A lot of peoples jobs are part of their identities and a valued part of their life. — Andrew4Handel

The operative word there is "part". It is what they do - and they can change to another occupation - in fact, many people nowadays have to change several times during their working life. Gone are the days when an old geezer, forced to retire from his bookkeeping job, died six months later, because he had lost his identity. And many people have to take two or more crappy jobs to earn a living at all. I hope nobody in the world will ever have to live with 'stockboy' or 'gofer' as their personal idnetity.

I would be labelled agender by someone else — Andrew4Handel

No, you said it yourself. You clearly wrote: “I don't have a gender identity and apparently that is being called ’Agender.’”

Should we be able to identify however we like? Would that be problematic and is there an ethical dimension? Should identities be challenged? — Andrew4Handel

My identity is very important -- to me. Important enough that I spend quite a bit of time dithering about it -- privately. No, I have no doubts whatsoever about my past, present, or future sex, gender, or sexual orientation. I know where I come from, though my background is not necessarily consistent with where I find myself today (retired old gay man). I presented myself frankly: what you saw was what you got.

I have a strong preference for other people presenting themselves in their true colors. I do not like discovering that you (any 'you') is not who you seemed to be.

An example: When I went into a gay bar to pick up a trick (haven't done that in years) I wanted some certainty that the trick was, in fact, like what he seemed to be like. Once in a while, a trick turned out to be other than what he seemed to be -- not dangerous, just not as advertised. Annoying.

Same goes for work relationships, casual friendships, and the like. BE your identity. If you are actually a ruthlessly competitive SOB, be up-front about it. I can deal with ruthlessness; I can't deal with ruthlessness masquerading as gentle and loving good works. If you are pretty much a crook, own it. If you are practicing for sainthood, that's your problem. Just don't act like a bureaucrat to cover it up.

As a general existential principle, I don't believe we can be just anything we want to be. Nature and nurture stacked our decks before we could hold the cards. People are best advised to honestly be who they are, for better or worse.

Well, alll right!

A good question by all standards. If I say "I'm a soldier" or "I'm Arnold Schwarzenegger" then that involves some amount of, let's just say, duty and responsibility. It's amiss/odd to think of oneself as a monk and then to fornicate wildly, high on ecstacy. :grin:

I don't know what existence precedes essence has to do with all this, but it just popped into my mind as I was making this post. Perhaps, "you can be anything you want, baby."

That is why some people convey a fake identity because it is an identity they wanted or it is an identity that is useful to them at some time. Such as evading capture or identity through elaborate disguise — Andrew4Handel

I think you may be confusing different things here.
Identity is who you feel yourself to be. It may be necessary to conceal or disguise it, or you may be confused about some aspects of of it, and it may be difficult to express, but that's your actual self.
Self-presentation is something else again. That's not about who you are, but how you want others to see you. It is self-presentation that drives the cosmetic surgery, fashion, makeup and hairdressing industries, as well as a good deal of PR and advertising.
You may, for whatever reason, wish to present yourself as something entirely different from who you really are, but that doesn't change your identity; it's just pretend. It's also quite normal for people to present themselves slightly enhanced, a little better than their natural best, in order to attract mates, opportunities and friends. That doesn't change their identity, either.
People choose careers and invest a huge amount of time and effort becoming lawyers or doctors or senators, and that desire, that investment becomes part of their identity. Not all of it, because the same people also identify as husbands, mothers, golfers, siblings, Masons or whatever.
A person's identity is made up of whatever ingredients that person feels is essential to being themselves. Identities are complex; they can be stunted or crippled by early experience; they can be expanded and liberated by success in work or love or friendship or therapy. They grow and change.
A person reveals as much or little of their identity as they think is appropriate to - or safe in - a situation, and environment, a relationship or a social setting.

Well said, @Vera Mont. I agree with pretty much everything you wrote there.

@Andrew4Handel I want to respond to something you said earlier, and clarify something:

This is an example of how there are (at least) two identities at play in any social interaction. The self-concept of an individual (how he sees himself), and the other-concept of the person interacting with him.
— tomatohorse

The question probably is to what extent should one influence the other.

I think it is probably impossible to force someone to think something abut you. Such that we have limited control over other peoples minds without deception and coercion.

So the problem for me is any attempt to enforce someone else's opinion on someone else's identity.
. — Andrew4Handel

What I had in mind, in the bit you quoted from me, was the natural human psychological behavior of getting social cues about ourselves (our role in the group, how our actions affect others, etc.) from others outside ourselves. Part of our self-concept is informed by this. No one is an island. We are shaped and influenced by others, for better or worse, both subtly and powerfully. (Calls to mind the old advice about choosing your friends wisely)

Yet we can also exercise agency over this influence. It can be very helpful to learn about and understand the ways our environment (including, but of course not limited to, other humans) affects us. But that's a whole other thread.

With that in mind, I wanted to also touch on your question about "to what extent should one influence the other." It's a really good question. There's a certain freedom that comes from not worrying what others think about you - and that can free a person from imaginary chains that hold them back unnecessarily. So, "don't listen to other people, only yourself" is sometimes good advice in that regard because it can help people do more good, self-actualize, etc.

But there's another side, too. None of us are perfect, we make mistakes, have erroneous views of the world, and lack skills (such as the painter from the example before). We need others to point out areas in which we are deficient, and tell us how to do better. So in that sense, "DO listen to other people," is sometimes the way to go.

Like most things in life, it's a balance. Finding that balance is a big part of the Art of Living Well. Eudaimonia.

It's all about original sin. Whether you Adam and Eve it or not, ever since, fig leaves have been de rigueur. It is mandated to hide the crucial aspect of one's social identity. And yet it is also mandated to display it in coded form. You must not see my penis, but you must see my top-hat and tails.

The reason Sub-Saharan Africans were enslaved and Arabs, Indians, etc were not, is the shameless nakedness of the latter 'proved' that they were less than human. we should not pretend that we are beyond such things, when the whole organisation of society right down to toilet facilities rests on such primitive notions.

There is a natural disgust for human waste - cattle also avoid eating around their own droppings. this is extended to menstrual fluids, and becomes gendered such that self-disgust and its projection onto the world is a particular female proclivity. See also for example, trypophobia.

The interweaving of instinct, social conditioning, and individual variability all contribute to the establishment of personal identity. We are coyly pretending that we are talking generally about all kinds of identity, but we all know somewhere, that what matters in any encounter with otherness, is to accurately identify the range of appropriate responses. Here you come, and shall I run from you, fight you, fuck you or eat you? Or some combination of these? Knowing the difference between a legitimate MD and a quack, or between a policeman and a postman is also potentially useful, but a minor, secondary question.

There are primal fears, and fundamental taboos in play in this discussion. The careful exposure of these to the insight of all participants is the prerequisite for anything approaching a rational or philosophical analysis.

Failing that, we are, alas, reduced to mere politics.

I think religious identities, special status and such are all socially imbued on a person. So there is a meaning to them beyond the silliness of being different due to a title. The public, the pnyotos, as the old Greeks called it, fears a person, or trusts a person or follows a person... these are not illusionary, but socially established. — god must be atheist

There are primal fears, and fundamental taboos in play in this discussion. The careful exposure of these to the insight of all participants is the prerequisite for anything approaching a rational or philosophical analysis. — unenlightened

I'm glad you immediately went there, so to speak @unenlightened. Let me try to make a "babies first" account of personal identity so that it can be ripped apart.

The first account, I'll call it the "felt account":
(Felt account): The felt account goes like this, people are who or what they identify with. What suffices for a person to have the identity X is:
( 1 ) The person can truthfully say "I identify as X".
( 2 ) The person expresses a behavioural commitment to behave like an X.
( 3 ) The person feels like they are an X.

I think that's what @bert1 was calling the "subjective account". It seems to work, at face value, for some things. It might work for X="A star wars fan". If they say they are a star wars fan, express their like for Baby Yoda plushies and has a positive disposition (feels like) towards Star Wars... Then they're a fan.

Even in that case though, there are some things which are unsaid. Some holes. You can say you're a Star Wars fan, you can feel like one, you can express a behavioural commitment to be a Star Wars fan... But if you don't watch the movies, don't know any of the lore, haven't read any of the books, played any of the games... You can say you're like that, you can express a commitment to Star Wars, but you don't act on it at all. That doesn't seem like a Star Wars fan at all. Why? Because the person behaves indistinguishably from someone who is not a Star Wars fan. And allegedly the statements of the "felt account" sufficed. This is a wedge between having an opinion+feeling it and behaving as if you have that opinion and feel like it.

The bullet could be bitten, and we could assert that what someone identifies with like in the "felt account" really is the person being that identity. In that respect committing to an identity doesn't make anyone need to behave in any characteristic way associated with that identity, just express a commitment too. The "hole" is between planning and execution, and it could be seen as a natural one.

There do seem to be stronger violations of the felt account though, falling in line with these characteristic properties. Someone can satisfy all of ( 1 ) through ( 3 ) but isn't, as was previously stated, a police officer. Why? Because they don't act like one. If insist on the felt account, it would mean someone can sit in their home, have no police training, never go to work as a police officer, but still be a police officer.



That bullet, too, could be bitten. An identity in the "felt account" could be entirely severed from any social role. Someone could identify as a police officer without working as one. And in that regard an the identification is severed from social commitments entirely. I think that is odd though, at least contrary to common sense understandings of identity. Why?

You could say something like: "I identify as a police officer but I am not one" or "I identify as a Star Wars fan but I am not one"... Those make very little sense. They seem to be akin to Moore's paradox, in which a commitment to a state of affairs is expressed, but the state of affairs is negated. "It is raining but I believe it is not raining"; the act of assertion itself is a claim to truth on the part of the speaker. Similarly, the act of asserting identity seems to be a claim to being one. That goes against the felt account.

The first species of holes is between who I feel I am and who I am. It seems that feelings alone don't cut the mustard. The nature of those holes is brought into relief by inverting the account, which brings us to the second account. Focussing entirely on behaviour.

Any comments before I word vomit more?

Any comments before I word vomit more? — fdrake

If the SS say you're a Jew, it really doesn't make much difference what you feel, say, or do. Just get in the cattle truck. Psychiatrists, social workers, doctors immigration officials and judges are all empowered to decide your identity for you. Or indeed against you.

We need others to point out areas in which we are deficient, and tell us how to do better. So in that sense, "DO listen to other people," is sometimes the way to go. — tomatohorse

The trick is discerning which others give useful constructive criticism, and which are harmful to our self-esteem. It's not always easy, because well-meaning relations who do have helpful insight are sometimes tactless in their communication; lovers or friends may be too kind and hold back the truth, while some well-spoken rival may use guile to undermine our self-image and adversaries may exaggerate our faults and shortcomings to erode our confidence.

Here you come, and shall I run from you, fight you, fuck you or eat you? — unenlightened

I like that summary - or the dog's classification of encounters. We don't get much from sniffing bums, so we look, listen and exchange some kind of greeting. That's what makes apparel so important. Not just the concealment of genitalia, but the display of sex, class, rank, marital status, occupation, material wealth, maturity, temperament, inclination. Voice, too, timber, tone, accent, enunciation, vocabulary and syntax all reveal not only how we are situated in society, but a good deal about our antecedents, self-image, attitudes and aspirations.
I've never liked physical contact with strangers, from the time I was patted on the head or had my cheeks pinched as a small child... right up until some time in hospital, when I perforce let go of that reserve. In between, I learned to accept handshakes; never did get used to the instant hugging that's standard in some circles. The greeting is like showing a badge: if you know the special handshake or use the correct salute, bow or curtsy, extend one hand or two, kiss one cheek or both - these greetings tell the other person whether you belong to their "us" or not, and if not, some indication of which 'them' you're a part of. Makes all the difference in the next step of aquaintance.

The first species of holes is between who I feel I am and who I am. It seems that feelings alone don't cut the mustard. The nature of those holes is brought into relief by inverting the account, which brings us to the second account. — fdrake

My teeth hurt from biting bullets - wish you'd brought toast instead. My problem with felt account is: where would such a feeling and commitment originate, if not from previous positive experience? Why would anyone imagine himself a Star Wars fan without having seen and admired the films?
The other one, identifying as a police officer, could be a fantasy role in the same way as fandom - from watching fictional police at work and believing that those imaginary guardians or peace and good order are better than you are as a real person. (Why this putative 'you' had such low self-esteem is moot, for the moment.) You don't have to 'work as' your role model; only to imagine. But it can evolve from fantasy to impersonation - where you actually dress up in a uniform and buy the weapons (the weapons seem to be crucial) and on to delusion: some impressionable people who identify with police do act out; they go into the street and shoot 'bad guys'.

If the SS say you're a Jew, it really doesn't make much difference what you feel, say, or do. Just get in the cattle truck. Psychiatrists, social workers, doctors immigration officials and judges are all empowered to decide your identity for you. Or indeed against you. — unenlightened

Absolutely! I think this is something which the felt account, and an account based on behaviour also miss.

Will detail an "only behavioural" account for it now. I'll call it the "only behavioural account".

(Only Behavioural Account): The following suffice for someone to have an identity X:
( 1 ) The person acts characteristically of how people with identity X act.

So someone will count as being a Star Wars fan if they act as one. That now includes going to see the films, owning Baby Yoda models and all that. The things which would be expected of a Star Wars fan. For this account, if someone said "I'm not a Star Wars fan" while behaving characteristically as one, it wouldn't matter... They would still be a Star Wars fan. Their feelings and intentions toward Star Wars don't matter, only whether they've eg. bought stuff and gone to movies.

Looking at this in terms of Moore's Paradox statements reveals an asymmetry between the Only Behavioural Account and the Felt Account. The assertion "I identify as X but I am not an X" is very Moore-ish, because both statements with the but between both act as identity claims, the first identifying with X and the second expressly not identifying with X. But trying to asset having behaved characteristically of an identity category doesn't ring as wrongly. Why it doesn't ring as wrongly I believe says something about how we understand identity.

Eg: "I've been to all the Star Wars movies, have read all the books, but I've never been a Star Wars fan", it would be improbable behaviour, but doesn't strike as a contradiction in terms as the felt account's assertion did. When someone asserts an identity of themselves, "I am an X", they are not thereby committing themselves to a list of concrete events immediately, just the general understanding of what an X is. Star Wars fans may argue about whether someone can even count as a Star Wars fan if they've not read the 1990s Bounty Hunter trilogy. Thus no definitive list of characteristic behaviours of a Star Wars fan is both necessary and sufficient for being a Star Wars fan as the predicate "is Star Wars fan" is commonly ascribed. This characterises "is a Star Wars fan" as more like a property cluster than as an extensional definition of sub-predicates which every Star Wars fan satisfies.

Some proper subsets of the cluster may be necessary, some may be sufficient, but pulling it apart goes against the normal use of the phrase. If you've behaved characteristically of an asshole, that hasn't made you an asshole.

I can see two major holes with the Only Behavioural Account. Firstly, it doesn't seem to work with all identities, secondly property clusters might provide a list of features to take into account for an assessment of whether a person has identity X - but it doesn't provide a social mechanism for them having identity X.

Examples;

For the first issue: a vigilante may behave characteristically of a police officer. Patrolling a beat, stopping crimes, checking in on families, removing people selling illegal goods from bars... Satisfying a large chunk of a property cluster... But they are not a police officer. Similarly, someone who is a police officer in Poland is not a police officer in the UK and vice versa, even though their behaviours would overlap in the property cluster of the identity "police officer" a lot.

For the second issue: let's say I presented you with the question:

This person does the following things: patrols a beat, stops crimes, checks in on families, removes people selling illegal goods in bars, stops fights, arrests people, provides largely untrained counselling to the mentally ill... What's their job?

You'd rightly be able to answer "police officer". But if you applied that to police officer in Poland, it would not suffice to demonstrate that they are a "police officer" in the UK. Even though they:

( A ) Exhibit the same property cluster and
( B ) Locational properties are not part of the property cluster. You can tell someone's a bobby from the list, you don't need to know where they are.

In that regard, if a police officer in the UK asserted "I am a police officer", truthfully they must count as a police officer in the UK under the law, not just as a police officer by the property cluster.

In both examples, external norms seem to render identifications as determinative. This, secretly, is also part of the Behaviour Only account, as what counts as a characteristic property for an identity is also - at least partially - determined by an agent's relationship with binding norms. Eg, the general understanding of what it means to be a Star Wars fan, and what institutional rites need to apply to the agent to make them a police officer over and above the constituents of the property cluster.

Just as @unenlightened said, when you look at personal identity closely, not even the bits which are "in you", or that "you feel" come even close to establishing your identity. In that regard, personal identity is deeply impersonal. Thus something like an institutional account of personal identity needs to be explored.

My problem with felt account is: where would such a feeling and commitment originate, if not from previous positive experience? Why would anyone imagine himself a Star Wars fan without having seen and admired the films? — Vera Mont

Absolutely. In normal circumstances someone would not assert they like something truthfully unless they behave as if they like it. This logical gap between personal expression and behavioural commitment is what I wanted to highlight with the account; folk understanding of identity I believe bundles behavioural commitments and expressions of sentiment together - as a correlation. And perhaps as a larger property cluster.

Edit: I forgot to bite the bullets for the only behaviour account, I shall try to do so soon.

A being who cannot see his own ears has less of an ability to determine his own identity, I’m afraid, than someone else. His vantage point and periphery is minuscule in comparison. Another person could do a lap around him, address what stands before his eyes, and give a more accurate description of what he feels, smells, sees etc. than one could have done of himself.

A personal identity ought to be challenged on these grounds, not to disrespect someone’s account of themselves, but to better inform him of how he appears from beyond his limited periphery.

Moore's paradox — fdrake

:up: It's consistent to believe I'm not a man while it's in fact the case that I am a man or in more general terms it is consistent to believe x while it's not x and vice versa. Doesn't bode well for the LGBTQ community I'm afraid. It boils down to the difference betwixt facts and beliefs - not the same thing and the problem is more widespread, it's almost everywhere, this.

Eg: "I've been to all the Star Wars movies, have read all the books, but I've never been a Star Wars fan", it would be improbable behaviour, but doesn't strike as a contradiction in terms as the felt account's assertion did — fdrake

"I had to, it's my job as a film critic." The well known 'jobsworth' defence.

A being who cannot see his own ears has less of an ability to determine his own identity, I’m afraid, than someone else — NOS4A2

Have you heard of a device called a mirror? It's like a 'someone else', but without the agenda.

Identity is relational. I am exactly like you in my uniqueness. You are one of us, unless you are one of them. There is always a mutuality of connection or disconnection. Your behaviour and feeling are identified in relation to my behaviour and feeling. Identity is irrevocably social, except to the extent that it is ineffable. Even Crusoe only becomes significant in relation to firstly his origins, and secondly his relation to the deprivation of the social, and thirdly to his 'other' as Friday. The desert island trope is the exemplar of the social nature of identity - the limit of individuality. Crusoe is the absolute monarch of nowhere.

Just as in language, identities are conventions based upon personal choice. As such, a society may or may not accept the identity chosen by an individual. Therefore, one can identify oneself however one likes to the extent that society permits.

Fundamentally, that is why identities are so controversial.

Because identities are conventions, they should be challenged as society sees fit. That does not, however, limit the freedom of a particular social circle to gather and have, say, a clown or a wolf party, because they identify as such.

This very freedom differs entirely from the possibility of challenging an identity. In other words, just because society considers best not to convene in recognizing a particular identity, doesn't mean they will be sanctioned in any way from doing so.

Everyone can do whatever they want, the limit being disorder, disrespect, offense, and so on. And society also has the right not to recognize their identity choice as a public element.

Identity is relational. I am exactly like you in my uniqueness. You are one of us, unless you are one of them. There is always a mutuality of connection or disconnection. Your behaviour and feeling are identified in relation to my behaviour and feeling. Identity is irrevocably social, except to the extent that it is ineffable. Even Crusoe only becomes significant in relation to firstly his origins, and secondly his relation to the deprivation of the social, and thirdly to his 'other' as Friday. The desert island trope is the exemplar of the social nature of identity - the limit of individuality. Crusoe is the absolute monarch of nowhere.

I could glean more of your identity from your ID card than I could by having any relations with you. Personal identity is not relational; it’s actual. Whatever “connections” we imagine exist between each other hold as much information about our identity as they do mass, which is to say none. His proximity to others, his social interactions, the number of friends he has, do not tell us what he is. To use them as grounds to an identity is to misidentify.

Personal identity is not relational; it’s actual. — NOS4A2

Yes. Its roots are in DNA and cultural heritage and grows on the individual like the rings of a tree, through life experience, interactions and memory. It doesn't change by external designation or an observer's description of physical traits. You may attain the rank of colonel and acquire the nickname Colonel Nosehair, but, unless you deeply identify with the rank and the facial flora, that is not who you are; it is a role you play.
Identity is personal. Because of the attitude of a group you happen to be in at the moment, or the society at large, you may choose to disclose much or little of your actual self. Among fans, you may identify as a fan, even though Star Wars, which you like well enough to understand the references, occupies only a tiny fraction of your attention; among armed racists, you probably wouldn't advertise your Black grandmother.
What we do in public is play assigned roles. Among friends, we let our guard down in some degree, but don't disrobe entirely. Even in intimate relationships, we continue to reserve a core of separateness.

Should we be able to identify however we like? Would that be problematic and is there an ethical dimension? Should identities be challenged? — Andrew4Handel

Lets clarify "identity". Do you mean an identity within a group of other people, or a self-identity?

In the case of self-identity, identify yourself however you want. As long as it doesn't get you killed or harm yourself, no foul. In the case of a social identity, you can attempt to identify yourself however you want, but people do not have to accept this.

In the case of a "Police Officer", you're indicating an identity that contains a status behind it that indicates training, accountability, and social authority. If you identify as a police officer without these, then you are a problem to society.

In the case of identifying yourself as a genius, other people are going to have to agree with you. Surround yourself with some people, and they may agree with you, or at least let you hold this belief among that group.

do personal identities (which could include religious identities) have a special status and should they be challenged? — Andrew4Handel

I would argue they can be challenged if someone sees that harm is coming to the individual or those around them. Other then that, unless someone brings those identities into the public purview, it really isn't anyone else's business. Many times our self-identities are how we get through our day. If its working for us, then let it slide.

Personal identity is not relational; it’s actual. — NOS4A2

Relations are actual. For example, my relation to my identity card is that I do not have one. Your relation to my identity card is blithe assumption that there is such a thing. Knowing is itself relational between knower and known.

Tell us about this actual personal identity that does not relate to the world. Of course it is impossible, because to speak at all is to relate to the public world. A private identity is nothing other than the way a fragmented consciousness relates to itself - a mere beetle in a box.

For example I could identify as a Police Officer. Is that problematic? Does it entail I should have to do some police work? Am I undermining the police force? — Andrew4Handel

I identify as the greatest metaphysician of all time. It is problematic for me, because I need to keep this fact undercover so that I do not end up like Socrates. So I intentionally hide my true identity from others, and present myself as an idiot.

Someone might be deceiving one's self however in self presentation. We can deceive ourselves and hence portray a false image of ourselves not reflecting some facts about us. — Andrew4Handel

Considering what I wrote above, where does my deception lie? Am I deceiving others in not portraying my true self? Am I deceiving myself by portraying a false image which others can see through, seeing the true me? Or am I deceiving myself by thinking that I am something other than what others see me as?

Relations are actual. — unenlightened

Yes. They are transactions between two or more separate personal identities.

Tell us about this actual personal identity that does not relate to the world. — unenlightened

Who said a person doesn't relate to the world? But something actual has to exist as a discreet entity before it can relate to anything else that exists.

But something actual has to exist as a discreet entity before it can relate to anything else that exists. — Vera Mont

Relations are actual. I get my 3 ducks in a row; their relation is being "in a row". That's an actual row of existing ducks, but not 'three ducks and a row' 4 existing things.

Who said a person doesn't relate to the world? But something actual has to exist as a discreet entity before it can relate to anything else that exists. — Vera Mont

I am saying that you cannot say anything about your personal identity as unique inner being, but only describe your relations to the world, and this is because language has to be public, not private.

Relations are actual. I get my 3 ducks in a row; their relation is being "in a row". That's an actual row of existing ducks, but not 'three ducks and a row' 4 existing things. — unenlightened

If they are actual ducks, we know nothing more about their identities. Are they live ducks, drakes, wild ducks, white Pekins, dead ducks, wooden decoys, squeaky rubber ducks, fuzzy toy ducks?
We know nothing about their relation to one another except their current spatial arrangement. Are they siblings? Rivals? Three amigos? Consecutive items off an assembly line with no relatives at all?
All we know about their relationship to you [an unidentified 'I'] is that they are your property and that you placed them in some arbitrary row.
We do know that actual ducks with actual individual identities had to exist and that an owner, 'I', with an individual personality had to exist before the 'I' could form a row of them.

I am saying that you cannot say anything about your personal identity as unique inner being, but only describe your relations to the world, and this is because language has to be public, not private. — unenlightened

Why? Language may be shared, though not all languages are accessible to all publics, and not all the speakers of any particular language actually speak or understand the same language, but that doesn't mean it must always be shared, or that the vocabulary is unavailable for private use.
Also, human and other baby animals who have not yet acquired language do exhibit a personality, and have a sense of identity, before they can communicate in words, and people at the other end of life, who have lost the power of speech but not memory still retain their inner identity.

Relations are actual. For example, my relation to my identity card is that I do not have one. Your relation to my identity card is blithe assumption that there is such a thing. Knowing is itself relational between knower and known.

Tell us about this actual personal identity that does not relate to the world. Of course it is impossible, because to speak at all is to relate to the public world. A private identity is nothing other than the way a fragmented consciousness relates to itself - a mere beetle in a box.

The fact a man can relate to the “public world” says something about his identity, sure, but not much. Man can do many things, like digest food, but it ought not imply that his identity is gastrointestinal. The actions one performs, his beliefs, his proximity to the rest of the world are secondary to, and indeed contingent upon, the thing that performs them.

It is similar with other senses of “relation” which we seem to be equivocating between here. The fact you do not have an identity card doesn’t tell us much about who or what does not have an identity card.

identity is strongly tied to behavior or innate characteristics. Identity is determined by parameters - that which defines.

A dictator is identified by their sole dictation of the status quo. A charitable person is identified by their servitude of the impoverished and "greater good" according to them.

A master/genius painter is identified by collective opinion, popularity or notierty of their work and its impact on the sphere of art, creativity, authenticity, muse and inspiration - whether one becomes an entrepreneur of a new art movement or is lost in the static white noise of mediocrity.

Celebrities are identified by their association to how "seen" they are - how influential their opinions, views, talents and contributions are recognised by the general population.

We are free in one sense to identify however we wish. That is our privacy of mind. But if our behaviour (the outcome from our perceived self identity) doesn't match the common definition - few are likely to believe us.

But the acceptance/tolerance or credence of an identity is judged by law, reasoning, culture and ethics.

If I want to identify as a criminal, many will be opposed to it. It doesn't mean I can't. It just means the identity will be met with majority opinion and whatever backlash and sanction that comes with that. If I want to identify as suicidal, again many will exert opposing effort to prevent me from enshrining the definition or convincing others of embracing it for themselves.

People can be proponents for or against any identity based on their personal assumptions of the definition. But usually it is based on whether it sits right or wrong within their personal moral compass.

The law in a strong and educated democracy reflects the collective moral conscience. That's why dictators must erode democracy and the legal system with convincing but untrue propaganda if they are to last any length in power.

Science on the other hand deals with how we all identify. What binds us as products of physics, chemistry and biology. It focuses on commonality and objective consistency that applies across the board.

The actions one performs, his beliefs, his proximity to the rest of the world are secondary to, and indeed contingent upon, the thing that performs them. — NOS4A2

The opposite is the case. things are secondary and intuited from their relations. Look and you can see it is the case How do you come to know the nature of man? Or the nature of a duck? By relating as observer to observed. The relation of observation gives rise to the object and the subject.

But this is way to theoretical for this thread.

If you ask someone who they are, or what they are, they will typically give you some of a name, nationality, some ancestry maybe, occupation, hobbies, address, age, medical history, significant others, bibliography, favourite music, ice cream flavour, etc, religious affiliation, political ditto, and so on and on for as long as you like.

You’re Agender but don’t identify as Agender? :chin:
— praxis

I would be labelled agender by someone else. It is a bit like atheism relying on theism.

I can't make sense of the non grammatical form of gender.

I think there is a difference between desiring to be X and the ability to be X. If I desired to appear more of a typical man I probably couldn't and that would probably mean trying to project a (gender?) image through aping someone else. — Andrew4Handel

Now here, I think Andrew is trying to convey to us something of his own feelings about himself as a gendered/sexual being. Which is that he finds he cannot really relate to it, at all. he fails to have any feelings about it. He is like the famous Buddhist in Northern Ireland, being asked if he is a Catholic Buddhist or a Protestant Buddhist. And when you have to answer questions of identity that make no sense to you, you are liable to get into trouble.


Facilities in the US used to be racialised, now they are only gendered. And woe betide you if you went into the wrong place. Even the most intimate and private features of the person - nay, especially the most intimate and private features of the person, are the most rigidly defined and enforced socially, both by law and by custom, by police and vigilante.

You have to be one or the other, Protestant or Catholic, Male or Female, Republican or Democrat; and if you are not - that is to say, you do not feel yourself to be - one thing or the other as socially defined, the feelings you are left with are loneliness, confusion, and fear. Because you have to use the facilities regardless, you have to live on one side of the wall (or the tracks) or the other, regardless.

The most highly policed aspect of personal identity of all, is of course the most personal of all, one's thoughts. A couple of psychiatrists can lock you up forever without a trial. So think happy thoughts, children.

Good advise. So you'll always find me where they want me to be. But the happy thoughts...?

things are secondary and intuited from their relations. — unenlightened

Intuited by what? Who are they that have relations? The cart is pulling the horse.