Foucault distinguished between the order of powers to affect and to be affected and the order of knowledge as heterogeneous but immanent to each other. "Between technics of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have their specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference" — Number2018
Like the duck-rabbit. It's never going to resolve the question of which it is. — Isaac
If it, or anything, is ineffable, then you would expect circularity: "Which sensation? The red one. What is a red sensation? Redness. What is X? X-ness." Once the ineffable is reached, description stops, and its name can only be recited. — hypericin
No, that's not how it seems to me. Experiences are all post hoc constructions. What 'comes first' is not an experience. It's not something we can report, nor anything that we're even conscious of. It's just a load of neural activity which, as we should all know by now, does not have any kind of one-to-one relation with the sorts of things we talk about like balls, colours, or words. all of that is constructed afterwards as a way of explaining what just happened.
So it's not a case of "I threw a red ball" being an experience constructed out of the constituent experiences "throwing" redness" and "ball".
It goes...
1. {some collection of neural firing events} ->
2. "I threw a red ball" experience ->
3. (if necessary) - abstraction of 'red', 'ball' and 'threw' from that experience (2) according to the social rules around identifying those components — Isaac
I think Deleuze was closer to Derrida’s approach to the relation between strategies of power than he was to Foucault’s. — Joshs
We have three: duck, rabbit and dick-rabbit. — Banno
There was more that can be said. Because it can be said, it is not ineffable. — Banno
However, since the phrase "there is always more that can be said" also implies that everything cannot be said, the ineffable is also implied. — Metaphysician Undercover
You still haven't made the case that value is transcendent. Values talk is simply a conversation people share about the world. Like the idea of truth, value is an abstraction and is not a property that looks the same where ever it is found. Values can only be understood through specific examples - it is a process applied to beliefs, objects, people, behaviours, etc. The process of setting or accepting values is mundane and subjective and messy - it is deliberative and people disagree. — Tom Storm
All this is wordy and says little to me, I'm afraid. Not sure what your point is. Good and bad have multiple meanings, many subjective, most people know this. As animals who depend on and risk so much to survive, it's hardly surprising that humans have created a multiplicity of notions for good and bad. Valuing things (making judgements and making choices) is how we stay alive, it's hard wired. — Tom Storm
Cheers, Meta. The more that can be said, by that very fact, can be said, and hence is not ineffable. — Banno
But if the general principle you stated is true, that there is always more which can be said, then it is impossible that all can be said. Therefore there is something ineffable. — Metaphysician Undercover
That there are things unsaid does not imply that there are things that cannot be said. — Banno
that there is always more that can be said.. — Banno
Can you see how "there is always more that can be said" implies necessarily that not all can be said? — Metaphysician Undercover
So what is value? Value is the strange stuff of the world, a given dimension of existence. Then, see the above. — Constance
Anscombe was professedly not a phenomenonlogist, and was an analytic philosopher. You think she is aligned with the outrageous things I said? Just for your recollection, I am looking at this from Witt:I suspect that you will find you have much in common with Anscombe, a devout theist. — Banno
Keep in mind that in the Tractatus ethics was transcendental. — Constance
Witt was struggling with the contradiction inherent in the confrontation with the world that one the one hand possessed logical delimitations, and on the other, intimated with such insistence that ethics and value were embedded in the intuitive presence of things... that he broke off with Russell on account of the latter failing to see that the essential point of the Tractatus was not what was revealed to be affirmed within the "state of affairs" of discourse, but rather just what it was that could not be said at all. — Constance
Such an index would be a saying, not a doing. He does nto tell us what to do.Wittgenstein has clearly given us an index to just this: ethics and aesthetics. — Constance
I think the dilemma is yours, not Wittgenstein's.what do you think of Witt's apparent dilemma? — Constance
is ill-framed. The Tractatus is not about "purifying of the familiar and spontaneous". Phenomenology tries to escape language, like a clown cutting off the branch on which he sits. The enterprise undermines itself. And that seems to be what is saying withAnd what of the reduction toward a purifying of the familiar and spontaneous, toward a clearer understanding of what it is that should be passed over in silence, the key purpose of the Tractatus? — Constance
When was the last time you had an experience of red and how did you know that that's what you were having at the time? — Isaac
So you have moved from "experience is a social construct" to "the conceptualization and verbalization of experience is a social construct"? (Which we all knew.) — hypericin
Do you now agree that the sensory experiences of 2 are ineffable, and are only communicable at all to those who have had the same experience? — hypericin
Aren't all variations of memory (e.g. short term memory and long term memory) the storage (however imperfect it may be) of what occurs in the present awareness of the organism? If not entertaining philosophical zombie scenarios, this is the only possibility I can currently think of. I for example don't find that we as humans can recall memories of events which we were never consciously aware of in some former present time. — javra
My view is that no animal, humans included, forms connections between word-sounds and certain neural networks. — javra
The animal would instead hold conscious awareness of the word-sound "treat" and would consciously associate it to, in my view, a category it is also in some way consciously aware of - most likely intuitively. And all of these activities that take place within the conscious awareness of the organism are then concurrently also manifesting in the workings of organism's neural networks. — javra
it seems to me that all lesser-animal predators will be aware of red, for it is the color of blood, which prey evidences when injured or eaten. — javra
I mention this because, of course, lesser animals do not make use of language (when understood as word use) to have experiences of red. — javra
The experience consists in the sensations, feelings and images of the body-mind. They don't all have to be conscious, or reflexively conscious, let alone reported. — Janus
What I'm suggesting is that the duck-rabbit is resolved in that we can talk of it being either a duck or a rabbit; we are not limited to one description. We have three: duck, rabbit and duck-rabbit.
But someone might come along and show us that it is also a sailing ship, that there is yet another description that we had so far missed. It's not that seeing the sailing ship is ineffable, since we now can talk about it. There was more that can be said. — Banno
What is your opinion on the validity, and/or manifestation, of mental imagery? — Mww
Of course, in his Lecture on Ethics, he was clear, talk of the nature of ethics was nonsense. Yet, the Good is at the very center of ethics. The implicit question was this, How is it that Wittgenstein was capable of, at once, a flat out denial of the possibility of talk about ethics; yet confessing this about the Good? Keep in mind that in the Tractatus ethics was transcendental. "The Good lies outside the space of facts." — Constance
You should see where this is going. Witt was struggling with the contradiction inherent in the confrontation with the world that one the one hand possessed logical delimitations, and on the other, intimated with such insistence that ethics and value were embedded in the intuitive presence of things (putting aside his own language limitation here, just to discuss) that he broke off with Russell on account of the latter failing to see that the essential point of the Tractatus was not what was revealed to be affirmed within the "state of affairs" of discourse, but rather just what it was that could not be said at all. This was the major thrust of the work. — Constance
Pretty much. Talking here about narratives, or propositional models, not neural nets. But that doesn't mean it doesn't apply to neural nets... — Banno
It is absolutely fascinating, that it seems as though I myself….the entire sum of entitlement…. think in images, when in fact, there couldn’t really be any. I’m prepared to swear to a figurative High Heaven my brain presents both from and to itself a relative diorama of this or that, but in seeking for the substance or the means for all those images, it shall be found the substance of the brain contains not a single image much less a compendium of them, and the means by which the material brain functions, contradicts their very possibility.
Yet….there they are. I swear. — Mww
Poetry seeks to overcome the weakness of words - easily given, but sometimes as easily broken - by invocation. One calls into being something that was not, by a creative verbal act. The weakness of this thread is that it does not even try to escape the dance of words - there's a red house over yonder, where even the blind can be seen to. Let there be Red!
And it was so, because the invocation was puissant. Thus poetry builds language as fast as doublespeak destroys it, and so builds the world anew, as Banno would have it. What does it mean that in a century we have gone from a nature red in tooth and claw, to a nature that is the greenest of greens? (This is an observation intended to evoke a transformation, not a question to answer.)
[What is ineffable? {response} But look we are talking about it, so that isn't it.] That is a gigantic turd of analysis, or a pathetic joke of logic.
What is creativity? Only original answers will be considered. — unenlightened
A difficult sentence. For Wittgenstein, ethics is not transcendent, but done. Looking at transcendence rather than action has mislead you, I think. So I disagree with — Banno
Such an index would be a saying, not a doing. He does nto tell us what to do. — Banno
It's not that ethics is ineffable, so much as that talking is the wrong sort of thing to do with ethics. There's a piece of apocryphal, that he was visiting a friend, who's wife came into the room to ask if they would like tea. The friend said "Don't ask, just do", to which Wittgenstein agreed, wholeheartedly. The good thing to do was to bring the tea in and make it available rather than talk about it. — Banno
As for phenomenology, it sets itself an impossible enterprise in attempting to suspending "states of affairs" as if they were distinct from "perceptual engagement". — Banno
is ill-framed. The Tractatus is not about "purifying of the familiar and spontaneous". Phenomenology tries to escape language, like a clown cutting off the branch on which he sits. The enterprise undermines itself. — Banno
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