an object with no properties is beyond imagination — frank

I agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of their properties.

agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of their properties. — RussellA

You're pushing Hume's bundle theory. Fine. Kripke isn't saying that objects exist independently of their properties. That would just be ridiculous.

And, Kripke supposes, this goes for any equivalence between heat and the motion of molecules. If "heat" is a rigid designator for that sensation, and "the motion of molecules" is a rigid designator for molecules in motion, then if heat is the motion of molecules, it is necessarily so. — Banno

I'm starting to see what he's getting at, I think.

For me, I'm hesitant to call "the motion of molecules" rigid because it doesn't pick out the same individuals in all possible circumstances. I'm hesitant about the relationship between names, aggregates, and whether or not aggregates are objects. The mereological problem is what I keep thinking of.

But if it's just a way of talking, and not mereology, then the truth/falsity of a particular proposition isn't what's at issue. I'm getting stuck on the ontology when he's talking epistemology. What's at issue is the necessity of identity statements, which at this time seems to me just to be anything of the form "x is y", where x and y pick out the same object.

So "heat is the motion of molecules" fits the form, and thereby are objects in terms of the logic. Kripke isn't even taking a stand on the truth/falsity of that statement as much as he's using it because identity theorists of the mind-body use it as an analogy to say "there are contingent identity statements", which is the belief Kripke is arguing against -- that if these be identity statements at all, then they are necessary.

I'm seeing this in the lectern example, where he states at p 179/pdf-18:

So, it would seem, if an example like this is correct -- and this is what advocates of essentialism have held -- that this lectern could not have been made of ice, that is in any counterfactual situation of which we would say that this lectern existed at all, we would have to say also that it was not made from water from the Thames frozen into ice. Some have rejected, of course, any such notion of essential property as meaningless. usually, it is because (and I think this is what Quine, for example, would say) they have held that it depends on the notion of identity across possible worlds, and that this is itself meaningless. Since I have rejected this view already, I will not deal with it again

Especially at the beginning it goes along with his other examples where he doesn't assert the truth as much as suppose the propositions are true in order to demonstrate necessary identity across possible worlds, since possible worlds are just counter-factual circumstances that are plausible (hence why, in the circumstances which Kripke was talking, the wooden lectern was necessarily not-ice, and since it was not-ice, it was necessarily not made of the Thames from the beginning of time)

It's the use of the counter-factual "world" (circumstances) that he's taking issue with -- in the counter-factual circumstances, the names pick out the same individual, and so -- given that every object is necessarily self-identical -- the object picked out in both the actual and the possible circumstance are necessarily the same individual, whatever the truth of the statements made.

one can use the phrase "possible world", as long as one takes it metaphorically. — RussellA

I've suggested several times that possible worlds are a convenient way of dealing with counterfactuals. If you wish to call them a metaphor, go ahead.

The salient piece for proponents of descriptions is that a proper name does not refer by making use of some description.

if all the properties of the lectern were removed, would this lectern remain — RussellA

I agree the notion of removing all of an objects properties is problematic. I don't think that is mentioned anywhere in the article - is it?

I'd also draw your attention to the difference between picking out an individual using a name and picking it out using a demonstrative.

Can I again commend the Donellan paper mentioned earlier to you? The Thales example is telling.

Kripke isn't saying that objects exist independently of their properties. That would just be ridiculous. — frank

Yep.

Especially at the beginning it goes along with his other examples where he doesn't assert the truth as much as suppose the propositions are true in order to demonstrate necessary identity across possible worlds, since possible worlds are just counter-factual circumstances that are plausible (hence why, in the circumstances which Kripke was talking, the wooden lectern was necessarily not-ice, and since it was not-ice, it was necessarily not made of the Thames from the beginning of time) — Moliere

I think we again are not in disagreement.

The wooden lectern is ipso facto necessarily wooden, yet that is understood only empirically. Unfortunately it's an example that is prone to misunderstanding, as in various posts in this thread.

the object picked out in both the actual and the possible circumstance are necessarily the same individual, whatever the truth of the statements made. — Moliere

This is perhaps the key concept, and the article is an articulation of how we can use this approach to talk consistently about counterfactuals. At the time of writing, under the influence of Quine, counterfactuals were generally thought senseless. After this article, and Kripke's other work, they became an important part of the analytic toolkit.

I'll say again, perhaps more explicitly, that I do not think the examples of heat and pain work to Kripke's advantage. This because heat and pain are not treated well when treated as objects. But while rejecting these last few arguments I am in agreement with much of the remainder of the article.

I know The Red Sox will win their next game, I know The Eiffel Tower is in Paris and I know that I am looking at the colour red. The word "know" is being metaphorically, in that it has degrees of certainty, because language is inherently metaphorical — RussellA

In the first case "know" is used incorrectly; you cannot know that The Red Sox will win the next game. In the second case you are merely repeating a well-worn fact. In the third case the "know" is redundant; you are just looking at something red (if you are).

In the first case you have left something out; you don't know, you feel you know, you believe. In the second case it is not really as if you know, it is that "it is well known". If you've never been to Paris, then you cannot correctly say that you know the Eiffel Tower is there, but rather that you merely accept what is generally accepted as a fact; again you beleive. In the third case the "know" is redundant; you see something red, that's all.

Similarly with same; some uses are ambiguous, but I don't think it is a matter of metaphor. If you have a red 1968 Ford Mustang and so do I, I might say " Oh look, we have the same car", but something is left out, making the statement strictly incorrect; we don't have the same car, but we have the same kind of car.

So on to the mind-body problem.

The premise of the discussion is that "my pain" is a rigid designator. I think this mistaken, for reasons identified by Wittgenstein in his discussion of pain. That's perhaps much the same objection as found in the Malcolm article mentioned. In my view a pain, like a sensation of heat, is not an object or individual in the sense required for it to be designated by a rigid designator. "I have a pain in my foot" and "It feels hot" are not suitable demonstratives. But that's another argument.

But we are here to talk about Kripke's account. And I think that, if pain is taken as an object or individual, rigidly designated, then Kripke's argument is pretty much correct.

That is, given the way Kripke developed here to talk about rigid designation, if that pain is rigidly designated, and that brain state is rigidly designated, then if they are identical, they are indeed necessarily identical.

And that does present a problem for identity theorists.

Either way, one must conclude that mental states are not the very same thing as brain states.

Either way, one must conclude that mental states are not the very same thing as brain states. — Banno

We already knew that, insofar as we can be aware of mental states, but not of brain states.

Beginning with this lectern, this lectern is made of wood. If it had not been made of wood it would have been a different object, so this lectern is necessarily made of wood. This sounds reasonable. — RussellA

This is the law of identity in a nutshell, as composed in Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing that it is, because if it were not, it would be something else.

This raises the question as to whether objects such as this lectern exist over and above their properties, in that if all the properties of the lectern were removed, would this lectern remain. — RussellA

The issue of whether or not a thing necessarily has properties is resolved by the implications of the law of identity. It is properties which make one thing distinct from another, so the law of identity implies that a "thing" necessarily has properties in order to be a unique particular.

Time is a thief" is a metaphor in that time is not the same as a thief. "Object A is object B" is a metaphor in that object A may be similar to object B, but object A can never be the same as object B. — RussellA

You only have this issue if you do not distinguish between the subject and the predicate, or object and property. In your quote, "time" is the subject, and "is a thief" is the predication. But predication is not the same as saying object A is object B. However, if through Platonism we represent properties as objects, then we might create that problem.

So "heat is the motion of molecules" fits the form, and thereby are objects in terms of the logic. — Moliere

Just out of curiosity, how could we account for radiant heat with this type of definition? Radiant heat is a real form of heat which we feel. Yet in that case, heat moves from object A to object B without the medium of molecules in between. So how would that heat get from A to B without moving through molecules in between?

Just out of curiosity, how could we account for radiant heat with this type of definition? Radiant heat is a real form of heat which we feel. Yet in that case, heat moves from object A to object B without the medium of molecules in between. So how would that heat get from A to B without moving through molecules in between? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we'd interpret radiant heat as molecules. (and, truthfully, that's how I understand Newton's notion of light -- they are little light particles)

In that case there would not be a necessary identity. And I think this gets to why I was so confused up front, too -- heat is not easy to define, especially in physical terms. We all basically get what it means in a generic sense, but that's it. So it doesn't seem like something I'd call a rigid designator, even in the normal sense of a proper name (unlike, say, Nixon).

It's the form of "NAME is NAME" -- heat and motion taken as names, where in the counter-factual we are able to refer to both heat and motion and say motion is not heat (because we are able to refer to the very same thing, whatever it is we were talking about) -- and refer to the same thing in both cases so that we can assert that these things are false. (else, to get transcendental, how else you know that "heat" refers to the same thing in the counter-factual than in the factual?)

I think we again are not in disagreement.

The wooden lectern is ipso facto necessarily wooden, yet that is understood only empirically. Unfortunately it's an example that is prone to misunderstanding, as in various posts in this thread. — Banno

We almost got to disagreement. Maybe next time. :)

Thanks for pursuing the thread. The explanations from different people finally got me to wrap my head around the baby idea.

This is perhaps the key concept, and the article is an articulation of how we can use this approach to talk consistently about counterfactuals. At the time of writing, under the influence of Quine, counterfactuals were generally thought senseless. After this article, and Kripke's other work, they became an important part of the analytic toolkit. — Banno

Cool. Nice that it finally clicked, in its own terms.

I'll say again, perhaps more explicitly, that I do not think the examples of heat and pain work to Kripke's advantage. This because heat and pain are not treated well when treated as objects. But while rejecting these last few arguments I am in agreement with much of the remainder of the article.

Yeah, I was definitely getting stuck on the examples. The mere "details" ;)

Well, it's all reducible to energy. And since the conservation of energy is universal, it would be the same in all possible worlds which are equipped with Einsteinian principles. Since "energy" is more universal, why not set it as the rigid designator instead?

Because it wasn't used that way in the analogy of the identity theorists Kripke was responding to in making an analogy between heat-molecules and mind-body to assert that there are contingent identity statements.

The problem though, is that if heat is defined as the motion of molecules, this doesn't account for all the forms of heat in the external reality, because a principal form of heat is radiant heat, and this is clearly not a movement of molecules. However, we do feel heat as the movement of molecules within our bodies, even radiant heat is felt that way. So by restricting "heat" by this definition, "motion of molecules", we restrict it to the sensation of heat, and so our understanding of "heat" under this definition is contingent on experience.

So we can't proceed from this definition of "heat" to show that heat is anything other than contingent on experience. And Kripke's stories about how it could be otherwise are not relevant, because he portrays heat as necessarily the movement of molecules, when "heat" is supposed to refer something external to the sensing body, and this is incorrect because much heat is radiant. So if we want to portray, or define "heat" in a way such that there can be a necessary relation between the word and the definition, we need an idea closer to "energy", which encompasses all forms of heat which are believed to exist. This would be the ideal conception of "heat", the one which includes all forms, and the external thing which that name refers to would be the Form of heat (Platonism).

You only have this issue if you do not distinguish between the subject and the predicate, or object and property. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, much of language is like that, ambiguous, in that rarely in practice if someone says "object A is object B" do they say in what sense they are using "is".

In the first case "know" is used incorrectly; you cannot know that The Red Sox will win the next game — Janus

If I am using "know" metaphorically, ironically, wryly, jokingly, humorously or sarcastically, it is not being used incorrectly.

I've suggested several times that possible worlds are a convenient way of dealing with counterfactuals. If you wish to call them a metaphor, go ahead. — Banno

Kripke wrote page 174: "All of this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in some way."
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The salient piece for proponents of descriptions is that a proper name does not refer by making use of some description. — Banno

Within Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions, a proper name refers to a set of true propositions that uniquely describe a referent.

Kripke and Donnellan rejected Descriptivism. Kripke described Descriptivism such that (1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties φ such that [speaker] A believes 'φX'

For example, to the name Aristotle there corresponds the properties Greek, a philosopher and a teacher. It is these properties that refer to the referent.

A property, such as being Greek, is also a description. As a proper name corresponds to a cluster of properties, and as properties are also descriptions, then surely doesn't Descriptivism make use of descriptions ?
===============================================================================

I agree the notion of removing all of an objects properties is problematic. I don't think that is mentioned anywhere in the article - is it? — Banno

Kripke wrote: "We can talk about this very object, and whether it could have had certain properties which it does not in fact have. For example, it could have been in another room from the room it in fact is in, even at this very time, but it could not have been made from the very beginning from water frozen into ice."

Kripke also wrote:"In fact, it would seem that both the terms, ‘my pain’ and ‘my being in such and such a brain state’ are, first of all, both rigid designators. That is, whenever anything is such and such a pain, it is essentially that very object, namely, such and such a pain, and wherever anything is such and such a brain state, it is essentially that very object, namely, such and such a brain state."

I agree that the possibility of removing all the properties from an object is not specifically mentioned in the article, but the problem of which properties may be removed from a rigid designator without affecting its status as a rigid designator must surely be important in understanding the article.

Objects have properties. Possible properties of this lectern are made of wood, made of ice, in another room, etc. A name is a rigid designator by virtue of having certain essential properties, whereby non-essential properties may be removed without affecting its status as a rigid designator. Kripke doesn't address the problem of how is it determined which properties are essential and which non-essential.

For example, some may believe that whether this lectern to be in this room or outside is clearly not an essential property, yet others may believe that the location of this lectern is an essential part of its identity, in that a stand made of wood outside a lecture theatre is not functioning as a lectern.

The article can only make sense to me if I can understand how is it decided which properties can be removed from a rigid designator before it no longer is a rigid designator.
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I'd also draw your attention to the difference between picking out an individual using a name and picking it out using a demonstrative. — Banno

Even Donnellan admits of description within proper names.

He wrote: "Nevertheless, so long as the user of a name can fall back on such a
description as 'the person referred to by Aristotle', the principle of identifying descriptions may be salvaged even if at expense of having to elevate one type of description to special status."

I proposed that if in this actual world, — RussellA

Pardon me, but it seems to me that this locution is misleading; as soon as the word 'if' appears, you are talking about a possible world, but then you doubly return us to 'this' and 'actual' world. But this actual world is necessarily the way it is, and not the way it would be if anything was different.

If you see what I mean. Or indeed, even if you don't.

"The sensation of heat" they say, as if there were only one. The heat one feels on a hot day is not exactly like the heat one feels coming from a radiator or the heat one has when feverish. One tests the temperature of baby's bottle on the sensitive wrist, not the calloused hand. And if you want to try fire walking, make sure there are no nails in the wood, because the conductivity of iron makes it feel much hotter than charcoal at the same temperature, in the short run, and also in the short walk. Warm socks and gloves do not have to be warm to be warming, and nor does chilli sauce. Why is life so complicated? Time for a song.

as soon as the word 'if' appears, you are talking about a possible world, but then you doubly return us to 'this' and 'actual' world. But this actual world is necessarily the way it is, and not the way it would be if anything was different. — unenlightened

In this world, Hesperus exists. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world.

If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, in which world would Hesperus not exist in, this world or a possible world ?

In this world, Hesperus exists. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. — RussellA

That's not true. We hypothesize about possible entities all the time. Sometimes we make them real.

If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. — RussellA

If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it wouldn't be this world, it would be that world.

The confusion continues.

Try it like this: instead of "if" always use "if in a possible world"

Then one can say "If in a possible world Hesperus didn't exist, x,y,z.
This is the same meaning as "If Hesperus didn't exist, x,y,z.

But when the substitution is made in your sentence, we get

"If in a possible world, Hesperus didn't exist in this world, ..."

That's already a contradiction, whatever comes after. my reply above makes no sense, and neither does your post that it replies to; but my reply at least has the merit of being a feeble joke.

Did you watch the second video, above? It shows why a piece of metal will feel colder than a book at the very same temperature. Meta's posts, as always, serve only to confuse.

Kripke wrote page 174: "All of this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in some way." — RussellA

Seems to me you want to make more of this than it will hold. Sure, it's a metaphor, a way to talk about counterfactuals. That's a turn of phrase in Kripke's hands, not the theory of meaning you want to turn it into.

Kripke's theory of meaning is causal. I't certainly not metaphorical.

doesn't Descriptivism make use of descriptions ? — RussellA

Sure. But proper names do not refer by using some description, in the way that Russell supposed. Kripke and Donellan demonstrate this.

A name is a rigid designator by virtue of having certain essential properties, — RussellA

Exactly wrong.

Note that, as I've been at pains to point out, the case of this lectern is an example of a demonstrative, not a proper name.

Frankly, you have two theories, that names stand in for descriptions and that language is metaphorical, and you are interpreting the text in such a way as to maintain those theories. Kripke and Donellan, so far as I am aware, accept neither.

I'd like to go over the lectern example once again. There's a few things of note, that seem to have been missed by various posters.

It's an example of the use of a demonstrative: This. It's not a proper name.

Now Kripke shows that proper names do not rely on descriptions. But that need not apply to demonstratives.

Note also that Kripke introduces it specifically in order to talk about this topic: "A question which has often been raised in philosophy is: What are its essential properties?"

While he uses a demonstrative to talk about essential properties, it does not follow that he thinks things designated by proper names have essential properties. Specifically, he does not think that a proper name refers in virtue of the essential properties of the thing named.

This by way of showing that the lectern example has little bearing on the use of proper names.

Now to the syllogism on p. 180, which caused some confusion amongst posters. Notice that (P⊃☐P) is an invalid inference. It is true that the cat is on the mat, but it is not necessarily truth that the cat is on the mat. Now the theorems of predicate calculus and such are necessarily true, true in all possible worlds, in virtu of their logical structure. But (P⊃☐P) is not amongst them. It is not a necessary truth in virtue of it's logical structure. If it is a necessary truth, it is for some other reason.

So what are we to make of

In other words, if P is the statement that the lectern is not made of ice, one knows by a priori philosophical analysis, some conditional of the form "if P, then necessarily P". — p.180

How can "This lectern is not made of ice" imply, a priori and in all possible worlds, that this lectern is not made of ice?

And the only way that I can see for this to be so is if the demonstrative, "this lectern", in some way already implies that the lectern is not made of ice. It's standing in for something like "this wooden lectern is not made of ice", which is true a priori.

Which is a convolute way of saying that if the lectern before us were made of ice, it would be a different lectern to the wooden lectern that is actually before us.

A corollary of all this is that the essence ascribed here is a long way from the Aristotelian notion of "to ti esti", "the what it is", that so confused his latin translators that they had to invent a new word.

Now Kripke shows that proper names do not rely on descriptions. But that need not apply to demonstratives. — Banno

It appears someone's been reading the SEP. <--- That sentence has a rigid designator in it. It actually comes down to what I meant by it. Don't forget that meaning is found in use, not in analyzing abstract collections of words.

As for the rest, you've gone out into controversial territory trying to find a way to deny what pretty much everybody else thinks: which is that Kripke was contradicting Quine regarding essentialism.

Bon voyage.

That post does not make much sense.

Sure, I found an interesting tidbit in SEP. Yes, SEP is a proper name. Proper names can be used to pick out an individual, without paying regard to their attributes.

And I've explicitly pointed out that Kripke is arguing against Quine; that's not something I wish to deny.

Whatever your point was, you haven't actually made it. And that is the pattern to your posts: somewhat snarky half-statements.

If you have a genuine criticism, a useful comment, or even another interesting tidbit, set it out.

If you have a genuine criticism, set it out. — Banno

You make this kind of statement a lot. Set out your argument, do you have anything substantive, if you have a point, make it. Then you promptly respond to the first three words someone wrote and ignore the rest.

I'm sure you can find someone to engage you. It's not going to be me. :razz: