The question simply makes no sense. What could an answer possibly be? "It feels like...?" What words could possibly fill the blank? — Isaac

You were the one arguing that perceptions were effable. So you would eff whatever their perceptions are like to them.

Dozens of researchers in consciousness think they know exactly what a good theory would look like and they've constructed their experiments closely around those models. The fact that you don't grasp them is not a flaw in the model. — Isaac

Cite one you think is satisfactory.

Why wouldn't they? What's in the way? What compelling physical law prevents biological processes from causing whatever symptoms they so happen to cause? — Isaac

"Why wouldn't they?" possesses exactly zero explanatory power. The question is rather "why would they?". Why would some neurological processes engender consciousness, and not others? What are the relevant mechanisms?

The Hard "Problem" does exist, but only in the sense of a semantic issue.

The Hard problem should not be regarded as a deficiency or bug of the natural sciences, but as a positive feature of the natural sciences; the semantics of the natural sciences should be understood as being deliberately restricted to the a-perspectival Lockean primary qualities of objects and events (for example, as demonstrated by the naturalised concept of optical redness) so as to leave the correlated experiential or 'private' concepts undefined (e.g phenomenal redness). This semantic incompleteness of the natural sciences means that the definitions of natural kinds can be used and communicated in an observer-independent and situation-independent fashion, analogously to how computer source-code is distributed and used in a machine independent fashion.

If instead the semantics of scientific concepts were perspectival and grounded in the phenomenology and cognition of first-person experience, for example in the way in which each of us informally uses our common natural language, then inter-communication of the structure of scientific discoveries would be impossible, because everyone's concepts would refer only to the Lockean secondary qualities constituting their personal private experiences, which would lead to the appearance of inconsistent communication and the serious problem of inter-translation. In which case, we would have substituted the "hard problem" of consciousness" that is associated with the semantics of realism , for a hard problem of inter-personal communication that can be associated with solipsism and idealism.

I don't follow. Can you dumb that down into simpler English and dot points? Phenomenological English seems labyrinthine. :wink:

I don't want to get into a long discussion about how science has to proceed. I will say that there is no reason the mind would not be among entities amenable for study by science. You and Constance are just waving your arms and promoting a ghost in the machine with no basis except that you can't imagine anything else. — T Clark

Then the last word would be this: It's not my last word. All analytic philosophers know this. The distance between objects in the world and our knowledge claims about them given a physicalist model simply cannot be bridged through empirical science unless there is a dramatic change of thinking here. The first move will have to be an abandonment of an ontology of physical substance, for this pulls all things toward Dewey/Quine's (and obviously others I haven't read) and science's naturalism, and this simply does not work. Just ask Quine:

"When . . . I begin to think about my own verbal behavior in theoretical or semantical terms, I am
forced to admit that, here too, indeterminacy reigns. Philosophical reflection upon my own
verbal behavior, concerned with hunting out semantical rules and ontological commitments,
requires me to make use of translational notions. I then recognize that the intentional content of
my own psychological states is subject to indeterminacy: semantical and intentional phenomena
cannot be incorporated within the science of nature as I would wish.

From Quine (though he does remain true to his naturalism throughout, I have read) and others I am led to believe that an ontology of physical substance has to be replaced by one of radical indeterminacy. This frees our doxastic affairs dramatically, for at every turn we are not led to those absurd physicalist delimitations, as if "semantical phenomena" has its final vocabulary, as Rorty put it, in this primitive idea. At the most basic level everything is indeterminate, so we are left with what is given, and givenness is basis of Husserl's phenomenological ontology. The distance is bridged by concepts like 'proximity' and 'intuition' as there is no epistemic distance between me and this cup simply because the cup's being there appears without distance. Being IS what appears.

Of course, there is interpretative "distance" and this is a big issue. But then, distance, in the way it is talked about here, implies a distance from something, and one would have to posit that something to make sense of it. So, this implies our knowledge claims, the sound ones, intimate something of whatever-it-is that is there, undisclosed. THIS is where very interesting philosophy begins, in my thoughts: how to enunciate the appearances of the world to see if "Truth" possibilities of our propositions have any purport beyond their explicit propositional content.

I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - the nature of consciousness, and the mysteries of QM, being the most commonly referenced. — Tom Storm

I think there is a case to be made for a theistic worldview. I actually have an OP on the subject half-written. I'll finish it eventually.

If instead the semantics of scientific concepts were perspectival and grounded in the phenomenology and cognition of first-person experience, for example in the way in which each of us informally uses our common natural language, then inter-communication of the structure of scientific discoveries would be impossible, because everyone's concepts would refer only to the Lockean secondary qualities constituting their personal private experiences, which would lead to the appearance of inconsistent communication and the serious problem of inter-translation. In which case, we would have substituted the "hard problem" of consciousness" that is associated with the semantics of realism , for a hard problem of inter-personal communication that can be associated with solipsism and idealism. — sime

But phenomenology is not about first person experience. This is a notion that issues from the very scientific perspective in question: here is a perceiving agent, there is a stone, and if phenomenology rules our thinking in this, the perceiving agent never leaves her private phenomenal space. Phenomenology does not think like this. It takes appearance as Being. I am there and stones are there and their existence is fully acknowledged as other than myself. My scientific conceptual relations with them do not change at all. All that has changed is now we are freed from the absurd ontology of physical materialism that makes it, not hard, but impossible to describe epistemic relations, which are THE biggest embarrassment of analytic's naturalism. What is left for philosophy is clearer analysis of what makes appearance possible.

Chalmers proposes that things like neutral monism or the extended mind would help us get closer to a theory of consciousness. He's flexible. But strictly speaking, he's part of the analytical tradition, so the physicalism you're speaking of is not essential to analytical philosophy.

Chalmers proposes that things like neutral monism or the extended mind would help us get closer to a theory of consciousness. He's flexible. But strictly speaking, he's part of the analytical tradition, so the physicalism you're speaking of is not essential to analytical philosophy. — frank

Thanks for that. Then I will have to read Chalmers on the extended mind. But the more one speaks of such things, the more one leans phenomenology. After all, what is it that is "extended"?

. After all, what is it that is "extended"? — Constance

That's what we want to know. Chalmers is a good start if you're interested in the philosophy behind developing a scientific theory of consciousness. He explains the difference between functional consciousness (the easy problem) and phenomenal consciousness (the hard problem.). He's very well versed in theory of mind and the amazing success science has had so far in explaining functionality.

All that has changed is now we are freed from the absurd ontology of physical materialism that makes it, not hard, but impossible to describe epistemic relations, which are THE biggest embarrassment of analytic's naturalism. What is left for philosophy is clearer analysis of what makes appearance possible. — Constance

How does this differ to idealism?

You were the one arguing that perceptions were effable. So you would eff whatever their perceptions are like to them. — hypericin

What does it mean for a perception to be 'like' something?

Cite one you think is satisfactory. — hypericin

I really don't think this is the format for discussion of neuroscience in detail (I've been there, without positive outcome). If you're interested, my preferred approach starts from Tulving's concepts on autonoesis, which were first identified in neurological terms by Emrah Duzel back at the turn of century (love saying that, it sounds ages ago), and Fergus Craik in an unrelated PET study.

You can look them all up, but without a basic understanding of the principles they're working from it's unlikely it'll make much sense.

"Why wouldn't they?" possesses exactly zero explanatory power. The question is rather "why would they?". — hypericin

Why?

Is there a question as to why glutamate exists, why bones have the structure they do, why atoms are small, why stars are far away, why the sea is wet...

Has anyone considered that the ability to manipulate information (and information itself) and consciousness are one in the same. Of course they are and why aren't you a proponent of that most obvious state. Information as we know it is never static but always dynamic... Quite clear supporting evidence...and please don't confuse the issue with any more Claude Shannon BS. It's been a done and dismissed....failed....dead end...period.

Consciousness is not information. But consciousness is informational. It is a phenomenon arising from flows of information. That is why the hard problem is so seemingly intractable. It tries to leap directly from matter to consciousness. But the matter of the brain supports flows of information, from which emerges consciousness. How is unclear. But it is far more conceivable that consciousness arises from information than from matter.

If you are of the opinion that information exists outside our minds I'll tell you that is in error.

The correct view is that information exists as our neurons containing and manipulating mental content. This two part form is the physical reality of how information can exist.

You can make assertions about consciousness all day. The thing is, to know what is, one must be knowledgeable about the environment in which it exists. The two things are coefficient. We've only had lightbulbs for a hundred years. We're just a stone's throw away from sleeping on hay.

Don't fool yourself into believing that the first thing about the environment of consciousness is understood.

You might be a nihilist. However, it seems worth while to send up trial balloons to see what flies and what gets shot down and try again. That's what some of us do here.

You can look them all up, but without a basic understanding of the principles they're working from it's unlikely it'll make much sense. — Isaac

Can you link a paper or article?

Is there a question as to why glutamate exists, why bones have the structure they do, why atoms are small, why stars are far away, why the sea is wet... — Isaac

Are you really suggesting that "why not? What's stopping them?" is an adequate answer to any of these?

I'm not a nihilist. I'm just a realist. The facts of humanity just aren't that optimistic.

We are so, so dumb. It's always the final paradigm.

We are so, so dumb. It's always the final paradigm. — neonspectraltoast

If we are so stupid, how do you know this? With what mechanism can you establish the clever things we do not know but should? Does this imply you are smarter than most? Or is this more of a Socratic position?

Shouldn't have called you a nihilist.

Yes, no shortage of dumb at every human level. How do we avoid it? We are tiny specks in an endless ocean of matter that is oblivious to us. Maybe I'm a nihilist in some ways.

I don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality. And still too foolish to assert myself.

I have seen many things. Things "smart" people have never seen. So, just trust me? Haha. That'd be a first.

The blind lead the blind. We trust the blind because they're like us, blind. It'll probably take centuries, but the more the proliferation of truth, the more bizarre we will become. That's nature, not cowardly conformity

I don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality...

...I have seen many things. Things "smart" people have never seen. — neonspectraltoast

I find your statements unconvincing.

It's more an issue of pride than reason. I fear most are partial to humanity. I have never been.

Our pride should come from our ability to persevere. Not our success, because we haven't succeeded. As it is, the cart is way out in front of the horse.

We think paradigms have shifted towards ultimate wisdom, but, just like our ancestors, human beings will eventually look back and call us fools.

Oh, really? Because I had my hopes on you being convinced.

Let's face it: The only things you find convincing are mundanities.

Has anyone considered that the ability to manipulate information (and information itself) and consciousness are one in the same. — Mark Nyquist

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell?

don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality. And still too foolish to assert myself. — neonspectraltoast

Isn't being aware of our ignorance the beginnings of wisdom (Socrates) and isn't ignorance quite different to being 'so, so dumb'? That latter seems a celebration of hopelessness.

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell? — T Clark

No.

The hard problem is just more masturbation.

How does this differ to idealism? — Tom Storm

Idealism affirms that everything in the we encounter is idea. Phenomenology affirms it as reality.

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - — T Clark

Phenomenal consciousness and metacognition constitute the hard problem. There is something it is like to be you (or me) what is this? (And no, I'm not looking for an answer.)