Russian confidence in NATO acting with restraint is shown by reports like:
“Russia had this ground force posture facing us for decades that is now effectively just gone.” — Paine

NATO wasn't/isn't this dire existential threat to Russia that's been proselytized and swallowed by whoever around the globe.
But, sure, NATO troop concentrations close to Russian borders could be seen as threatening moreso than local/native/domestic troops, and NATO training local troops could be seen as threatening in a way.
It's kind of the other way around, NATO would get in the way of free Russian military actions, and it's that "threat" that's been swapped out (partly successfully it seems) by the propagandists.
That being said, there's the matter of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, previously under the Kharkiv Pact, until ditched by Russia in March 2014.
If their perception is that Russia is doomed without that stuff intact (or perhaps doomed without a secured expansion thereof), then that could explain their invasion, waging war.
Until no-NATO is set in stone, Ukrainian NATO membership remains looming however, unless all of Ukraine was to be assimilated by Russia — this sort of "threat" can be raised perpetually by the propagandists.
What we've seen in Russian broadcasts can occasaionally best be described as paranoid fear-feeding.
The main threat NATO poses to Putin's Russia is to them getting away with free military actions, not the dire existential threat proselytized by their propagandists.
Meanwhile, they're raining destruction on Ukraine, refusing to let the EU act as an interlocutor, shamming and attempting to re-culturate, creating more haters.
The irony here is that Putin's Russia instead has proven a real, present threat to Ukraine.

Putin Admits Annexation of Crimea Put in Motion Weeks Before Referendum
^{— Vladimir Soldatkin · Haaretz · Mar 9, 2015}
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot
^{— BBC · Mar 9, 2015}
From 'Not Us' To 'Why Hide It?': How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted It
^{— Carl Schreck · RFE/RL · Feb 26, 2019}
Putin Admits He’s Worried NATO Could Help Ukraine Get Crimea Back
^{— Allison Quinn · The Daily Beast · Feb 1, 2022}
Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine — he fears democracy
^{— David Tafuri · The Hill · Feb 10, 2022}

Putin may dislike NATO expansion, but he is not genuinely frightened by it. — What Putin Fears Most · Robert Person, Michael McFaul · Journal of Democracy · Apr 2022

Putin sees no threat from NATO expansion, warns against military build-up
^{— Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · May 16, 2022}
Regime Preservation is Putin’s Primary Concern
^{— Mary Glantz · USIP · Sep 22, 2022}
Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine
^{— Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch · Foreign Policy · Sep 28, 2022}
How to respond to Putin’s land grab and nuclear gambit
^{— Steven Pifer · Brookings · Oct 4, 2022}

The main threat NATO poses to Putin's Russia is to them getting away with free military actions, not the dire existential threat proselytized by their propagandists. — jorndoe

Why exactly should a country accept that another country or group of countries limits its possible actions? If we accept countries are peers, this is principally problematic and militarily an issue because it means you're constrained in defence. If it's about aggression, we should be encircling most European countries and the USA.

A lot of what's written about this, does not take into account how Russians see NATO. Which is why people keep reiterating NATO is defensive and countries join because they feel threatened. That doesn't preclude the Russians feeling threatened, which in turn causes them to threaten their neighbours. So we have a nice vicious cycle and the West demands it to be broken by Russia acquising to the expansions, while it could also just stop expanding. A cynical interpretation is that NATO must expand or become irrelevant as tensions would subside and a geo-political equilibrium would arise with buffer states between the West and a regional player that doesn't want to be "Western".

I personally think limiting a nuclear power's conventional choices also increases the likelihood of nuclear escalation but I'm told not to worry since proxy wars never escalated before. Except of course everybody was fucking scared about a nuclear holocaust during the Cold War, entirely aware of the distinct possibility. The hand waving about the risk I see during this war should be grounds to worry about an escalation more instead of the opposite, simply because it's not taken seriously.

Nuclear anxiety was prevalent in many parts of the world during the 1980s. [3][6] Nuclear threats were identified among northern European students as their biggest concern, as the second or third biggest concern among North American students in 1986,[4] and was a source of anxiety in Third World countries, such as among Colombian youth.[5] It was rated the most frequently mentioned concern among Ontario students in 1985[10] and Finnish children and teenagers in a national survey in the same year.[3]

I figure the arguments over the larger strategy of Russia and other states do not have to be decided conclusively to observe that Russia has enough confidence to use those troops immediately in the path of NATO to fight in Ukraine instead. That speaks to an acknowledgement of efforts to avoid escalation as much as possible by NATO. The other side of that conversation is the support being given to Ukraine.

The restraint in arming Ukraine has been characterized by boethius as a callous burning of an asset. That view does not take into account the language of limited escalation being used by both Russia and NATO when it comes to Article 5.

One of the ironies of the collective nature of NATO's decisions is that they protect Russia from individual nations joining the fight by themselves. Any boots on the ground from any member states would be treated as an attack by all. Cue WW3. — Paine

That view does not take into account the language of limited escalation being used by both Russia and NATO when it comes to Article 5. — Paine

Both these statements are not really true.

First Article 5 is not "we start WWIII" but is technically only a commitment to meet and respond in some way.

More importantly, NATO's article 5 does not cover troops in other countries anyways. For example, attacks on US troops in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria or anywhere not in the US or some analogue they'll consider an attack (like an aircraft carrier), has nothing to do with NATO's Article 5 as these are not attacks on the US and article 5 is never invoked about any military interventions or wars of occupation.

Countries within NATO could send in troops to Ukraine if they wanted to and them being attacked in Ukraine would have nothing to do with article 5.

Countries don't send troops into Ukraine to help out because they don't care about Ukraine, and they don't actually believe that Russia will keep on expanding if not "stopped in Ukraine" and so have no actual security interest to ally with Ukraine.

Ukraine is simply a tool of both realpolitik by the US, essentially as a gas play (wise or not), as well as an outlet for Russian resentment (in East-Europe) and virtue signalling in West-Europe.

The war is the best possible distraction to all those starving children in Afghanistan. We're the good guys again, hurray!!

In the case of both East and West Europe the policy of maintaining a total war rhetoric without an actual justified total war scenario, is insanely dangerous, and not just because of the nukes.

Who is actually likely to attack other Eastern European countries once the war is done with Russia ... is Ukraine. They may not have an army big enough to go and defeat Russia, but they will be a formidable force to any of their neighbours, have zero economy and the likely outcome of the war for Ukraine is a "ultra nationalist" government dedicated to warfare. If they can't beat the Russians their attention will turn elsewhere. Anyone who thinks this war has made Eastern-Europe one happy family all of a sudden has never been to Eastern-Europe.

Obviously, for Western Europe, the smart thing to do would have been to just trade putting online Nord Stream 2 to avoid a disastrous war ... a pipeline that (sans war that started immediately after the project was cancelled) benefits Western Europe and very obviously would maintain the peace. The idea of "sovereign" states allowing the pipeline to be built but then advancing a policy against their own countries interest to not open the pipeline, is just dumb and even more dumb that they then claim to be supporting the "sovereignty" of Ukraine by supplying arms. Of course, maybe the pipelines not a good idea, but the time to decide that is years, preferably many years, before it's completed. It's just common sense diplomacy that you don't let your neighbour build a 10 billion Euro infrastructure project to your own benefit and then just not let it start. No credibly sovereign state would actually do that.

Now, what the US and Europe and other countries will do is a pretty open question, but what's not very difficult to guess is they aren't sending any troops to go help their non-ally.

And, if people think you can have allies that you don't go defend when they are attacked, that's just not what ally means. Ukraine is a tool, willing or not for more or less actual Ukrainians, of Western, mainly US, policy.

They will be the new Iraqi's, Afghanis, Kurds, whoever we were supporting in Libya, that, like them, in a relatively short amount of time we will have forgotten about and will be just a dirty word in any of, what @Olivier5 calls, "decent" conversation.

Indeed, as far as I can tell that process has already started as no one in the West wants to hear Ukraine is being completely destroyed and millions are suffering intensely ... as that would have a followup question of if we're actually going to do anything substantive to help and maybe even some sole searching of why we encouraged and financed Ukraine into this situation.

Once-upon-a-time leaders of countries were viewed as responsible for actual outcomes of their policies.

That "the enemy" did bad things to you ... sort of goes without saying that that is their function, what makes them enemies.

But people who lose wars, or get their country destroyed in the process of some disastrous stalemate, who throw their hands up in the air and say "our enemies did this": no shit Sherlock. Either avoid making them your enemy or have some plan to deal with the consequences.

Why, perchance, the finger pointing has begun with Zelensky trying to throw the mayor of Kiev under the bus and blame him for not preparing for the obvious next step in the war ... what NATO retired officers were literally mocking Russia for months not doing on day one and being "weak" and then deducing Russia ran out of missiles after a month ... as clearly if they had the missile capabilities we thought they had they would take out Ukrainian infrastructure, but they weren't doing that, the incompetents!

Countries within NATO could send in troops to Ukraine if they wanted to and them being attacked in Ukraine would have nothing to do with article 5. — boethius

From the Russian point of view, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would mean NATO did not wait to be directly attacked before fighting Russians. It is the most established part of Article 5 as a collective defensive agreement as it relates to the threat of Russian expansion. It is difficult to consider the other dynamics you refer to when this most obvious one is not considered.

Why exactly should a country accept that another country or group of countries limits its possible actions? — Benkei

Not all "possible actions", but in said context

The irony here is that Putin's Russia instead has proven a real, present threat to Ukraine. — jorndoe

There aren't that many protective clubs around. Putin would divert with reasons against any. The trajectories of Putin's Russia and Ukraine diverged. (But, hey, maybe Russia should become Ukrainian. :smile:) NATO ain't that dire existential threat it's made out to be by some. The fear-mongering by intuitive emotive appeal is another tool.

how Russians see NATO — Benkei

Most Russians / Russians in general? Hard to tell while Putin's team sets the agenda, largely controls broadcasts. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, whoever, apparently don't have particular reservations about NATO. Georgia left the CSTO (subject to the signature Russian interloping). The other day Putin had a get-together with select wives and mothers of lost soldiers. He made sure to emphasize not to believe what others say.

How to stop rolling the dice on the destruction of human civilization ← pessimistic
^{— Kelsey Piper · Vox · Sep 22, 2022}

Russia will lose as well as whoever else if they go nuclear. If that's on Putin's table anyway, then what's to stop them? It's become a perpetual threat begging for international standards/transparency toward stability. North Korea ain't helping. Another murderous autocrat. At least China is trying.

What would warrant "the complete destruction of Ukraine"? Self-defense?

Everything is in the hands of Ukraine. Not because I want to push this topic on Zelenskyy and Ukraine. In fact, everything is now in the hands of Ukraine. If they do not want the death, moreover, in huge numbers, of people. It is difficult, difficult, difficult, but it must be stopped, it must be stopped because what will follow is the complete destruction of Ukraine... It is not that Putin said long before the "operation" that this would threaten the loss of statehood - it would be the destruction of Ukraine. — Alexander Lukashenko

Ukraine Situation Report
^{— UNOCHA · ongoing}
October–November 2022 nationwide missile strikes on Ukraine
^{— Wikipedia · ongoing}

Kind of obscene. (For that matter, are homosexuals next?)

So the problem I saw here was that violating international law is not in defiance of "the West/NATO/US” because "the West/NATO/US" have little respect for international law either. — Isaac

And that objection is supposed to prove an “obvious error” I committed?! Are you crazy?! Aside from the fact that it fails to land anywhere near the target, I don’t even see how it can take off. Indeed, as it is formulated, your objection is a non sequitur, logically speaking. To be logically valid, it should look something like:

• P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
• P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
• C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US

To be sound both premises must be true. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that P2 is true, what about P1? Is it obviously true?! To me it’s the opposite of it. If it’s an empirical claim, where is the evidence to support it? If it’s a semantic entailment, can you exactly spell out what that is?
Anyways your objection totally misses the target. Let me repeat once again the point: my main claim wasn’t about international law violations but about Russian defiant attitude against West/NATO/US support for Ukraine. So I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!

Also, I found your evidence that this is, indeed, Russia’s intent to be sketchy at best. A lot of supposition, very little empirical ground. — Isaac

At this point, I don’t know really nor I’m sure I care about how you assess empirical evidence for whatever claim about “Russia’s intent” in this war made by avg dudes on a philosophy forum, not to mention that I take the facts I listed in my argument as common knowledge as the obvious mundane truism that Russia violated international laws. But you can always show me a comment of yours about Russia’s intent (or the US, NATO, West, Ukraine intent for that matter) that is more than “sketchy at best” and with great “empirical ground” and I might reconsider.

This doesn't seem to have a point related to the argument. You've stated a fact (Russia has this capability) but you've not made any argument about what is consequent to that fact. No one has expressed disagreement on those grounds, nor any argument assuming the opposite. So the statement just hangs purposelessly. Yes, Russia has that capability. So what? — Isaac

Security concerns are about means and intentions of potential hostile subjects: Russia has proven capability of damaging the West and proven intent to do so. If you do not understand the purpose of my argument about security concerns for the West (because I care for the West and reject Russian expansionism), that’s intellectually self-discrediting. These are pretty basic concepts and “as I said, you need to meet a minimum threshold of comprehension to take in part in discussions at this level”.

The argument being made is that Russia getting its way would be bad, but Russia not getting its way would be bad too (nuclear escalation). Therefore some negotiated compromise between the two positions is the best course of action.
You've only concurred that, yes, Russia getting its way would be bad. This adds nothing to the discussion because we were all already agreed on that matter, it's right there in the argument.
To dispute the argument, you have to show that one is worse than the other. Not merely that one is bad. — Isaac

To begin with, who is “we”? You commented a post of mine which was part of an exchange I had with another interlocutor. In that exchange he didn’t claim anywhere Russia getting its way would be bad for the reasons I discussed (as far as I read and remember of his previous posts he simply acknowledged that Russian aggression must be morally condemned, then he questioned the Western support of Ukraine for the risk of nuclear escalation). That’s why I discussed them. Actually, at some point, he expressed his disagreement with me. For that reason, I find your claim “we were all already agreed on that matter” twice false.
Secondly, I don’t buy the caricatural way you frame the problem, nor I care much about you pressing anybody to delimit the scope of the discussion the way you see fit. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t assume that my understanding of this war is nearly enough as good as the Western administrations’ one, starting with the US. And I have no strong reasons to question rationality, means and intentions of all directly or indirectly involved parties about avoiding any spiraling of this war into a nuclear world war, even in the case that tactical nuclear weapons would be used by Russia. From the news reporting the American establishment representatives’ doubts about the Ukrainian intentions to seize back Crimea (like Gen. M. Milley), one can guess some pressure by the Americans on the Ukrainians to get back at the negotiation table. Even in this case, that alone wouldn’t be enough evidence to support the idea that the Americans are acting primarily out of concern for a nuclear escalation. Also because in an hypothetical scenario where Russia is in such desperate conditions to use tactical nuclear weapons at some point, I wouldn’t exclude that the Western following military response, however not in kind, may decisively worsen the Russian situation on the battlefield.
Anyways, currently, there seems to be still room for continuing an attrition warfare without involving nuclear weapons. And if that’s expected to be in line with Western and Ukrainian objectives at the expense of an expansionist Russia, I’d welcome it too.

From the Russian point of view, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would mean NATO did not wait to be directly attacked before fighting Russians. — Paine

These would not be "NATO" just whatever country they are from.

For example, say Estonia announced they weren't going to just talk shit and launder money anymore, but actually put their beliefs in practice. "We're going to Ukraine!" they announce.

And then they go. And, if this isn't NATO doing anything, then that would be announced and clear, that Estonia is making a bilateral alliance with Ukraine and declare an official state of war with Russia (as they have the sovereign right to do!) and they are going in! This would not create an article 5 situation. NATO would make clear that Estonia is on its own now in declaring .

Now, let's also assume that Estonia troops don't matter in the slightest on the battlefield. Nothing would change in the current situation, except maybe Russia invading Estonia. That's what happens when you declare war on another country, and article 5 does not cover that.

The reason this is not even considered by these countries is for the reason I explain. No one actually believes the propaganda that Russia is can or plans or even wants to conquer all of Easter Europe, it's just propaganda. If people actually believed that their own countries are in danger, "going in" would be a serious consideration.

P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US — neomac

Again, more bullshit soup.

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here?

Obviously if West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then breaking international law is a homage to their realpolitik "move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance.

You seem to be holding on this word defiance like mould to stale bread because if Russia is "defying" the West ... then it follows in the topsy-turvy mental gymnastics of the propagandist the West must do something about that "defiance", regardless of the consequence on Ukrainians or even if our anti-defiance policies even work.

So no, Russia didn't violate international law in "defiance" of the West/NATO/US.

If the "WMD's" in Iraq that no one could find were justification to invade Iraq, then certainly the biolabs the US admitted in public were in Ukraine are more than enough justification to invade Ukraine. Russia is just paying homage to the West/NATO/US understanding of international law, if anything it's a sign of deep respect.

Appeasing the bully will just encourage Putin. The nuclear sabre rattling naturally is taken seriously, but it should be looked just how likely this would be.

- China is against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
- There's a serious risk of this escalating the war and not cowing the West push for cessation of fighting, but to do the opposite.
- Ukraine is next to Russia, hence radiation can easily travel to Russia by winds.
- Destroying Ukrainian forces with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult: troops on the modern battleground are very dispersed.
- Ukraine is unlikely to surrender or to give in just by using tactical nuclear weapons.
- Forces operating in nuclear fallout areas will need training and equipment Russia doesn't have now: basically you will create a small no-go zone for your troops also.
- After the initial quick-capture strategy went bust (on day one) and created the logistical fiasco, Russia has actually been very risk-averse. The withdrawal from Kherson (and Kyiv) shows this. Suddenly such an escalation would go against the way that Russia has fought the war after the initial push.
- Russia has no interest to initiate World War 3. If the "Escalate to De-escalate" doesn't work, then there is nothing to gain from this kind of escalation. It has suffered severe losses in Ukraine already and the last thing would be to escalate the war to a totally new level.

Furthermore, I was even before this war started very worried about the Russian doctrine to "Escalate to De-escalate", meaning that Russia would use at a time of it's convenience and by using the nuclear weapon to create an environment where there is a overwhelming public desire to stop the fighting at all costs immediately.

Yet this isn't 2014 and Russia has no strategic surprise. It had in 2014 the surprise then as just taking off the flag from their combat fatigues and Putin insisting that the VDV paratroops were not Russian soldiers confused the West and especially it's media totally. The "Escalate to de-escalate" strategy would need the West to be already confused about the war, the Western politicians not having had any thought of a nuclear escalation. Then knee-jerk response "STOP EVERYTHING!"

Now as the nuclear sabre-rattling is many months old, Western generals and Western leaders have had ample time to think about their response which makes it likely that NATO can hold it's line together even if Russia did escalate this way. The shuttle diplomacy behind the scenes of intelligence directors sending the message to Russia has made this pretty clear to the Russian leadership. Don't forget that NATO has it's own nuclear deterrence.

And the basic simple fact is that Russia can lose this war. In fact, because there is no opposition and Putin is firmly in control of the country (at least now), he could be just fine even after a disastrous humiliating defeat. Just like Saddam Hussein after the Iran-Iraq war and Desert Storm. Hence the idea that Putin cannot be humiliated is just pandering the dictator.

Appeasing the bully will just encourage Putin. — ssu

Encourage Putin to do what exactly?

Sure, it sounds good to say we're "standing up to a bully", but what cost to Ukrainians do you think is worth it for the Western policy of not doing anything that risks Ukraine "winning"?

And why is the West's policy to not go into Ukraine, no no-fly-zone, as well as severely limit weapons systems to Ukraine?

Resulting in this situation where Russia has no particular need to use nuclear weapons.

The disadvantages of nuclear weapons far outweigh the benefits ... but only because the West isn't really stopping Putin.

- China is against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. — ssu

The US/NATO are 100% clear that China is the real "competitor" and so on and they are enemies. China may have zero problem with Russia nuking NATO troops in Ukraine and then taking advantage of the uncertainty and fear to invade Taiwan.

Point is, what China would want in what scenarios we can only speculate. Certainly China's current stance is that nuclear weapons would be a bad thing ... but also there's simply no reason to use nuclear weapons at the moment.

Hence, why we don't see NATO troops in Ukraine as that may not only be reason enough for Russia to nuke them, but also their friends may see it is indeed reasonable course of action. As we've already discussed, Ukraine, with or without NATO troops, getting nuked would not be a reason to nuke Russia in turn.

Furthermore, actually losing in Ukraine may change the calculus to the Kremlin being what China thinks no longer a primary concern.

Hence, perhaps why we don't see Russia actually losing in Ukraine.

- There's a serious risk of this escalating the war and not cowing the West push for cessation of fighting, but to do the opposite. — ssu

Obviously using nuclear weapons could escalate to more nuclear weapons and this is a reason not to escalate.

... again, maybe why we see the US placing limits to weapons and assistance, and everything organised around the principle of not threatening Russian defeat in any realistic sense.

- Ukraine is next to Russia, hence radiation can easily travel to Russia by winds. — ssu

Radiation isn't all that big a concern when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons.

- Destroying Ukrainian forces with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult: troops on the modern battleground are very dispersed. — ssu

The utility of nuclear weapons would be in the scenario where Ukraine is actually advancing a sizeable concentration of force. Dispersed forces are a defensive measure and not an offensive measure.

There's also other uses of nuclear weapons such as destroying bunkers, bridges, logistics hubs, air bases, EMP and so on.

Of course, if Russian troops aren't actually at risk of any real defeat there would be no reason to use nuclear weapons against any such target. For example, right now Ukrainian airforce isn't doing much ... so why blowup air bases with nuclear weapons?

But, again, for the sake of argument, let's imagine the West actually supporting Ukraine in anyway it wants, and actually trained and equipped the Ukrainian airforce since the start of the war and now F-16's, B-2's, F-22's and F-35's, plethora of advances drones, and so on are an actual problem for Russia, then maybe nuking those airbases would be the only effective military option, and even China may see that as a reasonable response.

Again, why the Western media, politicians and officials simply accept the framework of "support Ukraine ... but, shhhhh, not too much".

- Forces operating in nuclear fallout areas will need training and equipment Russia doesn't have now: basically you will create a small no-go zone for your troops also. — ssu

Again, nuclear fallout of tactical nuclear bombs isn't all that big an issue, and you can just avoid these areas entirely or then, if it was a problem, only employe nukes far behind enemy lines to take out key infrastructure, such as the air base example above.

- After the initial quick-capture strategy went bust (on day one) and created the logistical fiasco, Russia has actually been very risk-averse. Suddenly such an escalation would go against the way that Russia has fought the war after the initial push. — ssu

Agreed ... but the reason why is that their parallel operation to capture the land bridge to Crimea was an amazing military success and they are in a defensive posture to protect these gains. Capturing the rest of the Donbas would be a political victory, but doesn't secure the land bridge any better in and of itself (only if it was captured at a cost benefit maintaining or improving relative strength terms, which explains the super slow advances that minimise casualties and simply withdrawing from positions that are difficult to defend).

- Russia has no interest to initiate World War 3. If the "Escalate to De-escalate" doesn't work, then there is nothing to gain from this kind of escalation. It has suffered severe losses in Ukraine already and the last thing would be to escalate the war to a totally new level. — ssu

Definitely. However, the question is what escalation the West would do that would be responded to with Nuclear weapons by Russia ... that the West would then not respond with nuclear weapons.

It's NATO that would be escalating to a point of Russia using nuclear weapons and then ... nothing, which NATO wants to avoid, and is avoiding by limiting assistance to Ukraine, excluding things like a no-fly zone, certainly not sending troops, and so on.

Nuclear "sabre rattling" has already deterred significant amount of actions that NATO (already "appeased" the nuclear bully in your parlance) would certainly have done if all this rhetoric was drummed up against a non-nuclear power.

And, you may say, "what's wrong with that! of course we don't want to harm Russia so much that they may actually use nukes!!" ok, yeah I agree, but then we're not really "standing with Ukraine" but we have a policy of appeasement. Our actions are more symbolic than practical.

This is the central absurdity of the West's position. It argues right up to its policy line with extreme rhetoric, standing up to Putin, Churchillian "never surrender" type stuff, Putin's a war criminal and the Russians are literally terrorists, and the entire world order is at risk, and basically the greatest moral imperatives you can think of etc. But when it comes to the question of "well, why not do more then, send modern tanks and fighter jets or then go in with our own planes and troops" the exact opposite direction of appeasement is argued that "of course the nukes". Well ... which one is it? Are we "doing what it takes" and fighting on the fields and beaches and and in the air and seas and so on, or are we actually tiptoeing around any actual risk to the Kremlins core goals and making clear we are appeasing with respect to those core goals so no need for any desperate measures?

Now, when it comes question to just adjust a tiny bit this balance between fighting pure evil and appeasement, then what's trotted out by Western retired general is "don't worry about the nukes!" ... but that's disingenuous as if you really weren't worried about the nukes then it wouldn't be slight policy adjustments under consideration (such as ... well, still not sending Western tanks, but at least scrounging up old Soviet tanks)-; if you were really not worried about the Nukes you'd be right back to no-fly zones, and send in the cruise missiles, and troops and strike Russia on their own territory and so on.

However, what this different arguments on different sides of the policy to sort of "squeeze it" to where NATO wants it to be means, is that there is no actual justification in any coherent moral or political philosophy. Different incompatible justifications are used to support conflicting elements of the policy framework. Putin is Hitler so we need to send some arms ... but also Putin isn't Hitler so we aren't going to actually go defeat Putin as we defeated Hitler. The analogy is only as relevant as we say it is!

Why? Because the actual policy is just to separate Europe from Russian resources, in a cynical realpolitik move that has no moral justification.

P1. If West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then Russia didn’t violate international law in defiance of West/NATO/US
P2. West/NATO/US has little respect for international law
C. Russia didn’t violate international in defiance of West/NATO/US — neomac


Again, more bullshit soup.

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here? — boethius

Why strawman?

Obviously if West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then breaking international law is a homage to their realpolitik "move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance. — boethius

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance", as if if they were incompatible, while Russia can be described as both. You are just playing with words (without defining them) and I don't care about your miserable rhetoric games. What I care about is the substantial security threats that an expansionist Russia constitute for the West.
BTW there is no international law resolution that NATO expansion has violated. While there is an international law resolution against Russian invasion of Ukraine. So what homage are you talking about?

You seem to be holding on this word defiance like mould to stale bread because if Russia is "defying" the West ... then it follows in the topsy-turvy mental gymnastics of the propagandist the West must do something about that "defiance", regardless of the consequence on Ukrainians or even if our anti-defiance policies even work. — boethius

Here I re-edited your caricatural bullshit to something that can express justified Western security concerns. BTW the West is already doing something about Russian defiant attitude, no matter what the Western propagandist and the pro-Russia propagandist like you is saying.

In other words, you just have "tautologies" that in the end you must agree with, dude. So suck it up and move on.

Encourage Putin to do what exactly? — boethius

Simple: to continue to undo "the greatest tragedy of the 2oth Century". Russia to claim dominance over it's "near abroad".

And the West has given him this: After annexing Crimea and starting in limited insurgency in the Donbas, what did Putin do? He took take the next step to make a large scale attack on Ukraine. Did then the West and NATO respond as it has now? No, not back in 2014. There's your example from history.

You really think he would be satisfied with Novorossiya and a puppet regime in Kyiv? No. Then there's Moldova. It's so clear and obvious when you read actually what Putin has said. And done.

Radiation isn't all that big a concern when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons. — boethius

Tell that to people. (I have to remember to quote you later.) And btw radiation on the site where a tactical nuke has been used, it is a problem.

The utility of nuclear weapons would be in the scenario where Ukraine is actually advancing a sizeable concentration of force. Dispersed forces are a defensive measure and not an offensive measure. — boethius

Again you have no idea what you are talking about. In the age of drones and instant fire-missions that can rain down in few minutes, artillery poses a threat at any time to any concentration of force. That's why you don't see columns of Ukrainian tanks... or nowdays of Russian armour moving along in long columns also. The unit size is smaller than before (Soviet doctrine was to operate with fronts and armies). This is obvious from the fact that the Russian forces, already before the war started, were deployed as Battalion-combat-teams. You don't operate with larger formation, brigades, divisions as in WW2 or as during the Cold War.

Definitely. However, the question is what escalation the West would do that would be responded to with Nuclear weapons by Russia ... that the West would then not respond with nuclear weapons. — boethius

I think it's obvious from what has been leaked even to the public. A conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine and Naval ships operating in the Black Sea. Hence notice the level of escalation: Russian sites in Russia aren't attacked. Then again Russia has an option to escalate: does it enlarge the battlefield to outside Ukraine and the Black Sea.

Let's remember that for example in the Korean war the Soviet Air Force fought the USAF on a limited airspace next to the Chinese border. That indeed the two Superpowers were engaged in fighting was simply kept a secret by both sides not wishing to escalate matters.

But then again, this is the "sabre rattling" to Russia's "sabre rattling" in the first place. What actually NATO would do or not is another thing. Medvedev could be right and NATO wouldn't do anything, but be outraged.

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance" — neomac

Where do I do this?

I do the opposite. The US's maverick attitude in invading Iraq with sufficient justification or a credible plan, somehow succeeding in making things worse than under Saddam, is an act of defiance against international law and morality. If Russia is doing the same, that's just called "learning" and being a fan, unless defying defiance is a thing, which I assume is what you'll be arguing next.

You are just playing with words (without defining them) and I don't care about your miserable rhetoric games. — neomac

The word play in this little dialogue is your use of the word "defiance" to somehow imply justification of something, in this case, Western policies.

Russia and allies "defied" Hitler in WWII ... did that make Hitler's war justified?

"Defiance" doesn't justify anything. Ukraine was defying Russia by financing and arming Nazi's ... so according to you the entire Russian war effort is justified due to the defiance of Ukraine.

What I care about is the substantial security threats that an expansionist Russia constitute for the West. — neomac

Again, what threat? Make your case. Russia is about to invade all of Western Europe? ... with it's incompetent army that can't do anything right?

What is this threat to the West you keep talking about?

Here I re-edited your caricatural bullshit to something that can express justified Western security concerns. BTW the West is doing something about Russian defiant attitude, no matter what the Western propagandist and the pro-Russia propagandist like you is saying. — neomac

The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.

You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question.

For example, Russia can just destroy the Ukrainian power grid. Is this a reasonable cost to Ukraine for the West to be seen "doing something about Russian defiant attitude".

And what's the end result? There is no guarantee that the current policies actually turn out bad for Russia.

In the current trajectory, Russia will have a far stronger army, ramped up arms industry, and has already reoriented its entire economy away from the West so if the West isn't willing to do more, Russia now has basically a free hand vis-a-vis it's neighbour's.

What has the war established so far?

It's mostly established NATO cannot defeat Russia through proxy means and is unwilling to intervene directly and sanctions are an empty threat that have already been expended, and the Russian military is willing to suffer large costs to achieve military objectives and can and will destroy your essential infrastructure if you "defy" them.

We keep on being told Ukrainian victory is just a battle away, but that hasn't happened.

This is the central absurdity of the West's position. It argues right up to its policy line with extreme rhetoric, standing up to Putin, Churchillian "never surrender" type stuff, Putin's a war criminal and the Russians are literally terrorists, and the entire world order is at risk, and basically the greatest moral imperatives you can think of etc. But when it comes to the question of "well, why not do more then, send modern tanks and fighter jets or then go in with our own planes and troops" the exact opposite direction of appeasement is argued that "of course the nukes". Well ... which one is it? Are we "doing what it takes" and fighting on the fields and beaches and and in the air and seas and so on, or are we actually tiptoeing around any actual risk to the Kremlins core goals and making clear we are appeasing with respect to those core goals so no need for any desperate measures? — boethius

Notice the difference with rhetoric and actions on the Russian side too. Russians have basically made the argument that they already are fighting NATO... when they are fighting Ukrainians armed with Western weapons and support.

And notice one limitation here: NATO does also have to upkeep it's own forces. Only the Baltic states have basically given all-out support plus the kitchen sink. Javelins are a good example: a huge portion of all Javelins have been sent to Ukraine means that the US to produce the systems to replace these will take two years I remember.

We have to remember that the armed forces of West European countries are small compared to Ukraine (and Russia). Ukraines army is now estimated to be 500 000 to 750 000. That is a huge army to arm, when by European standards the mobilized Finnish army is huge (less than 300 000).

This is what shouldn't be forgotten: The Ukraine war is a conventional war and because it wasn't a short two week war, it's draining the hell out of everybody. Yes, Russia has had to rely on antiquated tanks and ancient Cold War weapon systems because it doesn't have anything else. Well, don't think the West this would be different. The weapons manufacturing in the West is designed for small wars, small limited operations and procurement of small batches of expensive weapon systems. Not to feed a WW1/WW2 style weapons manufacturing juggernaut needed to provide sufficient materiel to the mouth of Moloch.

The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.

You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question. — boethius

Oh yes, the Ukrainians as the "proxies" of the evil West. How typical, the victim is the proxy.

Simply keep the same level as now. Keep the course now set. Let's see after next year. As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight, it's their decision. It is them who are actually paying the cost, not us. If they aren't willing to fight, then military aid is useless.

Simple: to continue to undo "the greatest tragedy of the 2oth Century". Russia to claim dominance over it's "near abroad". — ssu

... Like Belarus and Kazakstan and Georgia?

Places Russia already dominates?

What is the next step of this "rebuild the Soviet Union" plan?

And the West has given him this: After annexing Crimea and starting in limited insurgency in the Donbas, what did Putin do? He took take the next step to make a large scale attack on Ukraine. Did then the West and NATO respond as it has now? No. There's your example from history. — ssu

What Putin did next was negotiate Mink I, which Ukraine didn't respect and the Western "guarantors" didn't use any leverage to pressure Ukraine to respect it, and later Ukraine said was just playing for time to build up their forces to have a big war, and then ... negotiate Mink II, which had the exact same result.

However, the more important question remains what we can do about it.

This whole "Russia will keep expanding in an unexplained way without any evidence or rational" is simply to justify the Western policy of having Ukraine pay an enormous price for harming the Russians. A price that will never be compensated, may not achieve even close to the military outcomes, and in which the West could intervene at any moment to provide real help, but doesn't.

Tell that to people. (I have to remember to quote you later.) And btw radiation on the site where a tactical nuke has been used, it is a problem. — ssu

Radiation of tactical nuclear weapons simply isn't much. If there's a scenario in which a tactical nuclear weapon would be under consideration for military purposes, the radiation would not be a major concern. Of course, if there's zero military reason to use a nuclear weapon then the radiation, among a long list of things, is an additional reason not to use them.

Where radiation from nuclear weapons is a real problem, is in a full strategic nuclear exchange. Strategic weapons create far more radiation, far more fallout, and there would be hundreds if not thousands of them exploding around the world. Additionally, you may have nukes hitting nuclear power plants (that contain far more radiation than a nuclear blast) or then just society collapsing and melt-downs and nuclear fires at various defunct nuclear power plants.

Again you have no idea what you are talking about. In the age of drones and instant fire-missions that can rain down in few minutes, artillery poses a threat at any time to any concentration of force. That's why you don't see columns of Ukrainian tanks... or nowdays of Russian armour moving along. The unit size is smaller than before (Soviet doctrine was to operate with fronts and armies). This is obvious from the fact that the Russian forces, already before the war started, were deployed as Battalion-combat-teams. You don't operate with larger formation, brigades, divisions as in WW2. — ssu

Let's say Ukrainians form a bridge head over an important river and need to pour in significant resources to consolidate that bridge head ... drop a nuke on said bridge head and not only all those forces are gone, but it become clear that there is basically no way to ford the river in peace.

The idea Nuclear weapons have no military use is just insanely naive.

If there was no political reasons to not-use nuclear weapons, and it was just one of many capabilities, military commanders would find tactical uses for them.

Now, if you're saying nuclear weapons would not "guarantee" victory, again, totally false. Russia could drop a nuclear weapon on every Ukrainian city and every command centre and the war would be over in a day.

Again, there's lot's of reasons not to do that, but the idea nuclear weapons are some sort of nothing burger in a theatre of war seems just bizarre.

I think it's obvious from what has been leaked even to the public. A conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine and Naval ships operating in the Black Sea. Hence notice the level of escalation: Russian sites in Russia aren't attacked. Then again Russia has an option to escalate: does it enlarge the battlefield to outside Ukraine and the Black Sea. — ssu

It seems, if what you say is true, Russia can suffer some acceptable losses for the privilege of nuking Ukraine.

There would be a "cost of doing business" is what you are saying?

Of course, we are in agreement that there are plenty of good reasons for Russia to not use nuclear weapons (the main one being they are sitting on the land bridge to Crimea and Ukraine can't seem to do anything about that anyways).

However, that the cost to Russia of using nuclear weapons doesn't seem to be much, maybe explains why the West is careful to not create a situation where it would start to arguably a good idea to start using nukes: i.e. a situation in which Russia is actually losing in conventional warfare.

Let's remember that for example in the Korean war the Soviet Air Force fought the USAF on a limited airspace next to the Chinese border. That indeed the two Superpowers were engaged in fighting was simply kept a secret by both sides not wishing to escalate matters. — ssu

We totally agree.

Again, maybe just explains why the US and NATO aren't actually escalating to "help Ukraine win" which is why Ukraine has so far not won and suffering immensely for the honour of representing Western interests, in some vague way.

But then again, this is the "sabre rattling" to Russia's "sabre rattling" in the first place. What actually NATO would do or not is another thing. Medvedev could be right and NATO wouldn't do anything, but be outraged. — ssu

Of course the West wouldn't strike Russia, why would they?

However, West seems already at maximum outrage. I don't see what more outrage would accomplish.

How simply the same as now. Keep the course. Let's see after next year. As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight, it's their decision. It is them who are actually paying the cost, not us. — ssu

Our proxies will keep being proxies so therefore we should continue to use them as proxies? It's their country that gets fucked, not ours?

And to accomplish what?

First, "Ukrainians" make decisions now without any critical press or critical political parties and in a vast stew of propaganda. We don't really know what Ukrainians think and whether polls are accurate considering any dissent is viewed as "Russian collaboration" and may get you imprisoned and/or killed.

Additionally, the West keeps saying it will support Ukraine indefinitely and with "whatever it needs" and so on, so even if the decision to fight was genuinely democratic, it maybe based on the Wests assertions about support.

And, more fundamentally, they are still our weapons and we are still responsible for the outcome regardless of what the Ukrainians want to do. It maybe simply not morally acceptable to have Ukraine fight a lost battle even if they want to.

There are also many benefits to peace.

Ukraine is a tool, willing or not for more or less actual Ukrainians, of Western, mainly US, policy. — boethius

Convenient, that Ukraine and others could come together in a common cause, huh? :D Democracies against autocrats, defenders against invaders, ...?

Hard to tell what would happen if, say, the UK was to deploy 6000 troops + equipment, Poland 6000, France 6000, Romania 3000, Spain 5000, the US 10000, Australia 2000, Luxembourg 10, Norway 800, in Ukraine. (just whatever came to mind while typing, and assuming this stuff would go through whatever procedures the respective governments have, however unlikely, but invitation accepted) Would Putin play the victim card (again)? Take Kim Jong-un's offer? Tell Lukashenko "Send what you got!"? Ukraine could become quite the battleground. Not sure how realistic something like this is, but one might hope not all that likely...? What might happen?

NATO can defend Ukrainian cities, creating an interceptor network around major population centers to destroy incoming Russian missiles — Limiting the war: What might Western intervention look like in Ukraine? · Seth Cropsey · The Hill · Nov 27, 2022

Cropsey's comment ↑ there doesn't need NATO so close by. NASAMS (and others) can help. :up:

Lavrov says Ukrainians will be liberated from neo-Nazi rulers
^{— TASS · Nov 26, 2022}

Getting old, the Nazi thing (and Lavrov perhaps). Been shown the door. Repeating doesn't make it so.

Where do I do this? — boethius

Here:

"move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance. — boethius

The US's maverick attitude in invading Iraq with sufficient justification or a credible plan, somehow succeeding in making things worse than under Saddam, is an act of defiance against international law and morality. If Russia is doing the same, that's just called “learning” — boethius

Then neither Russia nor you learnt well. First of all the act of “defiance” which I’m interested in must be assessed wrt the subjects supporting some international law resolution against the violator. So my question to you is: what is the UN resolution that the US was acting against during its invasion of Iraq, exactly?
Secondly, the US’s invasion turned out to be a reputational failure for the US and set a dangerous precedent exploitable by anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Still the US is the hegemonic power which the Westerns rely on, so Western countries are not compelled to treat Russia with the same submissiveness they treat American abuses on geopolitical grounds. Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period.
Third, as I said elsewhere, I’m siding with the US not because I think the US is good nor because I think the US is good for the West, but because I think Russia or China would be worse than the US for the West if they managed to extend their hegemonic influence at the expense of the American hegemony in the West. So until there is a better alternative for the Westerners in the foreseeable future, I would find more reasonable to partner with the US than to partner with Russia or China.

The word play in this little dialogue is your use of the word “defiance” to somehow imply justification of something, in this case, Western policies.

Russia and allies "defied" Hitler in WWII ... did that make Hitler’s war justified?

"Defiance" doesn't justify anything. Ukraine was defying Russia by financing and arming Nazi's ... so according to you the entire Russian war effort is justified due to the defiance of Ukraine. — boethius

The word “defiance” is perfectly intelligible with or without reference to any legal or moral justification as a form of intentional disobedience. Since I’m reasoning on geopolitical grounds, I will assess Russian geopolitical posture as the challenger of the West accordingly.
Concerning your likely confused questions, rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals. That’s how practical rationality must be applied to geopolitics. This is true for ALL geopolitical players: Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, China, ISIS, the US, Ukraine, Switzerland, the Vatican, Roman Empire, etc.

Again, what threat? Make your case. Russia is about to invade all of Western Europe? — boethius

Looping for the thousand time on the same point: the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.

... with it's incompetent army that can't do anything right? — boethius

Wrong, with its incompetent army Russia did lots of damage. So far not enough to win its strategic war against the West, though.

The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.

You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question. — boethius

Your question is based on assumptions we do not share. It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? Likely the atheist answer won’t be based on what is claimed in the Bible, but on his disbelief of any such thing as “sins against God”, right?
The same between us, so here is my answer: at whatever cost Ukraine and the West as geopolitical agents are willing to pay. It’s reasonable in geopolitical terms if it’s effective for any of them. Hopefully for both of them.
Besides given the rate I'm repeating my answers to your objections, it's less that I'm dodging your questions and more that you are playing dumb.

There is no guarantee that the current policies actually turn out bad for Russia. — boethius

We are reasoning under uncertainty. Yawn.

In the current trajectory, Russia will have a far stronger army, ramped up arms industry, and has already reoriented its entire economy away from the West so if the West isn't willing to do more, Russia now has basically a free hand vis-a-vis it's neighbour’s. — boethius

What?!

What has the war established so far? — boethius

So far? NATO alliance was revived (and will likely expand). Russian original goals failed. Russia has been humiliated on the battlefield. And other countries are distancing themselves from Russia (even countries within within Russian sphere of influence, like Kazakhstan).

It's mostly established NATO cannot defeat Russia through proxy means and is unwilling to intervene directly and sanctions are an empty threat that have already been expended, and the Russian military is willing to suffer large costs to achieve military objectives and can and will destroy your essential infrastructure if you "defy" them.

We keep on being told Ukrainian victory is just a battle away, but that hasn't happened. — boethius

The same blablabla. We have already been through this, here is my answer once again:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.

Convenient, that Ukraine and others could come together in a common cause, huh? :D Democracies against autocrats, defenders against invaders, ...? — jorndoe

Again, if you declare martial law and disband the second largest political party, that does not qualify as democratic.

But even putting aside that, is the cause common?

Zelensky and his followers certainly want to "defeat" the Russians, that's certainly their cause, so if the cause was common what would follow from that is Ukraine would already have the weapons systems, training, even allied troops to accomplish this "common cause".

We don't see that, so perhaps because the causes are different.

US and co. is certainly happy to see the Ukrainians suffer a lot to make the Russians suffer somewhat, but unless the goal is to "win" I don't think that's what Zelensky et. al. have in mind.

Hard to tell what would happen if, say, the UK was to deploy 6000 troops + equipment, Poland 6000, France 6000, Romania 3000, Spain 5000, the US 10000, Australia 2000, Luxembourg 10, Norway 800, in Ukraine. (just whatever came to mind while typing, and assuming this stuff would go through whatever procedures the respective governments have, however unlikely, but invitation accepted) Would Putin play the victim card (again)? Take Kim Jong-un's offer? Tell Lukashenko "Send what you got!"? Ukraine could become quite the battleground. Not sure how realistic something like this is, but one might hope not all that likely...? What might happen? — jorndoe

Yes, seems incredibly unlikely.

If you agree on that point and just want to discuss hypotheticals, you haven't listed enough troops to make a significant difference.

Cropsey's comment ↑ there doesn't need NATO so close by. NASAMS (and others) can help. :up:

Lavrov says Ukrainians will be liberated from neo-Nazi rulers
— TASS · Nov 26, 2022

Getting old, the Nazi thing (and Lavrov perhaps). Been shown the door. Repeating doesn't make it so. — jorndoe

I posted 6 videos of Western journalists investigating Nazi's in Ukraine and all concluding that there definitely seems to be Nazi's in Ukraine.

But let's get back to that later and focus here on your argument form:

Ukraine keeps blaming Russians for the war ... has that gotten "old" in your definition?

Here:
"move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance.
— boethius — neomac

You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance", as if if they were incompatible, while Russia can be described as both. — neomac

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". Maybe follow the context.

You then setup some sort of maverick-defiance strawman stated above, which obviously has nothing to do with anything. As the following statements you cite demonstrate, pretty much doing anything can be construed as "defiance" of someone who disagrees.

Why are we talking about defiance? Because your argument about the West needing to deal with Russia's "defiance" (originally of international law) justifying Western policy, couldn't standup to @Isaac's criticism so you've again do what you always do and focus on some trivialities and moving the goalposts: in this case moving the goal posts from Russia is defying international law and that broadly supports your position, to Russia is defying the "West".

Secondly, the US’s invasion turned out to be a reputational failure for the US and set a dangerous precedent exploitable by anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Still the US is the hegemonic power which the Westerns rely on, so Western countries are not compelled to treat Russia with the same submissiveness they treat American abuses on geopolitical grounds. Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac

Notice how this, your actual position of supporting US hegemonic power, has nothing to do with justifications of US actions you throw against the wall to see what sticks and we've been cleaning up for hundreds of comments.

Putting that aside, let's deal with this argument. First thing to notice, is that if Russia is a Hegemonic power in its neighbourhood then Ukraine should be compelled to treat Russia with submissiveness.

The only justification here is who has the hegemonic power in the region should call the shots in Ukraine. If Russia comes out on top in the war then it was the Hegemonic power all along, Ukraine should have submitted and that would be that.

Your argument basically boils down to might is right, so who has the might is the key question which the war is going to uncover.

Your question is based on assumptions we do not share. It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? Likely the atheist answer won’t be based on what is claimed in the Bible, but on his disbelief of any such thing as “sins against God”, right? — neomac

Just wow. The question of whether the cost to Ukraine of our policies of encouraging, financing, arming more war is worthwhile cost so far to accomplish ... "liberation" of the Donbas? Crimea? well whatever it's accomplished compared to the offer at the start of the war, and what further cost do Zelenskyites think would be reasonable to pay to accomplish the objectives of the "common cause" ...

... is akin to asking if being gay is a sin against God to an atheist.

The same blablabla. We have already been through this, here is my answer once again:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

Your whole premise is:

Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac

... So what's there to fear?

And notice how just after lauds the "common cause", it's made as plane as day there is no common cause as Ukrainian defeat is completely acceptable as long as enough damage has been done to Russia along the way.

Is the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?

It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? — neomac

Truly remarkable.

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". — boethius

Meaning?

Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". Maybe follow the context.

You then setup some sort of maverick-defiance strawman stated above, which obviously has nothing to do with anything. As the following statements you cite demonstrate, pretty much doing anything can be construed as "defiance" of someone who disagrees.

Why are we talking about defiance? Because your argument about the West needing to deal with Russia's "defiance" (originally of international law) justifying Western policy, couldn’t standup to Isaac's criticism so you've again do what you always do and focus on some trivialities and moving the goalposts: in this case moving the goal posts from Russia is defying international law and that broadly support your position, to Russia is defying the “West". — boethius

Same steamy pile of shit as usual:
First, you keep repeating that I made a strawman argument. Do you know what strawman argument means? Explained that to me. And show me how that applies to my counterarguments.
Second, I already explained what I mean by “defiance”, it’s you who didn’t.
Third, your and Isaac’s duo-promotion is pathetic, but expected. Intellectually misery at its finest. Besides I don’t care about the scores you assign to me, I care about arguments.
Forth, every time you call my claims trivialities, that means you agree with me. And since I keep disagreeing with you by virtue of those alleged trivialities, then it means that you disagree with yourself. Do you see the problem, dude?
Besides my arguments are always the same ones. Just looping through them for a while now. And if I find your approach conceptually flawed, I don’t feel rationally compelled to stick to it.
Fifth, quote where I made such a claim “Russia is defying international law”, you serial liar.

Notice how this, your actual position of supporting US hegemonic power, has nothing to do with justifications of US actions — boethius

What do you mean by “justification”? I clarified for the thousand time my point when talking about practical rationality. While you keep playing with words.

First thing to notice, is that if Russia is a Hegemonic power in its neighbourhood then Ukraine should be compelled to treat Russia with submissiveness.

The only justification here is who has the hegemonic power in the region should call the shots in Ukraine. If Russia comes out on top in the war then it was the Hegemonic power all along, Ukraine should have submitted and that would be that.

Your argument basically boils down to might is right, so who has the might is the key question which the war is going to uncover. — boethius

No, there is no reason to constrain the field to region in the sense you suggest here. When great powers struggle for hegemony they can do so over all domains within their reach on earth, sea, space, virtual space. Small powers pick their side according to their means and convenience. Besides I don’t reason through caricatural slogans like “might is right”. I’m not sure it makes even sense.

Just wow. The question of whether the cost to Ukraine of our policies of encouraging, financing, arming more war is worthwhile cost so far to accomplish ... "liberation" of the Donbas? Crimea? well whatever it's accomplished compared to the offer at the start of the war, and what cost do Zelenskyites think would be reasonable to pay to accomplish the objectives of the "common cause" ...

... is akin to asking if being gay is a sin against God to an atheist. — boethius

When you are asking ME your questions you look as dumb, yes. I don’t share your conceptual assumptions. And for exactly the same reason, your rhetoric attempt of emotional/moral blackmailing me looks even dumber to me. And if you are doing it for your fans and sidekicks, I don’t give a shit about it.

Your whole premise is:
Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period. — neomac
... So what's there to fear? — boethius

Russia can still do lots of damage and especially at the expense of the American allies. Indeed if there is going to be a more direct clash between the 2 powers, this is going more likely to happen in Europe than on the American soil.

s the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable? — boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread.

Meaning? — neomac

Meaning pointing out US's invasion of Iraq was not an act of "defiance" does not create some situation where the "contrasting" the concepts of maverick and defiance has anything to do with anything.

You receive criticism ... can't deal with it, then move the goal posts. Obviously, you're no longer remotely arguing that Russia's breaking or not breaking international law is a justification for Western policies.

First, you keep repeating that I made a strawman argument. Do you know what strawman argument means? Explained that to me. And show me how that applies to my counterarguments. — neomac

I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance" and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.

Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony.

Forth, every time you call my claims trivialities, that means you agree with me. — neomac

No, when we say you've moved the goal posts to something trivial, the triviality maybe true, but that doesn't support your position.

You have a bunch of elements in an argument that doesn't support your position: we point that out and then you move the goal posts to focusing on just one element, such as "defiance", or then just generalising your argument into a tautology which you quite clearly didn't say, but very clearly said something specific but unfortunately unsupported.

Besides my arguments are always the same ones. Just looping through them for a while now. And if I find your approach conceptually flawed, I don’t feel rationally compelled to stick to it.
Fifth, quote where I made such a claim “Russia is defying international law”, you serial liar. — neomac

Do you just not remember what you've already written and what we've been discussing?

And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. — neomac

Clearly your position at the time can be summarised as Russia defying international law, the West/NATO/US therefore needing to apply that law somehow, and to make things more abundantly clear "violation of international law" is another way to say "defiance of international law".

What do you mean by “justification”? I clarified for the thousand time my point when talking about practical rationality. While you keep playing with words. — neomac

So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?

How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".

If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons?

No, there is no reason to constrain the field to region in the sense you suggest here. When great powers struggle for hegemony they can do so over all domains within their reach on earth, sea, space, virtual space. Small powers pick their side according to their means and convenience. Besides I don’t reason through caricatural slogans like “might is right”. I’m not sure it makes even sense. — neomac

Again, so if Russia wins the "struggle" over Ukraine then it's actions were justified all along and Ukraine just picked the wrong side since 2014?

You're only substantive criticism of Russia seems to be they haven't won yet ... but the US hasn't won this struggle yet either. "Might is right" is not a slogan, it's just exactly what you are describing: if the US can dominate Russia in this confrontation then it should do so, which of course exact same thing applies to Russia dominating Ukraine.

When you are asking ME your questions you look as dumb, yes. I don’t share your conceptual assumptions. And for exactly the same reason, your rhetoric attempt of emotional/moral blackmailing me looks even dumber to me. And if you are doing it for your fans and sidekicks, I don’t give a shit about it. — neomac

You say this question of cost is both dumb and emotional/moral blackmail ... while stating you already answered this question literally a few sentences later:

s the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?
— boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread. — neomac

Nothing is preventing anyone here arguing the cost is worth it. No one in the West hesitates to argue the cost to defeat Hitler was worth it. Sometimes great causes have great costs.

Of course, in the case of WWII the people arguing the cost was worth it actually sent their own soldiers to fight and share that cost. Saying the cost to Ukraine is worth it for our policies, such as not needing to "win" just damage Russia a lot, is quite clearly a cynical exploitation of Ukraine for our own ends.

However, nothing stops anyone from arguing the cynical exploitation and manipulation of Ukraine for our own ends is justifiable, that we will save more lives in the long run in the Baltics and Poland.

However, my question is not some "conceptual framework" that makes sense to reject. If you advocate some goal, such as in this case harming the Russians, "what would be a reasonable cost to attain that goal?" is just common sense. Obviously you wouldn't sacrifice every single American to harm one Russian soldiers knee ... so between that and achieve your objective at the cost of a cup of coffee there obviously some zone of acceptable cost (to the US, to NATO, to Ukraine) which you're comfortable with.

It's simply a common sense question to participants who reject a negotiated peace and any essentially any compromise whatsoever, what cost to Ukraine they think would be worthwhile in refusing to compromise. Would 300 000 lives be worth it to conquer Crimea? Is clearly a reasonable question. Of course, people can argue that 300 000 lives wouldn't be worth it, but it can be conquered with some amount of lives that is worth it. However, to be an honest participant in this debate one should be able to answer such simple questions.

That the questions simply point to a total incoherence, ignorance and Russophobia underpinning your position doesn't somehow make these simple questions as part of some "conceptual framework" that can be rejected.

Russia can still do lots of damage and especially at the expense of the American allies. Indeed if there is going to be a more direct clash between the 2 powers, this is going more likely to happen in Europe than on the American soil. — neomac

Like who? The Baltic states? Poland? Germany?

And in what conditions and scenario does Russia just start invading East-ward?

Also, if Russia can do what you say here, doesn't that just make them the Hegemon?

Meaning pointing out US's invasion of Iraq was not an act of "defiance" does not create some situation where the "contrasting" the concepts of maverick and defiance has anything to do with anything.

You receive criticism ... can't deal with it, then move the goal posts. Obviously, you're no longer remotely arguing that Russia's breaking or not breaking international law is a justification for Western policies. — boethius

But I wasn’t talking about the American invasion of Iraq, I was talking about Russian invasion of Ukraine. To repeat it once more:
I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!
Your criticism doesn’t address my claim and plays with words (“maverick”, “justification”) in interpreting my original claims which weren’t using such terms. Your conceptually confused or caricatural way of rendering my claims is good to mislead or brainwash you, not me. Anyways yes the Western reaction against Russia is justified on geopolitical and legal grounds.

I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance” and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.
Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony. — “boethius

First, in your blablabla is not clear to me what argument you claim as being invalid and unsound (the piece you quote is not my argument, but arguably Isaac's), so first show the argument of mine you are objecting to, then show why it is invalid, then show why it is unsound. Second, I didn't express myself the way you report "A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified". Third, you said I committed a strawman before making the distinction between maverick and defiant attitude [1], and what follows doesn’t prove that my objection to Isaac’s argument from the post you cite was a strawman wrt Isaac’s argument, it just offers another argument which is supposed to somehow save Isaac’s argument. However Isaac’s argument as it is formulated remains fallacious or inconclusive as I claimed. Four, your distinction between maverick and defiant is a diversion from what I was talking about, and it's irrelevant wrt what I originally claimed (it doesn't matter only who transgresses international law, but also against whom the transgression has been committed, especially if it looks like an insubordination from a minor power to a greater power), so why on earth would I let you drag me into a dispute grounded on a misunderstanding? Five, I didn’t abandon anything, it’s you who is progressively discovering how poor your understanding of my claim was and still is.
Anyways feel free to brainwash yourself into believing otherwise. Along with your sidekick. As I said, it's pathetic but expected. Fun fact is that even in two you can't manage to build a decent objection.

No, when we say you've moved the goal posts to something trivial, the triviality maybe true, but that doesn't support your position.

You have a bunch of elements in an argument that doesn't support your position: we point that out and then you move the goal posts to focusing on just one element, such as "defiance", or then just generalising your argument into a tautology which you quite clearly didn't say, but very clearly said something specific but unfortunately unsupported. — boethius

You and your sidekick focused on the word “defiance” from a comment of mine addressed to another interlocutor and for reasons apparently evident to you both, and yet when I questioned you both you are incapable of making a point without rephrasing in a caricatural or confused way my claims. Besides you are no credible referee nor credible reporter of our past exchanges. So I don’t see the point of such preposterous summaries other then offering cues to your sidekick to parrot.
BTW my claimes are "trivialities" or "tautologies" or "both"? Quote 2 trivialities/tautologies I claimed, and quote the claims expressing my position which the trivialities/tautologies I claimed later were moving from.

Do you just not remember what you've already written and what we've been discussing?

And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. — neomac


Clearly your position at the time can be summarised as Russia defying international law, the West/NATO/US therefore needing to apply that law somehow, and to make things more abundantly clear "violation of international law" is another way to say "defiance of international law”. — boethius

NO, IT CAN’T be summarised in the way you rephrased it. I wrote in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US not in defiance of international law. I get that the expression “Russia defying international law” is useful for your and your sidekick’s preposterous counterargument. But that’s NOT what I said. So it was you who tried to generalise my argument into a dumb claim about international law violations and arbitrarily conflating it into international law defiance. And that's why you committed a fallacious strawman argument against me! But once you realised how dumb your counterargument is, you started accusing me of shifting subjects to “tautologies” (do you know what “tautology” means? Explain that to me!) which you must agree with. How pathetic is that.

So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?

How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".

If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons? — “boethius

I clarified what I mean by “practical rationality” as applied to geopolitics: rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals.. While we could use the word “justification” to refer to practical rationality, one could use it also to refer to “moral justification” and “legal justification”. For that reason, there is a risk of conflation between three different cases of justification, and that’s why I didn’t use it. Since you didn’t clarify the way you use the notion of “justification” I’m not sure we share the same usage, nor I’m sure that you are not conflating different meanings (indeed, I suspect you conflate different meanings). In any case I do not feel compelled to use your wording to express my ideas.

Again, so if Russia wins the "struggle" over Ukraine then it's actions were justified all along and Ukraine just picked the wrong side since 2014?

You're only substantive criticism of Russia seems to be they haven't won yet ... but the US hasn't won this struggle yet either. “Might is right" is not a slogan, it's just exactly what you are describing: if the US can dominate Russia in this confrontation then it should do so, which of course exact same thing applies to Russia dominating Ukraine. — boethius

See how you reframe all my claims with terms I didn’t use, to make claims I didn’t make, while ignoring my other contextual claims or subsequent clarifications, and despite the fact that I complained about such approach several times?
My claim is more like this: if the US has valid reasons to perceive Russia as a security threat and has effective means to repel such threat, then it’s rational for the US to act accordingly. As it is doing.
The claim “might is right" is conceptually confused or misleading, it doesn't sound anything but a slogan to me. I could never use it to express my beliefs.

Nothing is preventing anyone here arguing the cost is worth it. No one in the West hesitates to argue the cost to defeat Hitler was worth it. Sometimes great causes have great costs.

Of course, in the case of WWII the people arguing the cost was worth it actually sent their own soldiers to fight and share that cost. Saying the cost to Ukraine is worth it for our policies, such as not needing to "win" just damage Russia a lot, is quite clearly a cynical exploitation of Ukraine for our own ends.

However, nothing stops anyone from arguing the cynical exploitation and manipulation of Ukraine for our own ends is justifiable, that we will save more lives in the long run in the Baltics and Poland.

However, my question is not some "conceptual framework" that makes sense to reject. If you advocate some goal, such as in this case harming the Russians, "what would be a reasonable cost to attain that goal?" is just common sense. Obviously you wouldn't sacrifice every single American to harm one Russian soldiers knee ... so between that and achieve your objective at the cost of a cup of coffee there obviously some zone of acceptable cost (to the US, to NATO, to Ukraine) which you're comfortable with.

It's simply a common sense question to participants who reject a negotiated peace and any essentially any compromise whatsoever, what cost to Ukraine they think would be worthwhile in refusing to compromise. Would 300 000 lives be worth it to conquer Crimea? Is clearly a reasonable question. Of course, people can argue that 300 000 lives wouldn't be worth it, but it can be conquered with some amount of lives that is worth it. However, to be an honest participant in this debate one should be able to answer such simple questions.

That the questions simply point to a total incoherence, ignorance and Russophobia underpinning your position doesn't somehow make these simple questions as part of some "conceptual framework" that can be rejected. — boethius

I argued against such putative “simple questions” a while ago. They are not simple, they are simplistic. In other words, I find them conceptually flawed.

Like who? The Baltic states? Poland? Germany?
And in what conditions and scenario does Russia just start invading East-ward?
Also, if Russia can do what you say here, doesn't that just make them the Hegemon? — boethius

All the alleged reasons that pushed Russia against the West (NATO expansion, Russophobia, protection of Russian minorities, existential threat, securing strategic military assets like in Crimea) may still be exploitable in the future once Russia recovers enough to pursue its geopolitical ambitions and if circumstances are more favourable (e.g. a US more isolationist toward Europe, China more supportive toward Russia) that could be a problem for unprepared westerners. But it’s not on me to figure out future plausible geopolitical scenarios and security threats from an authoritarian, expansionist and anti-Western Russia, I’m not a geopolitical analyst. I just read them.

You say this question of cost is both dumb and emotional/moral blackmail ... while stating you already answered this question literally a few sentences later:

Is the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?
— boethius

I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread. — boethius

Right. Indeed, also on that occasion I criticised the conceptual framework of my interlocutor who was wondering the same questions and supports your views. I'll let you guess who he was.


[1]

What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here? — boethius

Why strawman? — neomac

hypotheticals — boethius

Would have to be hypothetical; the numbers could be higher too.
The question was more what might happen: other troops on the ground.

I posted 6 videos of Western journalists investigating Nazi's in Ukraine and all concluding that there definitely seems to be Nazi's in Ukraine. — boethius

Sure, Nazis, and they're a problem, wherever, anywhere (even in Russia).
And that's not what Lavrov and the (other) propagandists say.
They postulate a Nazi junta ruling Ukraine — nonsense, old — part of their campaign.

the Netherlands, Texas, Greece, Argentina, Stockholm, Italy, Mexico — they're not "Nazi regimes" in need of deNazifying cleansing either — as mentioned

These days, gauging their crap is almost down to gauging their motives?

Zelenskyy vows Ukraine "cannot be broken" as Russia bombs civilians into darkness, but runs short of missiles
^{— Chris Livesay, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Nov 26, 2022}

Russia has more bodies to throw into the fire than Ukraine.
And that's apparently what they're doing, yet omit explicating.
Reports seem consistent, have been for a bit now...

Untrained Russian ‘minced meat’ soldiers so terrified they deserted and hid in woods
^{— Gemma Jones · Daily Star · Nov 6, 2022}
‘We were completely exposed’: Russian conscripts say hundreds killed in attack
^{— Pjotr Sauer · The Guardian · Nov 7, 2022}
Russia's mobilized soldiers speak out: 'We were thrown on to the frontline with no support'
^{— Emmanuel Grynszpan · Le Monde · Nov 10, 2022}

At the disposal of "Sota" was an audio story mobilized on September 22 from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, who is now being treated after a series of wounds received on the front line (the photo is at the disposal of the editors).
From the story, you can learn that:
➡️ The mobilized have practically no training: in Russia it takes one day, already on the border with Ukraine it is limited to less than a week, and comes down to drunkenness and ordinary shooting.
➡️ As a result of the lack of a medical examination, even before being sent to the front, one mobilized person died - a blood clot broke off from him.
➡️ The mobilized are transported to the Rostov region by civil aircraft. (We wrote about this earlier based on the analysis of flight data.)
➡️ The military on the front line is practically not fed: food was brought to them 1 time in 3 days.
➡️ The mobilized are put on the first front line, in front of the contract soldiers, actually using them as a human shield.
➡️ Unlike the Ukrainian army, the Russian army does not have modern weapons - drones and precision artillery.
“Our no one is trained, our commanders are concrete creatures who send mobilized boys to death ahead of contractors,” the narrator concludes. — SOTA · Oct 16, 2022

Putin Doesn’t Care: Russia Rushes Untrained, Unequipped Troops to Ukraine
^{— Stavros Atlamazoglou · 19FortyFive · Oct 17, 2022}
Untrained Russian draftees sent to fight for Makiivka sustain heavy losses, survivors record video message
^{— The Insider · Nov 23, 2022}

The president also urged the women not to believe "fakes" and "lies" about the raging war on TV or the internet. — Ukraine war: Putin tells Russian soldiers' mothers he shares their pain · Jaroslav Lukiv · BBC · Nov 26, 2022

Don't know Russian law, or if that matters, yet doesn't this seem kind of criminal?

And why is the West's policy to not go into Ukraine, no no-fly-zone, as well as severely limit weapons systems to Ukraine?

Resulting in this situation where Russia has no particular need to use nuclear weapons. — boethius

That is where nuclear weapons work: deterrence. If this would be a non-nuclear armed country attacking Ukraine, it is likely that a no-fly zone would have been enforced.

And it works both ways: Russia doesn't dare to attack the countries supplying arms to Ukraine or training Ukrainian troops.

China may have zero problem with Russia nuking NATO troops in Ukraine — boethius

Wrong.

“The international community should … jointly oppose the use or threats to use nuclear weapons, advocate that nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis in Eurasia,” Xi said.

China has warned Russia against threatening to use nuclear weapons in the conflict in Ukraine, in a rare departure from its usual tacit support for Moscow’s positions.

The warning came during talks on Friday between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing, according to Mr. Scholz and the Chinese state news agency Xinhua.

Messrs. Xi and Scholz agreed to oppose the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, according to Mr. Scholz and a report by Xinhua, which normally echoes Beijing’s official positions.

Trade relations with the West are important to China, you know.

... Like Belarus and Kazakstan and Georgia? — boethius

Two of the need a lot of work. Even if Russia did help the regime survive in Kazakhstan, they didn't turn the favour for Putin. Haven't gone along with the annexations and have given refuge to those fleeing the mobilization.

What is the next step of this "rebuild the Soviet Union" plan? — boethius

Not the Soviet Union, just Russia. With Putin you have the closest to a Russian Czar, actually. Only that he doesn't have a son waiting in the sidelines to become the next President.

As some have:

What Putin did next was negotiate Mink I — boethius

Minsk I (not Mink I) came only after Ukraine had fought the insurgents to a standstill (and the Russian army did have to save their asses a few times).

which Ukraine didn't respect — boethius

Which both sides didn't respect.

However, the more important question remains what we can do about it. — boethius

After Russia first declared the puppet regimes independent (in a choreographed meeting which an intelligence chief fumbled and got mixed with the next chapter, annexation) and then annexed not only them, but also more areas of Ukraine (parts of it which Russian forces don't even occupy), the Minsk procedures have been long dead and buried. Conveniently you are forgetting all the annexations that Russia has done.

Let's say Ukrainians form a bridge head over an important river and need to pour in significant resources to consolidate that bridge head ... drop a nuke on said bridge head and not only all those forces are gone, but it become clear that there is basically no way to ford the river in peace.

The idea Nuclear weapons have no military use is just insanely naive. — boethius

Why wouldn't you use a smart bomb, enough conventional missiles or artillery to destroy the bridge? Absolutely no threat of NATO getting involved. Good if the media even would pick it up, but it wouldn't cause any outrage. This is where the stupidity lies in using nuclear weapons. If you really think that it's "naive" not to use nuclear weapons, then just why aren't people using them?

Or you have now become and adherent for tactical nuclear weapons?

It seems, if what you say is true, Russia can suffer some acceptable losses for the privilege of nuking Ukraine.

There would be a "cost of doing business" is what you are saying? — boethius

There are escalatory ladders. But basically yes, there is a "cost of doing business" with nuclear weapons. Russia cannot dismiss the West's response of a conventional attack as a bluff. Of course, it could be a bluff, but I don't think they want to find out.

Again, maybe just explains why the US and NATO aren't actually escalating to "help Ukraine win" which is why Ukraine has so far not won and suffering immensely for the honour of representing Western interests, in some vague way. — boethius

As I said, there are two reasons why Ukraine isn't getting everything it wants:

1) Yes, there can be those who think of it as escalation and worry that for example longer range artillery rockets would be used to attack targets inside Russia proper (which actually Ukraine has done by it's own weapon systems).

2) The arm cache of the West isn't actually so big and new weapons cost much. The world economy is going to a recession and spending on military in Ukraine is costly and doesn't create jobs much if any, actually. The West's arms procurement is made for peace time, not for a long conventional war.

What I think is obvious that they mobilized are used in the classic Russian way as cannon fodder. I remember some Ukrainian soldiers that were interviewed said that the new mobilized troops were used in a way he never imagined troops would be used. Hence there is absolutely far too many incidents reported that this would be propaganda.

The simple fact is that the Russian Army was totally incapable of handling hundreds of thousands of mobilized troops at once. Annually in peace time Russia takes in a quarter of million of conscripts, 100 000+ in two batches. They are then basically trained in the units...that now are deployed in Ukraine. So where do you have the spare people to train suddenly 300 000? Nowhere. It basically will take them years to create an organization to train such huge masses. This is the simple reason why it's such a mess.

Even my country, Finland, would have severe problems after it mobilized the 280 000 war time force. Yes, the country has potentially 700 000 reservists. But once the 280 000 are deployed, there is nobody to train the next batch of conscripts than reservists themselves: all the professional officers are acting as commanders in the fielded army. As the army is fully oriented to being a reservist army and focus on that mission, it could be overcome, but then take Russia, an army that has tried to do away with conscription and didn't have an organization to mobilize hundreds of thousands. This is the simple unavoidable end result.

That those are then shot by the their own troops I would be skeptical, too crazy. Stalin's army with straf battalions? What is obvious that without anything else and without the ability to train the troops, they are used in this way. Perhaps the idea is to go through the winter and have then the next batch of conscripts ready and trained for the spring. After all, now as these parts of Ukraine are part of Russia, you can use the conscripts there.

But that won't change the endemic corruption among the armed forces and the utter lack to train such large forces. Just an example of the theft:

A recent investigation by BBC News Russian showed that, over the last eight years, military courts have issued more than 550 sentences for theft of clothing from army stocks. In total, during the same period, court data revealed that more than 12,000 corruption cases were opened involving the theft of military gear and equipment, with some cases occurring even after Russia invaded Ukraine.