But isn't it just those things that we cannot express well in words, such as justice, ethics, morality, honour, wisdom, etc, that are exactly those things which we should strive to express well in words?
3 hours ago — RussellA

I would say no, if you mean arriving at all-inclusive definitions of that they are; treating them as objects which can be definitively described, objects of knowledge if you will.

Would you be content with a chemist who refused to make use of the atomic theory of matter, insisting instead on dealing only in earth wind, fire and water?

That's how your insistence on applying only Aristotelian essentialism appears.

You are I think right about the flies. — Banno

I wonder--who would be the Lord of the Flies? Could it be...but no, I won't say the name.

...but no, I won't say the name. — Ciceronianus

Hence rendering that name ineffable...? And we return to the difference between what can not be said and what ought not be said.

Consider:

I have always viewed the term "qualia" as meaning "the stuff of experience", rather than a description of a subjective experience. Do you think we're both talking about the same thing? — Bret Bernhoft

This highlights one of the difficulties faced by the flies: mistaking experience for "stuff". See or

...suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list! — Banno

You and Banno appear to advocate that some knowledge/information is missing unless one undergoes the experience for themselves. As I see it, that is not a rejection of the ineffable, but an endorsement. — Luke

Exactly.

As I noted in a prior comment, the concession that the experience is not wholly conveyable in language concedes (1) that experiences are divisible into qualia, where some portions of the experience are conveyable and some not, and (2) that language is an interpretative act, offering a generalized glimpse into the experience, but not equivalent to it.

As to #1, I think it actually goes beyond that because if we can't accurately convey parts A, B, and C of an experience, I see no reason why we should think we could accurately convey D, E, or F, meaning the entire experience and all experiences are ineffable. If there are portions of the experience that are capable of being perfectly conveyed, I'd like to know what those portions are and why. It sounds like we're about to go down a Lockeian sort of division of the mental world, where there are primary qualities of mental events that can reduced perfectly to language and secondary sorts of ones that cannot. Sounds like a failed enterprise of trying to draw false distinctions. Where we'll end up is that all is ineffable or all is fully describable. It's equivalent to the direct realism versus indirect realism debate. Either we see all the world just as it is or none of it.

As to #2, if we start claiming distinctions between what we experience and what we talk about, we're in the murky world of metaphysics that I thought Wittgenstein was trying to avoid. That is, we're back to dealing with what there is versus what we can speak of, and if it appears that all experiences are ineffable (per #1), then we must remain silent about everything (a pleasant thought).

The visitor may not have the same skill as the gymnast in performing a gymnastic routine, but they can share in the experience. — RussellA

Is empathy the same as effability ? No. Even then the spectator can only partially "identify" with the performer. When Alex Honnold climbed El Cap in Yosemite a few years ago without a rope the world got an opportunity to indulge in a fantasy of the imagination while watching the Oscar winning film, Free Solo. But as a long time climber I could "feel" his moves with a depth not available to a casual spectator. You probably have had similar experiences watching something you have intimate knowledge of.

↪Gnomon
Would you be content with a chemist who refused to make use of the atomic theory of matter, insisting instead on dealing only in earth wind, fire and water?
That's how your insistence on applying only Aristotelian essentialism appears. — Banno

Who said anything about "earth wind, fire and water"? I'm not discussing physical Chemistry. Just meta-physical philosophy (ideas ; relationships ; categories). Do you believe that Philosophy should be about the physical world (matter) instead of the intellectual models (mind) of the world? We all look at the world through a framework, a paradigm, of some kind. The Chemistry frame is looking for the mechanics of matter, so that's what it sees. But the Philosophy frame is focused on the ineffable essential structure of those ideal constructs. That's why it's so difficult to express in conventional matter-based words. Some modern philosophers have gone so far into abstract abstruse linguistic analysis that they bury common sense under a pile of BS. Effing about the ineffable.

Apparently you haven't noticed that almost all of my links in Meta-physical topics are to the opinions of professional scientists, not theologians, or gurus, or mystics. What I'm presenting is a 21st century development from Quantum Science & Information Theory. Both of which have undermined outdated Atomism and Materialism. Science is indeed self-superseding. What nineteenth century scientists labeled "atom" was similar in function to the ancient Greek "atom". But, in the 20th century they were forced to abandon the search for a tangible foundation of reality. In essence, Materialism now comes down to Mathematics : formal (information) relationships.

As I mentioned before, Aristotle's physical science is obviously outdated in specific details, but not in general categories*1. For example, what he called "Fire" is what we now know as "Energy", but they are philosophically & essentially the same thing : dynamic change. Even his notion of "Aether", has been recently resurrected to explain how empty Space can act as a "Fabric" or Medium*2. Of course, fashionable philosophical paradigms, such as Atomism & Materialism evolve as new evidence comes in. But the essence of those categories remains : e.g. the smallest material element is now known as a trinitarian Quark, which is more of a mathematical philosophical notion than a tiny ball of tangible stuff*3. But what are quarks made of? The emerging physical/philosophical paradigm could be called Informationism. Please don't dismiss it (out of hand) until you try to understand (grasp) it. :smile:


*1. Evolution of Atomic Theory :
In the fifth century BC, Leucippus and Democritus argued that all matter was composed of small, finite particles that they called atomos, a term derived from the Greek word for “indivisible.” They thought of atoms as moving particles that differed in shape and size, and which could join together. Later, Aristotle and others came to the conclusion that matter consisted of various combinations of the four “elements”—fire, earth, air, and water—and could be infinitely divided. Interestingly, these philosophers thought about atoms and “elements” as philosophical concepts, but apparently never considered performing experiments to test their ideas.
https://chem.libretexts.org/Courses/Oregon_Institute_of_Technology/OIT%3A_CHE_101_-_Introduction_to_General_Chemistry/02%3A_Atoms_and_the_Periodic_Table/2.01%3A_Evolution_of_Atomic_Theory

*2. What is the Aether? :
The aether is a critical,missing component of physics that must be considered to explain the wave nature of matter.
https://energywavetheory.com/explanations/aether/

*3. Mathematical Matter :
We discuss the nature of reality in the ontological context of Penrose's math-matter-mind triangle.
https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0510188

Who said anything about "earth wind, fire and water"? — Gnomon

Me.

You links seem to be in the main, irrelevant.

What I'm presenting is a 21st century development from Quantum Science & Information Theory. — Gnomon

...using Aristotelian logic. Oddly anachronistic¹. Frankly, your posts do not make much sense.

Like this...

*2. What is the Aether? :
The aether is a critical,missing component of physics that must be considered to explain the wave nature of matter.
https://energywavetheory.com/explanations/aether/ — Gnomon

What the fuck²?

1. Unhook the wire within the spark plug:
Firstly, you have to disengage the primary spark plug wire. Probably the most important safety precaution that you can take when doing your repairs or maintenance on a lawnmower is to disconnect the spark plug wire before you do anything else.
https://www.gardentoolexpert.com/how-to-change-a-lawn-mower-carburetor/

2. How to Make Organic Fertilizer: Storing Your Tea
Because cow manure (or any manure for that matter) can contain pathogens it’s best not to store manure tea. But if you do want to store it make sure it’s covered and kept in a cool place. If you can’t use it up in a few days to a week pitch it into the compost pile. Compost tea is less likely to contain pathogens but still can. I stay on the safe side and use it within a week.
https://ourinspiredroots.com/how-to-make-organic-fertilizer-manure-tea/

How long is a thread about what cannot be said? — Banno

It's too long, I know. If you have time:

Think of it reductively: it is not about what cannot be said, but about what has to be removed from thought to see clearly. Ineffability is, in this inquiry, not a positive thesis but a negative one, and the positive thing we can say is what survives the reduction that is a process of discovery, this is the ineffable. Most of what is said in tis thread makes the mistake of deploying familiar language, and Wittgenstein's Tractatus makes the same error, for it does not occur to him that what-should-be-passed-over is no more silent than anything else; it is the positive residuum of removing presuppositions that implicitly give context and determine ontological propriety. Wittgenstein thinks with the working assumption that the world is the world that is delimited in all the usual ways, and he thinks like this because this is the consensus, and he never, ever thought that the intuitive landscape that is so familiar, that constitutes the norm could be other than this. In this he is like Kant and many others who think what we all talk about and the history of the way we talk about it is simply the established sanity for the way the world is. But consider what Hume says of reason, that it is an empty vessel that cares nothing as to what content it carries. It is not the structure of thought imposed upon the world that makes us finite and delimits meaning. It is the WORLD that does this, so the question of ineffability really come sdown to content that lies outside of the world, and by "the world" I mean the meanings that circulate through our institutions. We are inquiring about something new, something radically "other".

So where does this take ineffability? The reduction I have in mind is Husserl's. The idea is to consciously dismiss presuppositions that implicitly give us the familiarity of the familiar world in a perceptual event. The lamp before me comes to me not as an innocent lamp perceived with an innocent eye, and herein lies the matter of ineffability: We look upon things and invest them with meaning in the dynamic of a predelineating past. The present is never "pure" because the very education that allows the perceptual act itself to occur, fills the event with the thickness of experience, always, already, the moment the lamp appears. But if one can mitigate this hold that this body of delineating presuppositions has on perception, one can "liberate" the moment commensurately.

Possible? Is this not confirmed in the experience of achieving greater proximity to a pure intuition (putting Dennett aside altogether. Keeping in mind that strictly analytic philosophers put clarity over content, and are very conservative philosophically. What they miss is that the actualities philosophy faces are simply not clear, so instead of talking about what is before them, they take the totality of everyday thinking as unquestioned authority) in the simple reductive act of attending exclusively to its presence? If I ask one to observe and try to acknowledge only what is there before you in the occurrent event, and make an effort to do only this, is there not a "sense" of presence that steps in?

We tend to ignore this kind of thing, but it is well worth noting that Husserl's students, who practiced the method of the reduction were said to turn religious. And not to forget the Buddha who was the quintessential phenomenologist, called this because he reduced the world to a bare presence, and he called this (from the Abhidharma), in translation, of course, ultimate reality. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus would instantly reject this. The Investigations Witt would allow it meaning in a language game, but, as I understand it, the matter would not be allowed to be carried into some profound revelation of "presence".

I have always viewed the term "qualia" as meaning "the stuff of experience", rather than a description of a subjective experience. Do you think we're both talking about the same thing? — Bret Bernhoft

OK, so if the stuff of experience is sense impressions would you class those as qualia? I would have said qualia are the qualities of sense impressions.

So, say I have sense impressions of an apple; they might be colour, smell, taste, hardness, texture, and so on.

Those would be the different qualities of the apple as experienced; so qualia, as I intended it, would refer to those qualities. Not to suggest they are stand alone or separable from the perception of the apple. Do you mean something different by "stuff of experience"?

If I'm reading you correctly Luke, I think you and I and @Jamal and @Banno are thinking in terms of two different ways we can talk about "ineffable" -- Ineffable, as in unable to be spoken of in principle, and ineffable, as in different from linguistic competence. I think I'm thinking in the former, and you're thinking in the latter. — Moliere

I am also thinking of "ineffable" in the former sense. At least, I think that if the ineffable were ever to be eliminated, then it would require some sort of "perfect" language which is capable of communicating every possible nuance of any individual's experience. I don't think that our language is presently of this sort, but I also doubt that it ever will or can be.

There's an element to knowledge that includes experience. I'm just not sure I'd say that makes it ineffable in the former sense, though I'd agree with you that Mary learns something and we learn something by experiencing that isn't the same as words, nor could it be conveyed by words alone. They'd also have to experience the sound of a clarinet, the taste of salt, the love of God, or the color red to say they had experienced these things, and no amount of textual familiarity would give them the experience, and they even learn something from experiencing. — Moliere

If knowledge is something that can be communicated via language, and if there is nothing which is not able to be communicated via language (because nothing is ineffable), then there should be no "gap" between what can be known/taught and what can be said. However, you and Banno say that there is such a gap. You both keep writing this off as a mere gap between knowledge and experience - where all that's missing is having the experience - instead of acknowledging the gap that you have both asserted between knowledge and effability.

I was following Banno's reasoning and his conflation of knowing how to do something with doing it.
— Luke

Of course I'm doing no such thing. — Banno

What do you call this:

...there is no difference between "knowing how to ride a bike" and "riding a bike"; we don't have two things here, one being bike riding and the other being knowing how to ride a bike. — Banno

But now you say that your point is not that there is no difference between knowledge and experience; now you say that your point is that there is a difference between knowledge and effability:

The point made is, that one is able to ride a bike is proven not by being able to say what is involved, but in the act of riding. — Banno

Your position here is that there is a gap between knowing how to ride and saying it, which is a gap between knowledge and effability. If you know it but can't say it, then how is it not ineffable?

Maybe you will claim that I've mischaracterised your position and that you are not asserting any gap between knowledge and effability here. However, this was your position earlier:

Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever [effable] detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. — Banno

If the most detailed possible list of instructions for riding a bike does not give one the knowledge of how to ride, then there is a gap between saying how to ride a bike (via a detailed list of instructions) and knowing how to ride a bike, which means that there is something about riding a bike which is known but which cannot be stated and included in the instructions. Which is just to say that there is something ineffable.

I would say no, if you mean arriving at all-inclusive definitions of that they are; treating them as objects which can be definitively described, objects of knowledge if you will. — Ciceronianus

It would obviously be impossible to arrive at an all-inclusive definition of morality (for example). All we can do is strive to use words to better understand the nature of morality, surely not a futile philosophical undertaking.

I am also thinking of "ineffable" in the former sense. At least, I think that if the ineffable were ever to be eliminated, then it would require some sort of "perfect" language which is capable of communicating every possible nuance of any individual's experience. I don't think that our language is presently of this sort, but I also doubt that it ever will or can be. — Luke

Alrighty, I was wrong then. Just attempting to make sense of things.

If knowledge is something that can be communicated via language, and if there is nothing which is not able to be communicated via language (because nothing is ineffable), then there should be no "gap" between what can be known/taught and what can be said. However, you and Banno say that there is such a gap. You both keep writing this off as a mere gap between knowledge and experience - where all that's missing is having the experience - instead of acknowledging the gap that you have both asserted between knowledge and effability. — Luke

I guess I just don't see the need for this standard. I'd say that knowledge is never communicated by speech alone. Knowledge is an integration of. . . many things. To speak is never to know, though if you know something then you might have something interesting to say.

Let's just grant this "gap", as you call it, between what we can say and what is known. It strikes me as being somewhat prosaic -- we all know that there's more to the world than speech, and there's more to knowledge than speech too. So what does this calling attention to a gap do for us?

Further, having called attention to the gap, now we can talk about it. So we might introduce a distinction between, say, theoretical and practical knowledge. Now here we have two categories, one of which refers to speech, and one of which refers to action. And we can predicate things of action in general. So, we can talk about it. That doesn't convert activity into speech, only goes some way to making the case for effability -- let's call this kind of effabilty the ineffably effable. Some sort of in-between stage, where we do, after having experienced something, communicate our experiences with others who have had that experience too. It's not as easy as "The cat is on the mat", but it's not as hard as "The soul is immortal"

I'd say there are some categories which don't quite count as this in-between, where experience, repetition, and education is enough to give us whatever it is that's missing between speech and knowledge. So I could even grant your ineffability, but then I want to note -- there's more. Such as beliefs in the soul, or that we live in the best of all possible worlds, or that everything has a cause. Those are the sorts of things I have in mind when I think of the ineffable: that which cannot be spoken of, no matter how much experience I acquire, no matter what evidence I bring to bear, no matter how clever I am -- God himself wouldn't be able to speak on these things, because to speak on them would be to destroy them.

If the most detailed possible list of instructions for riding a bike does not give one the knowledge of how to ride, then there is a gap between saying how to ride a bike (via a detailed list of instructions) and knowing how to ride a bike, which means that there is something about riding a bike which is known but which cannot be stated and included in the instructions. Which is just to say that there is something ineffable. — Luke

The missing ingredient is that little bit of inspiration which gets you up off the couch and out to the bike, and continues to guide your movements at every step of the way. Sometimes its called spirit, motivation, ambition, or even determination. We all know how to use this feature of one's psyche toward getting what is desired, but since it only exists in the most general way, being able to be directed in any way whatsoever, it does not enter into any specific instructions. It is taken for granted.

E.g.: first, direct your attention toward the bike. Next, make your body move toward the bike. I think the majority of the processes occurring here are left undescribed. We easily cope with the ineffable by taking things for granted.

Here might be the best, non-jargon category I can think of --

One can never speak for someone else. If God himself spoke for me, he'd just be speaking for himself. Whoever our interlocutor is, just by virtue of being a fellow conversationalist -- well, if we spoke for them, they'd no longer be in the conversation.

Word use doesn’t literally mean “changing the state of the world — Joshs

Words and action

I will have to change what I previously wrote, from " A particular word may have a set of meanings. The set of meanings doesn't change with context" to "A particular word may have a set of meanings to me. The intended meaning depends on the particular context. The set of meanings may be modified after a new experience."

I can enter a new situation not knowing the meaning of a word, for example "jiwe". Within the situation I learn the meaning of the word. The key is, as Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus 4.1212 "what can be shown, cannot be said" and as @Banno said "but something is done, when we talk; some agreement or coordination is reached, and novel uses of language derive from mundane uses." I learn the meaning of "jiwe" by the merchant saying "jiwe" and pointing to a stone. To learn a word needs some kind of action.

Once I have learnt the meaning of a word, once I have a concept behind the word, the next time I enter a similar situation I will be more prepared. As you say, "It is reference (memory, expectation, anticipation) modified by context, which is another name for ‘use’ or ‘forms of life’ or ‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s sense". Almost certainly the concept I had when I entered the situation will be modified by the new experience. I may have a concept of an "apple", but after watching a program on growing apples in the Western Cape, I will definitely modify my concept. My concept of "apple", of any word, is continually changing with new experiences. What is not possible, when entering a new situation, is to be able to dismiss presuppositions and assumptions. To have, as @Constance discusses, an "innocent eye". As Gombrich said "reading an image, like the reception of any other message, is dependent on prior knowledge of possibilities; we can only recognize what we know.’ As Goodman said, ‘The innocent eye is blind and the virgin mind empty.’ The viewer is cognitively active and can never be passive. As you rightly say " Pure reference is impossible. It is reference (memory, expectation, anticipation) modified by context, which is another name for ‘use’ or ‘forms of life’ or ‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s sense."

Once I have learnt the meaning of words, the only purpose of my words is to change the state of the world in some way. If words didn't have an affect on the world, then language would serve no purpose, and there would be no language. I say, "one coffee please", or pass me the apple, or "where is the apple" because I want a change in the state of the world. I say "hello", or "Kant is the most important philosopher", or "I am tired" because I want to change the state of mind of the person I am talking to leading to a change in the state of the world. The only purpose of words is to lead to an action

I experience a novel situation, and new experiences inevitably modify my understanding of the meanings of words. In entering a coffee house and saying, "one coffee please" and being asked "mocha frappuccino or vanilla latte?", my concept of what coffee is changes at that moment in time. The purpose of my asking "one coffee please" hasn't changed, my goal is still to be given a coffee. My goal hasn't been changed, even though the context of my interaction with the barista has changed. The next time I enter the coffee house, having my concept of coffee modified by my past experience, I may well ask for a mocha frappuccino. Again, with a new interaction with the barista, I may well gain new knowledge and again modify my concept of coffee.

Words only have meaning if they can be used to change the state of the world, ie, meaning as use.

Whoever our interlocutor is, just by virtue of being a fellow conversationalist -- well, if we spoke for them, they'd no longer be in the conversation. — Moliere

You're saying that it's built into the concept of communication that our utterances must be distinct.

And yet we can express the same proposition.

To speak is never to know, though if you know something then you might have something interesting to say.

Let's just grant this "gap", as you call it, between what we can say and what is known. — Moliere

What is it we are doing when we merely ‘think’ rather than ‘speak’ something? Can we distinguish , for instance , pure thought or meaning from speaking to oneself? According to traditional understandings of the role of language, the communicative nature of language implies the risk of losing or distorting some aspect of what is to be communicated. Something is lost when we speak what we are thinking , and even more so when we write down what we are speaking. The problem with language is supposedly the risk associated with attaching of a signifier to carry and express the meaning of a signified.

But doesn’t this assume there is such a thing as a pure, or purely present to itself signified, an immediately present meaning in thought and then direct experience of doing that only secondarily , through symbolic language, is then expressed and communicated? What is immediate thought and direct doing are already mediated , already a form of speaking to oneself that is in fact never purely present to itself but already a form of language? When we know something , doesnt the knowing have to be repeated to itself, to refer back to itself, in or order to continue to be a knowing? Isn’t this necessary repetition a speaking to onself, and in speaking to onself, isnt there a gap from one iteration of the repetition to the next , between what one intends to mean to say to oneself and what one actually says and means?

:up:

Not the utterances, so much, as the speakers. We can speak for our self, but we cannot speak for another's self.

What is it we are doing when we merely ‘think’ rather than ‘speak’ something? Can we distinguish , for instance , pure thought or meaning from speaking to oneself? — Joshs

No, I don't think so. Though I think we have a phenomenological feeling of sub-lingual meaning, too, which is where this notion comes from. Listening to a song, absorbing a painting, or losing oneself in a play -- often times people think of meaning as being more than language, that language is this fallen state of meaning, and so there's some ineffability that's never reached.

According to traditional understandings of the role of language, the communicative nature of language implies the risk of losing or distorting some aspect of what is to be communicated. Something is lost when we speak what we are thinking , and even more so when we write down what we are speaking. The problem with language is supposedly the risk associated with attaching of a signifier to carry and express the meaning of a signified. — Joshs

Right! At least, this is my basic understanding of Saussure, more or less -- and even of Husserl, by way of the looking glass of Voice and Phenomenon, at least (clearly biased, but it made sense too...)

I suppose I see the communicative role of language -- in the sense of communication between two individuals, at least -- as subordinate to other roles of language. Rather than posit a metaphysical barrier between language and experience, I'd say that the full powers of language are still -- to this day -- unknown. With language we are able to do so much, and we continue to explore what more we can do with language while we have no idea why we're able to use it -- But our activity, I think, is deeply linked with meaning, as others have pointed out here too. But if activity is deeply linked with linguistic meaning, then that poses some problems for claiming activity, or experience (if we include experience as being part of meaning, at least), as ineffable.

But doesn’t this assume there is such a thing as a pure, or purely present to itself signified, an immediately present meaning in thought and then direct experience of doing that only secondarily , through symbolic language, is then expressed and communicated? — Joshs

I think that the classic notion of language assumes that, yeah.

When we know something , doesnt the knowing have to be repeated to itself, to refer back to itself, in or order to continue to be a knowing?

Yup. At least, for the kinds of creatures we are, we require repetition.

What is immediate thought and direct doing are already mediated , already a form of speaking to oneself that is in fact never purely present to itself but already a form of language? — Joshs

I'm interested. I might add, though, that I wonder if this is what's meant by ineffability with respect to language? In some ways language is this enabler for. . . so much. But then, what differentiates a reduction of everything to text from a reduction of everything to everything? (And, wouldn't a reduction of everything to text indicate that nothing is ineffable?)

Isn’t this necessary repetition a speaking to onself, and in speaking to onself, isnt there a gap from one iteration of the repetition to the next , between what one intends to mean to say to oneself and what one actually says and means? — Joshs

A gap in time, sure. And there's something funny going on with "repetition" too -- what marks the beginning an end of an act such that we can repeat it? What makes it the same act that we are practicing, when there's a gap between performances?

But not a speaking to oneself, exactly. In speaking, at least as I understand these things, we are speaking, not I. I use the collective vocabulary in my own way at times, but there's no self-contained subject which has its own meaning, that I can tell. (though there's something to the notion of a subject... just not a solipsistic one) -- rather, with respect to knowledge, I'd say it's more of a rehearsal, and that knowledge sits within the body. No performance is ever the same, but you can still put on 50 shows of the same script, regardless of that.

All we can do is strive to use words to better understand the nature of morality, surely not a futile philosophical undertaking. — RussellA

By referring to "the nature of morality" you identify it as a thing, and so are trapped into thinking of it as if is one. Why should we do that?

Thanks for such a considered reply.

What little I have understood of Husserl's approach gives me little reason to try to understand more. So I'll talk instead about Wittgenstein. Your account of his approach would have it appear superficial. That would be an error. Wittgenstein does not limit himself with language but examines with great care what it is that language can do. Wittgenstein begins with language because there is no other way to begin. Phenomenology pretends that it begins with direct experience, but of course it has no option but to immediately puts those experiences into language. The Tractatus sets out how language and the world are coextensive, going on to show how despite this language does not place a limit on our comprehension. The Investigations further sets out how language is inextricable from what we do in the world.

Wittgenstein showed that the unsayable is far more important than what can be said.

But unlike others, he had the acuity not to say more.

If the most detailed possible list of instructions for riding a bike does not give one the knowledge of how to ride, then there is a gap between saying how to ride a bike (via a detailed list of instructions) and knowing how to ride a bike, which means that there is something about riding a bike which is known but which cannot be stated and included in the instructions. Which is just to say that there is something ineffable. — Luke

Yep. And it is exactly riding the bike. Which is not something that can be said, but has to be done. Hence it is not a something that remains unsaid.

It's unclear if you have grasped this point, and are trying to articulate it, or if you remain benighted. Either way, I don't think adding more will be of help to you.

One can never speak for someone else. If God himself spoke for me, he'd just be speaking for himself. Whoever our interlocutor is, just by virtue of being a fellow conversationalist -- well, if we spoke for them, they'd no longer be in the conversation. — Moliere

Well phrased. Wittgenstein's discussion of pain in a nutshell.

If the most detailed possible list of instructions for riding a bike does not give one the knowledge of how to ride, then there is a gap between saying how to ride a bike (via a detailed list of instructions) and knowing how to ride a bike, which means that there is something about riding a bike which is known but which cannot be stated and included in the instructions. Which is just to say that there is something ineffable.
— Luke

Yep. And it is exactly riding the bike. Which is not something that can be said, but has to be done. Hence it is not a something that remains unsaid.

It's unclear if you have grasped this point, and are trying to articulate it, or if you remain benighted. Either way, I don't think adding more will be of help to you. — Banno

Since you've said that a detailed list of instructions won't give us knowledge of how to ride a bike, then perhaps you could tell us what additional knowledge one gains from riding the bike? Alternatively, could you explain why a detailed list of instructions for how to ride a bike does not give us knowledge of how to ride a bike?

That question doesn't follow from what I've said. It should have been "Since a detailed list of instructions won't give us knowledge of how to ride a bike, then perhaps you could tell us what else is required to riding the bike?". And the answer is getting on the bike and riding it.

But as I said, none of this seems to help you see the issue. Without a change of tack, there seems no point in continuing this conversation.

What has not been said is not the sort of thing that can be said. Nothing is missing from the list of instructions except it's implementation.

It's a bit like the difference between compiling a computer program and executing it. Or having a CD in the player and pressing "play" so you can hear it. The difference is in what is done, not what is said.

You links seem to be in the main, irrelevant.
...using Aristotelian logic. Oddly anachronistic¹. Frankly, your posts do not make much sense. — Banno

That's OK. We all have our blind spots. Yet, there are plenty of other posters who are not mystified by metaphysics, or flummoxed by feelings. But you're the one that raised a question about that which cannot be expressed in prosaic words. Ironically, this thread fills four pages of effing about the ineffable. Apparently your own negative feelings about "the ineffable" can be expressed in scornful language.

In Aristotle's day, much of what he discussed at length in The Metaphysics was ineffable to non-philosophers. Yet 2500 years later, even practical physical scientists are using his outdated-but-illustrative anachronisms to label some of the paradoxical & counter-intuitive concepts of Quantum Physics and Cosmology (e.g. Aether). :smile:


Ineffability and its Metaphysics : The Unspeakable in Art, Religion, and Philosophy
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/ineffability-and-its-metaphysics-the-unspeakable-in-art-religion-and-philosophy/

Effing the Ineffable :
Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, was convinced that it was nonsensical to try to speak about what lies outside the limits of language. Even so, he wrote an entire book about what cannot be said, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), concluding with the observation: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’
https://aeon.co/essays/what-if-anything-can-be-said-about-what-is-unsayable

EFFING IRRELEVANT NONSENSE

That question doesn't follow from what I've said. It should have been "Since a detailed list of instructions won't give us knowledge of how to ride a bike, then perhaps you could tell us what else is required to riding the bike?". And the answer is getting on the bike and riding it. — Banno

The question does follow; you're simply avoiding it.

You've said that the detailed list of instructions won't give us the knowledge of how to ride a bike. So what gives us the knowledge? If riding the bike gives us the knowledge, then you ought to be able to spell out what that knowledge is. I don't see what knowledge is gained from the act of riding which is missing from the instructions on how to ride.

It's a bit like the difference between compiling a computer program and executing it. Or having a CD in the player and pressing "play" so you can hear it. The difference is in what is done, not what is said. — Banno

This is disanalogous. A CD is not a set of instructions on how to press "play" or how to hear a CD, and a computer program is not a set of instructions on how to execute it. Even if they were, you are claiming that these instructions are insufficient to provide one with such knowledge.

What you've failed to address is this: you've previously said it's a difference in knowledge. So, what is the difference in knowledge between what is said and what is done? What is unknown after reading the instructions on how to ride a bike that is known after riding the bike? Or can you not say?

This is disanalogous. — Luke

No, it's spot on, but you insist on misunderstanding, again.

(disanalogous?)

I wonder what, if anything, you think you have said here.