So how does Quine come to such a position. (From the Pursuit of Truth): "From impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective and cumulative creativity down the generations have projected our systematic theory of the external world. Our system is proving successful in predicting subsequent sensory input." And thus we have the start of Quine's naturalized epistemology. In a nut shell, our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors. In contrast, I presume, phenomenology starts with appearance of things, or things as they appear in our experience, from a first person point of view, then attempt to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest or achieve some sot of knowledge of consciousness. — Richard B
our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors. In contrast, I presume, phenomenology starts with appearance of things, or things as they appear in our experience, from a first person point of view, then attempt to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest or achieve some sot of knowledge of consciousness. — Richard B
It is simply not the case that there is a binary choice between science and phenomenology. Which is just as well, since phenomenology remains vexed. — Banno
@Janus, @Constance and @Joshs apparently see a place for discussion of phenomena, via a somewhat esoteric method, that somehow permits the effing of the ineffable. Perhaps @Moliere is tempted to sympathy with that idea, but the problem here is that such a method becomes a beetle in a box. — Banno
As are feelings, and for much the same reasons. — Mww
what is it about objects that can elicit descriptive terms from sensation — Mww
There is no possibility of inventing a language to describe sensations. We can have words for sensations because we can point to things that invoke the sensation. But we cannot point to the sensations themselves, as they are internal. Therefore we can never assign words to features that would describe them. And so they will forever remain both immediate and indescribable. — hypericin
Deleuze's(1994) concept of intensive magnitude succeeds in deconstructing the quantity-quality binary by establishing a ‘ground' (as metamorphosis) in difference that is neither qualitative nor quantitative, and thus a basis of number that does not measure.
“Let us take seriously the famous question: is there a difference in kind, or of degree, between differences of degree and differences in kind? Neither.” “In its own nature, difference is no more qualitative than extensive” — Joshs
“A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). ... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections.” (Ibid, p.8) — Joshs
Deleuze’s concept of intensive magnitude implies that only difference returns and is never the same. Anything identified as the same, as something that can be the same, can never return. The differentiating return transforms the return circuit into a departure from the self so that a sense of self only emerges in this gup — Number2018
Referring to singularity, to the event of becoming, is ultimately incompatible with the phenomenological approach — Number2018
Our self (our subjectivity) is one of the lines of our current assemblage. — Number2018
To my (very limited) understanding phenomenology aspires to what the title suggests, an account of the "phenomenon of perception", of what it is like to perceive, in the abstract. Perhaps you can illustrate your point with a quote? I can't see how an abstract accounting like this can bridge the gap I described.I think Merleau-Ponty goes some way to undermine this thought — Moliere
If one of the meanings of sensory terms derives from sensation, hasn’t some language been used on it? — Mww
And if I read you correctly, it begs the question as to how conceptions, by which all objects are described, arrive at purely physical structures such as sensory devices. — Mww
Perhaps you can illustrate your point with a quote? I can't see how an abstract accounting like this can bridge the gap I described. — hypericin
He knew, as Heidegger did, that foundationally all roads lead to indeterminacy. — Constance
All we ever really see, encounter, understand, deal with intellectually, pragmatically, and so on, is phenomena. — Constance
Because "about" means concerning or referencing, but doesn't mean conveying, which would mean transferring actual content. — Hanover
How is talk of leaf and branch different to talk of smell and touch? See how the tree has a similar leaf to the Oak? See how the desert has a similar smell to coffee? Or see how the desert brings about a similar sensation to the coffee? Why aren't I here talking about the sensation? That's not conveying actual content? Or, if it is conveying actual content, then it's not about the sensation? Or what?When I read this it feels like it'd go the same with objects... we cannot say objects, and so they are ineffable. But the reason we can't say objects is that they aren't words, not because we can't talk about them. — Moliere
The problem with claiming that something is ineffable is, of course, the liar-paradox-like consequence that one has thereby said something about it. — Banno
Exactly. Somehow sensations are supposed to occupy some middle (@Moliere) ground, private, ineffable, yet somehow despite that, the foundation of our understanding (@Constance).Do we talk about them? Or do they drop out of the conversation as irrelevant? — Luke
Do we talk about them? Or do they drop out of the conversation as irrelevant? — Luke
Exactly. Somehow sensations are supposed to occupy some middle (@Moliere) ground, private, ineffable, yet the foundation of our understanding (@Constance).
You clever folk all agree, but can't explain it. I call bullshit. — Banno
How is talk of leaf and branch different to talk of smell and touch? See how the tree has a similar leaf to the Oak? See how the desert has a similar smell to coffee? Or see how the desert brings about a similar sensation to the coffee? Why aren't I here talking about the sensation? That's not conveying actual content? Or, if it is conveying actual content, then it's not about the sensation? Or what? — Banno
What do you make of the criticism that if words are metaphors we risk slipping into solipsism? — Tom Storm
Ok, so how does this differ from, say, talking about a tree? Can you convey a tree by talk? — Banno
Did it have a good cover — Tom Storm
What do you make of the criticism that if words are metaphors we risk slipping into solipsism? — Tom Storm
I would agree with the observation that ultimately, with enough questioning of fundamental beliefs and given assumptions, that soliipsism, meaninglessness, and moral relativism eventually follow. — Hanover
Poetically speaking, all roads out of Athens lead to solipsism. All roads out of Jerusalem, to meaning. — Hanover
AKA - atheism leads to nihilism? — Tom Storm
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