is an absence that is in the presence of the world. — Constance

I'm not sure I can say much of anything about the potentiality of such a threshold myself. They say talk is cheap.

metaphysics is not just nothing at all, like an empty set. This absence is intimated in the world, so it is part of the structure of our existence, and so, it is not outside of our identifiable existence as Kant would have it, but in it, saturating it, if you will, and it is staring you right in the face in everything you encounter. — Constance

This is unclear. Are you saying, as I do, that any philosophical worldview we can hold rests upon some metaphysical presuppositions? The 'saturating' part sounds a bit dramatic.

In the analysis of what it is to experience the world, it is clear that the language used to "say" what the world is is radically distinct from the existence that is being talked about. — Constance

Yes - many philosophers have said that (which is ironic). This is a point which is debated endlessly of course and we arrive back at the nature of the ineffable and probably soon talk of beetles in boxes. I have no firm commitments in this space. I really don't know what langauge does or doesn't do. But I do accept language is not the real world, that it helps 'create' it and I have read enough Richard Rorty to be sympathetic to some of his ideas here (the decadent scoundrel!)

The cup is smooth to the touch, and warm, and resists being lifted, and so on, but all this language I use to describe the cup takes the actual givenness of sensation up IN a language setting. I call it a cup, but the calling does not, if you will, totalize what is there in the language possibilities because there is something that is not language in the "there" of it. It is an impossible other-than-language, and because language and propositional knowledge is what knowing is about, the understanding encounters in the familiar day to dayness of our lives something utterly transcendental. The cup is both clearly defined as long as I can keep it contained within familiar language, and, utterly impossible, because it is there, radically unknowable, for to know is to be able to say. Wittgenstein put it simply: It is not how things are that is mystical; but THAT is exists. — Constance

I used to hold pretty much this view when I was a boy. I was always struck by the multiplicity of possibilities present in ordinary objects - both familiar and strange simultaneously. Not sure what this brings us. Humans are meaning making creatures. We see faces in clouds too.

Heidegger held that language and existence were of a piece, and our existence is language, and I think this is right; but I argue (have read it argued, too) that IN this matrix of language-in-the-world, a transcendental affirmation is possible, and this affirmation occurs in-the-midst-of everyday affairs. — Constance

Sounds like we would need an entire thread on how transcendental affirmation may be possible in such cases. Perhaps, but it is not a given (if you'll forgive my use of that word).

I was stuck by this from Rorty:

We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.

Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.

In this issue, the hard problem of consciousness, phenomenology is not just an alternative view; it is necessary and inevitable. — Constance

I'm not sure I can see the connection, or how it would assist us with mind/body. Unless you are saying that all there is is experience - a monist ontology - and that phenomenology is our only pathway out of the badlands of Cartesianism.

I can put something out there, but you won't like it. — Constance

Turns out I didn't dislike it. :wink:

Can you link a paper or article? — hypericin

Well, Tulving's paper is here https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2F0003-066X.40.4.385 but it won't give you much of an insight into how it's used in theories of consciousness without seeing also https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9280.00102 and https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.94.11.5973

Are you really suggesting that "why not? What's stopping them?" is an adequate answer to any of these? — hypericin

I don't think the question makes any sense at all. We don't ask why the speed of light is 299,792,458 metres per second, we don't ask why protein channels block certain molecules, we don't ask why water boils at 100C. Why would we expect an answer to the question of why these neurological functions result in consciousness. They just do.

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not?

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not? — Isaac

Mainly because functional consciousness would serve all those purposes adequately. What evolutionary advantage is there to having the experience of hunger when all that's needed is some adrenaline here, some dopamine there, and voila.

What evolutionary advantage is there to having the experience of hunger when all that's needed is some adrenaline here, some dopamine there, and voila. — frank

"Some adrenaline here, some dopamine there" is the experience of hunger. there's not the mechanisms and then something else. The car isn't an additional thing on top of the engine, the wheels, the chassis, etc..

The argument is about the first-person nature of experience - 'what it is like' is an awkward way of describing simply the nature of 'being'. Chalmers is pointing out that 'experience' or 'state of being' must always elude third-person description, because it's third person. — Wayfarer

I approach the "first-person nature of experience" from the perspective of the difference between "inner and outer". If we allow the fundamental empirical principle that some things are experienced to come from inside oneself, and others from outside oneself, we can understand that the third-person perspective cannot give us any observation of the inside.

So in the sciences for example, we are always breaking physical objects down into parts, analyzing, and using instruments like microscopes, Xray, CT-scans, MRI, and spectrometers, in an attempt to get a glimpse at the inside of physical objects. However, no matter how far we break down these objects in analysis, and whatever we do with these instruments we are always looking from the outside inward. That is unavoidable, as the nature of what is called scientific 'objective' observation.

Now the first-person 'subjective experience' gives us the capacity for a true glimpse at the inside of an object, thereby providing us with true observations of the inside of an object (human being in this case). Therefore, when it comes to observing the inside of an object, first-person observations, rather than third-person observations must be considered as the true observations, therefore the basis for any real science of the inside of objects.

Why is the inside/outside differentiation important? The importance is demonstrated to us by developments in modern cosmology which reveal a process called spatial expansion. The cosmological evidence is very strong, such that spatial expansion cannot be ignored in any credible ontology. The reality of spatial expansion demonstrates to us that there is necessarily a real difference between the inside and outside of space itself, which manifests as time passes.

Therefore it is very important to differentiate between the inside perspective, and the outside perspective, and work with true observations from each of these, comparing the two, if we intend to get a true understanding of the active nature of space itself.

Some adrenaline here, some dopamine there" is the experience of hunger. there's not the mechanisms and then something else. The car isn't an additional thing on top of the engine, the wheels, the chassis, etc.. — Isaac

How do you know that?

I don't think the question makes any sense at all. We don't ask why the speed of light is 299,792,458 metres per second — Isaac

Whenever our sciences leave us with an arbitrary starting point , this should be an impetus to start asking ‘why’ questions. Asking why a physical constant happens to be what it is is part of what led to the hypothesis that our universe with its constants may not be the only one , that perhaps an evolutionary development of universes produced a series of constants linked to each other via a genesis. Thus, ‘dont ask why’ was transformed into ‘this may be why’.

we cannot conceive how a cascade of biological processes can lead to the observed symptoms of consciousness, because we cannot conceive how any physical process can lead to consciousness.
— hypericin

I can. It's simple. Some collection of biological processes leads to the observed symptoms of consciousness. Why wouldn't they? What's in the way? What compelling physical law prevents biological processes from causing whatever symptoms they so happen to cause? — Isaac

To be fair to hypericin, the recent ambitions to explain consciousness were only possible as a result of innovations in thinking about biological processes which
removed the basis of those processes from traditional
accounts of physical causality. One cannot derive consciousness from a conceptually impoverished physicalist account.

Asking for a scientific explanation of consciousness, is like asking an artist to paint a canvas into existence.

Scientific explanations are grounded in empirical evidence, so it is nonsensical to demand of science an explanatory account of what empirical evidence is, which is what asking for a scientific explanation of consciousness amounts to.

If you're saying that the eye can't see itself, yes, that's a concern.

I don't think the question makes any sense at all. We don't ask why the speed of light is 299,792,458 metres per second, we don't ask why protein channels block certain molecules, we don't ask why water boils at 100C. Why would we expect an answer to the question of why these neurological functions result in consciousness. They just do.

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not? — Isaac

This makes a lot of sense to me, by which I mean I agree. This is why the hard problem may be hard, but it's not really a problem, just a question.

Whenever our sciences leave us with an arbitrary starting point , this should be an impetus to start asking ‘why’ questions. Asking why a physical constant happens to be what it is is part of what led to the hypothesis that our universe with its constants may not be the only one — Joshs

I'm with @Isaac on this one. There doesn't have to be a why. The speed of light has to be something. Why does there have to be a reason? Sometimes "just because" is a good answer to a question.

As for the multiverse, well, let's not get started on that.

So in the sciences for example, we are always breaking physical objects down into parts, analyzing, and using instruments like microscopes, Xray, CT-scans, MRI, and spectrometers, in an attempt to get a glimpse at the inside of physical objects. However, no matter how far we break down these objects in analysis, and whatever we do with these instruments we are always looking from the outside inward. That is unavoidable, as the nature of what is called scientific 'objective' observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with this, but I don't see why it is a problem. Science is looking in from the outside. That's how it works. If we can look at every other phenomenon in the universe with science, why would we not be able to look at consciousness that way? Apples taste good, but we can learn most of what we need to know about apples without considering that.

Scientific explanations are grounded in empirical evidence, so it is nonsensical to demand of science an explanatory account of what empirical evidence is — sime

Agree with this.

which is what asking for a scientific explanation of consciousness amounts to. — sime

Don't agree with this.

We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.

Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. — Tom Storm

Rorty did understand this. you will find in a footnote in this book an emphatic denial of non prepositional knowledge, and I take this as simply the same thing I am saying here: once you put something out there in a statement, a thesis, you have, and this is really what Wittgenstein was on about in the Tractatus, you commit it to the finitude of language. I take issue where it is flatly denied that we can, through the understanding's conceptual pragmatic architectonics acknowledge the world as meaningful. Rorty decided to teach literature instead of philosophy for just this reason, for literature "shows" us the world rather than explaining it. But on the other hand, phenomenology is descriptive/analytic, and what I talked about is an actual part of our existence. After all, language never could exhaust the the world's presentative content.

once you put something out there in a statement, a thesis, you have, and this is really what Wittgenstein was on about in the Tractatus, you commit it to the finitude of language — Constance

That's a novel interpretation of Witt, isn't it? I think he was pointing out that when we propose to know transcendent facts, we're positing a vantage point that we don't have.

I'm with Isaac on this one. There doesn't have to be a why. The speed of light has to be something. Why does there have to be a reason? Sometimes "just because" is a good answer to a question. — T Clark

‘Why’ questions have to do with the fact that explanations in science aren't just about what works, they are about coming up with different ways of construing how things might work. The why questions the frame within which the ‘how’ works A reductive stimulus -response account of human behavior works, but only when we ask why it works can we begin to see alternative ways of modeling behavior that also work, but according to a different ‘why’. It is via a ‘why’ that we can turn an arbitrary mechanistic explanation into one that transforms the arbitrary and seemingly random into a patterned regularity.

‘Just because’ ignores the fact that facts are what they are because of their role within paradigms( the ‘how’) , and paradigms are upended ( the why) on a regular basis.

Science fiction has been calling for a theory of consciousness since Capek's RUR. Those who aren't interested, don't know why anyone would ask, and are irritated because philosophical texts aren't dumbed down enough for them, should leave those who are interested in peace.

:up:

Science fiction has been calling for a theory of consciousness since Capek's RUR. Those who aren't interested, don't know why anyone would ask, and are irritated because philosophical texts aren't dumbed down enough for them, should leave those who are interested in peace. — frank

Oh Frankie, Frankie, Frankie. Here, let me make some cocoa for you. I put in a marshmallow the way you like it. Now come over here and sit in your nice chair, drink you nice warm cocoa, and shut the fuck up.

Go back to the shoutbox where you belong, bub.

Whenever our sciences leave us with an arbitrary starting point , this should be an impetus to start asking ‘why’ questions. — Joshs

But to say it's arbitrary is to already frame it as requiring a reason (but lacking one). 'Arbitrary' doesn't make any sense in the context of things not even requiring a reason.

Asking why a physical constant happens to be what it is is part of what led to the hypothesis that our universe with its constants may not be the only one , that perhaps an evolutionary development of universes produced a series of constants linked to each other via a genesis. Thus, ‘dont ask why’ was transformed into ‘this may be why’. — Joshs

I don't see how. In a multi-verse theory (which I make no claims to understand I should point out), we would have one speed and other universes would have another speed. That doesn't in the slightest answer the question why we have the speed we have, it only says that others don't.

the recent ambitions to explain consciousness were only possible as a result of innovations in thinking about biological processes which removed the basis of those processes from traditional accounts of physical causality. One cannot derive consciousness from a conceptually impoverished physicalist account. — Joshs

I don't see why not. I mean, I don't personally favour the reductionist accounts, but I don't see anything in them that somehow fails to account for consciousness. There's no fixed reason why consciousness can't be a direct physical result of chemical interactions. We only need allow such a narrative. Personally, it's not the narrative I find most appealing, but it's not ruled out in any way.

‘Just because’ ignores the fact that facts are what they are because of their role within paradigms( the ‘how’) , and paradigms are upended ( the why) on a regular basis. — Joshs

Again, I think you're really forcing the question 'why?' into a paradigm-shifting role which is it only very tangentially involved in. alternative mechanisms don't require even a question of 'why?' let alone an answer. One can simply say 'it needn't be that way'. All it takes to shift paradigm is an understanding that things need not be looked at the way they are, that grounding assumptions can be questioned. none of those questions need be 'why?' they could be 'is it?'